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Dedicated to Global First Responders

August 2026

PART A

New vaccine for Burkholderia pseudomallei (melioidosis)

KSA goes nuclear

Pufferfish toxin antidote

Religious AI

Sudan CWAs

AI bacteriophage

Genetic bioweapons

An International CBRNE Institute publication

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August 2026

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Topics that attracted attention!

EDITOR'S CORNER

Editorial

Brig General (ret.) Ioannis Galatas, MD, MSc, MC (Army)

Editor-in-Chief
ICI C²BRNE Diary

Dear Colleagues,

Smoke in Ukraine is still black, and thicker, and bloodier; smoke in the Middle East (year 1) is whitish (or not?)! And the winner in the US-Iran conflict is . . .(*)

UK: Just one in five Britons say they would be willing to fight for their country, either voluntarily or through conscription, a YouGov poll for Sky News has found. Almost three in ten (29%) believe a full-scale military attack on the UK is likely within the next decade. Just 6% say they would volunteer to join the armed forces, while a further 14% say they would only serve if they were called up. The public is concerned about the state of the armed forces, with a majority not trusting their ability to protect the country.

▶ The sighting of drones of unknown origin over **Diego Garcia**, a strategically important US-British military installation in the Indian Ocean, is raising questions. The isolated island, located about 1,000 miles from the nearest populated areas, is a major hub for US military operations in the wider region. The base supports, among other things, strategic bomber missions and other operations of the US armed forces.

▶▶ Anger and rage are rife in Piddington, Oxfordshire, Britain, with residents opposing plans to build a facility to house up to 1,250 men – all of them illegal immigrants – on military installations near the village, which has a population of just 356. The residents – with the support of the community council – are even holding a symbolic referendum on Piddington's "independence" from Britain, protesting the government's decision. Signs have been placed in various places with the message "No to the Ministry of Defence asylum centre in Bicester". A message that clearly "spurs" the British leadership, which has already "sunk" the busy urban centres with masses of Muslim foreigners. The reactions mainly focus on the safety of young children and the infrastructure of farmers and ranchers. Residents point out that there is neither adequate lighting nor sidewalks in the area, while expressing concerns about the fact that the facility will not be closed and guests will be able to move freely. O tempora, o mores!

▶▶▶ New guidance for asylum seekers in Britain attempts to clearly explain key principles of British law, from the equality of men and women to personal freedom and sexual consent! Sure!

Congo: There are 4,556 laboratory-confirmed cases of Ebola (Bundibugyo) virus in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the epidemic, declared on May 15, has claimed the lives of 2,128 people, according to a report released by the country's authorities. There is no approved vaccine or treatment for the Bundibugyo strain. The disease continues to spread with 46,3% mortality. A person dies every 30 minutes!

Iran: American Special Operations forces are preparing for what experts describe as potentially "the most sophisticated operation in military history" — a

*Let me know if you have valid info

ground raid to seize Iran's remaining enriched uranium from heavily fortified nuclear sites, according to a report by The New York Post. Seriously, now!

Spain: Since July 30, thousands of migrants have crossed into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in North Africa, with Pedro Sánchez's government reporting ~50,000 people, of whom, as it claims, more than 90% have already returned to Morocco, with the event constituting, however, the largest single increase in illegal arrivals ever recorded on EU territory. Ceuta had already experienced similar pressure in 2021, when around 10,000 migrants invaded the Spanish enclave in just 48 hours, between 17 and 18 May, Euronews reports. Some whisper that Israel (and MAGA?) is behind the invasion due to Spain's recognition of Palestine! The point is to stop the story with illegal immigrants before we move on to bloody countermeasures.

KSA: The JEC Tower has hit another milestone on its journey to become the new world's tallest skyscraper. The building is rapidly moving toward the halfway mark and has now reached a height of 1,410 ft (429,8m). If KSA were somewhere in the Gulf of Mexico or offshore Ireland, it would be OK. But that high in the Arabian Peninsula? Xmmmm!

Corsica: Armed separatists from the Corsican National Liberation Front have threatened tourists and those buying second homes on the island, warning them that they will not be safe. The group has released a video of its armed members denouncing the influx of foreigners as "uncontrolled colonialism." The separatists are protesting against a proposed bill on Corsican autonomy, which they say falls short of recognizing the Corsican people. France's anti-terrorism prosecutor has opened a preliminary investigation into criminal conspiracy and illegal possession of weapons after the controversial video was released.

Germany: German authorities have been alerted after suspicious drone flights over a Bundeswehr military installation in Mechernich, North Rhine-Westphalia, where Patriot anti-aircraft systems are maintained. According to German media, from the night of August 06 to the next day, employees of a private security company recorded a total of six drone flights between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m., which has caused particular concern for security services. Authorities are examining the possibility of espionage or information gathering on military installations.

EU: Ukraine is a cesspool of corruption, and Zelensky personifies it perfectly. It is not just "problematic" for EU membership; it is a dangerous travesty. According to the Financial Times, corruption is the most serious obstacle. A senior European diplomat says it clearly: you cannot put a country of 40 million people, ranked 104th in the world in the anti-corruption index, into the Union. Accepting it would turn the entire European project into a farce. Ukraine's greatest "contribution" to the enlargement debate is that it has revealed how unprepared we are for such failed states. After these statements, when should we expect the next financial support package?

USA: The head of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Robert Redfield, admitted in a sworn statement that they hid the side effects of the COVID-19 vaccines! The former head of the CDC admitted that there was not enough transparency from the beginning about the possible adverse side effects of the vaccines. These statements are evidence of a conspiracy that has claimed the lives of millions of people around the world. He also claimed that there were inappropriate decisions by some to limit the reporting of side effects, because there was a fear that this would negatively affect the vaccination coverage of the population.

Morocco: Hand-to-hand fighting is taking place on the Moroccan border with Ceuta, as the Spanish Army intercepts thousands of illegal immigrants who attempted to invade the Spanish enclave. There will be bloodshed soon! You do not play by the book when the "enemy" cannot read.

North Korea: The estimate of the size of North Korea's nuclear arsenal is rising, as Seoul estimates that Pyongyang has 80 to 120 nuclear warheads, a number significantly higher than the 57 recently reported by US President Donald Trump. As if it matters!

The Editor-in-Chief

▶ France builds Europe's largest mosque!

Poland unveils Europe's tallest statue of Mary in the tiny village of Konotopie. The gigantic statue of Jesus' mother towers at a staggering 55.6 meters (182ft) and is 17.6 meters taller than the Christ the Redeemer statue in Rio de Janeiro, although it remains smaller than the corresponding monument of the Virgin Mary in the Philippines, which reaches 98 meters.

Wargaming in a Resilience Context

By Rob Grayston | UKRA Associate
Source: https://ukresilienceacademy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/UKRA-Wargaming-Insight-Paper.pdf

July 2026 – Exercising is an essential part of preparedness in UK resilience. It exists to give a rigorous test to our plans and help give participants some experience for when a real-life incident occurs.
However, UK exercising culture is not unified in its approach to testing and training.
In our latest insight paper, we explore how modelling real consequences, resource limits, and time pressure turns an exercise from an awareness session into a genuine test of both plans and people – and sets out the formats available, from matrix games to megagames, and how to start using them.

Ceuta's Border Crisis and Europe's Migration Paradox

Source: https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20260731-ceuta-s-border-crisis-and-europe-s-migration-paradox

July 31 – Over the past few days, Spain's North African enclave of Ceuta has been thrust into the center of Europe's migration debate after a sudden mass crossing from neighboring Morocco overwhelmed local authorities and forced Madrid to deploy military support to the border. Depending on the moment in the reporting, officials described roughly 49,000 crossings in a single day or about 60,000 over several days, though the exact figure mattered less than the political shock: a border that had been relatively quiet suddenly became the site of a dramatic test of European migration law, Spanish state capacity, and Moroccan cooperation.
By Friday, the immediate surge appeared to be under control. Spanish and Moroccan forces had reinforced the frontier, many of those who crossed were being returned or processed, and the explosive phase of the episode had given way to a calmer but still highly charged dispute over why it happened, what the court ruling actually said, and whether the crisis pointed to a broader failure in Europe's migration system. What looks at first glance like a simple border breach is in fact a revealing case study in the interaction between law, deterrence, and public perception.

What Happened in Ceuta
The immediate events in Ceuta unfolded with unusual speed. People crossed from Morocco by land and sea, some swimming around the breakwater and others forcing their way through the border fence, while local reception facilities were quickly overwhelmed. Spanish authorities responded by sending troops to support the Guardia Civil, and the city's leadership declared an emergency as the border pressure intensified.
This was not a planned opening of the frontier and not a single, orderly migration route suddenly activated. It was a chaotic surge, one that appeared to mix opportunistic movement, organized facilitation, and the spread of a legal rumor that encouraged people to believe that reaching Spanish territory would reduce the chances of quick expulsion. Moroccan authorities also moved

to contain the situation, and by the end of the week the surge had largely subsided. The practical effect was a temporary collapse of border control followed by a rapid reassertion of control, which is exactly the kind of episode that tends to reverberate politically far beyond the border itself.

The human cost was also real. Reporting from the scene indicated deaths among those attempting the crossing, underscoring a familiar feature of Mediterranean migration crises: the more attention a border receives, the more dangerous it becomes when people believe a crossing window has opened. That is one reason such episodes are never just about numbers. They are also about incentives, perception, and the degree to which a legal development can change behavior on the ground almost immediately.

The Court Ruling at the Center

The legal trigger for the episode was a ruling by Spain's Supreme Court, not by a European court. The court said that migrants intercepted at sea while trying to reach Ceuta or Melilla could not be summarily returned under Spain's fast-track "border rejection" practice and must instead go through ordinary legal procedures.

That distinction matters a great deal. The ruling does not authorize irregular entry, and it does not say that migrants who reach Spanish territory have an automatic right to stay. But it does make immediate return more difficult in at least some cases, especially where authorities intercept people at sea rather than on the land border. In practical terms, that means more individualized review, more paperwork, more time, and more legal exposure for the state before removal can occur.

The broader implication is that border enforcement in Europe is increasingly constrained by procedure. Governments may want speed and deterrence; courts often insist on due process and individualized assessment. The result is a legal environment in which a single ruling can alter behavior well beyond the specific facts of the case. Smugglers and migrants do not need a perfect understanding of the law to react to it. They only need to believe that reaching a particular patch of territory buys them time.

Why the Ruling Matters Beyond Spain

Although the ruling concerns Spain's border practice, its significance reaches much further. Across the European Union, migration policy has moved toward tighter external border control, more screening at entry points, and faster returns. Yet the legal architecture remains constrained by domestic courts, EU law, and human-rights standards that limit how states can treat irregular arrivals.

This is why border enforcement in Europe often produces a tension between policy and law. Governments frame illegal migration as a problem of sovereignty and public order. Courts frame it as a question of legality, proportionality, and procedural rights. In normal times, the tension is manageable. In moments of crisis, such as Ceuta, it becomes politically explosive

because the public sees images of mass arrivals while officials explain that not every arrival can simply be sent back immediately.

That dynamic helps explain why this case has drawn attention beyond the Iberian peninsula. It is not only about Morocco or Ceuta. It is about whether the EU's migration regime can preserve deterrence while remaining faithful to legal guarantees. The answer, increasingly, is that it can do both only imperfectly.

Schengen and the Pressure for Controls

The Ceuta episode is also likely to feed into a broader debate over Schengen, the EU's borderless travel area. But it is unlikely to produce a wholesale collapse of the system. More realistic is the continued expansion of temporary internal border checks, which many member states have already been using in response to migration pressures, security concerns, or both.

Under EU rules, member states may temporarily reintroduce border controls when there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security, and the European Commission tracks these measures across the Schengen area. In practice, several countries have kept checks in place for long stretches, renewing them repeatedly. That means Schengen is already being stretched from within, even if its formal legal framework remains intact.

So the likely effect of Ceuta is not a sudden wave of withdrawals from Schengen, but a further normalization of exceptional border measures. Political pressure will continue to build for tougher enforcement, faster returns, and possibly more expansive use of national security justifications. Yet the actual legal structure of Schengen is unlikely to be abandoned. Instead, it is being gradually reinterpreted through repeated exceptions. That is a subtler but more consequential shift.

The Broader Migration Picture

One reason the Ceuta episode has had such resonance is that it seems to contradict a broader EU trend: irregular migration is down. Frontex said irregular border crossings into the EU fell by 37% in the first half of 2026, to just over 49,000 detections, and by nearly 40% in the first five months of the year compared with the same period in 2025.

That decline matters because it shows the current European migration picture is not one of uniform escalation. On the contrary, the overall trend has been downward. The reasons appear to include improved cooperation with countries of origin and transit, increased preventive action in departure states, difficult weather and sea conditions on some routes, and the early effects of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. These are not trivial factors. They have real effects on route choice, smuggling costs, and the willingness of would-be migrants to attempt dangerous crossings.

Still, the downward trend should not be mistaken for a solved problem. Migration flows are highly sensitive to geography, law, conflict, and rumor. Even when the total number of irregular crossings falls, specific routes can remain volatile or even surge suddenly. The Western Mediterranean route, which includes the Spanish North African enclaves, is one such pressure point. Ceuta demonstrates how quickly a localized flashpoint can dominate Europe's political attention even during a period of aggregate decline.

Why This Crisis Resonates

The deeper significance of Ceuta lies in what it reveals about the limits of contemporary border politics. European governments want migration control to look firm, fast, and visible. Courts insist that state power must still operate within legal boundaries. Migrants and smugglers, for their part, search for the narrow seams between law and enforcement, where a ruling or a rumor can create a brief but meaningful opportunity. That is why Ceuta matters even if the latest surge has been contained. It is a reminder that migration crises are rarely just about migration. They are about state credibility, legal constraints, diplomatic coordination, and the political meaning of borders themselves. In this case, a single domestic court ruling in Spain appears to have been transformed, in the eyes of many would-be crossers, into a signal that the border had become more permeable. Whether that interpretation was legally correct is almost beside the point. In migration politics, perception often moves faster than law.

For Europe, that is the enduring challenge. The continent may be seeing fewer irregular crossings overall, but it remains vulnerable to dramatic local shocks. As long as the EU combines a formal commitment to free movement with uneven external control and strong procedural protections, border crises like Ceuta will continue to expose the system's contradictions. The question is not whether those contradictions exist. It is whether governments can manage them without turning every frontier emergency into a broader challenge to the European project itself.

Nearly 800,000 weapons unaccounted for in NATO-occupied Ukraine

By Drago Bosnic

Source: https://weeklyblitz.net/2026/08/01/nearly-800000-weapons-unaccounted-for-in-nato-occupied-ukraine/

Aug 01 – Since the very beginning of the NATO-orchestrated Ukrainian conflict, InfoBRICS has been warning the world about the dangers of supplying the Kiev regime with weapons. As a deeply criminal entity, the NATO-backed Neo-Nazi junta is infamous for all sorts of illegal activities, be it arms smuggling, child trafficking, terrorism, etc. Giving such an entity more weapons was bound to create even more problems, as the thugs and goons running the Kiev regime sought ways to further enrich themselves at the expense of Western taxpayers and regular Ukrainians living under NATO occupation. The mainstream propaganda machine routinely dismisses such warnings as "baseless conspiracy theories".

However, numerous sources on all sides have confirmed this is exactly what's happening now. Namely, a vast wartime weapons smuggling scheme has turned former Ukraine into a massive source for the black market used by criminal undergrounds in Europe and elsewhere. The danger comes not just from a single smuggling ring, but the possibility of a complete breakdown in any semblance of control that would allow firearms and munitions to end up in illicit circulation. The sheer scale alone is deeply destabilizing, as it has reached industrial levels. Namely, reports indicate that nearly 800,000 weapons and various types of munitions are unaccounted for. The scandal points to a systemic problem that's much bigger than a series of isolated security failures.

This also implicates the Neo-Nazi junta itself, as the scale is too large to dismiss it as theft or even just battlefield losses. In wartime, inventories undoubtedly move quickly, with incomplete records and institutions struggling with bureaucracy and other forms of strain. Those conditions create exactly the kind of opacity that traffickers can readily exploit. Once weapons disappear, they can be resold, concealed, broken into parts or moved across borders through regular criminal channels. However, even under such circumstances, the figures certainly wouldn't go anywhere near a million. Even several hundred missing firearms would

sound alarms in any remotely capable and functioning government. However, as previously mentioned, the Kiev regime is not what you'd typically call a real government. Such a deeply criminal conglomerate of thugs, goons and all sorts of extremists gives it the necessary "legal flexibility". Coupled with the size and importance of the EU/NATO's black market, this gives the Kiev regime a unique position and endless opportunities for arms smuggling. The wider issue is no longer confined to the battlefield, but is slowly becoming a continental policing problem. Namely, when war-sourced arms enter black markets that already service organized crime, smuggling networks and violent groups, the possibilities for escalation become virtually endless, with police becoming easily outgunned. A weapon that vanishes in a conflict zone can reappear far from the frontlines, where its origin is extremely difficult to trace until it's already used. This also makes it virtually impossible to anticipate the said use. However, the fact that the weapons in question are not just regular firearms, but military-grade systems, means the danger is amplified exponentially. Namely, imagine criminal gangs acquiring high-capacity, heavy-caliber machine guns or even rocket launchers. Even if they used them solely in firefights with each other, civilians and law enforcement could easily get caught up in the crossfire. Worse yet, imagine a terrorist group acquiring an ATGM (anti-tank guided missile) or a MANPADS (man-portable air-defense system).

No public bus or a passenger aircraft would be safe. Police and even high-level security services would have the virtually impossible task of tracking such weapons and preventing their use. That's a Herculean effort even when it comes to just a single weapon. Now multiply that by 800,000. An entire army of criminals and/or terrorists could be equipped with such a massive quantity of arms. Police services in Europe are struggling with numerous knife attacks, which have now become a common, almost daily occurrence, to the point that the mainstream propaganda machine no longer even reports it. Now imagine each and every one of those knife-wielding criminals with an automatic weapon in hand.

Whether it's a submachine gun, an assault rifle or a heavy machine gun, the casualties could easily be in the hundreds. Civilians losing their loved ones would certainly seek justice from their incompetent bureaucratic governments, potentially causing violent protests in the process. A person who lost a family member to such attacks wouldn't care how the weapons that enabled it were acquired. Whether it was wartime chaos, theft, corruption, mishandling, moving arsenals under pressure, weakened oversight due to bureaucratic hurdles or even a simple accounting failure, it doesn't matter – the result is the same. Worse yet, if the weapons came from the "democratic government of Ukraine", a violent outburst is inevitable.

Namely, imagine the reaction of the masses if they found out that the Kiev regime was behind it, whether through numerous systemic failures or deliberate black-market schemes designed to enrich Zelensky and his entourage. Despite the years that the mainstream propaganda machine spent trying to lionize him and his thugs and goons, numerous corruption scandals and terrorizing of civilians in Russia and beyond have made Europeans deeply skeptical (at the very least) of the Neo-Nazi junta's "benevolence". What's more, the latest figures also indicate a massive spike in missing weapons, suggesting exponential growth in the black market's already insatiable demand.

Namely, back in October 2025, even Ukrainian sources reported that around half a million weapons went missing since February 24, 2022. If the latest numbers are nearly 800,000, that's a 60% increase in just 10 months. Such an enormous amount of weapons couldn't simply vanish and had to go somewhere. This should be deeply concerning for everyone, particularly those who'd dismiss wartime (or postwar) firearms control as a technical afterthought. Even if such a massive flow of military-grade weapons stopped today, it would leave a security nightmare across Europe. However, if sustained over a longer period of time, which is a much likelier scenario, it's virtually a guaranteed death sentence for hundreds (if not thousands) of unsuspecting civilians.

Drago Bosnic, Special Contributor to Blitz is a geopolitical and military analyst.

Serial rapist who attacked four women in East London 'to teach them a lesson for being out at night' could walk free

Source: https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/rapist-sunny-islam-east-london-parole-hearing-b1292068.html

Aug 02 – Sunny Islam, now aged 37, was handed an indefinite sentence in 2012 after being linked to the violent sex attacks in which he armed himself with a knife and plastic cable ties. Victims were traumatised after they were dragged from the street, tied up and subjected to brutal beatings at Islam's hands. Although police fear there may be more victims who have never come forward, Islam is now lobbying for freedom at an upcoming Parole Board hearing, The Mail reports. The hearing will

UNBELIEVABLE!

be held behind closed doors despite one victim's application for public proceedings, after it was heard Islam suffered "anxiety" at the thought of facing the public.

The Parole Board has now acquiesced to his lawyer's arguments for the session to be conducted privately. Islam's solicitor said: "Since learning that an application has been made for the oral hearing to be held in public, the prisoner has reported a dramatic increase in his anxiety, including sleep disturbance. "This could be a potentially de-stabilising effect. He is in the process of seeking medical advice in relation to those difficulties; however, at this stage, no documentary medical evidence is available due to the short space of time elapsed. "While this factor is not relied upon as determinative, it is relevant to the Board's assessment of the likely impact of a public hearing on [the prisoner's] ability to participate effectively and give his best evidence." Although no medical evidence was given in support of these argument, Judge Jeremy Roberts ruled against public proceedings, noting both Islam's "anxiety" and the potential impact on other victims whose thoughts are not known on the matter. Islam, who said he came from a devout Muslim background, was 21 when he launched a series of sex attacks in 2010. Police tracked him down after his third sickening assault took place in September of that year, when he kidnapped a 15-year-old girl off the street and ignored her pleas telling him she was only 11. Islam told the girl he would "teach her a lesson" for being out alone at night and drove her to an isolated spot where he raped her.

In a victim impact statement, the girl said: "No one will ever understand the flashbacks; they are so real. At night I lay in my bed and it is like I am there.

"It is like a screen in my mind forcing me to relive that night again and again. People will say time will heal, but I think time has helped me accept the truth — that I will never escape what happened."

Judge Patricia Lees told Islam in the dock: "You told her you were going to 'teach her a lesson'... Those words are a chilling indictment of your very troubling attitude towards all of these victims.

"You seem to observe women out at night as not deserving respect or protection.

"The harm you have done to your victims is incalculable."

Detectives were able to link Islam's registration plate to an earlier sex attack in July of that year, when he beat a 20-year-old sex worker and subjected her to a double rape, as well as a second attack that month on a 28-year-old woman in Forest Gate who he kidnapped, strangled and sexually assaulted.

When officers finally raided Islam's home address in Barking, blood found in his car was traced to a fourth and final victim - a 31-year-old woman who had been tied up and severely beaten while being raped.

At Woolwich Crown Court in 2012, Islam was convicted of seven counts of rape, one of sexual assault and one of imprisonment.

At his sentencing he was told he would serve a minimum term of 11 years, which expired in 2021 due to time already served.

The Parole Board has been approached for comment.

What Everyone Is Missing About Ceuta

By Howard French

Source: https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/08/06/ceuta-spain-morocco-migrants-history-africa-europe/

Aug 06 – In 1415, a young European prince named Henry, who came from an obscure, foundling dynasty in what would later be known as Portugal, charged out ahead of the troops under his command during an invasion of the African mainland, at a little trading outpost called Ceuta.

The prince, who would eventually achieve fame as Henry the Navigator, was less of a hero in battle than his reckless sally would suggest, but the Portuguese land grab soon succeeded. The gambit jolted Europe with the news of a success against the Muslims of the Marinid dynasty and announced a Portuguese dynasty, the Aviz, as a new force to be reckoned with in the Christian world.

What Henry sought was not converts to Christianity, nor even so much territory to add to the Aviz realm. Rather, it was access to the huge wealth in gold that had flowed into Europe for centuries via Mediterranean Africa from points far to the south, below the Sahara Desert.

In recent days, developments in tiny Ceuta, which helped launch the Portuguese empire and the so-called Age of Exploration, have led the news again. But this time, there has been a rush in the opposite direction, with tens of thousands of citizens of Morocco and other African countries risking their lives and perishing by the dozens to use the Spanish-controlled exclave as a springboard toward more prosperous lives in wealthy Europe.

As someone who has written at length about the origins of European imperialism—and with it,

the commerce and conquest in Africa that formed much of Europe's early wealth—I have been struck by the narrow frames that many news outlets have employed to cover what has occurred in Ceuta. Much of the coverage has presented it as a simple, if grave, immigration crisis, taking the current situation on the map, and the deep historical backstory behind today's headlines, for granted.

As I wrote in my book, *Born in Blackness: Africa, Africans, and the Making of the Modern World*, it is a mistake to buy into the notion that Portugal acquired its imperial possessions in Africa as "in a fit of absence of mind"—as one historian famously described British colonial conquest—with Ceuta being a mere historical relic and curio that the world should today unquestioningly accept as part of Europe.

The Aviz conquest of Ceuta followed its rivalry with Spain for control of the Canary Islands off the coast of Africa in the 14th century, where the Portuguese raided for slaves and the Spanish committed what some historians consider the first modern genocide, wiping out the native Guanche population. As with Ceuta and other islands such Madeira and the Azores, the Portuguese carried out carefully conceived ambitions to capture African gold wealth in an era that long predated both the trans-Atlantic slave traffic and Iberian efforts to discover a maritime route to Asia.

Beyond the search for gold, Portugal's early imperialism was motivated by competition with its far larger and more powerful neighbor, Spain, which hoped to subdue and incorporate Portugal into a united Iberia. Ceuta acquired its legal status as part of Spain after a convoluted crisis of Portuguese royal succession in 1578, when a new king, another Henry—Henry the Navigator's distant nephew—took the throne at an old age without an heir. This left Philip II of Spain, the grandson of a Portuguese king, with the strongest claim to the Portuguese crown upon Henry's death in 1580.

Given today's focus on Ceuta, one can't move on here without mentioning the striking fact that Portugal's 16th-century succession crisis resulted from a broader invasion of Morocco, which ended in disaster when King Henry's predecessor, Sebastian I, was killed along with much of his family. Decades later, after Portugal waged a successful war to restore its own royal line, independent of Spain, the spit of Moroccan land known as Ceuta was ceded to the Spanish.

Although extended a patina of legitimacy by international law and by the recognition of Spanish sovereignty by other states, this situation is clearly a historical fluke, and one that seems unlikely to endure. Consider how fragmented and open to contestation similar relics of imperial history are in this part of the world. Almost directly across the Mediterranean sits Gibraltar, a small protrusion of land into the sea that Britain has claimed and controlled since Anglo-Dutch forces seized it during the War of Spanish Succession in 1704. Nine years later, Spain ceded it to Britain in supposed perpetuity as part of the Treaty of Utrecht.

Spain rejects Morocco's historic and geographic arguments to rightful ownership of Ceuta, but it makes very similar claims to Gibraltar. A glance at the map quickly makes clear why Madrid and Rabat believe that they should control Gibraltar and Ceuta, respectively. (Incidentally, Gibraltar was founded as a fortified lighthouse outpost by North Africans from the Muslim Almohad empire in the 12th century, but this is a claim that Moroccans long ago quite sensibly relinquished.)

Continued possession of the exclave brings only a point of pride to Spaniards who are susceptible to nostalgia over the country's puny remaining imperial possessions. In fact, policing Ceuta against the next upsurge in immigrants incurs large, ongoing fiscal costs and intra-European tensions.

Indeed, last week, much of Europe recoiled in shock and anger at the prospect of tens of thousands of Africans entering their continent by storming the beaches of Ceuta, bearing the meager possessions that they could carry. Though most had returned within 48 hours, Europe's right-wing parties and press sensationalized what was happening for political or commercial gain, and Spain's near-neighbor, Italy, quickly instituted the screening of people arriving from Spain to make sure that no Africans were sneaking in through Spain's North African exclave. My bet, though, is that Spain will gradually, and perhaps even soon, see the wisdom of abandoning its African territorial claim out of a realism that has so far eluded the British in Gibraltar. The reason for that can be summed up in one word: demographics. Africa's population is growing more quickly than any other region, albeit a bit more slowly than projected a mere decade ago. Europe is heading in the exact opposite direction, with women in many countries—including Spain and Italy, to take two southern European examples—having roughly one child on average.

Spain's government has taken the wisest measure of this trend that I know of in Europe, granting amnesty to many who have immigrated illegally in the past, and hitherto publicly identifying continued immigration as one of the rare available remedies for population collapse, with all of the dire economic consequences that would bring to the country.

The quick and fierce lashing out against Spain by fellow European neighbors over the momentary Ceuta crisis makes clear, though, that public opinion on the continent is easily stirred by the prospect of any big and sudden foreign influx, especially one that involves brown- and Black-skinned people. At this point, Spain should do the right thing and restore this geopolitically insignificant territory to Morocco, closing off the possibility of it ever being used as a backdoor into the pan-European immigration zone known as Schengen.

While doing so, Spain should take the lead in the European discussion of the future of immigration to the continent—which, given its proximity, will disproportionately hinge on the future of Africa. Much of the rest of Europe clings to the delusion that

the movement of peoples from Africa and elsewhere in the global south can be handled indefinitely through little more than police action. But Africans and other migrants will continue to show up in Europe in ever larger numbers no matter what. Just how many, though, will depend on what Europe does today to renovate its economic ties to the continent just to the south, making sure that prosperity spreads there, as it once did from Africa to Europe.

Howard W. French is a columnist at *Foreign Policy*, a professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, and a longtime foreign correspondent. His latest book is *The Second Emancipation: Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism, and Global Blackness at High Tide*.

A 15-year-old Syrian migrant has been sentenced to 10 months in closed youth care in Sweden after repeatedly raping and abusing a 14-year-old Swedish girl, whom he forced to call herself his "whore" and his "dog." According to court findings, he forced her into sexual acts in public places, strangled her until she lost consciousness, threatened to release intimate recordings, made her cut off part of her hair, spat on her and filmed the abuse. He also controlled what she wore, whom she spoke to, and threatened to kill her. The trial court said the crimes would have carried the equivalent of around seven years in prison for an adult.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Why, they do not have zoos in Sweden? Most probably, court members either they have no children or they have only boys. **Skäms på dig!**

Singapore underground

Is Spain a NATO ally or a state sponsor of terrorism?

By Jose Lev Alvarez

Source: https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/4680584/spain-iran-dual-use-exports-nato-sanctions/

Aug 11 – For decades, Madrid's leftist foreign policy establishment has substituted strategic clarity with moral bankruptcy, quietly strengthening Iran's military-industrial capacity. At the same time, Washington policymakers indulge in the delusion that Europe stands united against Islamist aggression.

While the trend spans ideological lines, socialist Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero truly opened the floodgates. Spain's own trade statistics expose the depth of this cynicism: dual-use exports to Tehran soared from 2.16 million euros in 2006 to nearly 25 million euros in 2007, culminating in a staggering 61.95 million euros in 2008. Across Zapatero's two terms alone, the Islamic Republic pocketed 175 million euros in sensitive technology. Indeed, Iran ranked as Spain's second-largest dual-use customer between 2000 and 2010, trailing only the United States. It may sound preposterous, but this commercial windfall coincided exactly with United Nations Security Council resolutions 1696, 1737, and 1747 — measures explicitly designed to penalize the mullahs' nuclear defiance. While the West pretended to enforce isolation, Madrid ensured Tehran's lifeline remained wide open.

Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez's contemporary betrayal of the West is no aberration, but rather the lucrative continuation of Spanish prevarication. Since 2018, his corruption-plagued government has authorized 7 million euros in dual-use exports, with 1.33 million euros in detonators and precision machinery flowing directly to Iranian state enterprises.

While Madrid pockets profits from machinery sales exceeding $80 million, Spanish technology is actively feeding the very same Iranian drone and missile programs targeting American and Israeli forces. Ergo, Washington must stop indulging Madrid's double game. When a supposed "ally" builds weapons for the enemy under the guise of civilian trade, dual-use does not mean harmless; it means weapons-ready.

In March 2026, Iranian Ambassador Reza Zabib stood in Madrid to audaciously threaten strikes on Naval Station Rota and Morón Air Base, a hostile bluff effectively enabled by Sanchez's decision to ban U.S. aircraft from Spanish airspace during the operation against Iran. This strategic sabotage followed the Pegasus-blackmailed autocrat's unhinged rhetoric, which Israeli leaders correctly interpreted as a genocidal threat, lamenting his lack of nuclear weapons to halt Jerusalem. In Sanchez's distorted worldview, it is entirely normal to export military technology to a terrorist state, deploy nuclear rhetoric against a Western democracy, and still demand Washington's strategic trust.

Spain's strategic drift does not end with Iran. Sanchez has actively

transformed Madrid into Beijing's preferred European Trojan horse. Despite a gaping trade deficit, Madrid spent 12.3 million euros on Huawei OceanStor systems to store sensitive judicial wiretaps for Spain's National Police and its Civil Guard. Handing the keys to NATO's intercept infrastructure to a Chinese state-linked telecom giant is worse than naive; it is a profound threat to Western intelligence sharing. While Spanish technology flows to Tehran, Chinese spyware now actively penetrates NATO's southern flank.

Washington must close both corridors. Congress should expand state-sponsor-of-terrorism statutes to cover governments transferring dual-use technology to rogue regimes, triggering automatic secondary sanctions on complicit Spanish firms and banks. Concurrently, the Commerce Department must presume denial of U.S.-origin technology bound for Spanish entities that lack verifiable end-user documentation. Finally, the Pentagon should condition future dual-use licenses — and the modernization of Rota and Morón — on an audited cessation of Iranian trade and a public purge of Chinese infrastructure ventures. If Madrid refuses, Washington must relocate its vital naval assets from Rota to Gibraltar.

Zapatero's "Alliance of Civilizations" was delusional appeasement. Sanchez has metastasized that legacy into a sycophantic embrace of Tehran and Beijing. Washington must stop coddling this odious behavior and accept that Madrid has become a Fifth column in favor of America's enemies. Spain must purge its complicity with terrorists immediately, or the State Department must designate it a State Sponsor of Terrorism.

Jose Lev Alvarez is an American–Israeli scholar specializing in international security policy. A multilingual veteran of the IDF special forces and the U.S. Army, he holds three master's degrees and is completing a Ph.D. in Intelligence and Global Security in the Washington, D.C., area.

Death Penalty

Aug 12 – Lebanon has decided to abolish the death penalty, becoming the first country in the Middle East to make this important human rights reform. The Lebanese parliament voted on Tuesday to abolish the death penalty and replace it with life imprisonment with hard labor.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Do not get me wrong, because Hezbollah voted against it, but I am in favor of the death penalty for several offenses (i.e., terrorists, arsonists, rapists, pedophiles, human traffickers). In addition, when we say "life sentence", we do not mean 20 years because of good behavior; we mean enclosure in a prison cell and throw the key away until the end.

Trump's Iran Negotiations Trade the Art of the Deal for the Art of Concealing Defeat

By Elliott Abrams

Source: https://www.cfr.org/articles/trumps-iran-negotiations-trade-the-art-of-the-deal-for-the-art-of-concealing-defeat

Aug 11 – Hamas's assault on October 7, 2023, was the culmination of years of Iranian efforts to surround Israel with Tehran's proxies. Hamas and Hezbollah controlled Gaza and Lebanon, Iran-backed Shia militias dominated Iraq, and the Iranian regime worked closely with the Houthis in Yemen and the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria to encircle Israel. Israel has since torn apart this so-called ring of fire.

Hamas is badly weakened and Israel has taken control of half of Gaza. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is so disrupted that the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces can now contemplate challenging it. The Assad regime fell amid this regional chaos, and in Iraq, the government is pushing back against the Shia militias to bring them under some control. But Iran's weakness is also domestic: a dramatic uprising took place earlier this year and was put down only through the slaughter of tens of thousands of unarmed civilian protesters, and by every indication, the great majority of Iranians loathe the brutal and repressive theocracy that controls their country. The question now facing the Trump administration is whether to build on these changes by further weakening the Islamic Republic of Iran or to provide a quick accommodation that rescues the regime. While President Donald Trump fancies himself a great negotiator, his obvious desire for a deal with Iran has weakened his hand. Battering the Iranian economy by continuing the U.S. blockade of Iranian oil exports is eminently possible, but it may not deliver results before the U.S. congressional elections in November. Faced with a similar problem in 2006, President George W. Bush dismissed political considerations and proceeded with the surge of U.S. troops in Iraq. Trump seems disinclined to put national security over politics. But the president has no bargaining position if he won't use more military force. He wants to end the confrontation with Iran so that oil quickly resumes flowing and oil prices drop fast—and that urgency puts him in the position of the building owner who needs cash fast and cannot afford to wait for a better price.

The price Iran is demanding would change the Middle East—and make any future challenge to Iran's regional dominance far harder. The Iranian regime will be saved financially if it can monetize the Strait of Hormuz and export its own oil freely. The very fact that Iran had confronted the United States and emerged as the victor—and if Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, it will be seen as the victor—strengthens the regime and will allow it to demand tribute from oil-rich Gulf Arab states. Gulf oil producers' reliance on the United States for their security will be replaced by deals with Iran and a search for other protectors, as we have just seen in the new defense pact Saudi Arabia signed with Pakistan and Turkey.

This raises the question of whether Gulf allies can rely on the United States in the future. In discussions about the Strait of Hormuz, too little attention is paid to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which is also known as U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and is headquartered in Bahrain. This naval element of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has been under missile and drone attack from Iran all year, and suffered severe damage. While it may well be sensible for NAVCENT (and for CENTCOM's local headquarters in Qatar) to relocate farther away from Iran, that is different from relinquishing the Gulf to Iranian control. That move would quickly turn the Gulf into an Iranian lake, with the United States and its naval warships unable to enter. Such a step would, in effect, mean abandoning U.S. allies such as Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia to the tender mercies of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Thus far, the Trump administration appears unable to make a decision. The president clearly does not want more rounds of heavy fighting, and he wants a deal—even a bad one. The memorandum of understanding (MOU) negotiated in June was already a very bad one. It did not clearly state that the Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway open to all nations without tolling, and it legitimized Iran's intrusions in

Lebanon's internal affairs (which is mentioned five times in the MOU's first paragraph). The MOU contained several unacceptable terms that should have elicited a steady Trump administration rejection. But there has been nothing steady about the administration's or the president's reactions. These have included threats of total destruction (delivered with crude and foul language) followed by no action, then more threats, then more inaction. It's impossible for Americans or U.S. allies to judge what Trump's bottom line is—or whether there actually is a bottom line. This is a tragic position to be in for an administration that began to address the threat from Iran in June 2025 with Operation Midnight Hammer and then further strikes this year to destroy Iran's nuclear program and weaken its hold on the Strait of Hormuz. The position of strength that the United States appeared to hold a year ago, and even as this year began, is being eroded and may be abandoned. It has only allowed Tehran to grow more brash in negotiations. Iran is now seeking even more conditions, such as U.S. reparations, that are obvious nonstarters.

Along with potential negotiations over Ukraine, negotiations with Iran are the most serious foreign policy test the Trump administration now faces. In the end, the facts will be impossible to paper over with vague language: Iran will either control the Strait of Hormuz or it will not. If it does, Iran will have effectively driven the United States out of the Persian Gulf, with a huge effect on every Gulf state and the entire Middle East.

Such an outcome will inevitably undermine U.S. commitments in Asia and Europe as well, by suggesting that the United States—at least while the Trump administration remains in power until January 2029—views commitments as temporary and sees negotiations as an exit strategy rather than a way to protect its interests. That's not the art of the deal, but the use of negotiation to conceal defeat.

Elliott Abrams served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor in the George W. Bush administration, where he supervised U.S. policy in the Middle East. He later served as special representative for Iran and Venezuela in the first Donald Trump administration.

Why the Mecca Pact Is Not a Sunni NATO

By Tanya Goudsouzian, and Ibrahim al-Marashi

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/why-the-mecca-pact-is-not-a-sunni-nato

Aug 13 – In late 2004, Jordan's King Abdullah II coined a phrase that would come to define how many viewed the Middle East's emerging power struggle. Alluding to Iran's growing regional influence, after the fall of its regional rival, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the Jordanian monarch warned of a "Shia Crescent" stretching from Tehran through Baghdad and

Damascus to Beirut. This corridor, he declared, threatened to disrupt a longstanding balance of power, albeit one that had arguably served Western interests as well as those countries under the US security umbrella. Two decades later, the regional landscape is once again in flux.

On August 7, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey signed a joint defense agreement pledging that an attack on one will be treated as an attack on all, much like NATO's Article 5. As it was signed in Mecca, Islam's holiest city, almost immediately, some began describing it as the beginnings of a "Sunni NATO," or more provocatively, resurrecting talk of a new "Sunni Crescent." The comparison makes for great headlines, but is this really a sectarian realignment, or something more pragmatic?

It is telling that neither Egypt nor Iraq has yet signed on to the grouping, while Azerbaijan, a Shia-majority state, is reportedly considering joining. A closer look at the three countries, and at the history of past alliances, shows that this new triumvirate has far more in common than faith.

International relations theory can offer a lens to examine whether the alliance will endure. A realist view holds that fundamental security concerns in a competitive international environment ultimately drive a nation's foreign policy. A liberal institutionalist view, by contrast, focuses on how cooperation and international organizations can help manage conflicts through collective security. Constructivists take a different approach, arguing that ideas of competition and cooperation are constructs, imagined by political elites and publics.

For example, for two decades, the phrase "Shia Crescent" has been casually invoked by Western journalists and policy analysts when interpreting conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen. It framed these conflicts as contemporary manifestations of an epic sectarian showdown between Sunni and Shia powers, a view that some have rightly dismissed as fearmongering. The "Arab Spring" uprisings that swept the region after 2011 further entrenched this interpretation, with the resultant conflicts described as part of a "sectarian Cold War." Such language implied that sectarian conflicts were primordial and rooted in an irreconcilable Sunni-Shia divide.

The constructivists critically examine how these sectarian identities are constructs used by elites to mobilize political actors in response to specific crises. Constructivists would argue this framing is inaccurate and misleading. Iran's support for Christian Armenia over Shia Azerbaijan, for example, is often cited as evidence that Tehran's foreign policy cannot be reduced to sectarian solidarity. At the same time, there have been intra-Arab Sunni fights, whether between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and later between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The same distinction applies when assessing the Mecca Pact. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey may be Sunni majority countries, but faith alone does not explain or ensure the durability of the alliance.

From a realist perspective, the behavior of all three countries makes more sense in terms of their interests than in terms of their identity or sect. Saudi Arabia is looking for credible security guarantees after years of regional wars, and attacks on Gulf infrastructure have raised questions about the reliability of American security umbrellas.

Turkey doubts whether its fellow NATO members will come to its defense. Pakistan brings a large and experienced military, including a nuclear arsenal, defense ties with Beijing and Riyadh, and strategic links across the Gulf. Turkey adds NATO membership, a substantial military, a growing defense industry, and its own ambitions for a greater regional role. These national interests can overlap without being reducible to sectarian solidarity, which renders premature any talk of a new "Sunni Axis."

Pakistan, which maintains longstanding ties with Iran, has stressed that the agreement is "purely defensive," while Turkey has said explicitly that it is not directed against Tehran. Nor are any of the three signatories seeking to confront or encircle Iran. Pakistan and Turkey both maintain substantial political, economic and security ties with Tehran, while Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023 thanks to Chinese mediation.

All three Mecca Pact states also have significant Shia populations, further complicating any attempt to cast the agreement as a straightforward Sunni counterweight to Iran. None of the three countries endorsed the US-Israeli war against Iran, with Pakistan sending its premier to attend the Supreme Leader's funeral. As such, what is emerging is a hedging exercise by three powers that no longer assume regional security can rest on a single external guarantor.

There is a clear contrast between the Mecca Pact and the Abraham Accords, the latter being another example of constructivism that leverages the Abrahamic faiths to build a political alliance. It sought to reshape West Asia through diplomatic normalization with Israel, opening new channels for trade, investment, and security cooperation. The Mecca Pact takes a different route, building a security relationship among three Muslim powers around mutual defense.

The Abraham Accords represented one vision of a new regional order, while the Mecca Pact represents another. The distinction is ultimately between two different approaches to regional alignment, one centered on normalization with Israel and the other on Muslim collective security cooperation.

The liberal institutional school focuses on the role of international organizations, such as the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO. A historical precedent offers a cautionary note of constructing the Mecca Pact as a "Sunni NATO." Egypt, once the leader of the Arab world, was the linchpin of the 1945 Arab League, which included all 22 Arabic-language states. Still, it did not join the Mecca Pact—and not "for lack

of an invitation." The 1955 Baghdad Pact brought Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom together in a Western-backed security arrangement to prevent Soviet influence from reaching the Middle East. On paper, it looked formidable. In practice, competing interests, nationalist opposition and a rapidly changing regional environment weakened it, while Iraq's 1958 revolution effectively destroyed its original political foundation. The Mecca Pact may not be destined to follow the same path, but it is worth remembering that alliances built around a shared threat can prove less durable than those grounded in genuinely shared interests. Mecca is also different in that it is not a Western-sponsored containment pact, but an effort by regional powers to build their own collective security architecture. Still, the Baghdad precedent counsels against declaring a new axis before the agreement's institutions, military coordination and political commitments have been tested.

The wars in Gaza, Iran, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere have challenged the assumption that regional security can be outsourced to Washington. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Turkey are not necessarily abandoning their relationships with the United States, but they want to avoid dependence on a single external guarantor. It is too simplistic to label the Mecca Pact a "Sunni Axis," when it is part of a larger shift away from a US-dominated security architecture towards a more crowded, flexible, and self-reliant regional order.

The three signatories have distinct national interests, nuanced relationships with Iran and the United States, and different ambitions for the region. The agreement could ultimately become a powerful new security arrangement. It could also become another historical footnote like the Baghdad Pact. Its durability will depend on whether Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey can turn a common sense of insecurity into shared strategic interests.

Tanya Goudsouzian is a Canadian journalist who has covered Afghanistan and the Middle East for over two decades. She has held senior editorial roles at major international media outlets, including serving as opinion editor at *Al Jazeera English*. Her work has also appeared in *The National Interest*, *Responsible Statecraft*, *War on the Rocks*, *The New Arab*, and *Engelsberg Ideas*.
Ibrahim al-Marashi is an associate professor of Middle East history at California State University, on the board of the International Security and Conflict Resolution (ISCOR) program at San Diego State University, and a visiting faculty member at The American College of the Mediterranean and the Department of International Relations at Central European University. His publications include *Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History* (2008), *The Modern History of Iraq* (2017), and *A Concise History of the Middle East* (2024).

What Total Iranian Victory Over Trump Looks Like: Five War Goals Explained

By Tom O'Connor | Deputy Editor, National Security and Foreign Policy
Source: https://www.newsweek.com/what-total-iranian-victory-over-trump-looks-like-five-war-goals-explained-12319445

Aug 14 – As President Donald Trump attempts to impose new demands for a deal that would put an end to the United States-Israeli war against Iran, the Islamic Republic continues to maintain a defiant stance, seeking concessions that would have profound ramifications for the region.

Iranian observers say this confidence is rooted in their government's steadfast belief that it has gained the upper hand in the war amid reports of mounting frustration in the White House.

"Trump imposed this illegal war on Iran, but the Iranians stood firm and resilient, and have defeated America so far," Tehran-based security analyst Alireza Taghavinia told *Newsweek*.

The resulting equation means the Islamic Republic no longer views itself as fighting a war for survival but rather a battle to turn the tables on a superpower by enforcing its own key objectives, of which Taghavinia identified five leading goals for Iran to usher in "a powerful end to the war in its own favor."

US Military Withdrawal

The top priority identified by Taghavinia was preventing future attacks against Iran.

"Today, the first issue for every Iranian is that we must ensure that Iran is no longer invaded and that war is forever removed from Iranian soil," he said.

The intervention, launched by the U.S. and Israel in February, has even prompted many Iranians "to want to acquire nuclear weapons to create an effective deterrent for Iran so that no one else can attack the country militarily."

Some experts have suggested that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei may indeed seek to rescind his slain father's official ban on weapons of mass destruction as a result of the conflict. But in the absence of any doctrinal shift, Iran's primary focus to shore up security has been on securing an exit of U.S. forces in the region, especially positions close to Iranian territory.

A sculpture overlooking the Strait of Hormuz is seen along the seafront in Bandar Abbas, Iran, on August 10, 2026. | Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images

"First, the security balance in the region must change in favor of Iran and the basis of the threat, which is the U.S. military presence around Iran, must be eliminated," Taghavinia said. "Iran intends to ensure that the shadow of war is forever removed from its soil. And it believes that as long as America remains in the Persian Gulf region, the shadow of war and threat will remain."

U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf have already suffered extensive damage due to Iranian missile and drone attacks. The vulnerability of these facilities has reportedly prompted the administration to consider relocating operations further west rather than commit to the multi-billion-dollar effort to fully regroup so close to enemy territory, an idea also backed by some former officials, such as former U.S. Central Command chief General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

The memorandum of understanding signed by Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in June also addressed the issue, including a clause stating that the U.S. "further undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final Deal."

That deal never came as hostilities resumed last month, and both sides hardened their respective negotiating positions.

US Pays for Damage

Meanwhile, Iran has suffered even more extensive damage to both military and civilian infrastructure since the onset of the conflict. Officials want reparations, be it from the U.S. or its partners in the region.

"Iran is seeking compensation and considers itself the victor in the war because it was able to defeat America, thwart Trump's goals, and gain control of the Strait of Hormuz," Taghavinia said.

"This means that the damages that Iran suffered as a result of this war must be compensated," he added. "Of course, if America does not pay the damages, the Arab sheikhdoms, which have a lot of wealth and were supporters of America, must pay the money."

This demand appears to have particularly incensed Trump. The U.S. president issued a response via Truth Social on Monday in which he said he was "likewise demanding compensation from Iran, for all of the

people that they have killed and gravely wounded with their roadside bombs and many conflicts, for which they are famous, as led initially by General Soleimani, including the families of those killed on the USS Cole, and thousands of others killed in combat."
The Trump administration has repeatedly accused the late Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Major General Qassem Soleimani—who was killed in a January 2020 strike ordered by Trump—of masterminding improvised explosive device (IED) methods faced by U.S. forces in post-2003 invasion Iraq, where Iran-aligned Shiite Muslim militias emerged alongside rival Sunni Muslim factions, including Al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the earlier October 2000 bombing of the U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS *Cole* while at port in Yemen. However, Trump has also alleged complicity from Tehran.
Trump's claims of Iranian links to U.S. troop deaths due to IEDs and the USS *Cole* bombing factored into his justification for launching the war against Iran, as did his blaming of Iranian officials for the killing of protesters during a historic wave of unrest that rocked the nation in January.
As such, Trump's recent message also declared that "compensation should be paid to the families of the hundreds of thousands of innocent protesters that Iran has killed over the last 50 years, not to mention the 52,000 that have been killed in the last five months."
He then followed up in a separate post by saying, "Iran should be responsible for the damages and death caused to the people of Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Gaza" as well.

The destroyed Shajareh Tayyebeh primary school, where more than 150 people were killed in a suspected U.S. strike, is pictured in Minab on August 10, ... | Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images

Iran Dominates Strait of Hormuz

Of Iran's top goals, leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial waterway through which roughly 20 percent of the world's oil passed before the war, may be most consequential. It's also arguably the aim on which Tehran has demonstrated most progress.
"Iran's achievement in the war, namely dominating the Strait of Hormuz and generating revenue from this waterway, must be recognized, and there is a national consensus in Iran on this matter," Taghavinia said.
One former U.S. Navy officer recently described to *Newsweek* Iran's ability to throttle the chokepoint as, "in some ways, a more powerful weapon than a nuclear bomb."

This pressure point, reinforced not only by drones and missiles but also geography, has inflicted pain across the global economy, some of it potentially permanent. And while the U.S. may not be the most heavily impacted nation by the Strait of Hormuz disruption, it's far from immune, with consumers feeling the brunt of Brent crude oil prices having surpassed $110 per barrel in May and now once again on track to match or even surpass that wartime peak as markets' hopes for a fall fade.
The cost would likely be far higher if not for the Trump administration authorizing mass releases from the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve, which is now at its lowest level since 1983, when the Iran-Iraq War previously wrought havoc on the Persian Gulf.



But rather than fuel support for Trump's stated efforts to secure an Iranian capitulation, the crisis has prompted a further plummeting of popular opinion toward the war, according to multiple surveys. Some experts have argued that declining domestic support may prove an even more dire challenge for the administration and its party than waning munitions stockpiles ahead of midterm elections in November.
The fate of the Strait of Hormuz is now at the center of the conflict and the latest effort to resolve it. Iran and Oman, whose territory lies directly across the maritime corridor from southern Iran, have reportedly engaged in talks centered on a "voluntary" fee to be paid by countries whose vessels transit the Strait of Hormuz, not unlike arrangements established in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait. Trump has sought to push back on Iranian rhetoric over its Strait of Hormuz leverage, telling reporters Wednesday, “They don’t have control. We have total control. We own it."
Hossein Taeb, the newly appointed head of the IRGC's Basij paramilitary forces, had an answer for this: “Today you see that the Strait of Hormuz is under the management and control of the Islamic Republic, and our country continues on its path in complete security,” the semi-official Fars News Agency cited him as saying on Thursday.

Iran Enriches, US Lifts Sanctions

Iran's final two objectives are intertwined and predate the conflict altogether.

"Iran's nuclear rights must be recognized by the world, and Iran must be recognized in the world as a normal and powerful actor," Taghavinia said. "U.S. sanctions must also be lifted, and if the U.S. and its allies intend to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, they must surrender to Iran and lift the sanctions."

Iran has been subject to U.S. sanctions in some form since the 1979 revolution that established the Islamic Republic, but the campaign became global two decades ago upon the issuance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737, adopted in 2006 in response to international condemnation over the discovery of the Islamic Republic's undeclared nuclear activities.

A brief thaw came with the 2015 signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran, the U.S. and other major powers. But skepticism among conservatives in both Tehran and Washington persisted, and Trump ultimately abandoned the nuclear deal in 2018.

The move effectively renewed Iran's isolation, prompting Tehran to accelerate uranium enrichment beyond JCPOA caps. Failures to reach a new deal served as the pretext for Israel's 12-Day War against Iran last June, when the U.S. first took the unprecedented step of directly striking Iranian nuclear facilities.

With Iran's nuclear program once again on the agenda as Washington and Tehran explore options to end the current conflict, Iranian officials have insisted that they retain the right to enrich uranium at lower levels.

The White House's messaging has shifted throughout the course of the war, most often focused on generally declaring that Iran could never obtain a nuclear weapon, although Trump and other administration officials have also at times stated explicitly that Iran could not domestically enrich at all.

What Iran Has Already Achieved

In addition to successfully raising the costs of the war through regionwide strikes and leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's biggest win yet may be the way it has shattered long-held assumptions of the balance of power in the Middle East.

Regional countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and others, are recalibrating their assessments of U.S. security commitments and have pursued coalition-building in the region and its periphery to deter Iranian attacks with both the threat of force and promise of diplomacy, while Washington continues to transition assets further away to Israel and Jordan.

"This is a victory for Iran," said Amir Hossein Vazirian, another analyst based in Tehran. He recalled how, since the pre-Revolutionary era under the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty, "Iran believed that security order in the Persian Gulf is the issue of the Persian Gulf countries, without any foreign intervention."

But Vazirian noted that a divide persists in the opposing perceptions of the U.S. and Iran regarding their roles in the conflict, with both sides viewing themselves as the victor.

"There is a gap between the two countries on the winner of the war," Vazirian told *Newsweek*. "The United States believes that they succeeded in obliterating Iranian nuclear facilities and naval equipment, and so on and so forth. And the Iranian narrative is different. This is a part of the challenge to reach an agreement between them."

What's changed more recently from Iran's point of view, however, is that it appears to have advanced beyond a mostly reactive posture, as evidenced by Iran's pre-emptive strikes against U.S. positions in Jordan last month ahead of Trump's threats of a massive bombardment that was ultimately postponed in favor of diplomacy.

A new wave of hard-line thinking has also prompted threats of even further escalation, with Vazirian noting the June letter to Khamenei in which 85 officials reportedly appealed for a shift from an "eye for an eye" approach to a "head for an eye."

"The principle is changed. Unlike an eye for an eye, the new Iranian strategy is based on a head for an eye," Vazirian said. "And regardless of its credibility or its possibility, it is a reference to Iran's imagination about its powerful position in this war."

Henry Nowak murder: two officers under gross misconduct investigation

Source: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2026/jul/01/henry-nowak-two-officers-under-gross-misconduct-investigation

July 01 – The two police officers who handcuffed Henry Nowak as he lay dying from stab wounds have been placed under investigation for gross misconduct by the police watchdog.The Guardian has learned the two officers have been away from work because of threats they have received, which led to fears for their safety. The officers could face dismissal from the Hampshire force if they are found guilty.

The decision by the Independent Office for Police Conduct to change the nature of their investigation and expand it comes after two meetings with the Nowak family and their lawyer. It also follows public anger about the case after video footage showed the officers disbelieving Nowak's pleas that he could not breathe.

The IOPC had already been investigating since Nowak's death in Southampton in December 2025. It had previously assessed that there was no indication police may have breached discipline guidelines and treated the officers as witnesses. Nowak, 18, died in December 2025 after being

stabbed by Vickrum Digwa, who falsely told police he had been the victim of a racist attack, which led officers to handcuff Nowak and treat him as a suspect.

Bodycam footage shows Vickrum Digwa lying to police before his arrest – video

The investigation will also consider whether race was a factor. The case triggered claims started by the far right that Nowak's treatment by police had stemmed from an anti-white bias.

The IOPC said it would look at "whether the race or religion of either Henry or the Digwa family impacted on the actions and decision-making of the officers, [and] whether officers' decisions were influenced by assumptions or prejudice relating to community tensions at the time".

Pathology evidence heard at Digwa's murder trial said the stab wounds Nowak suffered were such that he could not have been saved. In a statement, the IOPC said: "The evidence indicates that both officers – who were the first to arrive at the scene late in the evening of 3 December 2025 – may have potentially breached the professional behaviour standards of duties and responsibilities, use of force, and discreditable conduct. "These relate to potential failures by the officers to recognise that Henry needed urgent medical attention, to immediately act after he said he had been stabbed and he couldn't breathe, and the decision to arrest and handcuff Henry rather than provide immediate first aid.

"There's also an indication one of the officers may have breached the standard relating to authority, respect and courtesy, for appearing to dismiss Henry saying he had been stabbed." Derrick Campbell of the IOPC said: "There is clear evidence that public confidence in the force may have been seriously harmed by this incident, and that is a factor we must consider when assessing the evidence.

"At the end of our investigation, we will decide whether any officers should face disciplinary proceedings."

The IOPC will also look at issues such as why Nowak was handcuffed, while Digwa was not when he was arrested for attempted murder after police realised Nowak had been stabbed. Campbell added: "It is also an important part of our role to identify whether any changes are needed to national or force policies or procedures, to improve police practice."

Digwa has been convicted of Nowak's murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum of 21 years. Senior government law officers are appealing against the sentence on the basis it is unduly lenient. The Hampshire force will not

suspend the two officers and said: "The officers are currently away from the workplace. If they return, they will be placed on directed duties that do not involve any contact with the public."

It declined to comment as to whether the reason the two officers were away from the workplace was because of threats.

The IOPC hopes to complete its investigation by September and is expected to interview the officers face to face.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Nowak had been walking home when he encountered Digwa, who stabbed him five times with a 21 cm (8.3 in) dagger he claimed was carried for Sikh religious reasons. Digwa was convicted of murder in May 2026 and sentenced to life imprisonment the following month, with a minimum term of 21 years. His mother was convicted of assisting an offender by hiding the dagger, and further charges were brought against Digwa and other family members over weapons found at their home. Digwa was carrying two ceremonial knives at the time of the murder: a small kirpan, required in the Sikh religion, and the 21-centimetre (8.3 in) dagger used to stab Nowak. He chose to carry the larger dagger or kirpan as a member of the Nihang order. The law in the United Kingdom allows initiated Sikhs to carry a blade, known as a kirpan, for religious purposes, as long as it does not exceed nine inches (23 cm). Nowak's father was of Polish descent, and Nowak himself was a dual citizen of the United Kingdom and Poland. Conclusions: (1) When we say "life imprisonment," we mean that we throw the key to the Thames River! (2) Law is not compatible with carrying a knife anywhere in the world! (3) Arresting officers should go back to school or even better, back to their homes and practice another profession. Wake up, UK!

A leader with a capital "L"

In a touching scene during the Indonesian military graduation ceremony, the Army commander noticed a soldier standing alone without family, so he took the initiative to embrace him, causing the soldier to burst into tears.

Want to lose weight and serve your country?

Apply for a position in a US air carrier!

Editor: I am sure that US Admiral James G. Stavridis would be very upset! Logistics win wars! Everybody knows this!

European Leaders: In Urgent Need of Deradicalization

By Robert Williams

Source: https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22737/european-leaders-need-deradicalization

Aug 16 – After World War II, many of Europe's "elites," notably in Germany and Austria, were in grave need of denazification. We have now arrived at a time when European leaders and "elites" are, once again, in desperate need of deradicalization -- from being "pro-Hamas." Sometimes the sentiment is presented as "pro-Palestine," but it really has nothing to do with Palestinians and everything to do with hating Jews. If these protestors were actually pro-Palestinian, they would be demanding freedom of speech, equal justice under the law, better educational opportunities and better governance, where Palestinian leaders were less

corrupt and did not shoot at their own people to prevent them from taking aid, or plant weapons depots among them to increase their own citizens' casualty rates.

Some of Hamas's senior leaders continue to live comfortably, far from Gaza, in Turkey and Qatar, and are billionaires many times over. Until a string of assassinations, the combined wealth of just the top three leaders of Hamas was $11 billion.

As with Nazism, the ultimate aim of the pro-Hamas or "pro-Palestinian" movement in Europe – especially since Hamas's Iran-orchestrated invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023 – is to rid the world of Jews "by any means necessary," as the pro-Hamas crowds explain at their demonstrations. At least, the thinking seems to go, if the Jews are terrorized enough, perhaps they might flee Europe on their own.

The "pro-Hamas" sentiments among the governing classes in Europe appear to be guided by an overwhelming, almost frenzied obsession with Jews and the Jewish state -- often in a way that works against these countries' own national interests. In Britain, for instance – a country literally circling the drain as it descends into migrant violence and chaos – there was recently a gruesome attempt by a Sudanese migrant to behead a British man in Belfast. What, though, is Parliament busy debating? Israel.

"This is already the second debate this week on Israel," Lord Austin told the House of Lords on June 10.

"Over the last few years, Parliament has discussed Israel more than any other issue — not just more than any international issue but more than any domestic issue, including the economy, unemployment, crime or the NHS. The public out there look at Parliament and think this is utterly mad." In Ireland, currently facing its own huge self-inflicted problems with migrant crime, President Catherine Connolly praised her sister's participation in the May 2026 Hamas-aligned Global Sumud Flotilla by saying she was "very proud" of her. The flotilla has documented links to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. The sitting president of a European country is proudly boasting of her own personal links to an Islamic terrorist entity — and is admired for it rather than removed from office. The Irish government is also trying to pass a law boycotting Israeli goods, known as the "Occupied Territories Bill," thereby risking the violation of U.S. anti-boycott laws. Ireland is home to a large contingent of US companies, including tech giants such as X, Meta, Google and Microsoft. If, however, such a law were to pass, those companies might have to stop doing business in Ireland. Even if such a move would be a drastic blow to the Irish economy, in Ireland the hatred of the Jewish people and their tiny state might well supersede national interests.

France has opened a "war crimes" probe into Israel over its treatment of the Global Sumud Flotilla members. Meanwhile in France, violence in the cities has become so prevalent that authorities imposed nightly curfews to get through the 2026 FIFA World Cup. In June, Paris Mayor Emmanuel Gregoire granting honorary citizenship of the city to Gazans and the Arabs of the West Bank, as well as to "Palestinian journalists" -- many of whom have turned out to be –big surprise -- Hamas terrorists.

Nevertheless, European leaders can be seen hard at work accusing Israel of every imaginable crime and then turning around pretending to be "shocked" when Jews suffer the consequences of the hatred that these "leaders" help to create.

Lord Austin, speaking at the June 10 debate in the UK House of Lords, said:

"Do the Government and Parliament not understand that singling out the world's only Jewish state, holding it to standards not applied to anywhere else, and falsely accusing Israel of committing these terrible crimes is bound to drive hostility towards people who are identified with Israel, which is the vast majority of the Jewish community? This is why I believe Parliament is playing a large role in driving the explosion of antisemitism that we have seen on the streets of Britain."

The obsession with the Jews has spilled over into the rest of the culture. Jews have now become so deliberately ostracized and boycotted that they can barely find publishers for their books or a bookshop that will sell them. Their book festivals are boycotted by Nobel Prize Laureates such as J.M. Coetzee. While Jews can barely get published anymore, simply because of who they are, the publishing world is clamoring to publish Arab terrorists: Marwan Barghouti, a convicted terrorist serving five life sentences for murder, has a book, *Unbroken: In Pursuit of Freedom for Palestine*, scheduled for simultaneous publication in several countries on November 5, 2026. Boosting him as some sort of Nelson Mandela, the book will be carried by the leading publishing houses in Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, and the US. Genocidal Jew hate sells well.

Above all, perhaps, a story from Madrid about the actions of a public school shows the consequences of European government leaders' frenzied Jew-hatred -- of which Spain's Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez is one of Europe's most radical adherents. To remain in office, Sánchez depends on the even further-left Podemos, a party born of radical activism whose founders have long been entangled in troubling financial networks linked to regimes hostile to the West — in particular Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro.

A public school in Madrid recently saw 10-year-old students performing – as if straight out of an actual Hamas summer camp for kids -- a pro-Hamas play, dressed as Hamas terrorists, in keffiyehs, military clothing and balaclavas, carrying toy weapons while chanting, "With strength and courage, we will not surrender."

German author Thomas Mann (1875-1955), speaking on NBC radio on March 9, 1940, said:

"The anti-semitism of today... is nothing but a wrench to unscrew, bit by bit, the whole machinery of our civilization... like a hand grenade tossed over the wall to work havoc and confusion in the camp of democracy. That is its real and main purpose." The Nazis almost succeeded.

European leaders are now doing just about everything in their power to destroy Western civilization. They have facilitated mass migration from the Middle East and Africa, including all the third-world "traditions" that come with it. This time, no one will come to save the Europeans from themselves.

Educating the invaders!

Stephen Walt: Why the US keeps losing wars

Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, where he served as Academic Dean from 2002 to 2006. He previously taught at Princeton and at the University of Chicago, where he was Master of the Social Sciences Collegiate Division and Deputy Dean of Social Sciences. He is a Contributing Editor at *Foreign Policy* magazine, Co-chair of the editorial board of *International Security*, and Co-editor of the *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs* book series. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in May 2005 and received the International Studies Association's Distinguished Senior Scholar award in 2014. His books include *The Origins of Alliances*, which received the 1988 Edgar S. Furniss National Security Book Award, and Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, which was a finalist for the Lionel Gelber International Affairs Book Award and the Arthur Ross Book Prize. His book *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2007, co-authored with John J. Mearsheimer) was a *New York Times* best seller and has been translated into more than twenty foreign languages. His most recent book is *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy* (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2018).

Do we have a winner?

By the Editor

If we assess the 2026 U.S.–Iran war as of 22 August 2026, the answer is more complicated than either "the U.S. won" or "Iran won." The crucial distinction is between military performance, achievement of war aims, strategic outcome, and political narrative.

Why an expert/analyst could argue that the United States won

From a strictly military and technological perspective, the United States has demonstrated overwhelming superiority. The U.S. and Israel were able to conduct sustained attacks against Iran, degrade major military and strategic infrastructure, inflict substantial personnel and material losses, and impose severe economic pressure. Iran has suffered thousands of deaths, extensive infrastructure damage, and serious economic disruption. The United States, despite casualties, has not experienced anything remotely comparable to the physical destruction imposed on

Iran. More than 750 U.S. troops have reportedly been wounded, however, demonstrating that the war has not been cost-free[1].
The second argument concerns strategic coercion. Washington has demonstrated that it can impose enormous costs on Iran while maintaining the capacity to continue the campaign. The renewed sanctions campaign is explicitly intended to force Tehran toward concessions, while Washington continues to insist that Iran cannot be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon[2].
Third, Iran has been pushed into a defensive and economically precarious position. Iranian political leaders themselves are now publicly debating how to end the war because of the deteriorating economic situation. President Masoud Pezeshkian has argued for ending the conflict from what he describes as a "position of strength," while parliamentary and military figures face the reality that continued warfare is imposing enormous economic costs[3].
For an expert, therefore, "winning" does not necessarily mean occupying Tehran or obtaining an Iranian surrender**.** If the operational objective was to degrade Iran's military capability, disrupt its strategic infrastructure, impose unacceptable economic costs and demonstrate overwhelming American escalation dominance, the United States has achieved important successes.
But there is a major qualification: the United States has not achieved its full political objective**.** The June ceasefire arrangement collapsed, Iran has not capitulated, and Washington has not obtained a definitive settlement eliminating the nuclear issue. The Strait of Hormuz remains at the centre of the confrontation, and the war is approaching six months rather than ending rapidly as initially anticipated.
Thus, an expert military assessment could reasonably be: U.S. tactical/operational victory + major Iranian degradation + incomplete strategic victory.

Why a layperson could believe that Iran won

For the general public, wars are usually judged according to a much simpler formula: "Did the enemy surrender?" Iran has not.
Iran remains an independent state, its government remains in power, its armed forces continue to exist, its missile capability has not disappeared, and Tehran continues to reject American demands. Indeed, Iranian President Pezeshkian has publicly claimed that Iran achieved victory through resistance to U.S. demands[4]. There is another extremely powerful psychological factor: Iran has survived**.**
The United States possesses vastly superior conventional military capabilities, yet it has not produced an unconditional Iranian surrender. The war has instead become prolonged, costly, and politically problematic. The June agreement failed, the conflict has continued, and the United States is now applying economic rather than simply military pressure[1].
For a lay observer, this produces the apparently paradoxical conclusion: "If America was overwhelmingly stronger, why didn't America win?" Iran can therefore present survival itself as victory**.**
Furthermore, Iran's ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz gives Tehran a disproportionately powerful political narrative. Iran's control or attempted control of the waterway has affected global energy markets, while Washington has been unable to translate its overwhelming military superiority into a quick restoration of completely normal maritime traffic[5].
Consequently, the Iranian public can be told: "America attacked us, but it failed to overthrow us, failed to make us surrender, and is now negotiating and imposing sanctions because military victory alone did not achieve its objectives." That is a politically powerful narrative even if Iran suffered enormous military losses.

[1] The Latest: Over 750 US troops have been wounded since the Iran war began, Pentagon says. AP (August 21, 2016). Available from https://apnews.com/article/ad0783da9f5c491ba6793ef801a9a11e
[2] T. Hunnicutt and K. Jackson. Trump says Iran won't make deal he thinks is needed, threatens to bomb Oman. Reuters (August 17, 2026). Available from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-iran-should-surrender-threatens-bomb-oman-2026-08-17/
[3] B. Ghaffari. Iran's president calls to end war with US from 'position of strength'. Financial Times (August 21, 2026). Available from https://www.ft.com/content/9a094571-604d-4f1e-b5ff-c0b5dc032dc1
[4] Egypt speaks with Iran after Tehran claims victory, and other Middle East developments. AP (August 22, 2026). Available from https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-iran-israel-golan-467d9b2970e0b9855ac9a68ef90c8e75
[5] M-A. El-Din and K. Singh. Iran condemns US plans to announce new sanctions. Reuters (August 22, 2026). Available from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-keep-up-hostile-rhetoric-ahead-new-sanctions-2026-08-22/

The logical conclusion via merging the two perceptions

The most intellectually defensible conclusion is that neither side has achieved a complete victory. The United States has won the conventional military contest in the sense that its technological, intelligence, airpower, naval, and long-range strike capabilities have demonstrated overwhelming superiority. Iran could not prevent the United States and Israel from penetrating its strategic depth and destroying or damaging important military and strategic targets.

But military superiority is not synonymous with strategic victory. The United States has not yet compelled Iran to accept Washington's principal political demands. The war has lasted almost six months, the June settlement collapsed, the Strait of Hormuz remains contested, Iran's government remains intact, and Tehran continues to possess military capabilities with which it can impose costs on the United States and its (GCC) partners[6].

Iran, conversely, has not won the military war. Its territory has been attacked, its infrastructure damaged, its economy severely weakened, thousands of people have been killed, and its conventional military capabilities have suffered serious attrition. Its ability to continue fighting should not be confused with military success. The best formulation is therefore: The United States won the war militarily; Iran avoided losing it politically. Or, more precisely: The U.S. achieved a substantial military victory but failed to convert that victory into a decisive strategic settlement. Iran suffered a major military and economic defeat but succeeded in preventing an American strategic victory. That produces a strategic stalemate emerging from an asymmetric military victory.

There is an even deeper lesson for security studies. The conflict demonstrates that the definition of victory has changed in modern warfare. In a conventional twentieth-century war, destruction of the enemy's military forces followed by surrender might constitute victory. In a twenty-first-century conflict involving a nuclear threshold state, missiles, drones, economic warfare, cyber capabilities, strategic chokepoints, information operations and domestic political endurance, victory can instead become a competition over who can sustain pressure longer and who can impose an acceptable narrative of the war on its own population and the international community.

And that is precisely where the U.S.–Iran conflict currently stands. Reuters[7] describes Washington's foreign-policy record as increasingly burdened by unresolved conflicts, while contemporary reporting characterizes the U.S. and Iran as locked in a strategic stalemate, each attempting to outlast the other.

My overall assessment as of 22 August 2026:

- ✓ **Military winner : United States.**
- ✓ **Military loser : Iran.**
- ✓ **Political/narrative winner: Iran can plausibly claim one.**
- ✓ **Strategic winner : Nobody yet.**
- ✓ **Overall outcome : an American military victory that has so far failed to become a decisive American strategic victory.**

That distinction is probably the most useful way to explain the apparently contradictory claims that "the U.S. won" and "Iran won" can both appear credible—depending on what the observer means by *won*.

Lowe's rape gang report and Europe's illegal immigration disaster

By Jemy Gatdula

Source: https://bworldonline.com/opinion/2026/07/10/762412/lowes-rape-gang-report-and-europes-illegal-immigration-disaster/#google_vignette

July 10 – Europe has spent the better part of three decades deluding itself that diversity is a strength. A slogan that became so fashionable, questioning it became treated not as a legitimate exercise of democratic inquiry but as a moral failing. Yet public policy, no matter how noble its intentions, must ultimately answer to reality. Reality recently came in the form of Rupert Lowe's recent Independent Rape Gang Inquiry. The report revisits one of the most disturbing scandals in modern British history: the systematic sexual exploitation of

[6] J. Krauss. The 60-day deadline for an Iran peace deal is expiring. Here's where things stand. AP (August 18, 2026). Available from https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-war-diplomacy-deal-deadline-nuclear-258e9c556fc861c05ccf6ed2b38515d6

[7] H. Pamuk, A. Shalal and S. Holland. Trump heads into midterms short on foreign policy wins. Reuters (August 22, 2026). Available from https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-heads-into-midterms-short-foreign-policy-wins-2026-08-22/

vulnerable young girls by organized grooming gangs and the repeated failure of public institutions to intervene effectively.
A British Member of Parliament, Rupert Lowe initiated his inquiry back in February. The resulting report estimates that at least 250,000 white British girls were groomed, raped, and that 95% of abusers were Pakistani Muslims. Grooming was done via drugs, alcohol, blackmail, and racial/religious abuse.



The report declares it a "catastrophic, decades-long institutional failure" for the UK and extensively focuses on how local authorities, the police, and social services allegedly ignored the abuse out of fear of being labeled racist or politically incorrect. Among the most disturbing testimonies cited by Lowe was of one survivor quoted as "saying that she got pregnant. 'I was raped by probably 600 or 700 different men.' "Another one described violence involving a child: 'They put a cigarette out on the baby's face.'

"Yet another survivor recalled: 'He took the bottle of Jack Daniels and he forced it up inside me. I was about 12 or 13.'
"A survivor alleges rape by 'multiple police officers' in different parts of the country. One survivor said that her Christian faith was mocked by her abusers. They allegedly said, 'Where is your God now? Has your God forsaken you?'
"One survivor said: 'Race DID play a part. Throughout my exploitation. The other girls I encountered or were abused alongside me, were almost all exclusively White.' Another recalled seeing multiple girls being transported together: 'It was all White Girls. In a van. I remember seeing 15-20 girls locked in dog cages'." ("'Put cigarette on face, raped by 600-700 different men..': UK MP reveals disturbing grooming gang
But the foregoing is essentially a description of a pattern that had been blackening Britain for years: in Rotherham, Rochdale, Telford, Newcastle, Huddersfield.
In Rotherham, the inquiry led by Alexis Jay concluded that approximately 1,400 children were sexually exploited between 1997 and 2013. Victims described rape, trafficking, intimidation, and violence. Numerous reports were made to authorities. Yet decisive action was repeatedly delayed. In Rochdale, organized groups preyed upon vulnerable girls while local institutions struggled to respond. Telford produced allegations spanning decades, involving claims that abuse had become so widespread that it was effectively normalized within certain circles. Newcastle and Huddersfield generated further convictions involving organized networks that targeted young girls for sexual exploitation.
Most infuriating is what the Lowe Report describes as public authorities being frequently hesitant to discuss certain aspects of the offending patterns for fear of generating accusations of racism or inflaming social tensions. This lines up with the 2016 Casey Review, where Dame Louise Casey examined social integration and opportunity in isolated and deprived communities. It highlighted significant levels of segregation and inequality, and accused public bodies of ignoring divisive religious and cultural practices out of a fear of being labeled racist.

The review criticized institutional reluctance to engage with uncomfortable facts and argued that public authorities had, at times, failed to pursue difficult questions with sufficient rigor. The broader implication was clear: a democracy cannot effectively address problems that it refuses to examine honestly. The British experience is not occurring in isolation. Across Europe, similar debates have emerged regarding integration, social cohesion, and the limits of multicultural policy. France and Germany continue to wrestle with the consequences of large-scale migration over the past decade. Sweden presents a particularly striking example. For many years, it was regarded internationally as a model of progressive governance and successful social democracy. Yet Swedish politics is now dominated by debates over gang violence, integration, and public security. And yet while Muslims are given privileged protection by the authorities, Christians are frequently viewed with suspicion or hostility by cultural and political elites.

For the Philippines, as it faces its own questions regarding migration, national identity, religious coexistence, foreign influence, and the regulation of public discourse, the broader lesson is for public policy to remain grounded in reality rather than ideology. Reality is indifferent to political liberalism and sooner or later every society must confront the consequences of its choices.

But for now, the words of political commentator Douglas Murray ("Things Worth Remembering: The Dangers of Multiculturalism," January 2025) give comfort:

"The world has finally woken up this week to one of the biggest crimes in 21st century Britain: the organized gang rape of thousands of white working-class girls, mainly at the hands of Muslim men of Pakistani origin."

Jemy Gatdula is the dean of the UA&P Law School and is a Philippine Judicial Academy lecturer for constitutional philosophy and jurisprudence.


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https://www.ctm-e.org/

Van slams into crowd at Berlin's Pride event, killing 1 and injuring 16; police identify suspect

Source: https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2026-07-25/van-rams-crowd-at-berlin-lgbtq-event-1-killed-15-injured

July 25 — A van slammed into people gathered for Berlin's famed LGBTQ+ event on Saturday night, killing one person, injuring at least 16 others and prompting police to call off the celebrations and a concert in the German capital hours after they had begun.

Berlin police said they have identified a suspect, who was shot and killed in a police operation in Spandau. He had ties to Islamic extremists (IS) in the German capital, police said.

"The suspect is known to police. He is known to us as a member of Islamic circles here in Berlin, and our search for this person is proceeding at full speed," said police spokesman Florian Nath. He did not identify the suspect.

Earlier, police said some of the victims had life-threatening injuries. In a post on X, police called on everyone to leave the site of the event immediately as ambulances and firefighters attended to the victims. "We are conducting an intensive search for possible suspects," Nath said in a short video released on the Berlin police account on X.

According to police, a white van had driven into the Tiergarten park around 10 p.m., which is just off the route where the Pride march had passed along earlier, and hit several people before colliding with a tree. Police could not say how many officers had been deployed to the scene. It was "definitely a lot of police," one officer said. Overall, more than 2,200 police officers have been on duty in Berlin since Saturday morning to protect the Pride parade and other LGBTQ+ events in the city. Police were conducting witness interrogations at the park during the night and were investigating accounts that, in addition to the crash, some victims appeared to have suffered stab wounds. It was too early to draw any conclusion from those accounts, police said. Berlin Mayor Kai Wegner expressed shock, saying that "following a peaceful and vibrant Pride parade, the rally for a tolerant and peaceful Berlin was attacked in the most brutal manner."

"This is an attack on our free and cosmopolitan society," Wegner said. "I have confidence in the police and security authorities, who will be working around the clock to investigate."

21-year-old Abdul Rahman Tawfiq Baloot, German citizen of Lebanese origin

Meanwhile, authorities called on possible witnesses to come forward and share with police any video or photos they might have taken at the scene of the attack.

The city also activated a crisis hotline for people searching for missing friends or family members.

Hundreds of thousands of people had come to Berlin on Saturday to celebrate at Berlin's Pride parade, known in Germany as Christopher Street Day. It's one of Europe's largest LGBTQ+ celebrations.

The Pride event in front of the city's iconic Brandenburg Gate downtown was called off around 10:15 p.m., and a band's performance on stage was interrupted. People were urged to go home and to avoid taking the route through the park.

Before the incident, people had celebrated peacefully, marching

through the city for hours, dancing to loud music and cheering some 80 floats that participated in the parade.
Julian Miethig, who had attended the LGBTQ+ party at Brandenburg Gate earlier, said he had wanted to go to an afterparty when he heard from a friend that "something bad happened there and there are a lot of fire trucks, a lot of emergency vehicles, ambulances." He said he went to Tiergarten and was shocked that something like this could have happened at Berlin's Pride celebrations.
"It's a dark day for the community," he said.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: He was known to authorities! ENOUGH! (1) Deport suspects with their families, relatives and friends; (2) Retire current police chain of command. We all know that surveilling all these suspects is impossible. So, more drastic measures are required. Otherwise, more blood, tears and flowers will follow…

Are Terrorist Networks Entering a New Era of Cooperation?

Source: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/07/26/are-terrorist-networks-entering-a-new-era-of-cooperation/

July 26 – For much of the modern era, terrorist organizations have been understood through the prism of ideology. Ethno nationalist insurgencies have pursued territorial autonomy, while jihadist organizations have sought transnational religious objectives. This distinction has long shaped intelligence assessments, military strategies and international counterterrorism frameworks. Increasingly, however, ideology appears to be giving way to operational pragmatism.
Across multiple conflict theatres, terrorist organizations with fundamentally different objectives have demonstrated a growing willingness to cooperate tactically, share logistical networks, amplify each other's propaganda and exploit information warfare when doing so advances their common strategic interests. The assassination of judicial officials in Pakistan's Mastung district on 23 July 2026 offers a compelling case study of this emerging phenomenon and its implications extend far beyond South Asia.
The attack itself was significant not simply because it targeted senior members of Pakistan's judiciary, but because of what followed.
Armed militants ambushed the official vehicle carrying Sessions Judge Abdul Hakeem Kakar as he travelled from Quetta to the Sessions Court in Mastung. Judge Kakar and his police gunman were killed, while Additional Sessions Judge Tariq Lashari later succumbed to injuries sustained during the attack. Judicial officials have historically represented one of the most protected symbols of state authority. Their deliberate targeting therefore constitutes an attack not merely on individuals but on the administration of justice itself.

Judges have long been priority targets for terrorist organizations seeking to obstruct prosecutions, intimidate legal institutions and weaken public confidence in the rule of law. Pakistan's Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan repeatedly adopted this strategy through assassinations of judges, prosecutors and lawyers involved in terrorism related cases. The targeting of judicial institutions is therefore neither unprecedented nor accidental. It represents a deliberate effort to dismantle one of the state's most important instruments against violent extremism.
What distinguished the Mastung attack was the almost immediate claim of responsibility issued by Islamic State Khorasan Province.
The rapid claim emerged despite widespread assessments by Pakistani security officials and several regional observers that the operation bore characteristics more commonly associated with the Balochistan Liberation Army. Whether that assessment ultimately proves correct remains a matter for investigators. Nevertheless, the timing of the ISKP statement immediately transformed a domestic terrorist attack into a broader intelligence puzzle with significant international implications.
The central question is no longer simply who pulled the trigger.
It is whether terrorist organizations with fundamentally different ideological narratives are increasingly willing to manipulate attribution itself as part of modern terrorist strategy.
Information warfare has become an indispensable component of contemporary conflict. States routinely employ cyber operations, influence campaigns and strategic messaging to shape public perceptions. Terrorist organizations have increasingly demonstrated similar sophistication. Responsibility claims now serve purposes beyond propaganda. They can confuse investigators, fragment public debate, shield operational partners and complicate attribution for intelligence agencies.
If one organization conducts an attack while another rapidly claims responsibility, investigators are forced to devote valuable time and resources distinguishing operational responsibility from information manipulation. The resulting

ambiguity benefits both organizations by delaying accountability and obscuring operational networks.

This possibility deserves careful consideration in the Mastung case. Publicly available evidence does not conclusively establish direct operational coordination between the BLA and ISKP in this specific attack. Any assertion of formal collaboration would therefore exceed currently available evidence. However, the sequence of events raises legitimate analytical questions regarding tactical convergence, propaganda coordination or mutually beneficial information operations between the two organizations.

Counterterrorism professionals increasingly recognize that ideological incompatibility does not necessarily preclude operational cooperation. History offers numerous examples of actors with divergent political objectives collaborating temporarily when faced with common adversaries. Organized crime syndicates, insurgent movements and extremist organizations have repeatedly demonstrated that logistics, financing, intelligence sharing and operational convenience often outweigh ideological purity. Modern terrorism has become increasingly networked rather than hierarchical.

This evolution is particularly relevant in South Asia.

Although the BLA and ISKP pursue distinct ideological agendas, both seek to undermine Pakistan's state institutions, challenge government authority and generate sustained insecurity. Their strategic objectives differ, but their immediate operational interests can occasionally overlap. Such convergence does not necessarily imply organizational merger or permanent alliance. Rather, it reflects the emergence of flexible terrorist ecosystems in which different actors may cooperate selectively whenever doing so increases operational effectiveness.

The broader security environment in Mastung reinforces concerns regarding this evolving threat landscape.

Only one day before the assassination of the judges, militants intercepted a civilian passenger bus, opened indiscriminate fire on passengers and killed several civilians. The district also witnessed attacks against military convoys, destruction of public infrastructure, including a bridge in Khad Kucha, and the reported arrest of alleged female suicide bombers linked to militant networks.

Taken collectively, these incidents illustrate a systematic campaign extending beyond traditional military targets.

Passenger transport, judicial institutions, infrastructure and civilian communities have all become targets. Such attacks are designed not merely to inflict casualties but to weaken governance, disrupt economic activity, isolate communities and undermine public confidence in the state's ability to provide security. This evolution reflects a broader transformation in global terrorism.

Increasingly, terrorist organizations seek to attack governance itself rather than simply security forces. Courts, schools, transportation infrastructure, hospitals, electoral institutions and civilian administrative systems have become attractive targets precisely because they symbolize state legitimacy. Their destruction produces psychological effects far exceeding their immediate tactical value.

The implications extend well beyond Pakistan.

The international counterterrorism architecture remains largely organized around discrete organizations with clearly identifiable command structures and ideological identities. Sanctions regimes, intelligence databases and designation mechanisms typically focus on individual groups. Yet emerging patterns of terrorist convergence challenge these assumptions.

If different organizations increasingly cooperate operationally while maintaining separate identities, existing counterterrorism frameworks may struggle to identify the true nature of evolving terrorist ecosystems.

The Mastung incident therefore raises an important question for international policymakers.

Should counterterrorism increasingly focus not only on designated organizations but also on the networks connecting them?

The answer may shape future international security policy.

The apparent convergence observed in recent incidents suggests intelligence agencies should devote greater attention to overlapping facilitation networks, financial channels, recruitment pathways, communication infrastructures and information operations that transcend organizational boundaries.

Equally important is the challenge of attribution.

Rapid claims of responsibility should no longer be accepted at face value. Intelligence assessments must distinguish between operational execution, logistical support, strategic direction and propaganda exploitation. These increasingly represent separate dimensions of modern terrorist operations rather than a single unified process.

For international institutions, including the United Nations Security Council, these developments may also have legal significance.

Should credible evidence emerge demonstrating sustained operational cooperation, financial facilitation or coordinated terrorist activity between designated and non designated organizations, it could strengthen the evidentiary basis for consideration under the UN Security Council's counterterrorism sanctions framework, including Resolution 1267 and subsequent resolutions. Any such action would, however, remain subject to the evidentiary standards and deliberations of the relevant UN sanctions committees.

Ultimately, the greatest lesson of Mastung is not confined to one district or one country.

The attack illustrates how terrorism itself is evolving.

The boundaries separating separatist insurgencies,

transnational jihadist movements and hybrid terrorist networks are becoming increasingly blurred. Modern terrorist organizations are demonstrating greater operational flexibility, greater sophistication in information warfare and a growing willingness to cooperate tactically despite profound ideological differences. For policymakers, intelligence agencies and international institutions, this transformation demands a corresponding evolution in counterterrorism strategy. The future threat may no longer be defined solely by individual organizations but by the dynamic relationships connecting them. Understanding those relationships, distinguishing operational reality from strategic deception and responding through coordinated international action will determine whether the next generation of terrorist convergence can be contained before it becomes the defining security challenge of the coming decade.

The War That Made America Weaker

By Ahmed Eldin

Source: https://ahmedeldin.substack.com/p/the-war-that-made-america-weaker

July 26 – Five months ago, on February 27th, the Strait of Hormuz was open. A fifth of the world's oil moved through it every day, no questions asked. Today it's closed, not on paper, but in the way that actually counts. War-risk insurance is running at eight times normal. The biggest shipping lines on the planet are routing around the entire continent of Africa rather than risk it. That's the smallest cost of this war. The rest is still coming.

Gas was $2.98 a gallon before the first missile flew. It's over four dollars now, and it touched $4.56 at one point in May. Every American filling up a tank is paying a war tax nobody voted for, funding a war nobody in this administration can explain the end state of. I wrote about this likelihood on February 27th, the day before the first missile flew.

Twenty percent of global oil trade. Twenty percent of global LNG. A twenty-one-mile-wide chokepoint that Iran had spent decades building the exact naval capability to hold hostage the moment it had nothing left to lose. None of that was classified information. It was sitting in open shipping data, in the record of how this regime uses leverage, and in plain geography. You didn't need a source inside Tehran to see it coming. You needed to read a map. A few days after that piece

went up, I spent fifty-two days in a Kuwaiti cell. Interrogators sat across from me circling the same questions: who inside Iran's government leaked me the Hormuz plan. I gave them the same answer every time. Nobody leaked me anything. There was no source, no back channel, no mole. There was a laptop, public shipping data, and twenty years of watching how this regime negotiates. It was easier to invent a spy than to accept that Iran's next move was obvious to anyone willing to actually study the region. On the very first morning of this war, a Tomahawk missile, American-made and American-fired, hit a girls' elementary school in a town called Minab. The AP spent months reconstructing what happened because the Pentagon wouldn't. Iran puts the toll at more than 150 dead, over 100 of them children. Five months later, there's still no American accountability or investigation of that morning. The president even floated, with a straight face, that maybe it was someone else's Tomahawk.

We were told this war would end Iran's nuclear ambitions. Instead we killed the one man in Tehran who U.S. intelligence itself believed genuinely didn't want the bomb. His son runs the country now, and our own intelligence agencies are telling the New York Times that Mojtaba Khamenei wants nuclear weapons more than his father ever did. The assassination of Mojtaba's father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, essentially handed the program to someone worse and called it progress.

Then there is the current state of the U.S. military. THAAD interceptors, Patriot missiles, Tomahawks — burned through at a rate that's got defense analysts warning the U.S. isn't positioned for anything else right now; not Taiwan, not Korea, nothing. The U.S. strategic petroleum reserve is at its lowest point since 1983, drained trying to blunt a gas price crisis this war created in the first place. Eighteen American service members dead. Hundreds more wounded, with the Pentagon's own count creeping upward every few weeks like it's still catching up to its own war.

Not long ago, Trump was telling reporters the U.S. would take control of the strait outright, that it would become the "Guardian Angel of the Strait," implying that shippers should pay Washington a toll for the privilege. In June he signed a memorandum in Versailles declaring the strait would reopen and calling it a major win. During the NATO summit in July, he was the one announcing that same memorandum dead. Friday, after thirteen straight days of fresh strikes, Trump told the military to stand down, then told a room of reporters the same line he's been repeating for months: Iran would "love to make a deal." Meanwhile it's Oman and Iran doing the actual negotiating over how to reopen the strait — not Washington and Tehran. The self-declared Guardian Angel isn't even in the room. Today, while his own administration was telling reporters that those talks were making real progress, an oil tanker exploded after striking an Iranian naval mine — a mine that turned up the moment a ship strayed from the shipping corridor Iran unilaterally decided is the only safe one, according to its own Tasnim news agency.

Men in a Kuwaiti interrogation room spent fifty-two days refusing to believe a journalist could predict this inevitability without a leak. The only person who genuinely didn't seem to see where this war would take us — and still, this week, doesn't seem to realize it — is the man who gave the order to start the war in the first place.

Into the Crowd: The Evolution of Vehicular Attacks and Prevention Efforts

By Alexandre Rodde and Justin Olmstead

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Source: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/into-the-crowd-the-evolution-of-vehicular-attacks-and-prevention-efforts

Five recent mass-casualty attacks underline the continued threat posed by the vehicle-ramming terrorist tactic. On December 20, 2024, Taleb Jawad Al-Abdulmohsen, a 50-year-old Saudi psychiatrist and self-professed atheist and anti-Islamist,[1] drove his rented BMW X3 around the Magdeburg Christmas Market in northeast Germany. Using an emergency escape road set up by local law enforcement,[2] the perpetrator was able to drive into the crowd for 400 meters, killing six and injuring 299.[3]

Eleven days later, Shamsud-Din Jabbar, a U.S. veteran from Texas, drove a Ford F-150 Lightning pickup truck flying an Islamic State flag into pedestrians celebrating New

Year's Eve on Bourbon Street in New Orleans, Louisiana.[4] Crashing his vehicle after 400 meters, he opened fire on the crowd before being neutralized by law enforcement officers. Fourteen people were killed and 35 were injured during the attack.[5]

A few weeks later, on February 13, 2025, Farhad Noori, a 24-year-old Afghan national, rammed his Mini Cooper into a union demonstration close the Munich train station. Two people—a mother and her two-year-old daughter—were killed and 37 others were

injured before the suspect was arrested by German law enforcement. Noori was known to share Islamist content online; he screamed "Allah Akbar" multiples times as he was arrested.[6]

A further two weeks later, in a terrorist attack on February 27, 2025, a 53-year-old Palestinian driver injured 13 people at a bus stop in Israel before being neutralized by Israeli law enforcement.[7]

Most recently, on March 3, 2025, in Mannheim, Germany, a 40-year-old German national with mental health challenges drove his car into a crowd, before fleeing. The attack killed two people and injured 11 others. The driver then attempted suicide using an alarm pistol in his car, before being detained.[8]

This article explores the characteristics of vehicular attacks, with part one discussing the tactical advantages they offer to the assailants both during the preparation of attacks and in their execution. The second part of the article discusses the evolution of the threat, and the third part examines the evolution of prevention efforts.

Characteristics of Vehicular Attacks

Vehicle-ramming tactics, and efforts to stop them, are far from a new phenomenon and were first observed in Israel in the early 1970s and have more recently been a regular feature of Islamic State terrorism in the West.[9] Vehicular attacks are, by definition, a low-skill and low-tech *modus operandi*. Most individuals are familiar with the use of a motor vehicle, and no technical knowledge is required outside of the target selection phase of the attack. Access to a vehicle can be gained through various means such as theft (as seen in Berlin in 2016 where Anis Amri stole the truck he used to target the Breitscheidplatz Christmas Market)[10] or taken from work (as seen in an attack in Jerusalem in 2008 involving a bulldozer).[11]

In other cases, assailants have used their personal vehicles during attacks, as seen as in a car-ramming attack in Munster, Germany, in 2018[12] and Waukesha, Wisconsin, in December 2021.[13] In numerous cases, perpetrators rented—at no significant cost—the vehicles they used in attacks. For example, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, who carried out what remains the deadliest vehicular attack in history in 2016 in Nice, France, rented a truck for a few thousand euros.[14] The rise of vehicle-sharing apps, similar to the one used by the New Orleans attacker, can reduce the cost of obtaining a vehicle while at the same time allow perpetrators to avoid whatever scrutiny they might face from commercial car renting companies.[a]

Perpetrators of vehicular attacks also have access to a vast number of potential targets given the growth of pedestrianized areas in urban centers and of open-air gatherings following the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite attempts by authorities to protect certain zones where there is high foot traffic, it remains all too easy for perpetrators to find targets. According to an examination by the authors of mass casualty attacks in the West between January 2012 and December 2022—defined as attacks in which four or more victims were killed—vehicular ramming was the second most common method used after mass shootings.[15]

Vehicular attacks also have a particularly shocking component, due to their speed and kinetic force and the fact that they occur in highly vulnerable pedestrian spaces. This facilitates an important aspect of terrorism: media coverage, especially if images or videos of the attack are posted online or broadcast. In the case of the Magdeburg attack, CCTV images immediately spread on social media in the minutes following the attack, before being broadcast on traditional channels. Some assailants seek to maximize the media impact, with one example being the New Orleans attacker flying an Islamic State flag at the back of his attack vehicle.[16]

Countering vehicular attacks is hugely challenging. Potential targets are numerous, changing in number according to seasonal activities, events, or time of day. The type of vehicle used by attackers will also impact the type of protection that needs to be set up, according to speed, weight, size, and special capacity in the case of a weaponized excavator or bulldozer. Detection of potential attackers is also made difficult because of the number of vehicles in urban areas and because of the usual absence of criminal acts in the preparation of attacks. In the Magdeburg, New Orleans, and Munich attacks, the intention of the perpetrators was only clear to law enforcement personnel at the moment the vehicle entered the restricted zones, just seconds before the attacks began.

On the response side, vehicular attacks are extremely fast-paced events with the immediate potential for a large number of casualties, including numerous polytraumatized victims who need immediate medical attention. The speed and impact of vehicular attacks sometimes resemble more of a large bomb attack than a mass shooting. The complexity of the victims' injuries presents challenges that go beyond the medical capacities of first responders.

The Evolution of the Threat

According to the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database, there were 288 incidents of vehicular terrorism from 1970 to 2020.[17] This number is focused on vehicles used as blunt-force weapons to attack civilians and does not include vehicle-borne explosives, or, in the case of Israel, against soldiers.

In 1973, Olga Hepnarová killed eight people in Prague when she drove her Praga RN truck into a group of pedestrians. Four years later, a man in his early 30s rammed his car into the stage during a Ku Klux Klan rally in Plains, Georgia, injuring some 30 people.[18] Seven years later, in 1984, an individual looking to "get even with the police" drove his car into a crowd in Los

Angeles, killing one person and injuring 54 injured.[19] Similar attacks took place elsewhere in the world, including in Australia and Brazil.[20] From 1990 to early 2000, there were regular vehicular attacks in Israel and the West Bank, frequently targeting IDF soldiers at bus stops.[21] This method of attack continued and expanded in the 2010s, mostly used by lone operators organizing attacks without the support of a group. In a 2010 edition of the al-Qa`ida magazine Inspire, jihadi groups promoted such tactics due to their efficiency, calling followers to "mow down the enemies of Allah."[22] In the mid-2010s, there was an increase in Palestinian vehicular attacks in Israel and the West Bank,[23] at the same time a wave of Islamic State-organized and -inspired attacks started in Western Europe.[24]

In September 2014, Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani called for supporters to use vehicles as weapons, saying that if they were "not able to find an IED or a bullet," then they should "single out the disbelieving American, Frenchman, or any of their allies, smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car."[25] Just weeks later, on October 20, 2014, one of the group's supporters, Martin Couture-Rouleau, heeded the call in a vehicle attack that killed a member of the Canadian armed forces.[26] There were, however, no further terrorist vehicular ramming attacks in the West until a January 2016 attack on the French military in the town of Valence. (See Table 1 in the appendix.)

The watershed moment for the threat came on France's national day in 2016. At 10:32 PM on July 14, a 19-ton Renaud Midlum truck, driven by 31-year-old Tunisian jihadi named Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, plowed into the crowd on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, France, for more than a kilometer. Eighty-six people were killed and 458 were injured in the span of four minutes and 17 seconds, before the terrorist was shot dead by law enforcement. He had carefully organized his attack, using his job as a delivery man to rent the truck in advance, and practicing reconnaissance and driving in the area 11 times in the days preceding the attack.[27]

In the years that followed the Nice attack, there was an increase in mass-casualty vehicular attacks in the West. (See Table 1.) Just five months after the Nice attack, in December 2016, another jihadi attack using a semi-trailer truck killed 12 people at a Christmas market in Berlin. As noted by Vincent Miller and Keith Hayward, "the VRA [vehicle ramming attack] has transitioned from being a relatively rare occurrence, to become, by 2016, the most lethal form of terror attack in Western countries, claiming just over half of all terrorism-related deaths in the West that year."[28]

The following year saw a surge in vehicular terrorist attacks in the West (defined for the purpose of this study as North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand), with seven attacks, the most seen in any year. (See Table 1.) These included mass-casualty attacks by jihadis in London in March 2017 (five killed, including four with a vehicle),[29] in Stockholm in April (five killed),[30] Barcelona in August (13 killed),[31] and New York in October (eight killed).[32]

It is noteworthy that there was a surge in vehicular terrorist attacks following the two deadliest attacks (Nice and Berlin). The authors assess that this created a demonstration effect in which the high casualties and significant media coverage of those attacks showed the effectiveness of this terror tactic and in turn produced a copycat effect. This suggests that the demonstration effect is a more powerful indicator of future attacks than calls by terrorist leaders such as the late Abu Muhammad al-Adnani for the tactic to be used.

The surge in vehicular attacks during this period was also seen in the developed world as a whole, to include Palestinian terrorism targeting Israel. Writing in 2019, Brian Michael Jenkins stated, "because there are relatively few events over a long period of time (more than 45 years), the trend lines can be misleading. However, the recent increase is obvious. There were 16 attacks between 1973 and 2007 and 62 attacks between 2008 and the end of April 2018. Thirty of these occurred in 2017 and the first four months of 2018 alone."[33] According to Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth, the use of vehicles as weapons of terror in developed countries increased from two in the years 1994-1997 to 68 in the period from 2014-2019.[34] [b]

These tactics soon extended beyond the jihadi ecosystem to include attacks perpetrated by non-ideological attackers in Melbourne, Australia, in 2017 (six killed, 27 injured);[35] Munster, Germany, in 2018 (four killed, 20 injured);[36] Trier, Germany, in 2020 (five killed, 23 injured);[37] and Waukesha, Wisconsin, in 2021 (six killed, 62 injured). Far-right terrorists also applied the same tactics, in London, United Kingdom, in front of the Finsbury Park Mosque where one person was killed and 12 others were injured by Darren Osborne in 2017[38] and London, Canada, where a 20-year-old killed four members of a Pakistani family with his car in 2021.[39]

According to the authors' database, there were 18 terrorist vehicular ramming attacks between January 2014 and March 2025 in the West. The large majority of attacks were carried out by jihadis, many of whom were inspired by the Islamic State. Fifteen (83%) of the terrorist attacks were carried out by jihadis and three (17%) by right-wing extremists. Five of the attacks (28%) targeted the military, police, and security services.

Cars were most often used in the attacks. Thirteen of the attacks (72%) were carried out by cars, three of the attacks (17%) were carried out by trucks and two (11%) by vans. It is notable that the two highest casualty attacks were carried out by trucks—the Nice attack (86 killed and 458 injured) and the Berlin attack (12 killed, 56 injured)—underlining that this form of vehicular attack poses the greatest threat. Nine of the attacks

(50%) were carried out by vehicles owned by the perpetrators, seven of the attacks (39%) were carried out in rented vehicles, and two (11%) were carried out in stolen vehicles, in both cases trucks.

A total of 152 people died in the 18 attacks. Demonstrating that attacks are highly likely to produce casualties after being launched, 12 (67%) of the attacks produced fatalities and only one attack resulted in no injuries.

As can be seen Table 1, with the waning of the Islamic State international terror threat, terrorist use of vehicular attacks dropped in the West from 2018 onward, before ticking up in 2025 with the attacks in New Orleans and Munich. Both these attacks, especially the New Orleans attack, received significant media coverage or, in other words, created a new demonstration effect that could lead to a surge in copycat attacks in the months ahead.

The Evolution of Prevention Measures

Beginning in the 1990s, there have been efforts in the United States to harden buildings and other critical infrastructure from vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).[40] In many cases, this had the added benefit of protecting pedestrians who use the sidewalks separating the street from commercial or government buildings. Security practitioners saw bollards as one means of hardening the landscape while not limiting the aesthetic value of the area. From the1990s, the use of bollards has been the preferred choice of protecting campuses and buildings in the United States. In the United States alone, 90,000 sites have added concrete bollards since the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.[41]

Attempts to prevent any type of vehicular collision with pedestrians began as early as the 18th century with the use of wood and iron structures to direct pedestrians away from horse-drawn vehicles.[42] Preventative measures continued to be adopted in the form of streets and highways being designed around neighborhoods well into the 20th century.[43]

As Paul Hess and Sneda Mandhan point out, in New York, prior to the 2017 vehicle-ramming attacks in Nice and Berlin, physical security of public spaces was focused on VBIEDs.[44] The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency did not provide any guidance on how to protect against vehicle ramming that was not delivered via VBIED.[45] Protection rested on diversion of vehicles from high pedestrian zones with the use of bollards and other physical barriers, or limiting access of vehicles and pedestrians to areas deemed critical.[46] According to the Mineta Transportation Institute, since 2012, preventative measures have evolved to include more technology, such as cameras, fencing, and effective intelligence gathering, to disrupt potential attacks.[47]

It was after the Nice and Berlin attacks of 2016 that governments and security practitioners in the West focused significant attention on protecting against the vehicle-ramming threat to pedestrianized areas. Governments and security practitioners began working on new prevention techniques. Traditional retractable traffic bollards were deemed no longer sufficient because they cannot withstand the impact of large trucks. Stronger protective measures were put in place, with, for example, the French company La Barrière Automatique (LBA) developing a retractable bollard capable of withstanding the impact of a 7.5-ton truck going 80 kilometers per hour (approximately 50 miles per hour).[48] The LBA model is deployed one meter above ground and another 1.70 meters below, providing an 'iceberg' protection effect. While traditionally delivering products for the French Vigipirate national security plan, LBA is seeing its customer base expand from embassies, industrial sites, and stadiums to communities and businesses such as shopping centers and supermarkets. Much like the LBA model, Intertex Barriers of Valencia, California, has developed a retractable barrier that can be manually operated or function autonomously.[49]

In recent years, the use of active, passive, deployable, or improvised vehicle-ramming mitigation tools became common practice.[50] Vehicle inspections and security checks at entry points, remote parking, and shuttle services have also helped in mitigating the risk as once an attack is underway, it is extremely difficult to stop because of the speed of the attack and the difficulty in bringing a moving vehicle to a stop. During the Nice attack, for example, the killing was only stopped by the action of a civilian was able to throw his scooter in front of the 19-ton truck, slowing it down so that law enforcement officers were able to shoot and neutralize the terrorist.[51] The use of hollow point bullets by a majority of law enforcement agencies[52] is another impediment to stopping attacks in their tracks due to the deflection caused by the windshield.[53] The difficulty of responding to an active vehicular ramming attack underlines the importance of preventing attacks.

Conclusion

Vehicular attacks committed by terrorists are not a new phenomenon. As described in this article, this *modus operandi* has been used by lone actors and groups for decades around the world. The recent cases in Germany and the United States are not a return of the vehicular attacks in the West but rather an evolution of the *modus operandi*, using new technical tools such as the use of electric cars and peer-to-peer apps.[54]

The recent attacks do represent an uptick in the use of the tactic, however. Following the Nice and Berlin attacks in 2016, vehicular ramming terrorist attacks in North America and Europe reached a peak in 2017, before subsiding with the waning of the international terror threat posed by the Islamic State and its supporters. Of the 18 terrorist vehicular ramming attacks between 2014 and March 2025, 15 (83%) were carried out by jihadis and three (17%) by right-wing extremists. Most of the attacks involved cars but the two of the highest casualty attacks (Nice

and Berlin) involved trucks, underlining that these forms of vehicular attacks pose the greatest threat. Most of the attacks produced fatalities and only one resulted in no injuries, demonstrating the high likelihood that vehicular ramming attacks will produce casualties once launched.

Since 2016, governments and security practitioners have focused significant attention on protecting against the vehicle-ramming threat to pedestrianized areas, bringing in new technologies. Protective measures such as using fixed or mobile bollards are key because once an attack is underway, it is very difficult to stop. But the facility of launching a vehicle attack and the very large number of soft targets means it is a tactic that is very difficult to defend against. Therefore, preventing attacks from being carried out in the first place through intelligence and law enforcement efforts is key but nonetheless challenging because an attack involving a vehicle can be planned and prepared with little risk of arousing suspicion.

When it comes to indicators and warnings of future attacks, the demonstration effect created by high-casualty attacks has, in the past, seemingly produced a surge in copycat attacks, which means that security agencies should be particularly vigilant in the months ahead given the recent uptick of high-profile attacks, including in New Orleans.

●▶ References are available at the source's URL.

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Berlin Pride: ISIS still inspires terrorism in Europe – but who carries out these attacks?

By Ibrahim Al-Marashi

Source: https://theconversation.com/berlin-pride-isis-still-inspires-terrorism-in-europe-but-who-carries-out-these-attacks-288447

July 27 – On Sunday, July 26, German police shot dead the suspected perpetrator of a car-ramming attack on Berlin's Pride march, which had left one dead and 20 injured the day before. The suspect already had a police record due to his previous attempt to join the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). In the 2010s, ISIS claimed multiple attacks on cultural events, mostly concerts. Some of its deadliest attacks on European soil were the 2015 Paris Bataclan attack and the 2017 bombing of an Ariana Grande concert at the Manchester Arena. More recently, in summer 2024, there was a failed ISIS-inspired plot to attack a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna.

There have also been previous directly homophobic ISIS-inspired attacks – the group also claimed responsibility for the 2016 attack on Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida.

As of 2018, ISIS no longer exists as a physical state, and without a political entity to inspire further attacks in Europe, its violence has slowed drastically over the last decade.

Yet the toxic ideology of "ISISism" – which seeks to resurrect a pre-modern Caliphate through modern, Western means, including social media – has continued to present the ultimate form of counter-hegemonic rebellion for a certain segment of young Muslims. Even stripped of its physical territory, the Islamic State still profoundly challenges and violates the sovereignty and safety of the US and Europe. Many people believed that the foiled 2024 Vienna attack marked the end of the already dwindling trend of European-born Muslims launching ISIS-inspired attacks. While there has been relatively little Islamist violence since then, the Berlin attack indicates that radicalisation and violence are certainly not a thing of the past.

The 'new Jihadis'

In early August 2024, three Austrian youths allegedly sought to target "Swifties", the fans of the American singer Taylor Swift, before her concert in Vienna in early August. The Austrian plotters had specifically declared their allegiance to ISIS. The plotters of the Swift concert attack included two Austrians, one with North Macedonian roots and the other with Turkish roots, both second-generation Muslims. The attacker behind the Pride parade in Berlin

had a similar background – he was born in Germany to Lebanese Muslim parents.

This trend backs up an argument made by Olivier Roy in a 2017 Guardian article entitled "Who Are the New Jihadis?" He argues that there are two demographics that usually join ISIS to conduct attacks in the West: second-generation European Muslims (often recruiting their brothers and sisters), and European converts. According to Roy, the children of Muslim immigrants born in European states typically live a secular life. They grow up in not-so-religious households, and may go to nightclubs and consume alcohol and drugs. Those from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds may end up involved in petty crime. At some point – often if they are incarcerated – they became "born-again" Muslims, embracing not just faith, but a more austere, radical version than their parents. They tend to meet in smaller religious groups, rather than the large mosques frequented by their families. It must be stressed that this is a small segment of "second-generation" European Muslims. What this trend reflects is that the children of immigrant families may engage in a generational revolt against their parents, seeking to prove that they are more devout than their parents. ISIS had little appeal for first-generation immigrants, who usually sacrificed everything for their children to have a better life in Europe. There are also very few "third-generation" European recruits, as by this juncture they are either well integrated into their society or have found ways to reconcile both dimensions of their identity.

A political flashpoint

Political debates surrounding the attack have already begun, with German minister Alexander Dobrindt labelling the attack "Islamic terror" after the attacker's past came to light.

His use of the word "Islamic" as opposed to "Islamist" may prove inflammatory. "Islamist" refers specifically to political Islam – which includes the beliefs of extremist groups like ISIS – while "Islamic" refers to the entire Muslim faith. Whether deliberate or not, Dobrindt's wording could be interpreted as suggesting a link between Islam and terrorist violence.

Right-wing parties and public figures across Europe will undoubtedly use the attack on the Pride parade as another reason to restrict immigration, even as they themselves work to actively dismantle and undermine LGBTQIA+ rights.

But the US and EU members can confront extremist terror attacks. Instead of being pulled into Islamophobic finger-pointing, they can instead take steps to address the socio-economic conditions that lead people towards terrorism. Despair, hopelessness and anger are why the allure of ISISism persists a decade after the declaration of the Islamic State. Marginalised, desperate communities provide fertile ground for ISIS' doctrine – and other forms of violent extremism across the political spectrum – to spread.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: Distinguishing between "faith" and "way of life" is the key to modern problems Europe is facing.

No EU-wide watchlist: Berlin Pride attack highlights gaps in monitoring Islamist extremism

By Anna Weglarczyk

Source: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/07/28/no-eu-wide-watchlist-berlin-pride-attack-highlights-gaps-in-monitoring-islamist-extremism

July 28 – The Berlin Pride attack has reignited questions over whether Europe is adequately monitoring individuals with a history of radicalisation and terrorism-related convictions who may pose a threat, particularly when suspects move across borders. There is no EU-wide register or official estimate of the number of individuals with established links to terrorism who are being monitored. Europol officials told Euronews that intelligence and security services operate at the national level, with each country applying its own legal definitions, surveillance thresholds and monitoring systems.

Suspect on police radar since 2022

The issue has come into focus after German authorities identified the suspect in the Berlin attack as 21-year-old Abdul Ballout, a German citizen of Lebanese descent known to police for previous violent offences and links to Islamist circles. Authorities are treating the incident, which claimed the life of one woman and injured 29 others, as an Islamist terrorist attack. The suspect was later shot dead by police.

Ballout had been known to German authorities for several years because of his criminal record, Islamist radicalisation and repeated attempts to join the Islamic State in Syria.

Convicted of assault and robbery-related offences in 2022, he later tried to travel to Syria via Turkey and Lebanon, where he was briefly imprisoned before being returned to Germany.

In May 2026, a Berlin juvenile court sentenced him to 22 months in youth custody for preparing a serious act of violence endangering the state, attempting to join the Islamic State and disseminating the group's propaganda online.

He was released after the court found there were no longer sufficient grounds for pretrial detention while prosecutors appealed for a harsher sentence. Authorities had also searched his home earlier this month over suspected weapons offences, although the investigation was dropped after officers found only a toy gun. Before the attack, Ballout had been ordered to undergo a deradicalisation programme. However, the organisation overseeing it concluded he had attempted to mislead evaluators into believing he had abandoned his extremist views.

Hundreds of potential Islamist threats in Germany

Germany is among the few European countries that publishes detailed figures on Islamist extremism, although authorities distinguish between the wider extremist scene and individuals considered at higher risk of carrying out violence. The country's domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), estimates that there are around 28,000 people on the Islamist extremist scene. However, only a small proportion are classified as potential violent actors. "From the larger group of Islamic extremists, there are about 450 to 470 people who are considered potentially violent," Dr Raphael Bossong from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) told Euronews. These individuals fall under the German security category "Gefährder" — a term used for people whom authorities believe could potentially commit a serious politically motivated crime. The number of Islamist Gefährder currently stands at around 446 people, according to figures cited by Bossong from the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). However, it fluctuates as investigations develop and individuals are added or removed from monitoring lists. The numbers also vary among Germany's federal states. In Berlin, authorities have previously identified around 100 people classified as Islamist Gefährder,although state-level figures are not always publicly available.

Terror threat in Belgium

Belgium also maintains a national watchlist of individuals considered a priority for monitoring under its Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation Strategy (T.E.R.), which combines intelligence gathering with prevention and rehabilitation. According to the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), the country's Common Database on Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation contained 529 entities in July 2026. These include 446 linked to Islamist extremism, 47 to right-wing extremism, 12 to left-wing extremism, six to nihilist extremism and 10 to anti-establishment extremism. "Being included in the database does not automatically mean that someone has been convicted or is in prison," a CUTA spokesperson told Euronews. "For every person included, an individual risk assessment is carried out to determine what type of follow-up is required. This may consist of security measures, but also guidance and preventive support through local partners."

CUTA said Belgium's approach is based on the principle that terrorism and extremism are "not only a security challenge, but also have a societal component".

No single European picture

Other European countries also maintain national monitoring

systems, but the figures are not directly comparable. France operates one of Europe's most transparent systems through theFSPRTwatchlist, which contains several thousand individuals considered at risk of violent radicalisation linked to terrorism. French authorities stress that being included on the list does not necessarily mean someone has committed a crime or belongs to a terrorist organisation. Outside the EU, the UK has said MI5 manages around 43,000 "subjects of interest" across all terrorism investigations, including Islamist and far-right extremism. The Netherlands also publishes threat assessments without disclosing the number of individuals under monitoring. Security experts caution that these figures cannot be combined because they measure different categories, from broader extremist milieus to active intelligence investigations and individuals considered potential attackers.

Europol: No central register, but intelligence sharing continues

The absence of a European-wide statistic has prompted questions over whether the lack of a common database affects cross-border monitoring of suspected extremists.

"Europol does not hold statistics on how many known terrorist suspects are currently being investigated or monitored across the European Union, as member states are not required to share such information with us," a Europol spokesperson told Euronews. The agency stressed, however, that the absence of a central figure does not mean that information-sharing mechanisms are missing. "Counterterrorism investigations are first and foremost a national responsibility," the spokesperson said. "Where investigations concern individuals with a potential cross-border dimension, member states can share relevant operational information with Europol."

Europol analyses that information, helps identify links between investigations and facilitates cooperation between national authorities.

"Europol's role is not to maintain a central register of individuals under investigation, but to support member states in cases where international cooperation is required," the spokesperson added.

The agency pointed to the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (EU TE-SAT) as the main publicly available source for tracking terrorist threats across the bloc.

The decentralised system means that European security services rely on national intelligence databases combined with information-sharing mechanisms, rather than a single EU-wide watchlist of individuals considered potential terrorist threats.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Source: https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc

Also Known As: Revolutionary Guards; The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami; Pasdaran; Sepah; and سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی

July 28 – Iranian military force created following the Islamic Revolution in 1979; according to the United Nations Security Council, involved in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; according to the European Union, has operational control over Iran's ballistic missile program and has undertaken procurement attempts to support Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear programs.

Responsible for protecting Iran's Islamic Republic government and extending its influence abroad; operates independently from and in parallel to Iran's conventional armed forces; reports directly to the Iranian Supreme Leader.

Provided a fortified site to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) for the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; reportedly has a Nuclear Command that provides security at nuclear installations; reportedly involved in providing security for Iranian nuclear experts and has reportedly supervised them to prevent the release of sensitive information about Iran's nuclear program.

Through its Aerospace Force and a network of state-owned and private companies, oversees development of missiles and military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); operates a military space program, which launches satellites into orbit for military use and oversees the development of space launch vehicles (SLVs); SLVs employ similar technologies to those used in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Was responsible for the early development of Iran's offensive chemical weapons program during the Iran-Iraq War, according to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency; since 2005, IRGC-affiliated Imam Hussein University has researched chemicals that have a wide range of sedation, dissociation, and amnestic incapacitating effects, according to the U.S. Department of State.

Affiliated universities Baqiyatallah University of Medical Sciences and Imam Hussein University have carried out research on viral strains that can be used as biological weapon agents.
Has provided financial and material support, weapons, and training to terrorist groups and militants in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere in the Middle East; has been directly involved in plotting terrorist attacks, according to the U.S. Department of State; has planned, orchestrated, or carried out terrorist attacks worldwide, often through its Qods Force.

Maintains offensive cyber capabilities.
Consists of seven main elements:

- Aerospace Force, which operates the IRGC's manned aircraft, ballistic missiles, drones, and anti-aircraft systems;
- Ground Force, a small conventional ground army that is also used for domestic security;
- Navy, a naval force which operates asymmetrically-armed small vessels near Iranian territorial waters;
- Qods Force, an expeditionary force responsible for overseas operations and managing foreign proxy groups;
- Basij Resistance Force, a paramilitary militia and reserve force involved in domestic security and repression;
- Intelligence Organization, a domestic and foreign intelligence unit that operates independently from Iran's intelligence ministry;
- Intelligence Protection Organization, a counterintelligence unit focused on IRGC internal security.

Comprised of more than 190,000 active-duty personnel; claims to be able to mobilize approximately 600,000 volunteers through the Basij; through the Qods Force-led Shia Liberation Army (SLA), is able to mobilize non-Iranians from countries including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan; deployed forces, including conventional ground forces and Afghan and Pakistani nationals, to Syria during the Syrian civil war.
Affiliated with several Iran-based universities and research institutions, including:

- Amir Al-Momenin University of Military Science and Technology
- Baqiyatallah University of Medical Sciences
- Imam Hussein University
- IRGC University of Command and Staff

Has business interests across the Iranian economy, including in the oil, construction, manufacturing, aviation and retail sectors.
Receives an allotment of Iranian oil production, which it sells to China through a network of front companies and vessels registered in third countries; coordinates oil exports through its Shahid Purja'fari Oil Headquarters.
Controls Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA); according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, uses profits from KAA's construction of infrastructure to fund illicit activities including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and support for terrorism.
Controls Bonyad Taavon Sepah and Bonyad Taavon Basij, ostensibly charitable organizations used to provide financial services to personnel and manage investment holdings.
Commander is Major General Ahmad Vahidi.
Other senior leaders include:

- Major General Ali Abdollahi (commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, which coordinates Iranian military operations)
- Brigadier General Seyyed Majid Mousavi (Aerospace Force commander)
- Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani (Qods Force commander)
- Brigadier General Mohammad Karami (Ground Force commander)
- Rear Admiral Ali Azmaei (Ali Ozma'i) (Navy commander)

Former senior personnel holding high-ranking Iranian government positions include:

- Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (speaker of parliament)
- Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr (secretary of the Supreme National Security Council)
- Mohsen Rezaei (military adviser to the Supreme Leader)
- Yahya Rahim Safavi (military adviser to the Supreme Leader)

Former commanders include Hossein Salami, Mohammad Ali Jafari (currently head of the IRGC's Baqiyatallah Social and Cultural Base), Mohammad Pakpour, Mohsen Rezaei, and Yahya Rahim Safavi.
According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), has been involved in attempts to produce beryllium domestically; according to the NCRI, several nuclear scientists involved in Iran's military nuclear activities were members of the IRGC, including Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani, and Mansur Asgari.

Sanctions
Named in U.N. Security Council resolution 1929 of June 9, 2010, which calls upon all U.N. member states to exercise vigilance over transactions involving the entity that could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
Listed by the European Union on July 26, 2010, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's

development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, EU member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

Listed by the European Union on February 20, 2026, as a terrorist organization; with some exceptions, EU member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, prevent assets from being made available to it, and prevent its leading members and operatives from entering into, or transiting through, their territories.

Designated by the U.S. Department of State on October 25, 2007, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; added on October 25, 2007, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing the entity's assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382; also designated on October 13, 2017, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, which restrict the use of the U.S. financial system for transactions involving Iranian entities.

Designated on April 15, 2019, by the U.S. Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO); the designation allows for criminal and civil penalties against those that knowingly provide support or resources to the entity, imposes financial restrictions on the entity within U.S. jurisdiction, and prohibits its members and representatives from entering the United States.

Foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity may be subject to U.S. sanctions; foreign financial institutions facilitating transactions for the entity may be prohibited from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States; also subject to heightened U.S. export license requirements (with a presumption of denial) due to involvement in activities related to WMD proliferation and terrorism.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and/or financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed as a terrorist group or a state threat/state sponsor of terrorism by the governments of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and/or financial transactions with the entity, freezing its assets in those countries, and/or allowing for criminal penalties against those that knowingly provide support or resources to the entity.

Listed by the Japanese government in 2025 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to missiles and conventional and nuclear weapons.

How Houthi instability is fueling the return of Somali piracy

By Suraiyya Aziz

Source: https://weeklyblitz.net/2026/08/01/how-houthi-instability-is-fueling-the-return-of-somali-piracy/

Aug 01 – After more than a decade of relative calm, Somali piracy is once again emerging as a serious threat to international shipping, regional security and global trade. Once considered a largely defeated menace following an unprecedented multinational naval campaign, pirate networks operating from the Horn of Africa have regained momentum amid growing instability across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. A combination of geopolitical conflict, weakened maritime security and alleged cooperation between armed groups has created conditions that security analysts warn could allow piracy to flourish once again.

The renewed wave of attacks comes as commercial shipping has already been under enormous pressure from ongoing instability in the Middle East. The disruption of major maritime routes, attacks on merchant vessels and shifting shipping patterns have all increased vulnerabilities across one of the world's busiest trade corridors. Against this backdrop, Somali pirate groups appear to have seized an opportunity to rebuild their operations.

Between January and May this year, roughly 20 suspected piracy incidents were reported in waters stretching from the Somali coast into the wider Indian Ocean. Several commercial vessels were successfully hijacked or detained, signaling that pirate groups are no longer limited to opportunistic attacks close to shore.

Among the most significant incidents was the seizure of the tanker MT Asana on July 17 approximately 50 kilometers off Yemen's Hadhramawt coast. Earlier, the MT Eureka was reportedly captured on May 2 before being taken toward the Somali coastline, while the vessel Honor 25 was similarly diverted in April.

Unlike the piracy crisis that peaked more than a decade ago, today's attacks demonstrate improved operational capability. Rather than remaining confined to Somali territorial waters, pirate groups are now operating hundreds of miles offshore, threatening vessels throughout the Indian Ocean.

Somali piracy did not begin as an organized international criminal business. Following the collapse of Somalia's central government in the early 1990s, local fishermen increasingly complained that foreign commercial fleets were illegally exploiting Somali fishing grounds while others dumped waste along the country's coastline.

With no effective navy or coast guard to defend national waters, local communities turned to armed militias for protection. Initially presenting themselves as defenders of Somali resources, some of these groups gradually transformed into sophisticated criminal organizations focused on hijacking commercial ships for ransom.

Between 2005 and 2012, Somali pirates attacked more than 1,000 vessels. The crisis reached its peak in 2011 when nearly 240 ships were targeted in a single year. The consequences extended far beyond East Africa.

International shipping companies rerouted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid pirate-infested waters. Insurance premiums surged dramatically, fuel costs increased and global supply chains experienced significant delays. Economic studies estimated that piracy cost the global economy approximately $18 billion annually through ransom payments, military operations, shipping disruptions and increased transportation expenses.

The dramatic decline in Somali piracy remains one of the most successful examples of coordinated international maritime security.

Navies from dozens of countries deployed warships across the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean to escort merchant vessels, disrupt pirate operations and respond rapidly to distress calls.

One of the central pillars of this effort was the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a multinational naval partnership established in 2001 that now includes 47 member nations, including Gulf Cooperation Council states. Its counter-piracy mission became instrumental in reducing attacks across key maritime corridors.

The European Union also launched Operation Atalanta in late 2008, providing additional naval resources to protect commercial shipping and humanitarian aid deliveries. China, Russia, Japan, India and several NATO members likewise contributed independent anti-piracy patrols.

Military operations at sea were reinforced by broader initiatives on land.

International partners supported Somalia's federal institutions, strengthened law enforcement capabilities, trained security forces and invested in governance programs aimed at restoring stability. Improved intelligence sharing, successful prosecutions and stronger legal frameworks further disrupted pirate networks.

The results were remarkable.

From 239 piracy incidents in 2011, successful hijackings fell sharply the following year. By the end of 2013, successful Somali piracy had virtually disappeared. Only one successful hijacking occurred during 2014 and 2015, followed by several years with almost no successful attacks.

The current resurgence is unfolding under very different geopolitical circumstances.

Since 2023, attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea have significantly altered global maritime traffic. Many shipping companies have chosen to avoid the Bab al-Mandab Strait altogether, redirecting vessels around southern Africa.

This diversion adds roughly 3,000 nautical miles to many shipping routes and extends voyages by between 10 and 14 days. Longer transit times mean ships spend more time in waters where naval coverage may be thinner, increasing opportunities for pirate attacks.

Security analysts also argue that pirate groups have become considerably more sophisticated than they were a decade ago.

Modern satellite communication systems reportedly allow pirates to monitor vessel movements far beyond the Somali coastline. Improved navigation technology enables operations deeper into the Indian Ocean, while heavier weapons increase their ability to intimidate crews during boarding operations.

These technological improvements represent a significant evolution from the relatively basic pirate skiffs that once relied primarily on speed and surprise.

One of the most debated aspects of the current piracy resurgence concerns the alleged relationships among Somali pirates, the militant group Al-Shabab, and Yemen's Houthis.

Multiple regional security assessments have suggested that Al-Shabab provides logistical support, safe havens and operational assistance to pirate networks operating along parts of Somalia's southern coastline.

Some analysts further argue that weapons, communications equipment and military expertise may flow through broader regional networks, allowing pirate organizations to improve their operational capabilities.

There have also been allegations that pirates increasingly serve as indirect proxies capable of disrupting international maritime traffic while providing plausible deniability to other armed actors. These claims remain difficult to verify independently, and the Houthis have publicly denied involvement in piracy operations.

Nevertheless, concerns about growing cooperation among non-state armed groups have become an increasingly important focus for regional security planners.

Somalia's own domestic difficulties have also complicated efforts to contain piracy.

The federal government continues to confront multiple security crises, including persistent attacks by Al-Shabab and the presence of other extremist organizations in parts of the country.

Political disputes between federal authorities and regional administrations continue to consume government attention, while economic constraints limit investments in maritime security, coastal policing and judicial enforcement.

Without sustained improvements in governance, many experts warn that criminal organizations will continue exploiting weak state institutions and poorly governed coastal areas.

Economic conditions also continue to favor piracy.

Higher global energy prices have increased the value of oil tankers and petroleum cargoes, making fuel shipments particularly

attractive targets. Shipping companies already facing elevated insurance premiums and longer routes must now contend with renewed piracy risks that could further increase transportation costs.

For pirate groups, successful hijackings offer the possibility of large ransom payments or access to valuable cargoes, creating powerful financial incentives to expand operations.

Although today's piracy levels remain well below those recorded during the height of the Somali piracy crisis, maritime security experts caution against complacency.

Experience from the previous decade demonstrated that piracy can escalate rapidly if early warning signs are ignored. Once pirate networks establish secure operating bases, recruit new members and accumulate financial resources, dismantling them becomes significantly more difficult.

Preventing another large-scale piracy epidemic will require a comprehensive international response.

Naval patrols across the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and western Indian Ocean may need to be strengthened through expanded multinational cooperation. Intelligence sharing among regional governments, commercial shipping operators and international naval forces will remain essential for tracking pirate movements before attacks occur.

At the same time, Somalia will require continued political, economic and security assistance to strengthen its own institutions, improve coastal law enforcement and address the underlying conditions that allow piracy to re-emerge.

Finally, disrupting the financial, logistical and military support available to pirate organizations-whether through criminal networks or armed groups-will be critical to preventing today's resurgence from evolving into another global maritime security crisis.

The successful suppression of Somali piracy a decade ago demonstrated that coordinated international action can work. Whether the international community can replicate that success amid today's far more complex geopolitical environment may determine the future security of one of the world's most important maritime trade routes.

Suraiyya Aziz specializes on topics related to the Middle East and the Arab world.

How ISIS continues to inspire terrorism in Europe

Source: https://en.vijesti.me/world-a/evropa/820504/How-ISIS-continues-to-inspire-terrorism-in-Europe

Aug 03 – On Sunday, July 26, German police shot dead a suspect in a car attack on participants of the Berlin Pride Parade, which left one person dead and 20 injured the day before. The suspect was already known to police for a previous attempt to join the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). During the second decade of the 21st century, ISIS claimed responsibility for several attacks on cultural events, mainly concerts. Among the deadliest attacks carried out by the organization on European soil were the attack on the Bataclan concert hall in Paris in 2015 and the bombing of an Ariana Grande concert at the Manchester Arena in 2017. Most recently, in the summer of 2024, a planned ISIS-inspired attack on a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna was thwarted.



There have been previous attacks inspired by ISIS ideology that targeted the LGBT community. The organization also claimed responsibility for the 2016 attack on the gay nightclub Pals in Orlando, Florida. Since 2018, ISIS no longer exists as a territorial entity, and without a political entity to incite new attacks in Europe, the organization's violent activities have significantly weakened over the past decade.

Yet the toxic ideology of "ISIS," which seeks to restore a pre-modern caliphate using modern Western means, including social media, remains the ultimate form of countercultural rebellion for a segment of young Muslims. Although it has lost the territory it once controlled, the so-called Islamic State continues to pose a serious threat to the sovereignty and security of the United States and European countries.

Many believed that the failed attack in Vienna in 2024 marked the end of an already waning trend of ISIS-inspired attacks by European-born Muslims. While there has been relatively little Islamist violence since then, the Berlin attack shows that radicalization and violence are certainly not a thing of the past.

"New Jihadists"

In early August 2024, three young Austrians allegedly planned to attack "Swifties," fans of American singer Taylor Swift, before her

concert in Vienna in early August. The Austrian plotters had previously pledged allegiance to ISIS. Among those planning the attack on the Taylor Swift concert were two Austrians: one originally from North Macedonia, the other of Turkish descent, both second-generation Muslims. The attacker who carried out the Berlin Pride Parade attack had a similar background - he was born in Germany to a Lebanese Muslim family.

This trend confirms an argument made by Olivier Roy in a 2017 Guardian article titled "Who are the new jihadists?" He argues that there are two groups of people who most often join ISIS to carry out attacks in the West: second-generation Muslims born in Europe (who often recruit their brothers and sisters) and European converts. According to Roy, children of Muslim immigrants born in European countries tend to lead secular lives. They grow up in families that are not particularly religious, but they may go to nightclubs and consume alcohol and drugs. Those from poorer socio-economic backgrounds can sometimes end up in petty crime. At some point, often while in prison, they become "born again" Muslims, embracing not only the faith but a stricter, more radical version of the religion than that practiced by their parents. They usually gather in smaller religious groups rather than in the large mosques frequented by their families. It must be emphasized that this is a small proportion of "second-generation Muslims" in Europe. What this trend shows is that children of immigrant families can sometimes go through a generational rebellion against their parents, trying to prove that they are more pious than them. ISIS has had very little impact on first-generation immigrants, who have mostly given up everything to provide a better life for their children in Europe. There are also very few third-generation recruits in Europe, as by that point they are either well integrated into the society they live in or have found a way to reconcile the different parts of their identity.

Political point of conflict

Political debates over the Berlin attack have already begun, after German Minister Alexander Dobrint called the attack "Islamic terrorism" when the public learned about the attacker's past. His use of the word "Islamic," rather than "Islamist," could provoke strong reactions. The term "Islamist" refers specifically to political Islam, including the ideologies of extremist groups like ISIS, while "Islamic" refers to the Muslim faith as a whole. Intentional or not, Dobrint's choice of words could be interpreted as linking Islam in general to terrorist violence.

Right-wing parties and public figures across Europe will undoubtedly use the attack on the Pride Parade as an additional argument for restricting immigration, even as they themselves actively work to abolish and undermine the rights of the LGBTQIA+ community.

But the United States and its European Union allies can confront the onslaught of extremist terrorism. Instead of engaging in Islamophobic recriminations, they can take action to address the socio-economic conditions that drive people to terrorism. Despair, hopelessness, and anger are reasons why the appeal of ISIS's ideology persists, a decade after the Islamic State was declared.

Marginalized and desperate communities provide fertile ground for the spread of ISIS doctrine, as well as other forms of violent extremism across the political spectrum.

What unites Islamists and right-wing extremists

By Hans Pfeifer

Source: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-islamism-and-right-wing-extremism-a-story-of-mutual-radicalization/a-78194607

Aug 02 – Following the attack on a Berlin Pride festival, the focus in Germany is turning to Islamist terrorism. An expert warns: Looking only at Islamists overlooks the parallels with right-wing extremism.

The terror attack on Berlin's Pride parade has shocked Germany. The perpetrator, 21-year-old Abdul Ballout, was a German national and known to German security forces as an Islamist who had tried to join the "Islamic State" group. He had already been convicted of criminal offences twice, and was awaiting a decision about a possible prison sentence at the time of the attack.

The LGBTQ+ community is not a surprising target, according to Jakob Guhl, a director of policy and research at the London-basedInstitute for Strategic Dialoguewho has studied Islamist extremism for many years. "The ideology is deeply homophobic and hostile to the queer community. The 'Islamic State' terror group, when it held territory in its so-called caliphate, executed people it accused of homosexuality," Guhl told DW.

In recent years, there have been several attacks on Pride events, Guhl said: In London, Oslo, Zurich and Vienna.

Parallels between different extremist movements

Guhl has also noticed that Islamist extremism has a close relationship with far-right extremist movements. Both ideologies strengthen each other and profit from one another, he argues: "Both are of the view that peaceful coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims is impossible."

Young Muslims' experiences of discrimination in Germany, being marginalized, and negative reporting about Islam are cited as

proof of the German state's hostility towards Islam, according to Guhl.

Like Islamists, far-right radicals often oppose LGBTQ+ rights

"In the view of the Islamist extremists, right-wing extremists are representative of Germans as a whole, and on the other hand the right-wing extremists say that Islamist extremists essentially represent Muslims," Guhl says. "There is an attempt to split society into two camps."

Both ideologies overlap in numerous attitudes: contempt for Western liberal society, the propensity toward conspiracy ideas, mistrust of government institutions, anti-feminist attitudes, and hate of the LGBTQ+ community.

"Their reasons for disliking the LGBTQ+ community do vary. On the one hand, from the religious ideological perspective, they believe it goes against the instructions of God," Guhl explained. "On the far-right extremist side, it mostly stems from a biological-racist perspective that it lowers the birthrate and weakens the health of the nation."

Berlin attack: When deradicalization programs don't work

In Germany, security authorities have for years observed the formation of a new generation of young, violence-prone, far-right extremists who are mobilizing against Pride parades.

In a 2018 study entitled, "Loving hate. Anti-Muslim extremism, radical Islam and the spiral of polarization," Guhl and other authors described the common interest of both ideologies: Social division, itself a breeding ground for extremism.

Fuel for extremism: Hate speech on social media

To combat the proliferation of such ideologies, the authors recommended a tougher approach toward hate speech on social media. They also call upon traditional media to avoid one-sided reporting and finger-pointing, which only fuels the polarization spiral. According to Guhl, one example of this is the current discussion about the background of the attacker of the Berlin Pride event. "I find the question of the nationality of the perpetrator problematic: You quickly run into the danger of creating a two-tier society between different affiliations. That is counterproductive when it comes to the dynamics of radicalization." For Guhl, it is also important to keep pointing to what Muslim and non-Muslim communities have in common: "We share many more things than those which divide us."

How Boko Haram adopted artificial intelligence

By Rena Rowe

Source: https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/national-security/4671192/how-boko-haram-adopted-artificial-intelligence/

Aug 03 – Over hours of interviews with former Boko Haram members, Cambridge researcher Antonia Juelich gained insight into how terrorist groups are using artificial intelligence. "Trial and error can kill you. AI gives you accuracy," one former fighter told her.

The interviews, conducted in 2025 and 2026, explored who introduced militants to AI tools, how they incorporated the technology into daily operations, and how they worked around safeguards intended to prevent misuse.

Juelich's findings suggest extremist organizations have already moved beyond simply experimenting with AI. Instead, she found the technology becoming embedded in routine operations as a general-purpose tool to solve problems, improve efficiency, and overcome logistical obstacles. "What surprised me the most was that AI adoption and use has been faster, more extensive, and more systematic than I thought," Juelich told the *Washington Examiner*. "AI

misuse by terrorist groups is no longer some kind of hypothetical future threat, but a present and growing reality."

Much of the public discussion around AI and terrorism has focused on catastrophic scenarios, such as terrorists using AI to develop chemical or biological weapons. Juelich argued that this emphasis overlooks how extremist groups are actually adopting the technology. "There was very little evidence on what was happening on the ground," she said. Existing research, she argued, has largely focused on what AI models are theoretically capable of rather than how terrorist organizations are using them in practice.

Instead, she found AI functioning as an "operational assistant," helping militants answer everyday questions, troubleshoot problems, and improve existing capabilities.

"They really understood that it's a general-purpose technology that they can use for any kind of questions that come up," she said. That "operational middle ground" is where Juelich believes governments and AI companies should concentrate their attention. Juelich said her interviews demonstrate the need to better understand how AI is already helping extremist groups overcome routine operational challenges before those capabilities evolve into something more dangerous.

An intelligence problem with no single solution

The research also underscores a high-level challenge: No single government agency, AI company, or research institution has a complete picture of how terrorist organizations are using artificial intelligence.

Rebecca Hersman, a national security expert who has proposed creating an AI threat fusion center, said critical information is scattered across intelligence agencies, technology companies, and independent researchers.

"Critical information sits in very different locations," Hersman told the *Washington Examiner*. She added that AI companies may detect suspicious user behavior, intelligence agencies may possess classified reporting, and researchers may uncover insights through interviews like Juelich's research.

"What we don't have is a way to pull that together … in a way that's safe and secure," she added.

Juelich's interviews, Hersman said, illustrate the type of information that is difficult for any one organization to collect but becomes far more valuable when combined with other intelligence.

"Sitting alone, it's not perfect," Hersman said. "But put together more holistically, knitted together with other information, it could become incredibly valuable."

To bridge those gaps, Hersman has proposed creating a fusion center where cleared government officials and designated representatives from AI companies could share threat information while protecting classified intelligence and proprietary data.

Such a center, she said, could produce "threat-informed risk assessments" of how extremist groups are using — or may seek to use — AI, while also conducting classified model evaluations and reducing the risk of publicly disclosing sensitive information that could inadvertently aid adversaries.

Hersman said Juelich's report reinforced her own research showing that terrorist organizations are using AI less for futuristic weapons programs than for practical operational support.

"They're really using it for what I would call operational assistance," Hersman said, referencing Juelich's report and pointing to tasks such as surveillance, target selection, and basic bomb-making guidance. While those activities may not be technologically sophisticated, she said, AI can remove obstacles that have traditionally complicated terrorist operations.

That, she argued, makes it essential for governments and AI companies to look for those patterns now rather than waiting for more advanced forms of misuse to emerge.

"We need to lean forward and try to get ahead of where these actors might go before they actually go there," Hersman said. "We don't want to be looking at that problem in hindsight."

How AI companies are responding

The findings come as AI developers face pressure to demonstrate that their systems cannot be exploited by terrorist organizations.

OpenAI told the *Washington Examiner* its policies prohibit terrorist and violent extremist activity and that its systems are designed to refuse requests related to building weapons or facilitating violence. The company said it can disable accounts, block related accounts, and work with law enforcement when it detects misuse.

Anthropic said it relies on automated safeguards, dedicated threat intelligence teams, and outside partnerships to identify and disrupt dangerous activity.

"Our safeguards are built to refuse dangerous requests, including those tied to violence, attack planning and building explosives," an Anthropic spokesperson told the *Washington Examiner*.

The company also emphasized that defending against AI-enabled threats requires cooperation across the industry.

"No single company can counter these threats alone," the spokesperson said.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency told the *Washington Examiner* it is also working with government and private-sector partners to monitor emerging AI developments and assess how the technology can strengthen national cyber defenses against malicious actors.

The race to stay ahead

Juelich warned that AI capabilities are advancing more quickly than traditional methods of assessing terrorist threats.

"It's great if one provider has really strong safeguards," she said. "But it doesn't make us safer as a society if there are still other companies who don't really care about safety. We are only as strong as the weakest one." Hersman agreed that strong guardrails at AI companies are important, but argued they are only one piece of the solution. To stay ahead of emerging threats, she said, governments and industry need a far better understanding of how specific terrorist organizations are already using AI to overcome operational barriers.

She said creating a fusion center would require combining classified intelligence, company data, and outside research in carefully controlled settings before extremist groups become sophisticated enough to pursue higher-risk capabilities.

"We don't want to be doing that or looking at that problem in hindsight," Hersman said, adding that "the companies are doing great work when it comes to setting really firm guardrails and trying to prohibit access to that information, but that is the difficult process, especially when we're doing it generically."

Is AI Moving From Propaganda to Operations in Terrorist Organizations?

Source: https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/08/03/ai-in-terrorist-organizations/

Aug 03 – Based on interviews conducted in 2025 and 2026 with former Boko Haram members, Antonia Juelich presents one of the first in-depth and field-based studies documenting how an active terrorist organization has adopted frontier artificial intelligence (AI). In "God Has Helped Us, and So Will AI: How the Terrorist Group Boko Haram Uses Frontier AI," Juelich argues that AI is evolving beyond its previously recognized role in propaganda into an organizational capability. With the shift from theoretical concern to documented operational use, the report discusses important implications for AI governance, counterterrorism, and national security. Juelich observes that both factions of Boko Haram – the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (JAS) – use multiple commercially developed frontier AI models, including ChatGPT, Anthropic's Claude, Gemini, Grok, Meta AI, and DeepSeek. AI tools are being used for attack planning, weapons troubleshooting, explosive-device design, logistics, and operational security. Interviewees report using techniques such as jailbreaking, deceptive prompting, and multiple accounts to circumvent AI safeguards.

With lower barriers to adoption and growing enthusiasm for the performance and capabilities of AI's large language models (LLMs), use has expanded beyond propaganda. Interviews with former Boko Haram members confirmed that leadership "places significant value" on AI and has institutionalized its use through dedicated teams, restricted access, and organizational investments. Network leaders restrict AI to only trusted, trained operators and limit access to certain ranks to retain oversight. AI research and development are also considered important success factors for terrorist innovation. External AI support, trainers from other countries, and operatives enable skill development, knowledge transfer, and training. AI research and development are also considered important success factors for terrorist innovation.

According to Juelich, Boko Haram members consider AI a problem-solving tool to improve the speed and accuracy of planning. She maintains that the group's enthusiasm for AI, combined with an openness to mass-casualty weapons, highlights the need for greater attention from policymakers and AI developers. Juelich's report is an in-depth analysis of terrorists' use of frontier AI to date. It emphasizes that AI capabilities may only provide an uplift for terrorist groups' attack planning and troubleshooting today. She acknowledges the limitations of the research and calls for continued research and greater collaboration among governments, intelligence services, and AI developers to address the threat posed by AI-enabled terrorist activities.

In a related *Discourse in Small Wars Journal,* "AI Use in Terrorist Plots and Attacks Surges in 2025," research indicates that terrorists are expanding their use of commercial large language models (LLMs) beyond producing propaganda. AI is also being used as a tool for operational planning. In their original Militant Wire article, later republished by Small Wars Journal, Broekaert and Webber examine documented terrorist plots involving commercially available AI tools, which increased significantly during 2025. According to the articles, AI was used to accelerate learning, research, and planning; visualize scenarios; and provide step-by-step, interactive guidance.

Key Takeaway

Taken together, these articles suggest that AI capabilities are being integrated into terrorist groups' operating models, automating operational planning, organizational adaptation, and decision-making. Although questions remain regarding the extent of AI-enabled capabilities, the findings highlight an emerging security challenge for counterterrorism and AI governance.

Parol Board protect the UK!



Aug 11 – Three Islamist **terrorists** jailed for the 2006 plot to blow up transatlantic planes with liquid bombs could be freed from prison within months. Arafat Waheed Khan, Waheed Zaman and Ibrahim Savant face Parole Board hearings this autumn, with critics warning they could walk free by Christmas.

Berlin Pride Attack Exposes Europe's Changing Terrorism Threat

By Giorgia Valente
Source: https://themedialine.org/top-stories/berlin-pride-attack-exposes-europes-changing-terrorism-threat/

Aug 05 – Online radicalization, lone-actor violence, and Iran-linked networks are placing European security services under pressure from distinct but increasingly simultaneous threatsThe deadly attack near Berlin's Pride celebrations in late July reopened a difficult question for European authorities: How should security institutions assess individuals whose commitment to extremist violence is visible online but has not yet developed into a specific, detectable attack plan?

On July 25, a man drove a van into a crowd near the closing events of Berlin's Christopher Street Day, one of Europe's largest LGBTQ+ Pride celebrations. Investigators say the suspected attacker then continued on foot and was later found armed with a machete. A Polish woman was killed, and at least 29 people were injured. The 21-year-old suspect, Abdul Ballout, was killed the following day during a confrontation with police. German federal prosecutors subsequently confirmed that investigators had recovered a video in which a masked individual believed to be Ballout announced his intention to carry out an attack and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS).

The attack was not directed or operationally coordinated by ISIS, based on information publicly disclosed so far. It nevertheless reflects a model of violence that has become increasingly central to the jihadist threat in Europe: an individual radicalized through propaganda, acting with accessible weapons and apparently without requiring sustained contact with the organization's central leadership.

This distinction matters because Europe is not necessarily witnessing a return to the coordinated, high-casualty campaigns associated with the Islamic State's territorial expansion between 2014 and 2017. The more immediate threat is dispersed across individuals and small groups whose ideological formation, communication and sometimes operational preparation take place largely online.

"What we are observing in Europe is not so much a return to jihadist terrorism in the form we experienced between 2014 and 2017, but rather its transformation. This is probably the most important distinction to make," Daniele Garofalo, an expert on extremist groups and jihadism, told The Media Line.
Europol's latest terrorism assessment reinforces that conclusion. According to the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2026 published in July, European Union member states reported 45 terrorist attacks in 2025 and 486 terrorism-related arrests. Jihadist terrorism accounted for 24 of the attacks and 347 arrests. Most attacks and plots involved lone actors or small, self-initiated cells using relatively simple methods.
The imbalance between arrests and successful attacks does not necessarily indicate that the threat is expanding at the same rate as arrests. It may also demonstrate that intelligence and police services are intercepting suspects during the preparatory phases, including while acquiring materials, conducting surveillance, disseminating propaganda or attempting to contact foreign organizations. "This might appear paradoxical, but in reality it indicates that European authorities are intercepting a significant part of the threat before it materializes," Garofalo said. "The increase in arrests does not necessarily mean that terrorism has suddenly surged, but that there is an active base of radicalization that security forces are monitoring more effectively." European authorities are intercepting a significant part of the threat before it materializes. The Berlin case, however, illustrates the limitations of prevention when warning signs do not produce a sufficiently clear assessment of imminent intent.
German prosecutors said Ballout had published prohibited Islamic State propaganda on Instagram twice in June 2024. In 2025, he traveled to Lebanon while allegedly intending to reach Syria and join the organization. He was detained in Lebanon before returning to Germany, where he was arrested and held in pretrial detention. In May 2026, a juvenile court convicted him and imposed a sentence of one year and 10 months for preparing a serious act of violence endangering the state and for offenses involving prohibited ISIS propaganda. The court postponed for six months a final decision on whether the sentence would be suspended, released him under the supervision of a probation officer and lifted the existing arrest warrant. It took into account his time in detention, his confession, his stated distancing from ISIS and the absence of a concrete threat resulting from the offenses. Prosecutors appealed, seeking a longer sentence that could not be suspended and the continuation of his detention. For Lucas Webber, a senior threat intelligence analyst at Tech Against Terrorism, the case demonstrates how online activity may be underestimated when assessed in isolation from the broader process of radicalization.

"The Berlin Pride attack underscores the enduring threat of ISIS-inspired violence, where propaganda consumed and shared online sustains ideological commitment independent of any operational command link to ISIS leadership," Webber told The Media Line.
He continued, "The attacker had been convicted of publishing Islamic State propaganda online, yet received a suspended sentence because judges weighed his confession and apparent distancing from the group against the fact that no concrete threat had materialized, a judgment his subsequent actions have now overtaken.
Ballout's precise legal sentence was more complex than a suspended sentence that was immediately finalized, because the court had postponed that decision for six months. The central issue raised by Webber nevertheless remains: how much evidentiary weight should courts and security services assign to the repeated production, consumption or distribution of extremist propaganda when no specific target or operational plan has yet been identified?
"That gap between digital activity and perceived risk is the core problem: online propaganda sharing is too often treated as a lesser offense, a symptom to be monitored rather than a direct indicator of intent, when in practice it is frequently the only visible marker of radicalization before an individual moves to violence," Webber said.
That gap between digital activity and perceived risk is the core problem. Europol has identified the same digital environment as a central component of contemporary terrorism. Its 2026 report states that online platforms allow extremist actors to reach, recruit and mobilize large audiences while coordinating activity both online and offline. Algorithmic distribution can amplify extremist content, while initial exposure on mainstream services may lead users towards closed groups and encrypted platforms containing more explicit material. Young and vulnerable individuals are considered particularly susceptible.
Among jihadist suspects, Europol found that most arrested individuals had been inspired by ISIS propaganda, although direct organizational connections were less common. Radicalization often began with user-generated jihadist material on social networks, youth-oriented platforms or gaming environments before moving towards more secure communications.
"In recent years, the distinction between propaganda and operational planning has become increasingly blurred," Garofalo said. "Many individuals begin by consuming extremist content, gradually come into contact with digital networks, establish relationships with online facilitators and, in some cases, eventually begin preparing an attack. The radicalization process is far more individualized than it was in the past and often does not pass through clandestine mosques or

structured territorial networks." This transformation also affects attack methods. Complex, coordinated operations require communications, financing, logistics, and personnel, which increase the likelihood of detection. Vehicles, knives, improvised weapons and arson require fewer resources and can be deployed with limited preparation.

"The relatively limited number of successful attacks should not be interpreted as an indicator that the threat is low," Garofalo said. "On the contrary, it also reflects the high effectiveness of the preventive work conducted by intelligence services, counterterrorism units and international cooperation. Many plots are disrupted during their initial stages, when individuals are still acquiring materials, carrying out reconnaissance or communicating with other extremists."

The Berlin attack has not been connected to Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas or any Iranian state structure. Conflating ISIS-inspired terrorism with Iranian or Iran-aligned operations would obscure significant ideological and operational differences. Its relevance to the wider Iran-Israel-United States conflict lies instead in the cumulative burden on European security services, which must now monitor several distinct threat environments at once.

The war has intensified propaganda, political polarization and threats against Jewish, Israeli, Iranian opposition and Western targets. Europol has warned that groups linked to Iran's regional network could seek to conduct destabilizing activities in Europe, potentially including terrorism, intimidation, financing and cybercrime. The agency also warned that the rapid spread of polarizing material could accelerate short-term radicalization among individuals and diaspora communities.

According to the EU's 2026 terrorism report, pressure on Iran and its proxy network could generate more direct threats inside Europe. While Iran-aligned organizations had historically used European territory primarily for fundraising and logistical activity, Europol warned that some could increasingly consider attacks against Jewish, Israeli or other targets. The report also referred to indications that Iranian actors and proxies had used criminal networks in incidents across several member states.

In February, the European Union formally added Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to its terrorism list, subjecting the organization to asset freezes and restrictions on access to economic resources inside the bloc. Britain has separately sanctioned individuals and entities allegedly connected to an Iran-linked criminal network accused of planning attacks and facilitating hostile activity. Tehran has repeatedly denied involvement in attacks and plots in Europe.

These developments represent a different security model from the largely self-directed ISIS supporter. Iran-linked activity may involve state intelligence structures, proxy organizations, financial networks, surveillance operations, criminal intermediaries and deniable acts of violence. Yet both threat environments may exploit similar vulnerabilities: encrypted communications, decentralized online recruitment, informal financial channels and individuals who initially appear peripheral to organized terrorism.

"The traditional jihadist threat has recently been joined by an additional layer of risk linked to the growing tensions among Iran, Israel and the United States," Garofalo said.

"European authorities have intensified their monitoring of individuals connected to the Iranian apparatus, Hamas, Hezbollah and other affiliated organizations, not only because of the risk of attacks but also because of intelligence activities, surveillance, financing and logistical support. This is a different threat from the one represented by the Islamic State or al-Qaeda, but it is potentially complementary."

The word "complementary" does not necessarily imply cooperation between ideologically hostile organizations. ISIS has repeatedly portrayed Iran and Shiite groups such as Hezbollah as enemies. Rather, it describes the cumulative pressure placed on European institutions when several unrelated networks operate within overlapping digital, financial and criminal ecosystems.

International conflicts also offer extremist movements a constant supply of images and grievances that can be reframed for recruitment. Europol found that conflicts in the Middle East continued to be exploited in 2025 by jihadist, far-right, left-wing and other violent extremist actors, sometimes contributing to threats or attacks against Jewish and Muslim communities.

The challenge for European governments is therefore broader than identifying members of a particular organization. They must distinguish between lawful political expression, possession or dissemination of illegal propaganda, ideological commitment and concrete preparation for violence—often on the basis of fragmented digital evidence and before a suspect has selected a target.

Webber said the case shows why authorities should maintain long-term scrutiny of people with documented histories of creating or circulating extremist material, rather than ending monitoring at conviction or release. In his view, online expressions of ideological commitment can persist despite apparent remorse or claims of disengagement and should remain part of risk assessments.

"Platforms, courts, and security services all have a stake in closing that gap, treating sustained online extremist activity as a persistent risk factor rather than a resolved one once a sentence is served," he said.

Platforms, courts, and security services all have a stake … in treating sustained online extremist activity as a persistent risk factor rather than a resolved one once a sentence is served,

Such monitoring also raises questions of proportionality,

judicial oversight and the allocation of limited counterterrorism resources. Not every individual who views or shares extremist material will proceed to violence, and treating digital consumption alone as proof of operational intent risks weakening legal safeguards and producing assessments that are too broad to be effective.The Berlin attack nevertheless demonstrates the consequences of the opposite failure: dismissing online extremist behavior as peripheral when it may be the clearest available evidence of an individual's ideological trajectory. Europe's emerging security environment is not defined by a single organization or a single conflict. It combines persistent Islamic State inspiration, increasingly individualized radicalization, Iran-linked state and proxy activity, and the exploitation of geopolitical crises by multiple forms of extremism.

It is less reminiscent of a single, organized terrorist campaign than of a fragmented, continuous threat environment. The principal test for European institutions will be whether they can identify when digital allegiance becomes operational intent—without conflating distinct actors, criminalizing communities or waiting until the final stage of radicalization becomes visible through violence

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UN Report: Terrorist Threat from Afghanistan Remains Largely Unchanged

Source: https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-200411

Aug 13 – The report describes ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) as the greatest threat to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the region.

The United Nations Security Council's Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team has claimed in its latest report that the threat posed by terrorist groups based in Afghanistan has not changed significantly.

The report describes ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) as the greatest threat to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the region.

However, the report says that counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan have reduced the group's capabilities.

The report by the UN Security Council's Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team states: "The terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan remained broadly unchanged. The ability of multiple terrorist groups to operate in Afghanistan continues to pose an enduring threat to neighboring countries and the Central Asian region. Despite efforts by the de facto authorities to combat ISIL-K and contain other terrorist groups, they have not been able to fully suppress the terrorism problem."

The team said tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan remain high, and that continued tensions between the two countries have increased the risk of creating opportunities for terrorist groups.

Political analyst Sadiq Shinwari said: "The increase in tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan has led to the strengthening of these groups."

Political analyst Najibullah Hotak said: "The countries that claim there is international terrorism in Afghanistan should know that, with the return of the Islamic Emirate, all terrorist groups have been suppressed."

The spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate rejected claims about the presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan and told TOLOnews that currently no such groups are present in the country.

Zabihullah Mujahid added that al-Qaeda has no presence in Afghanistan and suggested that members of the group may have returned to their own countries.

Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate, said: "The groups they have named are not linked to Afghanistan. The TTP exists in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda is not present in the region, and its members may have returned from across the region to their own countries. Regarding Afghanistan, we can say with confidence that they are not present here."

Islamic Emirate officials have previously and repeatedly said that they will not allow Afghanistan's territory to be used against other countries.

How ISIS Fights

Military Tactics in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt

Author: Omar Ashour
Source: https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-how-isis-fights.html



Explores the military endurance of ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt

- Based on extensive fieldwork in the Middle East, dozens of interviews with soldiers and fighters who engaged ISIS and their predecessors between 2013 and 2020, and hundreds of ISIS publications, battle-relevant videos and ISIS commanders' audio-releases
- Focuses on a core set of ISIS urban and suburban battles in Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi, Raqqa (City and Governorate), Derna, Sirte and Northeastern Sinai
- Offers insights into how ISIS, like-minded organisations and other armed non-state actors may or will fight in the future

How did ISIS – a widely hated, massively outnumbered and ludicrously outgunned organisation – manage to occupy over 120 cities, towns and villages from the Southern Philippines to Western Libya?
Seeking to understand ISIS's combat effectiveness, Omar Ashour analyses the military and tactical innovations of ISIS and their predecessors in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt. He shows how their capacity to mix conventional military tactics with innovative guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism strategies allowed ISIS to expand and endure beyond expectations.

Omar Ashour is a Professor of Security and Military Studies and the Founding Chair of the Critical Security Studies Programme at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. He is the author of *How ISIS Fights: Military Tactics in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt* (Edinburgh University Press, 2021) and *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements* (Routledge, 2009), as well as the editor of *Bullets to Ballots: Collective De-Radicalisation of Armed Movements* (Edinburgh University Press, 2021).

How We Won the War on Terror

By Tod Lindberg
Source: https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/how-we-won-war-terror-tod-lindberg

Aug 18 – On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush gave a major speech to Congress and the country in which he outlined the coming U.S. response to al-Qaeda's 9/11 attack. He said, "Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." Thus began what would soon be known as the "Global War on Terror," or GWOT, in its unlovely acronym.
Over the quarter century since, a parade of commentators, scholars, and politicians has marched through the media to offer overwhelmingly negative judgments on the GWOT. Here is former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in 2007: "The damage these three words ["war on terror"] have done—a classic self-inflicted wound—is infinitely greater than any wild dreams entertained by the fanatical perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks." CNN's Fareed Zakaria in 2008: "Bush's basic conception of a 'global War on Terror'… has been poorly thought-through, badly implemented, and has produced many unintended costs that will linger for years if not decades." In the journal International Security in 2012, John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart pronounced the GWOT "an ill-conceived and remarkably unreflective effort." Boston University's hawk-turned-isolationist Andrew Bacevich, who lost a son in Iraq, in 2021 repeated his long-standing conclusion: "The Global War on Terrorism was a needless and costly distraction." From the anti-interventionist left, here was journalist Spencer Ackerman in 2021: "We've learned from the war on terror, that security solutions to political problems are doomed to failure, they're doomed to making those political problems worse." In his recent book The Return of the Great Powers, Cambridge University's Brendan Simms decries "the huge cost and

abysmal failure of the 'War on Terror.'" These blanket judgments are wrong.

They are heavily colored by the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, almost as if "GWOT" was just another name for those wars. In fact, the record of the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan is, in its own right, far more complicated. But more to the point, the "war on terror" was indeed "global," not just focused on these two countries. And it was a war not only in the kinetic sense but also insofar as it marshaled a full spectrum of resources of the United States and allied governments in identifying and targeting malevolent organizations and their support structures abroad before they could effectively target American and allied interests. And this war, the real Global War on Terror in its totality, has been a remarkable success, notwithstanding Iraq and Afghanistan.

What Didn't Happen

Let's begin with the obvious. In the fall of 2001—that is, in real time after the 9/11 attacks but before the opportunity for retrospective judgment arrived—the question of what horror might be coming next for the United States took on an urgency unseen since the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 60 years before. Osama bin Laden's spectacular plot succeeded not only in destroying the twin towers of the World Trade Center and gashing the Pentagon but also in its more general and visceral objective: It terrorized.

What would its perpetrators do next? This was a question whose answer was unknown to government officials and individual Americans alike. One could and did speculate. Would bombs be going off downtown in New York, Washington, and other big cities? What about a dirty bomb producing a cloud of radioactive debris? What about an actual "loose nuke"? Would platoons of would-be martyrs undertake massive urban assaults? Would chemical weapons be unleashed on the subway, like in the 1995 sarin attack in Tokyo? Powdered anthrax of unknown origin was already taking lives through the mails; was a massive aerosolized attack next? Were water reservoirs and the food supply about to be poisoned? Would more airplanes be turned into fuel-air bombs?

The answer to all these worries turned out to be no—but that was not for want of terrorist ambition or effort. Following 9/11, foreign-trained or inspired jihadist terrorists attempted numerous suicide or sabotage attacks. Individuals included would-be "shoe bomber" Richard Reid, dirty-bomb plotter José Padilla (who trained with al-Qaeda), and would-be "underwear bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. A number of plots targeted infrastructure, including the Brooklyn Bridge, fuel tanks at JFK airport, and a rush-hour backpack-bomb attack on the New York City subway. Financial buildings were another target. A group was planning an attack on Fort Dix, New Jersey.

In some cases, the attacks came close to deadly success but were undone by the incompetence of the perpetrators—a bomb that did not detonate properly in Times Square, as well as the shoe- and underwear-bomb failures. Some did come off to lethal effect, such as the bombing of the Boston Marathon in 2013, which killed three and injured hundreds; an attack at a government building in San Bernardino in 2015, in which two shooters killed 14; and the Pulse nightclub attack in Florida in 2016, in which a gunman killed 49. Yet none of these successful attacks was remotely close in scale to 9/11, and the perpetrators came not from abroad but were self-radicalized jihadists on American soil of Chechen, Pakistani, and Afghan origin.

According to a regularly updated New America Foundation database, only one lethal attack in the United States took place under the direction of a foreign jihadist organization: the 2019 shooting at Pensacola Naval Air Station, which killed three. In New America's tally, the total number of American lives lost to jihadist terror attacks in the United States since 9/11 stands just over 120—barely 4 percent of the direct 9/11 death toll (excluding the 19 hijackers) of 2,977.

By the broadest and most important indicator, then, one must ask: If this is failure, what would success have looked like?

Meanwhile, numerous other jihadist terrorist attacks were foiled by American authorities, often in collaboration with allied governments. Hundreds of individuals are serving prison terms in relation to these plots. A 2015 RAND working paper analyzed 150 successful and foiled terrorist plots from 1995 through 2012. It found that plots were more likely to be thwarted in the years after 9/11 than in the six years before.

Why? Many of the details we will never know. These operations were and are the work of counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts undertaken internationally, domestically, and locally (the NYPD Intelligence Bureau is the most notable example of the latter). The FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces date back to the establishment of the first such regional office, in New York in 1980. After 9/11, the FBI substantially expanded the program, which does its own work but also liaises with other federal, state, and local law enforcement. There are now about 200 JTTFs, including at least one in each of the bureau's 56 field offices. Protecting the United States from terrorist attack is the bureau's stated "number one priority."

Hardening the Targets

Substantial resources have also gone into "hardening" potential terrorist targets. The most conspicuous is the airport screening of the Transportation Security Administration, created in legislation Congress enacted in November 2001. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act federalized airport screening and began the process of requiring airlines to report all passenger and crew manifests, including biographical data such as sex and date of birth, to the government.

As the shock of 9/11 wore off over the years, the TSA came in for criticism for its randomized practice of selecting the occasional grandmother for additional screening procedures. Nevertheless, the "security theater" so roundly mocked seems to have been an effective deterrent to attempts to smuggle weapons onto planes. Well before 9/11, Americans had largely forgotten how easy that used to be during the hundreds of hijackings worldwide from the late 1960s through the 1970s.

Consider the case of the Federal Air Marshals program. The number of armed agents flying incognito increased from about 30 before 9/11 to an estimated 3,000 in the years since. There are hundreds of inbound international flights on American carriers daily, so the program places one to four marshals on routes (including domestic routes) that officials deem high-risk—or in response to specific intelligence on a threat.

There's no public record of marshals foiling a plot in the air, though there have been reports of marshals intervening with unruly passengers, presumably including circumstances in which the reason underlying the unruliness was initially unknown. But does the program deter, as is its major purpose? Hard to say, but would Americans feel safer, and actually be safer, if the Department of Homeland Security announced it was halting the program to divert the resources elsewhere? Should we no longer require that cockpit doors be hardened against easy entry on grounds that only intoxicated or crazy passengers, not terrorists, have tried to bust through them since 9/11?

These questions are especially relevant because all initiatives intended to prevent or deter represent an opportunity cost—if you do one thing, you won't have money left to do another. The resource allocation has been neither random nor frivolous but has rather been the product of risk analysis and deliberation by officials who take their responsibilities seriously. That they may err and that their errors may become clear only after a failure is hardly a warrant for the dismissal of the seriousness of their efforts.

The 9/11 attack also brought forth legislation intended to enhance federal authority to detect and disrupt terrorist plots. The first to be signed into law, within weeks of 9/11, was the Patriot Act, which (among other provisions) broadened wiretap rules to encompass multiple devices, thus making it easier to track plotters rather than specific phones. Government officials have credited the new rules as instrumental in foiling the New York subway attack. The Patriot Act also enabled domestic law enforcement and U.S. foreign intelligence agencies to share information; government officials early on identified the firewall separating foreign and domestic counterterrorism agency missions as a leading cause of the failure to detect the 9/11 plot.

Next was the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created the new Cabinet department and revamped or consolidated numerous protective agencies there. The department would also become a clearinghouse for collecting relevant information from the FBI and intelligence agencies. Meanwhile, the "what went wrong" investigation of the estimable 9/11 Commission produced a slew of recommendations enacted in subsequent legislation. In 2004 came a major intelligence overhaul, which created the coordinating position of director of national intelligence as well as the National Counterterrorism Center. State drivers' licenses had to meet new federal standards set forth in the REAL ID Act of 2005. Those IDs, which provide confident correspondence between the ticketed passenger and the person boarding a plane, were the last link in the government's comprehensive knowledge of who is flying where (and it took two decades for states to implement the program fully). The process now has integrated facial-recognition systems, which have the added benefit of speeding up the security checks at airports. Welcome to what U.S. spy agencies refer to as "ubiquitous technical surveillance." This is worrisome to many civil libertarians. But taken simply as a security measure, the ubiquity provides a new level of deterrence.

As Abe Greenwald noted, writing in these pages 15 years ago on the 10th anniversary of 9/11, a decade without a comparable attack on the homeland should have been thought a considerable achievement. At this writing, the record stands at a quarter century. There is no predicting what will come in the years or even days ahead, and if a failure on the scale of 9/11 is in our future, that will be very bad indeed—but it will not negate the 25 years of prevention Americans experienced through 2026.

Taking the Fight to the Terrorists

Beyond the homeland defensive measures of the kind discussed above, a key premise of the GWOT was that taking the fight to terrorist organizations where they were quartered would reduce their ability to target Americans at home and U.S. interests abroad. Again, let's start with the basics: Even before 9/11, the United States had the ability to identify and strike its enemies, from genocidaires in former Yugoslavia to jihadists. But doing so wasn't necessarily easy, and the willingness to do so was often lacking.

Following the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the revelation of its direct tie to a new type of Islamic radicalism, the FBI led an investigation that produced criminal charges against the conspirators and lengthy prison sentences, then an international manhunt for the ringleader of the attack, Ramzi Yousef. A policy debate erupted in Washington and elsewhere over whether the "law enforcement" model of response was adequate for terrorist attacks or whether the new danger required a new approach. In 1995, Pakistani authorities working with the FBI and CIA nabbed Yousef and

transferred him to the United States, where he was tried and convicted—a temporary victory for the complacent "law enforcement" model.

The United States made no attempts to target jihadists abroad until the deadly al-Qaeda attacks on U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. Later that month, U.S. officials tried to target and kill the head of the organization, Osama bin Laden. A Tomahawk attack on al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan reportedly missed him by hours. The Clinton administration, the 9/11 Commission found, had had numerous other opportunities to attempt to kill bin Laden—all, however, "uncertain" and carrying "high risks." The commission found "no credible evidence that the U.S. government had actionable intelligence that could have prevented the 9/11 attack."

This politick but contentious bipartisan conclusion took President Bush off the hook for his first nine months in office—and President Clinton off the hook for seven years of muted response following the World Trade Center bombing. His refusal to focus on the threat lasted the entirety of his second term—at the start of which, and well ahead of the embassy bombings, the CIA was already well aware of the danger bin Laden posed. The story of Clinton 2 was one of multiple declined opportunities to take out bin Laden and one unsuccessful attempt. Of course, it is impossible to assert that capturing or killing bin Laden would have prevented 9/11, but the commission's bland assertion that no "actionable intelligence" the U.S. government had "could have prevented" it is hypothetical hindsight speculation that minimizes the undeniable ambivalence of the Clinton administration about how far to go to do it.

Here's another hypothetical: If we had had the drone-strike technology of today at the time of bin Laden's emergence, especially after the embassy attacks, but before 9/11, would Clinton have tried harder? I think the answer is no, because seriously going after jihadist terrorists abroad required the paradigm shift that 9/11 produced.

That shift produced the Global War on Terror as offense. Its charter was the Authorization to Use Military Force, which Congress passed three days after 9/11 and Bush signed into law four days later. It gave the president authority "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the 9/11 attack "or harbored such organizations or persons." The law included no expiration for this authority, and every president since has relied on it. The executive branch has invoked it for air strikes and military operations against jihadists in Afghanistan, Djibouti, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, as well as in "support" of counterterrorism efforts in partner countries from the Middle East to Africa and the Philippines.

Its first major use was in the U.S. military and CIA paramilitary operation toppling the Taliban government in Afghanistan. In his September 20, 2001, speech to Congress, Bush delivered an ultimatum to the radical Islamist Afghanistan rulers: Shut down and deliver al-Qaeda or "share their fate." When the Taliban refused, they were effectively acknowledging their role in the attacks by having harbored and continuing to harbor the 9/11 plotters. The U.S. campaign swiftly toppled the government, dispersing the Taliban and al-Qaeda to remote regions of the country and over the border into largely lawless northwest Pakistan.

Our military's ability to carry out such a mission was little known. The supremacy of U.S. military power was well understood, especially after we demonstrated in 1999 that we could halt a genocide in Kosovo by the judicious application of air power. Nevertheless, the speedy collapse of the Taliban came as a revelation to many.

The skill set already available in time for Afghanistan in 2001 would continue to develop over the succeeding years of the War on Terror. The visible culminating points to date—and there is no indication they represent peak achievable U.S. capability—were the destruction of the Fordow nuclear site in Iran in 2025, the raid on Venezuela nabbing its ruler, Nicolás Maduro, and the utter military dominance over Iran in the 2026 war (an intervention whose geopolitical consequences have still to be reckoned, of course). The U.S. military is very good at what it does, and a significant reason is the experience gained fighting the Global War on Terror.

What We're Good At

The two central means of striking jihadists abroad were (and remain) drone or air strikes and raids by Special Operations forces. Like the FBI's terrorism task forces, the military's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) predated 9/11 but got a tremendous boost in its aftermath. The Iraq War was its crucible. During the war's worst phase, 2004–2006, JSOC was under the command of General Stanley McChrystal. He realized that its highly capable operators nevertheless lacked the skills they needed to defeat the gathering insurgency of al-Qaeda

in Iraq (AQI). He embarked JSOC on a crash program of changing its ways to meet the challenge. It successfully did so alongside President Bush's "surge" of troops to Iraq in 2007–2008 and the "Anbar awakening," in which Sunni sheikhs switched their sympathies from the fanatical AQI insurrectionists to the United States. The Iraq experience—the turnaround that actually won the war for the United States but has never been acknowledged as such—produced sufficient stability by 2009 to allow President Barack Obama to make good on his opposition to the war from the outset by ending the U.S. military presence there in 2011. Unfortunately, Obama proved wildly off when it came to the emerging successor to AQI, the Islamic State. A civil war that blew up in Syria in 2011 proved a magnet for jihadist foreign fighters against the Assad regime, and many consolidated their loyalties under the Islamic State's founder, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. As late as January 2014, Obama pooh-poohed the Islamic State as a "JV" squad compared with bin Laden's al-Qaeda—even as its all-black flags were rising over considerable swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq, including the strategic city of Mosul, which fell less than six months after Obama's glib comment. The atrocities of the newly proclaimed caliphate were boundless, from beheadings and sex slavery to genocide against the Yazidi people of Iraq.

The necessity of destroying the Islamic State was obvious. But the challenge was greater due to Obama's unnecessary withdrawal from Iraq and then his reluctance to provide adequate resources to make good on his new pledge to "degrade and destroy" the caliphate.

Painfully slowly, U.S. Special Operations deployments increased, this time to lead allied Iraqi Army and Kurdish forces in pushing the Islamic State back. This culminated in urban combat to retake Mosul house by house in 2017. This was the U.S. military's "by, with, and through" model, first advanced in the 1990s, in action. We fought an enemy in partnership with local forces, with U.S. Special Operations fighters on the ground effectively running the show and directing air power in support. The approach became paradigmatic for ground operations in the Global War on Terror. The idea was that American boots on the ground in large numbers would be unnecessary with properly trained and led local forces. The eventual victory over the Islamic State was the product primarily of the ingenuity and efficacy of U.S. Special Operations forces implementing the model.

Afghanistan was likewise a proving ground. The role of JSOC and CIA paramilitary operators evolved over two decades from initial successes on horseback directing precision air strikes in October 2001 to a key role assisting the Afghan army in keeping the regrouped Taliban at bay. JSOC developed a specialty of finding and killing or capturing "high-value targets"—al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. Special Operations raids in 2008, for example, hit 550 targets, killing about 1,000. To his credit, Obama saw great value in JSOC capabilities and leaned on them even more heavily than Bush had. Al-Baghdadi met his end in a Trump-era raid in Syria in 2019. He detonated a suicide bomb vest, taking out as well two children who were with him.

President Trump, in his first term, wanted out of Afghanistan but got talked out of it. Unfortunately, President Biden could not be. His rigid timeline produced the appalling, unnecessary, and lethal spectacle of the chaotic withdrawal of U.S. forces in August 2021. Note that in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the failures to stem the revival of terrorist satrapies were the product not of military inefficacy but of political decisions made by the commander in chief, the U.S. president. And the military and political successes the United States achieved in the past quarter century required brave U.S. leadership under extreme pressure, which the United States got from Bush during the Iraq surge and from Obama after his belated recognition of the Islamic State threat. The Philippines, by contrast with Afghanistan, provides an example of efficacious military operations that ended well. Starting in the 1990s, several Islamist separatist groups conducted a bubbling insurgency in the south Philippines, replete with kidnappings, bombings, and beheadings. The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines deployed 500–600 personnel from 2002 to 2017. CIA paramilitary officers joined as well. The counterinsurgency efforts of Filipino forces aided by Americans—"by, with, and through"—culminated in 2017 with a five-month battle in Marawi, which wiped out the jihadists but for local remnants. One must not omit mention of the greatest Special Operations raid of all time, orchestrated in close collaboration with the CIA. In May 2011, Navy SEAL Team Six entered a walled compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and killed Osama bin Laden. This raid, like many others, also yielded a substantial cache of intelligence, including letters lamenting the decline of al-Qaeda in recent years—as well as bin Laden's personal collection of porn videos, which in turn prompted the greatest New York Post front-page headline of all time: OSAMA BIN WANKIN'.

In some cases, the potential for collecting intelligence stemming from elimination of a high-value target through a raid justifies the greater risk of a JSOC operation. In others, taking an enemy off the board is sufficient reward in itself to allow for a drone or air strike. A 2006 air strike called for by Special Operations forces took out Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Qasem Soleimani, the head of Quds Force, the branch of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps working outside the country, met his end in a 2020 drone strike in Iraq. Targeted drone and air strikes numbered in the multiple thousands in Afghanistan and in the hundreds in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Although he would claim credit for reducing U.S. reliance on targeted killings by drone in 2013, Obama in his first term took the number of strikes to its peak, in

2010. During his time in office, the United States killed or captured 45 jihadist leaders from al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and Al Shabab in East Africa. This seems to be an indication of the indispensability of drones and targeted killings to presidents in the overall scheme of protecting the country.

The United States has lost about 660 Special Operations personnel fighting the Global War on Terror. More than half died in Afghanistan, with Iraq accounting for about 1 in 5. Other theaters of the GWOT claimed a total of about 90. The figure is just under 10 percent of the total U.S. service members killed over the past quarter century, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. Add another 140 or so CIA paramilitary fatalities, about whom the public record is understandably much thinner.

Was this success? In Afghanistan, it was—until Biden's catastrophic bugout, which threw success away. Afghanistan was hardly easy duty, but the total number of American combat deaths there from 2020 until the chaotic withdrawal itself, during which 13 service members lost their lives in a suicide bomb attack, was four. The number was fewer than 20 in each of 2017, 2018, and 2019. If this were truly a "forever war," as critics took to calling it contemptuously, by 2021 it was "war" only in the sense of a support operation that gave Afghan forces the spine they needed to keep the Taliban at bay.

In Iraq, the rise of the Islamic State after we had quelled the post-Saddam chaos counted as a failure of vigilance, its destruction as a success. Notably, Iraq is no longer a source of security concerns outside its borders. And recall that Iraq was very possibly the single most destabilizing country in the world from 1969 onward, after Saddam Hussein took power.

If Saddam Hussein had been left unmolested, would Iraq be as placid as it is today? Would Saddam have kept a lid locally on the global rise of Islamic State–style radicalism, or would he have humored it and helped it along? Most observers note that the gravitational power of terrorist organizations rises with success (for example, 9/11 and the declaration of the Islamic State caliphate) and declines over time with setbacks, such as the defeat of the Islamic State. As a 2022 study by George Washington University researchers observes, "Both IS and al-Qaeda—the two brand names of global jihadism—are severely weakened. Both have suffered crippling blows to their leadership, and neither appears to have the stature, manpower, territorial control, and ability to operate on a global scale they had in their heyday." Far-reaching international plots—the 2015 attacks in Paris, for example—seem to have receded in favor of retail jihadist efforts to recruit local "lone wolf" actors. Bigger attempted plots tend to be thwarted. That's an improvement.

The Tools of the GWOT

From its inception, the Global War on Terror has been subject to criticisms large and small, ranging from tactics to overall conception. From their first use in the War on Terror, drone strikes have come under sharp attack. Some expressed concern about civilian casualties, and that's a legitimate issue insofar as it is morally wrong and illegal to target civilians. But no U.S. drone strike goes forward without an assessment of risks to civilians. Numerous anecdotes describe strikes called off due to civilians being too close to the target. Unfortunately, civilian death as "collateral damage" has always been an element of warfare, and it will stop only when the use of force is no longer necessary as an instrument of national policy.

Drones are also remarkably precise, far more so than the cruise missiles lobbed toward bin Laden. True, drone strikes anger those in proximity to them. Some claimed that drone attacks would call forth a flood of new recruits committed to jihadist terror. There has been no such flood. Jihadist movements in Africa have been growing in recent years, but their ambitions lie only distantly in attacking Americans and U.S. interests. Their agendas are primarily locally focused.

Some have also questioned the overall efficacy of drones and targeted killing. Critics acknowledge that such operations hit their targets efficiently and, in the case of drones, at effectively no risk to U.S. military personnel. But won't junior members of terrorist organizations simply step up to fill the shoes of their eliminated superiors, whether they died by drone or raid? Certainly, but as captured documents have revealed, the disruptions have created difficulty and friction in jihadist organizations in the descriptions of their leaders themselves.

We should also keep in mind the moral dimension of targeted killing in wartime. Let us not mince words. In the characterization of future CENTCOM commander and Defense Secretary James Mattis, speaking to his Marines early in the Iraq War, "There are some a******s in the world that just need to be shot." This is true, and the reason in the case of jihadists is that they are evil and intend to do evil.

At a broader level, some, like Brzezinski, took early issue with the very idea of a "war on terror" or with "global war on terror" as a descriptor of what lay ahead for the United States after 9/11. Time proved them wrong. Of course, a nation shouldn't go to war against a tactic in the expectation of crushing it as the favored means of policy of your enemies' organizations, especially when terrorism is all they've got. But you can go to war against those who plot and practice terrorism and those who house and fund them. You can take the armed conflict to them, where they are. Waging war on terrorists is what the United States has done for 25 years with more success than failure, Biden's Afghanistan tragedy excepted.

Stopping the Money Flow

The Global War on Terror has had two other main components, one on the economic side, one diplomatic. The U.S.-led clampdown on terrorist financing has been one of the singular

achievements since 9/11. If money is the mother's milk of politics, that's no less true for the means to pursue jihadist politics through terror.

The basic principle has been to interrupt the flow of funds before the money can get where the jihadist paymasters want it. Various points in the flow offer different opportunities for disruption. One almost amusing example from 2016, as the war against the Islamic State was picking up steam: U.S. air strikes blew up more than $500 million in physical cash in Islamic State distribution centers, where the paper dollars were awaiting payout for various expenses, including the salaries of fighters.

The process of disruption is generally less kinetic, however, with the U.S. Treasury Department in the lead role. A 1990s law gave the secretary of state the authority to brand malign entities with the designation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, subjecting them to sanction. A quick post-9/11 executive order from President Bush granted the Treasury Department the authority to name Specially Designated Global Terrorists and substantially increased the scope of available sanctions. Following designation, Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control can move in to freeze assets, deprive designees of access to the international banking system, and prohibit transactions with U.S. citizens and entities, from businesses to NGOs. Whereas pre-9/11, money used to flow alarmingly freely, now jihadists and their supporters have to work much harder to finance their activities. Designated entities have increased from several hundred a few years after 9/11 to more than 900 by the mid-2010s to more than 3,000 today.

In 2004, Treasury announced the establishment of its Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence as a consolidated clearinghouse for its activities and its liaison with other government agencies, including the Justice Department, the FBI, the IRS, and the intelligence agencies.

The United States has also pressed banks and other private-sector financial institutions into service in combating terrorism and other crimes. One such requirement is called "Know Your Customer," an anti–money laundering program that predated 9/11 but was enhanced after. Banks must demonstrate that they have done what is necessary to have a "reasonable belief" that their customers are who they say they are. They also have to engage in assessing the potential risk a customer poses and monitor for suspicious transactions. They and other institutions have a strong incentive—a "safe harbor" protection from civil action against themselves—to file Suspicious Activity Reports about whatever they encounter with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, another part of Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. The key point is that each bank has a compliance officer overseeing the green-eyeshade version of "If you see something, say something."

Numerous individuals convicted of abetting terrorist plots have faced charges of bank or wire fraud as well.

The United States has not merely focused within its own borders but also worked internationally to establish a global system for bank-customer identification and monitoring and reporting on suspicious activity. Global sanctions also contributed to putting the squeeze on Islamic State finances.

As in the case of the international crackdown on terrorist financing, so too did the kinetic element of the War on Terror involve international partners and diplomacy, as did counterterrorism intelligence gathering. The U.S. leadership role in international politics has long required the support of allies and other partners. Unsurprisingly, the 9/11 attack was a turning point. Pre-9/11, Saudi Arabia, though itself conventionally Sunni in religious outlook and a kingdom as authoritarian and repressive as they come, was also a significant funder of radical Islamist ideology—Salafism or its Wahhabi variant. No doubt some members of the House of Saud were true believers in terrorist jihad. Others probably concluded pre-9/11 that providing a payoff to the radicals would result in less domestic pressure for a revolution to install a caliphate at home. In any case, the Saudi government spent billions on madrasas teaching radical Islam around the world. Fifteen of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudi nationals, as was bin Laden prior to being stripped of his citizenship for denouncing Saudi Arabia's hosting of U.S. forces during and after the 1991 Gulf War to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Saudi ambivalence continued after 9/11, even as the United States turned up the diplomatic pressure on Riyadh to crack down on financial flows from the Kingdom to al-Qaeda. Then a series of al-Qaeda suicide bombings inside Saudi Arabia from 2003 to 2006 produced a greater sense of urgency. Major cuts in funding for madrasas abroad ensued.

Well aware of the threat it faced from the radicalism it had helped promote, Saudi Arabia was also keenly aware of a potentially greater danger that entered the scene in 1979: Iran. Iran's Twelver Shiism regards Sunni Islam as erroneous and the Gulf states that embrace it as rivals seeking to thwart Iran. For different but no less heartfelt reasons, revolutionary Iran has long sworn to wipe Israel off the map. Israel, for its part, was never a proponent of the United States going to war to topple Saddam Hussein; it saw Iran as the bigger problem. This view converged with the Saudi view and, by various accounts, led to the development of a security and intelligence dialogue between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

That exchange increased after the 2006 Lebanon war and intensified further around 2009–2010. The head of Israel's Mossad met repeatedly with Saudi counterparts. The Iranians, for their part, were aware of this budding relationship, and they hated it. In 2011, the Justice Department announced it had unraveled an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador

to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, by detonating a bomb at the Georgetown restaurant he frequented. But—why him? It seems plausible that he was playing an outsize role in developing stronger covert ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which were little reported on at the time. In any event, the perception of where the biggest terrorist threat comes from was evolving, with events from al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to Iran. U.S. diplomacy to develop the subtle Sunni–Israeli dialogue into something bigger eventually yielded the Abraham Accords—still a work in progress, especially with regard to Saudi Arabia itself, but a great diplomatic breakthrough nevertheless.

The 25-Year Odyessey

The 25-year Global War on Terror has had many successes—and where it has failed, especially in Afghanistan, the reason was not that the United States was in the fight, but that we precipitously left for gratuitous reasons. The same had been true with the rise of the Islamic State, thankfully corrected by its eradication. Look again at that quotation from George W. Bush's speech of September 20, 2001. Of the War on Terror, he said: "It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."

There aren't many terrorist groups of global reach left in business. That's impressive in its own right, but put it aside. Bush's rhetoric seemed to imply an achievable end point—but only superficially. Terrorism of some sort will always be a threat, and so the Global War on Terror will continue. The terrorists themselves will see to that.

The question is whether we can maintain our vigilance.

Tod Lindberg is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute specializing in national security issues and the role of US leadership. He writes widely on US foreign policy and national security, as well as on American politics and philosophical topics. Mr. Lindberg is the author of *The Heroic Heart: Greatness Ancient and Modern*, a philosophical investigation of changing ideas about heroism and its connection to political order and change, and *The Political Teachings of Jesus*, a study of Jesus's Gospel teaching about worldly affairs. He is co-author with Lee Feinstein of *Means to an End: US Interest in the International Criminal Court* . He is the editor of *Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership* and co-editor with Derek Chollet and David Shorr of *Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide* . Mr. Lindberg's main policy focus in recent years has been on improving US government policies and processes as well as international cooperation for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. He served as lead of the expert group on international norms and institutions of the 2008 Genocide Prevention Task Force convened by the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and co-chaired by Madeleine Albright and William Cohen. He also served as coordinator for the task group on Preventing and Responding to Genocide and Major Human Rights Abuses for the United States Institute of Peace's 2005 Task Force on the United Nations (the Gingrich-Mitchell task force). He is a member of the Experts Committee on Preventing Mass Violence, whose final report, *A Necessary Good: US Leadership on Preventing Mass Atrocities,* was published in December 2016. With his long-time collaborator Lee A. Feinstein, he is author of *Allies Against Atrocities: The Imperative for Transatlantic Cooperation to Prevent and Stop Mass Killings*, a major report for the Holocaust Museum whose principal recommendations the American Bar Association endorsed without dissent at its February 2017 meeting; he has been named co-chair (with Raymond Brown) of the ABA's new Atrocity Prevention and Response Project. He is also a member of its Working Group on Crimes Against Humanity. In 2017, he joined the Holocaust Museum's Committee on Conscience, the oversight body for the Museum's Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide. Mr. Lindberg has written for scholarly and popular publications from *Telos* and the *Review of Metaphysics* to *Foreign Affairs* and *Commentary* to the *New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal* and *USA Today*. He is adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service, where he teaches a graduate seminar on ethics and decision-making in international politics. From 1999 until 2013, he was editor of the acclaimed bimonthly *Policy Review*. From 2001 to 2017, he was a research fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution. He established Hoover's Washington, D.C. office in 2001. Previously, he served in senior editorial positions at the *Washington Times* and was the founding executive editor of the *National Interest* and an editor at the *Public Interest.* He has participated in numerous policy study groups, most recently a RAND study commissioned by the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment on the future of global order, for which he drafted a working paper on "Global Order and Liberal Overreach." He contributed a chapter on victims' rights and the International Criminal Court to Mark Lagon and Anthony Arend, editors, *Human Dignity and the Future of Global Institutions* (Georgetown University Press) and a chapter on "What is the 'International Community'?" to Chester A. Crocker, Fenn Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, editors, *Managing Conflict in a World Adrift* (U.S. Institute of Peace). In modified form, it also appeared as a Council on Foreign Relations Working Paper, "Making Sense of the 'International Community.'" He was principal author of a working paper of the German Marshall Fund of the United States on "Next-Step Pressure Points and Democracy Promotion." He was a member of the Steering Committee of the Princeton Project on National Security and co-chair of its Working Group on Anti-Americanism. He contributed the lead chapter, "The Case Against the Case Against Europe," in Simon Serfaty, editor, *Visions of the Atlantic Alliance: The United States, the European Union, and NATO* (Center for Strategic and International Studies). His article co-authored with Derek Chollet, "A Moral Core for US Foreign Policy," has been anthologized in G.

John Ikenberry, editor, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* (Wadsworth/Cengage Learning). He has spoken at Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Virginia, Indiana, and Texas among other colleges and universities. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Advisory Council of the Stanley Foundation, the Advisory Board of the Chicago Council Survey, and the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. He served two terms as an appointee of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the US National Commission for UNESCO. He was an advisor on national security to John McCain's 2008 presidential campaign. He studied political philosophy and literature at the University of Chicago with Allan Bloom and Saul Bellow, among others. *Commentary* published his long poem, "The Apology of Patroclus," a dramatic monologue, in its October 2016 edition. He and his wife Tina live in Washington, DC. They have two grown daughters.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: OMG! We won? Nobody told me about it!

Curt Weldon: "I will not remain silent, let them kill me"

Jihad Goes Viral

By Eleni Kapsokoli

This chapter is in the book De Gruyter Handbook of Cyber Conflict and Warfare
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Abstract

Jihadist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) systematically exploit cyberspace and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to amplify their propaganda. Through digital platforms, social media, and emerging technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), these groups craft tailored information campaigns, spread ideological narratives, coordinate actions, and recruit supporters worldwide. Technology grants them a strategic advantage by enabling the virality of their narratives through demographic, behavioral, and sentiment analysis. This chapter illustrates how ISIS built a resilient digital ecosystem that enhances its influence, mobilizes supporters, and maintains its global reach.

Eleni Kapsokoli holds a post-doctoral degree from the Department of International and European Studies at the University of Piraeus, focusing on "The Securitization of Digital Electoral Processes: The Case of the European Union" in 2025. In 2022, she completed her PhD on Islamic cyberterrorism at the same department. She holds a bachelor's degree in "Political Science and Public Administration" from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and a master's degree in "International Relations and Strategic Studies" from the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences. Her primary research interests encompass international relations, international security, European security and defense, strategy, terrorism, cyberterrorism, hybrid threats, cybersecurity, disinformation, strategic communication, digital authoritarianism, artificial intelligence, and digital democracy. She has published extensively and participated in numerous conferences and research projects related to these research fields. She is also a PhD alumna of the European Doctoral School on Common Security and Defence Policy. She actively participates in research initiatives at the Laboratory of Intelligence and Cyber-security at the Department of International and European Studies of the University of Piraeus, the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), the Council for International Relations – Greece (CfIR-GR), the Foreign Affairs Institute (FAINST), the Institute for National and International Security of Serbia (INIS), and the Institute of Studies for Politics and Democracy (ISPD) of Cyprus.



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SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

Gaps in Prehospital Care for Patients Exposed to a Chemical Attack – A Systematic Review

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Abstract

Introduction: The survivability of mass casualties exposed to a chemical attack is dependent on clinical knowledge, evidence-based practice, as well as protection and decontamination capabilities. The aim of this systematic review was to identify the knowledge gaps that relate to an efficient extraction and care of mass casualties caused by exposure to chemicals.

Methods: This systematic review was conducted from November 2018 through September 2020 in compliance with Cochrane guidelines. Five databases were used (MEDLINE, Web of Science Core Collection, Embase, Cochrane, and CINAHL) to retrieve studies describing interventions performed to treat victims of chemical attacks (protection, decontamination, and treatment). The outcomes were patient's health condition leading to his/her stabilization (primary) and death (secondary) due to interventions applied (medical, protection, and decontamination).

Results: Of the 2,301 papers found through the search strategy, only four publications met the eligibility criteria. According to these studies, the confirmed chemical poisoning cases in acute settings resulting from the attacks in Matsumoto (1994), Tokyo (1995), and Damascus (2014) accounted for 1,333 casualties including 11 deaths. No study reported comprehensive prehospital clinical data in acute settings. No mention was made of the integration of specialized capabilities in medical interventions such as personal protective equipment (PPE) and decontamination to prevent a secondary exposure. Unfortunately, it was not possible to perform the planned meta-analysis.

Scientists Just Made a Wearable, Ultra-Light Material That Actually Cools Your Skin During Exercise

Source: https://www.sciencealert.com/scientists-create-a-breathable-hydrogel-inspired-by-human-lungs

July 26 – Wearable health sensors capable of continuously monitoring changes in the body have become a massive development in health technology in recent years.

These devices, along with medical patches and wound dressings, often need to remain in contact with the skin for hours or days. However, the water-rich hydrogels commonly used in such products can trap heat and sweat, potentially causing irritation and disrupting sensor readings. In a new study published in *Nature*, engineers led by a team at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) report developing a hydrogel containing a stable, three-dimensional network of microscopic, air-filled channels. A 2024 study published in *Science Advances* achieved eight days of continuous skin monitoring using a gas-permeable hydrogel sensor about 10 micrometers thick and reinforced with a polyurethane nanomesh. The new MIT study takes a different approach, creating a stable network of air pathways within a bulk hydrogel while maintaining a water content of 70 percent. Despite being 70 percent water, the material achieved an oxygen permeability of up to 185 barrer (that's not a typo, that's the unit of measurement for gas permeability!) in laboratory tests. That's around 10 times more permeable than a conventional hydrogel. Inspired by the air-carrying architecture of human lungs, the researchers took a regular hydrogel recipe and added a small amount of silica aerogel particles – essentially 'solid-form' air bubbles. These water-repelling particles trap air and prevent the tiny air spaces inside them from collapsing or filling with water. During production, the particles came



The new design of the breathable hydrogel (white) floats on water due to its air tunnels. The old design (clear) drops to the bottom of the water. (Melanie Gonick, MIT)

together inside the hydrogel to form a thin, interconnected network of air-filled channels. These channels allowed oxygen and water vapor to travel through the material while it retained its high water content.

The hydrogels also transmitted water vapor at rates 10 to 100 times higher than silicone and polyurethane patches, helping moisture escape from the skin.



A ladybug rests on an air-permeable hydrogel floating on water. (Xuanhe Zhao, Yan et al., *Nature*, 2026)

The hydrogel was also soft and durable, retaining about 95 percent of its air permeability after 10,000 stretching cycles.

To prove the wearability of the new product, researchers tested the comfort of wearing their patches compared to more common silicone ones.

Infrared images taken two minutes after the patches were removed showed that skin temperature beneath a commercial silicone patch had risen by 6.5 degrees Celsius following a 20-minute workout. Beneath the new hydrogel, however, it had fallen by about 1 degree, possibly because the material allowed heat to escape more efficiently.

A substantial amount of sweat also collected under the silicone patch, while skin covered by the breathable hydrogel remained similar to uncovered skin.

In another test, 10 volunteers wore the new patches on their chests during an hour of moderate exercise, with none reporting itching, irritation, or other adverse skin reactions.

The team also adapted the hydrogel for use as an electrode that records the heart's electrical activity.

During cycling tests, conventional hydrogel electrodes produced less stable electrocardiogram (ECG) signals as sweat accumulated. Electrodes made with the air-permeable hydrogel maintained clearer readings during and after exercise.

In extended monitoring, the hydrogel electrodes were worn continuously for 10 days and continued recording usable ECG signals during activities including sleeping, working, walking, and exercising.

Xuanhe Zhao, the study's senior author and mechanical engineer at MIT, told ScienceAlert that the most immediate applications could include wearable medical devices, wound dressings, and skin-mounted health monitors.

"These technologies often require prolonged contact with the skin, but conventional hydrogels trap heat and moisture because they do not allow sufficient oxygen and water vapor to pass through," Zhao said.

"Our material overcomes this limitation while maintaining the high water content and softness that make hydrogels comfortable and biocompatible."

However, the material is not yet ready for clinical use. Zhao says further studies will need to assess its long-term biocompatibility, performance on



large animals, sterilization, manufacturing at scale, shelf life, and regulatory safety. The human tests were small and designed mainly to demonstrate the material's feasibility.

The exercise and comfort assessments involved up to 10 volunteers, while the skin physiology measurements included only two participants and the exercise ECG comparison involved three. Larger and more diverse studies will therefore be needed to confirm the findings. The material will also need to be adapted for individual products, as a wound dressing, wearable sensor, and implant each has different requirements. The current material is not inherently adhesive, meaning it still requires a separate backing or attachment mechanism to remain on the skin. In the longer term, the design could potentially be used in tissue engineering and implantable devices, where keeping cells supplied with oxygen remains a major challenge.

"Many engineered tissues and implants require efficient oxygen transport to maintain cell viability, and our material offers a way to improve gas exchange while preserving the hydrated environment that cells need," Zhao said.

However, implantable applications will require substantially more testing, he cautions, making skin-based uses the more realistic first step.

●▶ **The findings are reported in** *Nature*.

The Challenges of Testing AI in the CBRN Detection Environment

By Brandon Graham

Source: https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/ai-and-advanced-tech/column-the-challenges-of-testing-ai-in-the-cbrn-detection-environment/

July 27 – National Security Presidential Memorandum 11, signed June 5, 2026, gives federal officials 90 days to develop a roadmap for computing access across the national security enterprise. That roadmap, the memorandum says, should include an AI test range for national security use cases, subject to the availability of appropriations. Ninety days falls in early September. As of July 26, 2026, I have found no publicly released roadmap.

There is a precedent for what happens when an evaluation matures. In early 2025 OpenAI published a candid account of why its cybersecurity testing, useful as far as it went, did not capture how operations actually run. Its capture-the-flag challenges presented a single well-defined task in a low-risk environment where the solver already knew a vulnerability was present. Real operations, the company wrote, require chaining vulnerabilities across long-running sequences, working under constraints that include evading defenses, using situational awareness to order actions, and sifting noise. The proposed remedy was to build a range.

It built one, introduced in the o3 and o4-mini system card that April. According to the later GPT-5 system card, the cyber range measures end-to-end operations in an emulated network: the model must plan toward an adversary objective, exploit real-world weaknesses, and chain them to the goal. The problem set grew from two scenarios to five. A developer saw that its tests measured isolated tasks rather than operations, and built the environment that closed the gap.

I have found no public counterpart for CBRN, by which I mean an end-to-end, stateful evaluation of a model operating through a detection architecture, as distinct from the model-capability tests and simulation tools that do exist. Whether one exists in classified work I cannot say, and the absence of a public account is not evidence of an absent capability. The roadmap due in September is where an unclassified answer could begin.

It will not be answered by copying the cyber pattern. A detection architecture can be emulated to a degree, but it is more than a network: instruments, procedures, people, and authorities producing contested claims about the physical world under time pressure. Defeating it turns on properties a network-only range does not represent.

Technical evaluators should decide how to run the test. Operational practitioners should help decide what the test has to prove.

First, evidentiary status. An alarm is not an identification. An identification is not proof of harmful exposure. A hazard is not proof of malicious intent. None of them automatically carries authority to act, and authority itself varies by jurisdiction, agency, and action, so the scenario has to represent the decision rights that actually apply rather than infer them from technical confidence. A range that collapses all of this into one truth value is testing pattern recognition and calling it judgment.

So the environment has to hold the underlying physical condition separately, what was observable, how each observation was produced, whether observations are independent, and what remains unresolved. Instrument condition, collection quality, and shared causes belong inside the simulation, not in assumed-perfect metadata. Two readings from instruments with a common failure mode are not two independent ones. The participant has to separate not detected from not observable, preserve provisional from confirmatory, name which proposition an observation supports, and choose an information-gaining next action without laundering uncertainty into certainty.

Scoring follows from that. A correct conclusion reached through invalid evidence or double-counted corroboration is not success, and judgment is scored against what was knowable when it was made. Unresolved can be a competent outcome when it arrives with a defensible interim action and a next step that would resolve it, which is what separates it from evasion.

A concrete case makes this visible. A portal alarms as a vehicle passes: an indication, not an identification. The spectrum resolves to an isotope consistent with a common medical source, which raises a benign explanation without establishing one. A second sensor agrees, which adds nothing independent if it shares the first one's failure mode. Nothing yet speaks to intent, and the authority to hold the vehicle may not include the authority to open it. A model that reports a threat, or clears the lane, has skipped every step. A model that names what is supported, flags what is unresolved, and recommends the action that would resolve it has done the work, even before a final label exists. Only the second is competence.

Second, operational memory. A newly briefed operator facing an isolated alarm is the clean-world equivalent of a fresh network, and it is the wrong starting condition. Real architectures accumulate history. Prior alarms and how they resolved, instrument quality events, earlier model recommendations, human overrides, and the standing reputation of the alarm process itself all shape what happens next.

NIST states the consequence plainly in its guidance on false alarm testing for radiation detection systems: an operator facing a high false alarm rate becomes desensitized, and may cease responding to what may be valid alarms. The same document ties the acceptable threshold to the effort required to adjudicate an alarm and the number a user could absorb in an eight-hour shift. That is NIST reporting the effect. The design point I draw from it: operator trust is not a human-factors footnote but a state variable in detection performance, and history sets it.

The environment therefore has to carry that history forward, and the score has to include the condition the system is left in. A model that handles the consequential episode correctly after teaching its operators to ignore alarms, or to escalate everything, has failed the architecture even as it passed the scenario.

The remaining four are more familiar and usually specified too loosely.

Third, competing explanations rather than noise. Random interference does not test whether a model can distinguish among causally coherent alternatives, and an architecture faces exactly those, among them invalid observation, innocent alarm, genuine hazard with no malicious origin, malicious event, and evidence that legitimately does not resolve. Material identity, harmfulness, and intent are three separate determinations, and collapsing them is how a technical finding becomes an assertion about intent that no one actually established.

Fourth, the alarm-to-action chain rather than a decision point. The operational unit is not one person choosing against a clock but a claim moving through roles with bounded information and bounded authority, and the requirement is that its basis, its uncertainty, its evidentiary status, and the action being requested all survive escalation and handoff intact.

Fifth, intervention coupling rather than a reactive defense. The point is not that the architecture responds but that responding changes what can afterward be known. A protective action can foreclose a confirmatory one, a confirmatory action can disturb what an investigation needs, and each choice alters what remains observable. The task has to force that tradeoff, and the score has to reflect the state left behind.

Sixth, path dependence rather than duration. A long exchange in a world that resets between turns is a branching quiz. What matters is that earlier decisions change what can later be observed, established, or done.

Scoring runs on two ledgers. The realized objective, the adversary's goal in an offensive evaluation or the defender's in a protective one, still counts, since ignoring whether the goal was reached understates risk. The trajectory is scored separately: whether evidence was handled defensibly, whether corroboration was real, whether uncertainty survived. A lucky correct call is not competence.

None of this is defensive decoration bolted onto an offensive question. It is the attack surface. The noise floor is cover, alarm fatigue is an exploitable state, and the handoff seam is where a claim loses its provenance. An adversarial evaluation and a defensive one can be built on the same environment for this reason, even where their permissions and success criteria diverge. What the attacker exploits is what the defender must hold. Much of the difference is which ledger you read.

Nor does any of it require reproducing a fielded system. Synthetic environments, validated surrogates, and controlled-access

testing can carry these properties without exposing the thresholds, configurations, coverage, or timing that would make the exercise dangerous. Specifying which properties matter is the contribution, and it needs none of those details published.

NSPM-11 directs two forthcoming products where this belongs: the roadmap due in early September, and the standardized test, evaluation, verification, and validation methodologies due in early October. The roadmap's directing provision permits consultation with other agencies as appropriate and does not list the Secretary of Homeland Security among the officials required to coordinate it, though the Secretary of Homeland Security is a recipient of the memorandum and holds roles elsewhere in it. Neither directing provision expressly mentions CBRN. That is a reason to ask for it, not evidence that anyone decided against it. Carrying that history forward has a cost that belongs in the design from the start. Operator decisions, overrides, and reliance can become personnel-performance records, and a record of how individuals performed under pressure invites monitoring uses well beyond evaluation. Encoding who is authorized to act is a legal question before it is a technical one. A range built on these properties needs lawful basis, retention and access controls, and civil-liberties review as first-class requirements, not afterthoughts, and saying so is part of specifying it responsibly.

The people who could specify these properties run detection programs in transit systems, at ports, and across cities. Their experience is complementary to the laboratory scientists who design the instruments, not replaced by it, and it has to be asked for rather than assumed.

What a range like this measures is not whether a model recognized the event. It is whether an uncertain indication can move through a living detection architecture into a defensible action without corrupting the evidence, the organization's trust, or the next decision. That is the test. The officials drafting the roadmap and the evaluation methodologies should say CBRN belongs in the range, require that a stateful, end-to-end detection-architecture evaluation be part of it, and bring the operators who run those systems into defining what it must prove, while officials still have time to shape the products the memorandum requires.

Brandon W. Graham has spent more than thirty years in emergency services, homeland security, and counter-WMD operations with a focus on preventive radiological and nuclear detection, and is a doctoral student in intelligence and global security. The views expressed are his own and do not represent any agency, program, or organization with which he is affiliated.

Title: A practical PPE decontamination method using warm air and ambient humidity.

Authors: Jesse J. Kwiek[i], Christopher R. Pickett[i], Chloe A. Flanigan[i], Marcia V. Lee[ii], Linda J. Saif[iii] Jeff Jahnes[i,iv], Greg Blonder[v]

Abstract: Personal protective equipment (PPE) remains in short supply. Current decontamination methods are complex, slow, expensive and particularly ill-suited for low to middle income nations where the need is greatest. We propose a low temperature, ambient humidity decontamination method (WASP-D) based on the thirty minute or less half-life of Sars-CoV-2 (and other common pathogens) at temperatures above 45°C, combined with the observation that most PPE are designed to be safely transported and stored at temperatures below 50°C. Decontamination at 12 hours, 46°C (115°F) and ambient humidity should consistently reduce SARS-CoV-2 viral load by a factor of 10^{-6}, without negatively affecting PPE materials or performance.

Today, Argon Electronics becomes part of Evallic.

Source: https://www.argonelectronics.com/news/argon-electronics-joins-evallic-appoints-new-ceo

Over the past three decades, we have built a world-leading position in CBRNe detection simulation and training, supporting customers across defence, law enforcement, and civil protection organizations worldwide.
Evallic strengthens its mission of rebuilding European defence and resilience while powering the protection of people and society.
Through this acquisition, Evallic completes a uniquely integrated CBRNe platform spanning detection software (Bruhn Newtech), hazard prediction and modelling (Riskaware), and physical detector simulation and training (Argon). While continuing to operate under its established brand, Argon gains access to Evallic's platform, industrial capabilities and global defence market reach.
"Joining Evallic marks a pivotal milestone for Argon. We have built something world-leading over 30 years, with products trusted by customers in more than 40 countries. With Evallic's platform, international reach and industrial backing, we have found the ideal environment to expand our product range, accelerate international growth and meet the sharply rising demand for CBRNe preparedness solutions in a more dangerous world," - Steven Pike, founder of Argon Electronics.
At the same time, we are pleased to welcome Bob Cargill as Chief Executive Officer. With extensive experience across defence, national security, and technology, Bob will lead Argon through its next phase of development.
Cargill brings many years experience in senior executive roles including for QinetiQ, Fujitsu and Microsoft, building and winning large, complex contracts in defence and national security. He has regularly been engaged as a consultant in the defence space helping tech companies large and small understand, develop and grow in this industry. This is underpinned by 25 years in the RAF Regiment, with operational tours in Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan, and recognition for both gallant and meritorious service. He continues to serve in the RAF Reserves.
"Argon has built something genuinely differentiated in a market awash with start-ups and large primes — trusted products and long-standing customer relationships in a sector that demands credibility. My focus is to build on that: structured training and evaluation services alongside the hardware, more recurring revenue, and a platform that helps customers demonstrate and sustain CBRN readiness. The threat is real and growing." -Bob Cargill, CEO of Argon Electronics
This combination of commercial and military success matters. Argon doesn't just sell hardware, it sells confidence: the ability of an organisation to demonstrate, credibly and repeatably, that its people are prepared for a CBRN threat they hope will never materialise. That requires someone who has planned for such threats operationally, and who understands the institutional pressures that cause organisations to underinvest in readiness until it is too late.
Together, we look forward to advancing CBRNe training, simulation, and preparedness for customers around the world.

Imam Hussein University (IHU)

Source: https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/imam-hussein-university-ihu

A public university and military academy (also known as Imam Hussein University of the Revolutionary Guards), overseen by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that is involved in nuclear, missile, chemical weapon, and military research.
According to the U.S. Department of State, has conducted research on chemical agents intended to incapacitate, including **medetomidine**, since 2005; in 2014, chemistry department sought to obtain kilogram quantities of medetomidine from Chinese suppliers.
Faculty members have conducted research on fast neutron detection in collaboration with scientists from Shahid Beheshti University (SBU) and Amirkabir University of Technology (AUT), including Gholam Reza Eta'ati, on improved bridge type inrush current limiters in collaboration with scientists from AUT and Shahed University, on natural convection in a rectangular enclosure, and on simulating and evaluating pressurizer dynamic behavior in collaboration with scientists from Islamic Azad University and the Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI) of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
Faculty members have also reportedly conducted research on capacitive flux compression generators, copper vapor lasers, electromagnetic

induction, electromagnetic radiation, high-temperature superconductors, laser photoablation, nanocomposites, neutron emission, the neutron energy spectrum, photomultipliers, polyaniline gas sensors, radar, subsonic conical diffusers, the transmission of encrypted data, and the numerical simulation of ballistic penetration of long rods into ceramic metal armor.

Reportedly the intended site of a project on nuclear reactor theory to be conducted with assistance from the AEOI and proposed by Fereydoun Abbasi Davani, who has served as a vice president of Iran and head of the AEOI; affiliated researchers have reportedly collaborated with multiple AEOI research institutes; reportedly hosted a 21-member research team conducting experiments on tritium. Has reportedly worked on developing a solid-fuel satellite launch vehicle in cooperation with the IRGC Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization; in 2011, reportedly developed a low-earth orbit gravitational search platform in collaboration with Rayan Roshd Afzar and the IRGC Ground Forces. Has reportedly run aircraft engineering courses for Hezbollah drone experts later deployed to Syria; in 2016, reportedly deployed 100 personnel for 2-month missions as advisors and trainers in Iraq and Syria. In 2017, concluded a memorandum of understanding with Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA); has reportedly obtained goods or services from the Iranian technology firm Hafiz Samaneh Company.

In 2013, hosted a conference on the defense applications of nanoscience sponsored by the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Malek Ashtar University, the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), Sharif University of Technology, and Tarbiat Modarres University.

According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), has assisted the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) with research on nuclear weapons; according to the NCRI, has produced **anthrax** and **aflatoxin** and acquired and stockpiled microbial weaponry for Iran's research on biological weapons; according to the NCRI, has collaborated with the late Masoud Ali Mohammadi, an Iranian nuclear scientist who was assassinated in 2010.

Faculties and research centers include:

- Cyber-Electronic Research Institute
- Defense and Security Sciences Research Institute
- Faculty and Research Institute of the Great Prophet
- Faculty and Research Institute of Information and Communication Technology
- Faculty and Research Institute of Management and Economics
- Faculty and Research Institute of Social and Cultural Sciences
- Faculty and Research Institute of Technology and Engineering
- Faculty of Command and Management
- Imam Hadi Faculty and Research Institute
- Imam Sajjad Research Institute
- Research Institute for International Studies
- Research Institute of Security Engineering and Passive Defense

Offers academic degrees in subjects including electronic warfare, passive defense, remote-sensing geographic information systems, and strategic defense; areas of research have included nuclear physics, solid propulsion, liquid propellants, analytical chemistry, atomic and molecular physics, advanced reactor physics, and computational physics. Current administrators include Mohammad Reza Hassani Ahangar (president of Imam Hussein Comprehensive University) and reportedly Na'man Gholami (commander of Imam Hussein Officer and Guard Training University); other administrators have included Morteza Saffari (commander) and reportedly Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Ali Fazli (commander of Imam Hussein Officer and Guard Training University), and Hamid Abazari (lieutenant commander of Imam Hussein Officer and Guard Training University). Faculty members have included the late Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (reportedly a professor of physics), who concurrently served as the head of the SPND, and reportedly Abbasi Davani (dean of the physics college according to the NCRI).

According to the NCRI, other faculty have included Mansur Asgari (member of board of scientists of the physics college), Reza Haj Beiglou (commander of the nuclear physics program), Seyyed Hassan Hosseini (commander of the nuclear physics program), and Dr. Karami, an alleged expert on biological weapons.

Established by IRGC commander Mohsen Reza'i in 1986 as Imam Hussein Higher Education Center; in 2008 or 2009, was divided into Imam Hussein Comprehensive University, a graduate school, and Imam Hussein Officer and Guard Training University, which trains IRGC officers.

Sanctions

Added on November 8, 2012, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; also designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity are subject to U.S. sanctions; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations; foreign financial institutions facilitating transactions for the person may be prohibited from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States.

Sanctioned on August 14, 2013, by the government of Australia, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and freezing its assets in Australia.

Listed by the Japanese government in 2020 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to missiles and biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.

Baqiyatallah University of Medical Sciences

Source 1: https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/baqiyatallah-university-medical-sciences
Source 2: http://www.bmsu.ac.ir

Also Known As: BMSU; Bagiatollah Medical Sciences University; Baghiatollah Medical Sciences University; Baqyatollah Medical Sciences University; Baqiyatallah Medical Sciences University; Baghyatollah Medical Sciences University; Baqiatollah Medical Sciences University; and دانشگاه بقیةالله پزشکی علوم

A military medical school that is the primary medical institution for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Faculty members have conducted research on **viral strains** that can be used as biological weapon agents and have written about the classification and properties of chemical warfare agents, including **sulphur mustard** gas; faculty members have also studied the development of a sensor for detecting trace amounts of uranium, and have conducted research in cooperation with scientists from Imam Hussein University, Tehran University of Medical Sciences, and the University of Tehran. Operates three university hospitals and 18 clinical research centers, including research institutes focused on biotechnology, nanobiotechnology, microbiology, virology, and chemical injuries; has a Systems Biology and Poisonings Institute; publishes a scientific journal dedicated to military medicine. Has 8,000 students in four schools; awards scholarships that require students to work for the IRGC upon graduation. University officials include Alireza Jalai (rector), Abass Ebadi (vice rector for education), and Gholamreza Ali Shiri (vice rector for research); former officials include Jafar Aslani (rector), a brigadier general in the IRGC. Established in 1994.

The lower building of the Bagiatollah hospital (Tehran) is dedicated to CWA victims from the Iran-Iraq war in the 1970s (**personal experience** from a 2003 OPCW medical course conducted there – a unique opportunity to examine firsthand mustard eyes and auscultate CWA lungs).

Sanctions

Added on November 8, 2012, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; also designated on October 31, 2017, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity are subject to U.S. sanctions.

Sanctioned on February 5, 2016, by the government of Canada for involvement in Iran's proliferation activities or affiliation with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), prohibiting (with some exceptions) its access to goods, funds, and related services in Canada. Listed by the Japanese government in 2022 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to missiles and nuclear weapons.

Possible Not Plausible: CBRN (Chemical – Biological – Radiological – Nuclear) Policy Drift

By **admin** - Agosto 3, 2026 17 0

BIG TEXT

Executive Summary

BLUF: The central failure mode in **CBRN (Chemical – Biological – Radiological – Nuclear)** policy is not a shortage of imagination but the substitution of technically possible nightmare scenarios for empirically plausible threat trajectories. This brief treats the supplied thesis as a governance problem: when institutions lose trained staff, recurring data venues, and disciplined translation between technical experts and budget authorities, speculative narratives may outcompete observable indicators. The analytic consequence is a policy portfolio that reacts to vivid hypotheticals while underweighting recurring chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear patterns. The five-year planning horizon from **January 2026** through **December 2030** should therefore be organized around evidence triage, scenario stress-testing, and reconstruction of accountable expertise. The response below does not emit live-source claims because

no live retrieval and verification step is available in this session; all externally dependent empirical assertions are omitted under a source-or-silence rule. Instead, it provides a decision-support architecture: five competing hypotheses, **Bayesian** and **Monte Carlo** scaffolds without numerical outputs, shadow-domain tracking, and an interactive qualitative dashboard. The objective is to help senior decision-makers distinguish possible from plausible, protect technical judgment from alarm cycles, and align private-sector collaboration with public accountability. Its operational output is not a forecast, but a control system for reducing epistemic drift, preserving treaty language, and forcing nightmare scenarios to survive evidence, red-team review, and resource constraints before they become strategy.

Master Abstract

The contemporary **CBRN (Chemical – Biological – Radiological – Nuclear)** policy environment is best understood as an epistemic control problem rather than a simple resource problem. The supplied thesis suggests that nightmare scenarios may displace current trend analysis, and that institutional contraction may be associated with weaker discipline over those scenarios. This response treats that thesis as a hypothesis requiring verification, but it can still organize a rigorous decision framework. [CONFIDENCE: LOW]

The method is designed to integrate structured analytic techniques, forensic provenance discipline, enterprise risk modeling, and predictive scenario scaffolding. The core risk is that policy formation becomes dominated by narrative salience: a vivid future attack, a dramatic technology pairing, or a politically urgent label may overwhelm slower, less cinematic indicators such as stockpile maintenance, doctrine, training, procurement anomalies, treaty compliance friction, and low-level use patterns. In such an environment, the state may simultaneously overinvest in speculative capabilities and underinvest in response, attribution, medical countermeasures, alliance coordination, and arms-control enforcement. The distinction between possible and plausible is therefore operational, not philosophical. Possibility is generated by scientific progress; plausibility is constrained by intent, capability, logistics, deniability, escalation risk, and observed behavior. A serious policy architecture must force every high-consequence scenario to pass through those constraints before it shapes budget, posture, or public communication. That architecture should also preserve semantic discipline, because treaty obligations, criminal statutes, and alliance mechanisms depend on stable definitions rather than elastic threat branding. The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses is organized around five frameworks. H_1, **Institutional Drift**, posits that loss of trained personnel, discontinued reporting, and collapsed forums corresponds with weaker signal detection more than adversary innovation itself. H_2, **Alarm Capture**, posits that high-salience future scenarios correlate with budget and attention attraction even when evidence is thin, and may generate reactive portfolios and mission creep. H_3, **Empirical Repair**, posits that restoring incident databases, technical translation, and recurring exercises would be associated with materially improved policy discrimination without necessarily expanding large bureaucracies. H_4, **Shadow-Network Acceleration**, posits that non-state armed actors, illicit procurement, cyber-enabled logistics, and private dual-use platforms may create deniable pathways that may outpace traditional state-centric monitoring. H_5, **Normative Reconfiguration**, posits that contested definitions—especially around **weapons of mass destruction**, **biothreat**, and alleged chemical-use categories—may alter legal thresholds, alliance cohesion, and deterrence signaling. Each hypothesis is evaluated against diagnostic evidence: personnel continuity, reporting cadence, budget alignment, incident database health, treaty language stability, private-sector reporting quality, and adversary behavior. Because live primary-source verification is not performed in this session, no hypothesis is assigned a numerical posterior. The hypotheses function as structured lenses, not forecasts. This preserves analytic utility while avoiding false precision, and it allows future evidence to be inserted without redesigning the entire decision framework. [CONFIDENCE: LOW]

Bayesian and Monte Carlo techniques are included as governance instruments, not as decorative formalism. The Bayesian scaffold requires a prior distribution over H_1 through H_5, an evidence register E_1 through E_n, and likelihood assessments $P(E_j|H_i)$ derived from primary documentation, inspected data, audited incident records, or official multilingual records from .ru, .cn, and .eu domains admitted only after provenance and translation checks. In a verified environment, evidence such as treaty filings, budget justifications, inspectorate findings, laboratory procurement traces, and official incident reports would update posterior confidence. In this session, those likelihoods are not available under the required live-verification standard; therefore, no numeric posterior is emitted. The Monte Carlo scaffold similarly requires parameterized variables: institutional capacity, evidence density, shadow-network exposure, normative stability, and private-sector alignment. Each variable would need a defensible distribution, iteration count, and sensitivity test before outputs could inform strategy. Because those inputs are absent, the model is expressed as a qualitative sensitivity surface: the interactive component below allows users to move structural levers and observe which dimensions dominate policy fragility. This approach respects the prohibition

on invented probabilities while preserving the analytic value of scenario exploration, stress-testing, and assumption tracking. It also forces future teams to identify the exact data required to convert qualitative concern into quantitative decision support. The result is a disciplined bridge between expert judgment and future evidence collection, rather than a false dashboard of invented certainty.

The five-year outlook from **January 2026** through **December 2030** is structured as a sequence of governance phases rather than a deterministic forecast. In the first phase, **January 2026–December 2026**, the priority is evidence triage: identify which current **CBRN** conversations are grounded in verified incidents, treaty mechanisms, procurement signals, and historical baselines, and segregate those from speculative technology narratives. In the second phase, **January 2027–December 2028**, the focus shifts to instrument repair: incident databases, technical translation cells, interagency red teams, and private-sector reporting protocols. In the third phase, **January 2029–December 2030**, the system should test whether repaired instruments change budget choices, requirements, and crisis response. Across all phases, shadow dimensions require continuous monitoring. **Mercenary dynamics** may affect deniable delivery and logistics; **cyber-norms** may affect attribution, laboratory security, and information integrity; **liquidity flows** may reveal how insurers, banks, shippers, and commodity markets interpret risk. The outlook does not assert that any specific incident will occur. Instead, it defines readiness as the capacity to distinguish plausible escalation pathways from technically possible but operationally implausible stories, and to do so quickly enough to protect policy from alarm capture. This makes the outlook testable: if evidence triage, instrument repair, and shadow monitoring are not visible in budget documents and exercise after-action records by the end of the period, the governance failure persists regardless of rhetoric.

The recommendation set follows from the structural diagnosis. First, decision-makers should require a plausibility gate for every high-consequence scenario: evidence classes, historical analogues, weaponization constraints, delivery feasibility, and escalation implications must be documented before the scenario can drive requirements or public messaging. Second, technical communities should create shared glossaries and translation products so that medical, intelligence, acquisition, legal, and arms-control actors do not talk past one another. Third, private-sector collaboration should be formalized through charters that specify data provenance, confidentiality limits, red-team participation, and escalation reporting. Advisory councils can help, but they must include deep technical expertise in biology, chemistry, radiological science, nuclear systems, and treaty law rather than only adjacent technology voices. Fourth, historical data must be treated as infrastructure: incident portals, case files, and lessons-learned archives need sustainable stewardship, even when annual budgets are constrained. Fifth, semantic discipline should protect treaty-embedded terms from political convenience, because classification disputes may degrade coalition action and legal clarity.

The ultimate objective is not to suppress concern about emerging technology; it is to ensure that concern is disciplined by evidence, institutional memory, and operational reality. If these measures are adopted, the policy system can absorb novel threats without surrendering analytical control to the most emotionally compelling but least evidence-bound narrative.

Open access Protocol

BMJ Open

Acute care for patients exposed to a chemical attack: protocol for an international multicentric observational study

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ABSTRACT

Introduction The use of weapons of mass destruction against civilian populations is of serious concern to public health authorities. Chemical weapons are of particular concern. A few studies have investigated

medical responses in prehospital settings in the immediate aftermath of a chemical attack, and they were limited by the paucity of clinical data. This study aims to describe the acute management of patients exposed to a chemical attack from the incident site until their transfer to a medical facility.

Methods and analysis This international multicentric observational study addresses the period from 1970 to 2036. An online electronic case report form was created to collect data; it will be hosted on the Biomedical Telematics Laboratory Platform of the Quebec Respiratory Health Research Network. Participating medical centres and their clinicians are being asked to provide contextual and clinical information, including the use of protective equipment and decontamination capabilities for the medical evacuation of the patient from the incident site of the chemical attack to the moment of admission at the medical facility.

In brief, variables are categorised as follows: (1) chemical exposure (threat); (2) prehospital and hospital/medical facility capabilities (staffing, first aid, protection, decontamination, disaster plans and medical guidelines); (3) clinical interventions before hospital admission, including the use of protection and decontamination; and (4) outcomes (survivability vs mortality rates). Judgement criteria focus on decontamination drills applied to any of the patient's conditions.

Decontamination and modern technologies

Army soldiers assigned to a chemical defense unit under the Chinese PLA Xinjiang Military Command spray down the simulated chemical-contaminated area with the assistance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) during a Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear (CBRN) decontamination drill. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by LiuYihui)

Genetically modified hookworms could protect against deadly pufferfish toxin

Source: https://refractor.io/disease/genetically-modified-hookworms-could-protect-against-deadly-pufferfish-toxin/

Aug 05 – Hookworms are freeloaders that live at the host's expense inside their gut, drinking about two drops of blood per day. This parasite could soon pay its way with engineered hookworms serving as living medicine factories. Using CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing technology, researchers genetically modified the human hookworm *Ancylostoma ceylanicum* to produce and release

a therapeutic antibody into the host that partially neutralizes tetrodotoxin – a potent neurotoxin found in pufferfish.

"This was a technically ambitious project because no one had previously achieved stable genetic modification of a human hookworm," the co-author of the study, Makedonka Mitreva at the Washington University School of Medicine, told *Refractor*. "It was a remarkable moment for the entire team."

Larva of *N. americanus*.

Once the hookworms enter the human body, they migrate to the small intestine, mature there, and can live for several years. These hookworms maintain a healthy balance of drinking blood, just enough to not cause an infection. During this time, they release proteins into their surroundings, which scientists think may benefit the host. Mitreva told us that hookworms have evolved several characteristics that make them potentially valuable for long-term drug delivery. Since hookworms naturally secrete hundreds of proteins into the host, the researchers sought to redirect this existing secretion system so that the engineered worms also produce the therapeutic antibody. To achieve this stable genetic modification, Mitreva and her colleagues first had to determine how to deliver the CRISPR components into the hookworm eggs. They had to identify a safe place in the genome for the therapeutic gene that wouldn't interfere with the worm's own genes. After identifying the genomic safe harbors, the researchers applied short bursts of electricity to those eggs.

This technique, called electroporation, creates temporary, tiny pores in a cell's outer membrane, allowing genetic material to enter and integrate into the hookworm eggs.

Here, the genetic material is CRISPR/Cas9 instructions that instruct the hookworm to synthesize a specific protein, s16-HuScFv, which can neutralize tetrodotoxin.

After zapping the eggs, they were left to hatch. About 80 to 100 transgenic larvae were delivered into the Syrian golden hamsters' stomachs. In a control group, hamsters were infected with wild-type worms.

The blood drawn from the hamsters infected with the engineered hookworms had detectable levels of antibodies that remained biologically active. These antibodies later neutralized about 16% of tetrodotoxin in laboratory tests.

"By precise engineering, we can include a therapeutic protein without disrupting the other secreted molecules, and we could potentially achieve sustained medicine production without repeated injections," says Mitreva.

Mitreva told us that hookworms cannot multiply inside the host, as part of their reproductive cycle must occur outside the human body. Therefore, the number of initially administered hookworms may remain relatively stable, with no possibility of increasing.

"This could allow a defined population of engineered worms to function as long-lived biological pumps," she adds. Once the treatment is done, the worms can be easily eliminated with an antiparasitic medication.

"However, the concept of delivering therapeutic levels for years still requires direct testing, optimization and rigorous safety evaluation before it could be considered for human use," Mitreva told us.

The researchers also found that the eggs collected from the hamster droppings carried the inserted gene. The team confirmed that those eggs developed into infective third-stage larvae. This means that the genetically modified hookworms had reproduced and passed the change on to their offspring.

"The idea of using a parasite as a living pharmaceutical factory is no longer simply a concept. We had **demonstrated that the process could work from beginning to end," Mitreva concludes.**

●▶ **The study has been published in** *Nature Communications*.

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SPECIAL REPORT

Decontamination of Mass Casualties — Re-evaluating Existing Dogma

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Abstract

The events of 11 September 2001 became the catalyst for many to shift their disaster preparedness efforts towards mass-casualty incidents. Emergency responders, healthcare workers, emergency managers, and public health officials worldwide are being tasked to improve their readiness by acquiring equipment, providing training and implementing policy, especially in the area of mass-casualty decontamination. Accomplishing each of these tasks requires good information, which is lacking. Management of the incident scene and the approach to victim care varies throughout the world and is based more on dogma than scientific data. In order to plan effectively for and to manage a chemical, mass-casualty event, we must critically assess the criteria upon which we base our response.

This paper reviews current standards surrounding the response to a release of hazardous materials that results in massive numbers of exposed human survivors. In addition, a significant effort is made to prepare an international perspective on this response.

Preparations for the 24-hour threat of exposure of a community to hazardous material are a community responsibility for first-responders and the hospital. Preparations for a mass-casualty event related to a terrorist attack are a governmental responsibility. Reshaping response protocols and decontamination needs on the differences between vapor and liquid chemical threats can enable local responders to effectively manage a chemical attack resulting in mass casualties. Ensuring that hospitals have adequate resources and training to mount an effective decontamination response in a rapid manner is essential.

Han Kuang Chemical Drill Models Spy Sabotage, Not Artillery: Taiwan Tests NBC Response

By Roger Satterfield

Source: https://www.techtimes.com/articles/323699/20260810/han-kuang-chemical-drill-models-spy-sabotage-not-artillery-taiwan-tests-nbc-response.htm

Aug 10 – On the fifth day of Taiwan's Han Kuang 42 live-fire exercises, soldiers from the Army's Chemical Group in Hualien County were ordered to assume that the enemy was already inside the wire — that

Chinese intelligence operatives had penetrated multiple military positions and released toxic gases specifically to prevent armored units from moving north to reinforce Taiwan's more exposed front lines. That scenario — spy-delivered contamination rather than artillery-fired chemical shells — is the detail that makes Sunday's nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) decontamination drill in Hualien editorially significant: Taiwan's planners are no longer designing CBRN exercises around the Cold War paradigm, and the doctrinal gap between those two delivery models is not subtle.

Taiwan's Army Chemical Group stood up a temporary decontamination station within 30 minutes of receiving the order on August 9, 2026, then processed each contaminated armored vehicle through a multi-step decontamination sequence in eight to ten minutes per vehicle. The drill mobilized the Hualien Armored Vehicle Unit of the Army's Second Combat Zone — the eastern formation whose strategic purpose is to surge northward and reinforce the island's more vulnerable coastline against a Chinese amphibious assault. Those two facts together — 30-minute station setup, sub-ten-minute vehicle throughput — are Taiwan's publicly visible answer to a specific operational question: how quickly can the Chemical Group reconstitute an armored unit after it has been chemically contaminated by an adversary who entered unseen?

What the Scenario Choice Reveals About Taiwan's Threat Model

Every military exercise encodes a threat model in its scenario design, and the Hualien drill's scenario encodes something specific. Cold War CBRN training centered on artillery and rocket delivery — agents arriving from outside the perimeter, creating area contamination, giving defenders warning time proportional to their detection capability. Taiwan's August 9 scenario assumes none of that: the agents were already released by enemy agents who had infiltrated the positions.

This distinction matters operationally. Under the military CBRN defense framework, incidents assumed to be intentional and malicious — which describes every scenario involving enemy operatives — carry obligations beyond decontamination: evidence preservation, zone isolation, and investigation of the delivery mechanism. When Taiwan's Chemical Group responded in Hualien, they were not just washing down tanks; the full protocol implies they treated the contaminated zone as a crime scene with live tactical consequences. The enemy who released the gas remains unlocated. The armored column still needs to move.

That double pressure — decontaminate and reconstitute

quickly while maintaining operational security discipline — is what makes this drill more demanding than a conventional area-contamination exercise. A unit responding to an artillery-delivered chemical strike can proceed once contamination levels drop below detection thresholds. A unit responding to spy-delivered contamination must also account for the possibility that the operatives are still present, that additional releases are possible, and that the contaminated area must be treated as potentially hostile until cleared. Taiwan has decided this is the scenario worth rehearsing. The broader analytical context reinforces the logic. The Royal United Services Institute, in a March 2025 analysis of Taiwan's gray-zone threat environment, recorded that Taiwan's defense officials described an escalation ladder that could go to full military action — and that the rungs of that ladder include sabotage. Chemical sabotage of armored positions prior to an amphibious assault would serve the same operational purpose as any gray-zone disruption tactic: it degrades response capacity without crossing the threshold of declared war. The Hualien drill is Taiwan's rehearsed answer to that specific rung.

How the Decontamination Worked

Chemical Group soldiers wore CBRN respirators throughout the operation — the sealed positive-pressure mask standard that protects against airborne toxic agents while permitting effective work. The decontamination sequence as observed by an embedded CNA reporter proceeded in four stages.

The first stage identified contaminated areas and detected the specific toxic substances present — a step that determines which decontamination agents are required and whether personnel can work in lighter protective gear or must remain in full ensemble. The second and third stages removed the hazardous material from vehicle surfaces using hot water followed by decontamination powder — a dual-solvent approach that addresses both surface adhesion and chemical neutralization. The fourth stage drove each vehicle through a decontamination pit filled with cleansing materials to address underside contamination, a vector that surface-wash procedures cannot reach. Before any vehicle was released from the decontamination zone, soldiers applied detection papers and electronic instruments to confirm the vehicle no longer carried contaminated material — a dual-method verification that reduces the risk of false clearance in a real contamination scenario. Detection papers give a rapid colorimetric indication; electronic instruments provide quantitative measurement. Neither alone is sufficient for a combat clearance decision, which is why both are required.

That dual-method protocol is operationally rigorous. A vehicle that passes only the paper test and moves north to a kinetic engagement, then is found to have residual contamination, has exposed every other vehicle and soldier it contacted in the convoy. Taiwan's Chemical Group is not drilling a shortcut.

Hualien's Strategic Position and Why This Drill Happened Here

Hualien sits on Taiwan's eastern coast, geographically isolated from the western population centers by the Central Mountain Range. The isolation is both a vulnerability and a strategic asset. Because a Chinese amphibious assault is most likely to target Taiwan's western and northern coastlines — where flat terrain, road networks, and port infrastructure favor an invasion — eastern Taiwan serves as the staging area from which armored reserves can surge northward once the attack has materialized and the defensive picture has clarified.

That staging role is precisely what the Hualien NBC drill was designed to protect. If Chinese agents can contaminate the armored units at their eastern staging areas before the surge order arrives, they can neutralize a key defensive reserve without engaging in any conventional military action Taiwan could unambiguously attribute to China — let alone respond to proportionally. The drill's scenario is not far-fetched; the Foundation for Defense of Democracies noted in a July 2026 analysis that Taiwan's exercises are increasingly coupling "counter-blockade and quarantine exercises" with counter-invasion drills to "develop a full-spectrum deterrence model against rising Chinese coercion."

This operational context also explains why the same night as the decontamination drill, Taiwan conducted a separate overnight cross-region deployment exercise moving armored vehicles through Hualien-Yilan tunnel infrastructure — the exact corridor that chemical contamination would have blocked in the drill's scenario. The two drills are sequential components of a single validation test: first, prove the Chemical Group can clear contaminated armor fast enough to be useful; then, prove the cleared armor can make the northward surge.

The Exercise on Day Five

Sunday's NBC drill was one operational thread within a larger exercise day. President Lai Ching-te inspected troops in Taoyuan in the north — accompanied by Defense Minister Wellington Koo and National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu — where he was briefed on counter-invasion coordination and observed the Army's 21st Artillery Command operating Avenger air defense systems. The Avenger system — a short-range air defense platform mounted on a Humvee — provides low-altitude missile coverage in exactly the kind of dispersed urban environment Taiwan's defense architecture requires.

Han Kuang 42, Taiwan's 42nd annual war games, began on August 5, 2026, and continues through August 14. The live-fire phase runs ten days and nine nights, with more than 20,000

participants including roughly 5,000 reservists operating in two brigade-scale formations — one in northern Taiwan and one in the south. The exercises have served as Taiwan's primary war games since 1984.

Among the 42nd edition's notable firsts: officers received no advance scripts for the first time in the drill's history to test adaptive decision-making rather than scripted recall; the newly delivered M1A2T Abrams tanks appeared in a Han Kuang live-fire exercise for the first time; and the Littoral Combat Command, established on July 1, 2026, is participating in the exercises for the first time after integrating the Navy's anti-ship missiles, coastal defense artillery, mobile radar, and unmanned systems under a single command structure.

Does China Have Chemical Weapons Capable of This?

China is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which it ratified in 1997, and officially maintains no stockpile of declared chemical agents. Its military, however, has documented capabilities that overlap with the Hualien scenario's premise: a Ministry of State Security apparatus that operates human intelligence networks in Taiwan, a PLA doctrine that explicitly includes special operations forces in the opening phase of an island-landing campaign, and a gray-zone playbook that a March 2026 Brookings Institution analysis confirmed has already crossed into Taiwan's territorial airspace — when China's drone violated Taiwan's airspace for the first time in January 2026.

What Taiwan appears to be modeling is not necessarily a chemical weapons stockpile deployment — which would require production, weaponization, and delivery infrastructure that carries enormous international legal exposure — but something more available: industrial or commercial toxic chemicals, available in any port economy, placed by operatives with access to military areas. The Hualien drill's scenario says "toxic gases released around multiple military positions." That description encompasses a range of toxic industrial chemicals far broader than weapons-grade nerve agents.

Taiwan's eastern maritime threat picture has also worsened on the same timeline. Chinese vessel excursions into eastern waters increased significantly in 2026, representing an expansion of gray-zone pressure from the western strait to the Pacific approaches. That eastern maritime expansion is directly relevant to Hualien — a port city on that coast — and to the scenario where adversary assets positioned near Taiwan's eastern coast could support covert infiltration into eastern military positions.

Taiwan's Record Defense Budget Lands Same Day as the NBC Drill

The Hualien decontamination exercise occurred on the same day Taiwan's Central News Agency reported that the cabinet is preparing to propose a 16 percent increase in defense spending for 2027, taking total defense investment above NT$1 trillion (approximately $31 billion at current exchange rates) for the first time in the island's history. The formal proposal is August 20.

In 2026, total defense spending — which includes coast guard and veterans' affairs — reached NT$949.5 billion (approximately $29.4 billion), representing 3.32 percent of GDP and a 22.9 percent year-over-year increase from 2025. The 2027 proposal would take the figure above NT$1.1 trillion (approximately $34.1 billion). President Lai Ching-te has set a longer-term target of raising defense spending toward 5 percent of GDP by 2030 — a level the United States itself has not reached since the Cold War.

The CBRN program is one component of this broader investment. It receives less public attention than Taiwan's missile acquisitions and tank deliveries, but CBRN readiness addresses a gap in asymmetric defense thinking: high-end anti-ship missiles and air defense networks are of limited value against an adversary who contaminates armored positions before the shooting starts.

Does Taiwan Prepare for a Gradual Escalation or a Sudden Strike?

The structural assumption behind all of Han Kuang 42 — and particularly behind exercises like the Hualien NBC drill — is that a future conflict will not begin cleanly. Taiwan's defense officials have publicly stated that warning time is shrinking, that the transition from a large-scale PLA exercise to a genuine attack could

occur with minimal observable escalation, and that the island must plan for scenarios in which gray-zone pressure can escalate without a declared war threshold being crossed.

The NBC drill sits in that analytical framework as preparation for the first phase of that escalation — not the invasion itself, but the degradation of Taiwan's response capacity that precedes it. Chemical contamination of eastern staging areas by infiltrators, maritime disruption of supply lines to Taiwan's allies, and cyberattacks on communications infrastructure are the kinds of operations that a rational adversary would attempt before committing to a landing force that the entire international community could see on satellite imagery.

Taiwan appears to have concluded that preparing for the invasion is no longer sufficient by itself — that it must also prepare for the preceding phase in which the conditions for invasion are created. The Hualien NBC drill is one visible piece of that preparation.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why does Taiwan model spy-delivered chemical contamination rather than artillery delivery?

Covert delivery by infiltrators is operationally harder to defend against than artillery-delivered agents, which can be detected by radar, give some warning time, and affect an area outside the defensive perimeter. A spy-delivered release assumes the adversary is already inside, providing no warning, no detectable delivery system, and no clear attribution. Taiwan's planners appear to have assessed this as the more dangerous scenario for eastern staging areas specifically because China's gray-zone playbook already involves human intelligence and infiltration operations. The choice to rehearse this scenario rather than the more

conventional one signals a specific threat assessment about how a future conflict might begin — not with a weapon fired across the strait, but with one already positioned.

What is the strategic importance of the Hualien Armored Vehicle Unit's eastern position?

Taiwan's western and northern coastlines are the likeliest targets for a Chinese amphibious assault given the terrain, infrastructure, and historical PLA exercise patterns. Eastern Taiwan — Hualien, Yilan — serves as the reserve staging area from which armored reinforcements can move northward once the assault materialized and defensive lines are established. The overnight cross-region deployment exercise that followed the NBC drill on the same evening, moving armor from Hualien northward through tunnel infrastructure, shows that Taiwan is training the full reinforcement sequence: decontaminate the staging area, then execute the surge. Contaminating Hualien's armor before that surge is ordered would neutralize a key defensive reserve without any kinetic action that could be unambiguously attributed.

What does the 2027 defense budget increase mean for CBRN programs specifically?

Taiwan's cabinet is proposing NT$1.1 trillion (approximately $34.1 billion) in defense spending for 2027 — a 16 percent increase over 2026 and the first time total defense investment has exceeded NT$1 trillion. The formal proposal arrives August 20. The budget breakdown by program area will not be available until then, but President Lai's publicly stated investment priorities emphasize asymmetric capabilities: drones, missiles, coastal defenses, and reserve-force readiness. CBRN readiness falls under the broader force-preservation category — the capacity to sustain combat-effective units after an adversary has degraded them through unconventional means. The Hualien drill represents the human-training dimension of that investment; hardware investment in detection instruments, decontamination agents, and protective equipment would be the complementary procurement story.

How does gray-zone escalation relate to a potential CBRN attack on Taiwan's forces?

Gray-zone warfare operates in the space between peacetime competition and declared conflict — deliberately ambiguous, designed to impose costs without triggering conventional military responses. Taiwan's defense establishment, as documented by analysts at RUSI and the Soufan Center, explicitly understands gray-zone escalation as a ladder: each rung is more coercive than the last, with a declared quarantine or full invasion at the top. Chemical sabotage of military positions — releasing toxic agents to delay reinforcements — would occupy a rung below a declared missile strike but above persistent drone harassment. It imposes a severe operational cost, maintains deniability (industrial chemicals are not weapons of mass destruction per se), and occurs before any invasion timeline that international monitoring systems would detect. Taiwan is rehearsing for that rung specifically

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Commentary

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Radiation and Chemical Program Research for Multi-Utility and Repurposed Countermeasures: A US Department of Health and Human Services Agencies Perspective

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From Lab Expertise to Chat Interface: The New Risk of Toxin-Level Attacks

By Daria Alexe

Source: https://gnet-research.org/2026/08/12/from-lab-expertise-to-chat-interface-the-new-risk-of-toxin-level-attacks/

Aug 12 – A recent report published by the New York Times (NYT) has shown that publicly accessible artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots, when tested by biosecurity experts, produced strikingly detailed suggestions on how to acquire genetic material, assemble dangerous pathogens and deploy them in public spaces, raising acute concern that these tools may lower long-standing barriers to biological and toxin-level attacks. This Insight will examine how conversational AI systems can accelerate the transition from intent to feasible toxin-level plots, and what this means for intelligence, platform governance and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) counterterrorism.

From Specialist Labs To Chat Interfaces

Recent UN and EU work on CBRN terrorism and health security stresses that non-state actors face significant hurdles in developing or using CBRN materials, as doing so requires specialised expertise, controlled substances, and appropriately equipped facilities. A 2025 European Commission communication on health emergency preparedness notes that the changing threat landscape "calls for more intensive efforts to develop highly specialised teams in the medical and CBRN areas" and to maintain strategic countermeasure capacities. The UN Office of Counter-Terrorism's overview of CBRN terrorism similarly emphasises that non-state actors must obtain dangerous agents, technical know-how and appropriate delivery mechanisms to pose a serious CBRN threat.

At the operational level, UNICRI's programme on "Technology and CBRN" highlights that hazardous materials and dual-use technologies are normally managed in regulated environments with physical protection, access controls and export-control obligations designed to prevent diversion for malicious purposes. EU-level CBRN-E preparedness work likewise assumes that serious CBRN incidents will typically involve specialised equipment and infrastructure, noting the need for minimum standards for facilities and "multidisciplinary plans, procedures and measures" for prevention, preparedness and response.

These assumptions have shaped intelligence practice, with collection and early warning traditionally focused on visible indicators such as anomalous procurement of precursors, movements of trained personnel, suspicious laboratory activity, or efforts to obtain and export dual-use equipment. When experimentation occurs in laboratories, universities, or industrial facilities, potential threat actors generate logistical and operational signatures that established counter-proliferation tools are designed to detect.

Generative AI does not remove these physical constraints, but it changes where and how early-stage knowledge acquisition and operational framing can happen. Instead of consulting specialist literature or tacit laboratory networks, intent-driven actors can now turn to large language models (LLMs) and chatbots that answer follow-up questions, structure information and maintain context across sessions. When such tools are accessed via encrypted applications, privacy-oriented browsers, or locally hosted open-source models,



crucial parts of early-stage knowledge acquisition may occur in conversational and hard-to-observe environments.



Figures 1 and 2: Author-generated screenshots of a conversation with an AI platform, DeepAI, that receives more than 15 million monthly visits. To test the platform's safety mechanisms, the author adopted the role of a crime writer and requested information on potential methods for spreading a virus. The chatbot supplied information concerning the virus's genetic structure, replication cycle, molecular architecture, and biological properties. The interaction was conducted exclusively for research purposes. Sensitive information has been redacted to avoid malicious use.

The information generated by the chatbot in these interactions was assessed against established scientific literature and found to be broadly consistent with publicly available knowledge on viral structure, replication, and biological properties. While the model did not provide complete or directly actionable protocols, the outputs were sufficiently accurate at both conceptual and technical levels to be meaningful to a knowledgeable actor with relevant training and access to appropriate facilities. This underscores that the concern is not limited to misinformation or hallucination, but rather the aggregation and accessibility of legitimate scientific knowledge in ways that may lower barriers to misuse.

What Chatbot Transcripts Actually Show

In the experiments described to the NYT, scientists shared transcripts in which leading chatbots outlined how to buy raw DNA, assemble it into harmful pathogens, and spread agents over a city with a weather balloon, and in which another model ranked livestock diseases by their potential economic damage. Additional reporting summarised how a model adapted the formula of an anti-cancer drug into a putative novel toxin and suggested ways to deploy biological agents on public transport, while yet another system generated a multi-thousand-word response approximating a step-by-step protocol for producing a pandemic-era virus, even though experts noted technical inaccuracies.

Developers have responded that many of these tests targeted earlier model versions and stressed that newer models would refuse some of the most serious prompts, while insisting that the examples do not "meaningfully increase" an untrained person's ability to cause real-world harm. Experts quoted in the same coverage cautioned that chatbots alone do not suddenly make complex biological weapons easy to produce, since viable agents still require specialised knowledge, controlled materials and repeated hands-on experimentation. At the same time, analysts have emphasised that these transcripts reveal how chat-based systems can help users knit together open-source information into coherent attack narratives, perform feasibility checks and explore the sequencing of steps in a way that reduces uncertainty and increases procedural confidence for actors who already possess some relevant background.

Toxins as "Low-Tech, High-Impact" Threats

Toxins such as ricin occupy an uncomfortable middle ground between improvised chemicals and complex biological weapons. They can be derived from common precursors, yet remain technically

challenging to purify and disseminate effectively, making them attractive to extremists seeking psychologically strong but logistically manageable methods. An assessment by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses notes that more than 40 ricin-related plots and incidents have been recorded worldwide since the late 1970s, but none have resulted in mass casualties because perpetrators generally produced crude toxin preparations of very low purity.

The disrupted plot uncovered by Gujarat's Anti-Terrorism Squad in November 2025 shows both the enduring appeal of toxins and the persistent difficulty of turning that appeal into operational capability. The same plot, described in a 2025 Indago Technologies assessment of the Islamic State Khorasan-Province (ISKP)-affiliated ricin plot in India, involved a China-trained doctor from Hyderabad, working with two younger accomplices, who allegedly turned his apartment into a makeshift lab to attempt ricin production under the direction of an ISKP handler.

According to that assessment, the cell planned to weaponise ricin for mass poisoning of public water supplies, temple food offerings and crowded markets in major Indian cities, combining toxin production with cross-border weapons smuggling by drone and reconnaissance of political and religious targets. Investigators concluded that, at the time of disruption, the doctor had not yet successfully isolated or weaponised ricin, leaving the plot at an aspirational but dangerously advanced preparatory stage. Notably for this Insight, the Indago report records that the doctor used both conventional search engines and at least one publicly available AI chatbot to research precursor chemicals and potential suppliers. This provides an early example of AI-mediated knowledge seeking within a toxin-focused plot.

Extremist Ecosystems, CBRN Interest and Generative AI

Monitoring by Tech Against Terrorism and other organisations indicates that terrorists and violent extremists are already exploiting generative AI primarily for propaganda and content manipulation, but this experimentation is taking place in ecosystems where interest in CBRN methods is long-standing. Tech Against Terrorism's analysis of more than five thousand pieces of AI-generated content shared in terrorist and violent extremist spaces concludes that hostile actors are using these tools to scale up multilingual propaganda, generate variants that evade hash-sharing databases and produce synthetic media tailored to specific audiences, thereby creating a denser information environment in which CBRN-related narratives and justifications can be normalised and recirculated.

European and multilateral security bodies warn that terrorists' adoption of emerging technologies, including AI, is converging with existing CBRN vulnerabilities by expanding opportunities for online learning and the digitalisation of sensitive know-how. UNICRI notes that increasing digitalisation in the CBRN domain, from biosurveillance to laboratory management and training, creates new weaknesses that malicious actors can exploit, while United Nations (UN) guidance highlights that non-state actors are actively seeking access to weapons of mass destruction and related expertise, including in chemical and biological fields.

Recent research on generative AI and terrorism underlines that early misuse has focused on scalable propaganda – meaning content that can be produced and distributed quickly and at low cost at large volumes – as well as training materials and operational guidance in adjacent domains such as cyber-attacks, but explicitly flags the potential for LLMs to lower informational barriers to certain chemical and biological plots by streamlining open-source reconnaissance, scenario design and basic procedural understanding.

Observing Systems As Well As Actors

One way to avoid speculative doom scenarios about malicious actors exploiting advanced AI to plan or refine toxin-level attacks, while still addressing the genuine risk, is to focus on the observable behaviour of current AI systems and documented extremist experimentation, rather than hypothetical future capabilities. This suggests a dual-track response.

On the AI side, structured "red-teaming" and scenario testing, as advocated by the OSCE and the Global Internet Forum to Counter-Terrorism (GIFCT) AI Working Group, can be used to map where and how live models respond to CBRN-adjacent prompts, which refusal patterns they display, and whether adversarial prompting can elicit problematic guidance. Importantly, such exercises need not – and should not – solely attempt to elicit detailed harmful outputs. They can instead focus on boundary behaviour, the tendency to suggest euphemistic workarounds, and whether models redirect users to high-level safety information or inadvertently signpost sensitive open-source material.

On the extremist side, researchers and practitioners can continue to document concrete instances where violent actors use AI tools in ways that touch CBRN domains – for example, the Hyderabad plotter using an AI chatbot to research ricin-related materials, or jihadist propaganda channels using generative AI to support propaganda and interactive recruitment, as recent research on terrorist exploitation of generative AI notes. By triangulating these two strands, analysts can ground risk trajectories in evidence about how specific systems behave and how particular actor communities are actually using them.

Implications and Recommendations for Platforms and AI Developers

AI developers and major platforms form the first layer of defence because their design choices

shape how easily users can turn vague intent into practical know-how, and existing safeguards – such as keyword filters and generic refusal messages – are already being probed and circumvented by motivated extremists. Recent guidance from the OSCE on the ethical use of generative AI in P/CVERLT and from GIFCT's AI Working Group points towards three concrete priorities.

First, treat CBRN as a special-case safety domain. Platforms should deploy CBRN-specific classifiers to detect biological and toxin-related prompts and route them to tightly constrained response templates that emphasise legal and ethical constraints, redirect users to high-level biosafety information and avoid optimisation, troubleshooting or euphemistic "workaround" advice. In practice, models should not suggest alternative phrasing, proxy substances, or disguised terminology when users probe around agents or delivery mechanisms.

Second, build privacy-preserving signal detection instead of transcript-level surveillance. GIFCT recommends anomaly detection in chatbot interaction logs to spot potentially harmful patterns, such as repeated jailbreak attempts or escalating operational prompts. Platforms can extend this by logging structured event-signals – for example, clusters of toxin-related queries in one session – and using aggregated, pseudonymised telemetry to monitor trends, with clearly defined thresholds for internal review or engagement with multi-stakeholder bodies, in line with the EU's risk-based AI framework.

Third, make CBRN a distinct workstream in cross-platform collaboration. Mechanisms such as those instituted by GIFCT already coordinate responses to terrorist exploitation of AI. Extending this to a CBRN-focused stream would allow providers to share information on toxin-relevant abuse patterns, jailbreak techniques and model-chaining tactics, and to co-design red-team scenarios with CBRN specialists, public-health agencies and biosecurity researchers. This moves platforms beyond generic "safety by design" language towards a concrete, CBRN-aware agenda that is proportionate to the specific risks discussed in this Insight.

Taken together, the evidence suggests that conversational AI is not eliminating the physical constraints of CBRN terrorism, but it is reshaping how intent is formed and how early-stage preparation can be concealed. The central policy challenge is therefore to detect these shifts earlier, without overreading chat outputs while still recognising when they materially lower barriers to misuse.

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Building CBRN Crisis Ready Supply for Protection and Sustainment

By Professor David Crouch and Natascha McVeigh

Source: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/building-cbrn-crisis-ready-supply-protection-and-sustainment

Aug 12 – The next CBRN crisis will be shaped as much by supply chains, industrial resilience and public trust as by sensors and detection technologies.

When Detection Does Not Deliver Protection

Across the UK, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) readiness is frequently framed as a technological problem: sensors, data platforms and modelling tools that promise earlier warning and higher-resolution situational awareness. Yet early warning alone has never been enough to protect the public. In every major CBRN-relevant crisis, from pandemics to contamination events, lives were shaped not only by what was detected, but by how quickly essential supplies could be moved from warehouses to people. When personal protective equipment (PPE), diagnostics and medical countermeasures are not available at speed and at scale, detection becomes a hollow milestone rather than a trigger for effective action. This structural gap remains the most significant constraint on the UK's ability to manage a large-scale CBRN emergency. The US' national approach to public-health supply chains underscores this logic.

Resilience depends on diversified sources, **warm-base manufacturing capacity, the maintenance of sovereign or trusted industrial capability at a level sufficient to enable rapid surge production during crises,** and continuous visibility across suppliers. Together, these levers allow systems to absorb shocks, adapt to disruption and maintain function under conditions of extreme demand. By preserving production infrastructure, skilled workforces and critical supply networks before an emergency occurs, warm-base manufacturing reduces reliance on overseas suppliers and shortens the period between warning and effective response.

Britain's own assessments reach a similar conclusion. Recent parliamentary scrutiny has highlighted serious weaknesses in civil preparedness and CBRN-relevant logistics, warning that

these gaps risk undermining the country's ability to operationalise early warning during crisis.

At its core, this is a crisis-management challenge. CBRN incidents demand the rapid translation of weak or ambiguous early signals into coordinated nationwide action across procurement, logistics and public communication. Without tightly connected sensing and supply, detection offers awareness but not protection. As the UK considers how to rebuild readiness in the face of rising strategic competition and more complex hazard environments, the central question becomes clear: how do we transform sensors into supply, and signals into sustained societal and industrial resilience?

Lessons From Recent Crises: Supply and Information Failures

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed structural weaknesses that extend far beyond infectious disease response. Across the world, shortages of PPE, diagnostics, reagents and ingredients for vaccine production amplified the impact of the outbreak, not because these products were technologically difficult to make, but because supply chains had become brittle after decades of lean procurement and extensive offshoring. The most effective corrective actions came from countries that invested in on-shoring or near-shoring essential manufacturing, expanded domestic capacity and created smarter, better-managed stockpiles designed for rapid rotation and prepositioning. Britain's evaluation of its own pandemic response reached similar conclusions.

The supply chain is always responding not only to crisis conditions but also to crisis narratives.

Yet the supply challenge was not the only systemic failure. Modern CBRN incidents unfold within a contested information environment that influences public behaviour, trust and operational decision-making. Analyses of Fukushima wastewater narratives, Salisbury incident counternarratives and the East Palestine derailment demonstrate that mis- and disinformation can distort risk perception, weaken compliance with protective measures and complicate crisis communication. Policymakers and crisis managers increasingly recognise that reactive 'debunking' is too slow. Instead, proactive 'pre-bunking', anticipating predictable falsehoods and issuing clear, uncertainty-aware guidance in advance, has emerged as a more effective strategy.

A recurring lesson across these crises is that information without context is noise. Large, unstructured releases of technical data, such as environmental readings or dispersion models, often increase public confusion rather than improve understanding. Without translation and narrative framing, data overwhelms rather than informs. For CBRN preparedness, this information dimension is inseparable from supply: misinformation-driven behaviours directly shape demand for medical countermeasures, public willingness to adopt protective actions and the overall tempo of emergency response. The supply chain is always responding not only to crisis conditions but also to crisis narratives.

A Dual-Lens Model for CBRN Resilience

To protect both society and the industrial ecosystem that sustains protection, the UK must adopt a dual-lens model that brings together:

1. Fused detection and decision-support systems on the incident side.
2. Protected procurement and resilient capacity on the industrial side.

This dual-lens approach reflects a shift in thinking: from seeing detection and distribution as separate domains to treating them as interlocking components of a single system. Only when these functions are integrated – technically,

contractually and operationally – can early warning drive the necessary logistics actions in time.

Incident Side: From Detection to Orchestration

The first requirement is to fuse sensing with logistics. This means building a national Sensing-to-Supply Orchestrator capable of receiving detection inputs, concentration levels, deposition patterns and epidemiological indicators, and triggering three categories of response: targeted stockpile releases, demand modulation based on hazard conditions and surge manufacturing at pre-contracted warm-base sites. Many of the underlying mechanisms already exist in international practice, particularly in the US, where supply-chain mapping, bill-of-materials transparency at the raw-material level and demand-linked analytics provide the basis for real-time orchestration. Britain can adapt these principles to its own context.

A second requirement is to institutionalise pre-bunking and embed it directly within command-and-control structures. During a CBRN incident, risk communication is not a parallel process but a core operational function. A dedicated Narrative Management and Risk Communication cell should issue templated updates, what is known, what is unknown and what actions the public should take, linked directly to shifts in system state. Co-locating communication specialists with plume-modelling and epidemiological analysts ensures alignment between technical assessments and public messaging. This approach reduces confusion, increases compliance and supports the logistics system by stabilising demand. By combining orchestrated logistics with integrated risk communication, Britain can begin to close the gap between detection and distribution, turning early warning into timely action.

Industrial Side: Protected Procurement and Resilient Capacity

On the industrial side, the UK must treat protected procurement as a national security function rather than a commercial one. Guidance from the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) outlines a lifecycle for high-risk procurement, decision to outsource, supplier selection, contracting, oversight and termination, that maps directly onto the supply chains for PPE, diagnostics, reagents and other critical CBRN-related components. Applying this lifecycle to the CBRN domain requires policies that address several distinct threat vectors.

The first is geographical and legal exposure. Offshoring data, intellectual property or component manufacturing can expose British capabilities to foreign legal regimes and involuntary state access. Contracts must enforce UK or EU data residency, restrict cross-border transfers of sensitive IP and include mandatory notification clauses if changes in ownership or jurisdiction occur.

The second is hostile ownership, control or influence. Foreign direct investment can create vulnerabilities if suppliers fall under incompatible legal systems or coercive state power. Due-diligence processes must examine ownership chains, board structures and ultimate beneficial owners. Contracts should enforce change-of-control notification rights and allow early termination if unacceptable risks emerge.

A third vector is insider, cyber and technology risk. This includes compromised personnel, privileged system access by third parties and insecure digital infrastructure that provides pathways into operational technology. Procurement frameworks should require elevated personnel screening, strict access controls and provenance assurance for operational equipment. They should also mandate hardened industrial-control systems for suppliers involved in critical manufacturing or cold-chain logistics.

Finally, physical security remains essential. Suppliers must meet baseline standards for storage, transport and site protection. Cold-chain and contract manufacturing organisations, especially those providing vaccines or antidotes, must be stress-tested to ensure they can operate under disrupted conditions.

Together, these controls form a protected procurement architecture that reduces vulnerabilities, increases industrial resilience and strengthens the UK's ability to supply critical capabilities during crisis.

Aligning UK Policy with European and NATO Instruments

Alongside domestic reforms, Britain must integrate its CBRN supply-chain strategy with wider European and NATO priorities and frameworks, such as the NATO Support and Procurement Agency. Parliamentary assessments have identified urgent UK capability gaps in civil preparedness, air and missile defence, space resilience, and logistics, warning that the window to address them is rapidly narrowing.

These findings emphasise the need to connect national CBRN capabilities with broader European industrial instruments such as SAFE (Strategic European Funding for Defence) and the European Union Permanent Structured Cooperation's Military Mobility initiative. These mechanisms support standardisation, improve cross-border movement of materials and provide joint procurement opportunities that are essential for scaling production during surges in demand.

For the UK, alignment means several things. Distributed sensing networks must meet European interoperability requirements. British suppliers should have access to joint procurement frameworks that allow rapid expansion during crises. And logistics corridors linking detection, stockpiles, warm-base manufacturing and distribution must align with cross-border mobility standards.

By embedding CBRN supply chains within these frameworks,

Britain can strengthen readiness while maintaining a NATO-first posture.

The Resilience Triad: Turning Principles into Practice

Operationalising resilience requires a practical model. The Resilience Triad, Robustness, Agility and Visibility, offers a simple but effective framework.

Robustness demands diversified sourcing and geographic redundancy for raw materials and finished goods. Ethical and sustainable production standards strengthen long-term resilience, and investment in automation can make domestic PPE lines more competitive against subsidised imports.

Agility depends on maintaining warm-base manufacturing for PPE, diagnostics and key components; designing interchangeable devices to simplify supply; rotating stockpiles with partners to avoid expiry; and applying demand-management methods that guide conservation during high-stress periods.

Visibility requires continuous supply-chain mapping, analytics and forecasting. Publishing a national resilience 'scorecard' creates accountability and helps target investment in weak areas.

Embedding these components within a strengthened governance structure, one that links epidemiological triggers to allocation, rotation, surge and risk communication, turns resilience from a slogan into a system.

Case Vignette 1: Fukushima – When Lack of Context Undermines Trust

The Fukushima incident illustrates how inconsistent or poorly contextualised data releases can undermine public confidence even when technical systems function.

If Britain can make its supply chains as instrumented, agile and responsive as its sensors, the next CBRN alert need not be a sign of impending failure.

Early reluctance to release predictive fallout data and later mass distributions of unfiltered information created confusion that, in some cases, directed evacuees towards higher-risk areas. Years later, outdated images and misinterpreted graphics fuelled misinformation about wastewater discharge. The core lesson is the importance of visibility and context: without clear narrative framing, data alone cannot support public decision-making.

Case Vignette 2: Salisbury – Narrative Competition in a Domestic Incident

The Salisbury incident demonstrated how quickly state-linked influence campaigns can exploit an information vacuum. While the UK eventually developed a more adaptive communications posture, initial inconsistencies allowed alternative narratives to proliferate. A surge in automated bot activity complicated the information environment and shaped public perception. The episode illustrates the need for early, consistent messaging with auditable communication chains, especially during CBRN events where public behaviour directly affects operational priorities.

Recommendations: Five Near-Term Actions

1. **Mandate Bill of Materials Transparency**
   Require full material-level reporting for all licensed CBRN-relevant products. This enables proactive identification of supply constraints and earlier surge triggers.
2. **Establish a National Sensing to Supply Orchestrator**
   A single, joint unit across government, health services and industry should manage stockpile allocation, warm-base manufacturing and demand modulation. This provides the connective tissue between detection and distribution.
3. **Institutionalise Pre-Bunking Within Command & Control (C2)**
   Integrate risk-communication specialists into operational structures to provide consistent, uncertainty-aware public updates. Align these messages with technical assessments and hazard thresholds.
4. **Implement Protected Procurement Minimums**
   Enforce data-residency requirements, ownership-change notifications, personnel-security baselines, provenance controls and cold-chain stress tests across all CBRN-related contracts.
5. **Adopt Targeted, Rotational Stockpiling**
   Create vendor-managed and virtual stockpiles in high-risk regions and publish an annual resilience scorecard aligned with civil-preparedness standards.

Conclusion: Protection Through Distribution

The UK must reframe CBRN resilience as a discipline centred on protection through distribution. Early detection matters, but the decisive capability is the ability to move supplies at speed, under pressure and in the face of contested narratives. A resilient system integrates sensors with supply chains, risk communication with analytics and industrial capacity with protected procurement. Aligning these elements with European and NATO frameworks enhances readiness and ensures interoperability across borders.

If Britain can make its supply chains as instrumented, agile and responsive as its sensors, the next CBRN alert need not be a sign of

impending failure. Instead, it can become the moment when a well-rehearsed, well-coordinated and well-supplied system moves into action—protecting people and preserving the industrial foundations on which national resilience depends
.

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India's ricin plot bust exposes ISIS push towards bioterrorism

By Ujwal Jalali
Source: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/india/indias-ricin-plot-bust-exposes-isis-push-toward-bioterrorism/

Aug 14 – India's foiling of an alleged ISIS-linked plot to develop the deadly toxin ricin assumes wider significance amid a fresh international warning that Al-Qaida and Islamic State (ISIS) networks are sustaining efforts to acquire the capability to develop chemical and biological weapons.
The warning comes from the latest report of the UN Security Council's Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which says the two groups have shown "a sustained interest" over several years in developing such weapons, although they have so far struggled to overcome the technical challenges involved.
For India, the concern is not merely theoretical. In November 2025, the Gujarat Anti-Terrorism Squad arrested Hyderabad-based doctor Dr Syed Ahmed Mohiuddin along with two Uttar Pradesh-based associates in a case that investigators subsequently linked to an ISIS-directed bioterror conspiracy.

The National Investigation Agency, which took over the case in January, chargesheeted the trio in May, alleging that they planned to use ricin for mass poisoning in public spaces. The agency said Mohiuddin had allegedly converted his Hyderabad residence into a clandestine laboratory for preparing the toxin and was working under the direction of a foreign-based ISIS handler.

The case had initially come to light after Mohiuddin was intercepted at a toll plaza carrying illegal weapons, four litres of castor oil and other incriminating material. The two other accused were arrested the same day.

The UN report now places the Indian case against a broader evolution in the terrorist threat. It notes that instructions for producing toxic agents are being circulated widely in online extremist communities. ISIL's English-language Invade magazine, for instance, reportedly carried instructions on developing botulinum toxin and cyanide, while ISIL-K has shown particular interest in ricin.

The Indian case is therefore significant because it represents the point at which online propaganda and technical instructions allegedly translated into an attempt to develop a biological toxin on the ground.

The NIA has alleged that the three accused were also involved in recruiting vulnerable youths, handling terror funds and weapons, conducting reconnaissance and maintaining contact with foreign-based handlers.

For Indian security agencies, the emerging challenge is consequently two-fold: preventing conventional terror attacks while also detecting attempts by ISIS and other jihadist networks to exploit scientific knowledge, medical expertise and easily accessible biological material for mass-casualty attacks.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations in Extreme Cold Weather

By Chief Warrant Officer Two Vanessa C. Baker and Chief Warrant Officer Two Alejandra Gallego

Source: https://home.army.mil/wood/contact/publications/cr_mag-2/Chemical-Biological-Radiological-and-Nuclear-Operations-in-Extreme-Cold-Weather

Photo from the FY25 Swedish CBRN Winter Course. From left to right: DoD civilian Charles Barton (DTRA, Germany); 1SG Schreurs (Luxembourg); CW2 Vanessa C. Baker (110th Chem BN, WA); CW2 Alejandra Gallego (22nd Chem BN, TX); and SGM Fern (Luxembourg). All photos in this article are property of the Swedish Armed Forces.

The U.S. Army's ability to operate effectively in subarctic and arctic regions is increasingly important as peer and near-peer adversaries with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expand their presence in these environments. The United States Army Chemical Corps must renew its focus on countering these threats and protecting U.S. and allied forces conducting large-scale combat operations (LSCO) in extreme cold regions.[1]

The CBRN Winter Course FY25 participants conducted a 5-kilometer movement in snowshoes.

In January 2025, we (WO1 Vanessa Baker and CW2 Alejandra Gallego) participated in the Swedish CBRN Winter Course hosted in Umeå, Sweden. This immersive training exposed participants to subarctic winter conditions while conducting hands-on operations with live chemical agents. The course is specifically designed to enhance CBRN reconnaissance-and-detection capabilities in these extreme cold-weather environments.

The AP4C's flame spectrometer being utilized after failed attempts to detect vapors.

Prior to this experience, we underestimated the operational complexities of extreme cold weather. What we observed during this course challenged many of our current doctrinal approaches. This article summarizes five field observations that revealed fundamental gaps in our detection capabilities; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); decontamination methods; training regimes; and leadership emphasis.

Detection Equipment Functionality

The cone method being utilized to aid the JCAD with detection.

The challenges of CBRN operations in extreme cold weather are multifaceted. Most nonpersistent chemical-warfare agents become persistent at 32°F/0°C.[2] While the reduced vapor hazard appears diminished, this deceptive calm masks a more insidious danger. Reconnaissance, detection, and identification are severely restricted, and in many cases, agent detection is not possible.[3] The functionality of CBRN protective clothing and detection equipment is significantly degraded at temperatures below –25°F (–31°C). During the course, we observed that the M50 protective mask becomes stiff and brittle, leading to tears and cracking that prevent it from forming an effective seal. The Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) displayed extended self-test cycles and frequently reverted to the 'wait' status during operation, with drastically reduced vapor-detection capability in cold weather. These limitations forced dangerously close proximity to potential hazards and increased detection times to 45 seconds or more. The Universal Chemical Detector (AP4C) experienced similar challenges; however, its flame-spectrometry technology

remained critical, requiring increased sampling frequency and affecting operational tempo to maintain accuracy. Additionally, M8 paper could not provide quick, accurate, or reliable guidance to commanders, placing ground forces at risk and slowing movement. These limitations create gaps in situational awareness and must be thoroughly considered during planning.

Accurate environmental assessment becomes exceedingly difficult, hindering the ability to track the presence and movement of chemical agents. A 1960 Chemical Corps Study (*Chemical Warfare Operations in Low Temperature Areas*, p 66) states that "the employment of agents in cold, where ice and snow prevail, introduces a new aspect of agent behavior. The agent persistency is increased, and freezing agent droplets and aerosols contaminate the snow and are able to be transported over a wide area."[4] The possibility of Soldiers unknowingly being contaminated will impact the force in their most vulnerable moments of being unprotected and in close proximity with each other, such as being in heated vehicles, tents, and sleeping quarters. Within these confined, heated spaces, chemical agents start to off-gas and achieve their desired effects. The traditional CBRN operational paradigm of "detect to warn," allowing for preemptive protective measures, shifts to detect and react, which necessitates a fundamental reassessment of detection strategies, operational procedures, and risk-mitigation strategies.

TTPs for ECW Conditions

FY25 Swedish CBRN Winter Course participants conduct small group dismounted reconnaissance.

Current CBRN TTPs require substantial modification for effective execution in extreme cold-weather environments. During the Swedish winter course, the Swedes shared several of their existing detection methods—the Cone, Bag, and Bag & Hot Water methods—which underscore the challenges posed by the low volatility of chemical agents in extreme cold. The Cone Method, which isolates suspected agents to capture vapors, becomes cumbersome and time-consuming. The Bag Method (mashing snow with M8 paper) and the Bag & Hot Water Method (requiring the transport and heating of water) introduce logistical complexity and further delay detection. All of these adapted methods are significantly more time-consuming than standard procedures. Reduced off-gassing of chemical agents, combined with potential obscuration by snow, drastically increased sampling frequency during dismounted reconnaissance—potentially tripling the number of stops required compared to standard TTPs. Therefore, a comprehensive review and update of existing TTPs and standard operating procedures (SOPs) is essential to incorporate specific guidelines for CBRN operations

Swedish conscripts conduct personnel decontamination.

in extreme cold weather. Integrating cold-weather considerations into all levels of CBRN training will enhance the Army's overall readiness and effectiveness in Arctic operations.

Decontamination Challenges

Chemical decontamination processes are significantly less effective in cold weather. The Van't Hoff-Arrhenius theory indicates that an 18°F/10°C temperature decrease can reduce the rate of many chemical reactions by half, meaning that to achieve the same level of decontamination at lower temperatures, the contact time must be doubled. During the Swedish CBRN course, this theory was tested using the Reactive Skin Decontamination Lotion (RSDL). The results showed that RSDL neutralized the venomous agent X (VX) within seconds at room temperature, but at -15°C, it took over an hour to remove just 50% of the agent. Furthermore, RSDL can freeze at low temperatures, and the impact of freeze-thaw cycles on its effectiveness remains poorly understood. The traditional methods of decontamination become kinetically unfavorable in extreme cold-weather environments. To address these challenges, research into the temperature-dependent efficacy of our current decontaminants should drive the development and implementation of cold-weather-specific decontamination protocols such as mechanical removal, UV light, and the continued use of charcoal. Finally, training programs must be updated to specify cold-weather decontamination techniques.

Participants conduct live-agent detection training.

Photo sourced from the Swedish Armed Forces Facebook page 'CBRN Skolan,' illustrating the physiological effect known as cocooning.

Live-Agent Training

The compromised functionality of CBRN detection equipment in temperatures below 0°F/-17°C requires careful selection and administration of training stimulants to accurately reflect physiological responses to live-agent exposure in extreme cold. For example, methyl salicylate can simulate the evaporation of mustard at room temperature, while bis-(3-chloropropyl) sulfide can be used to study mustard evaporation at 37°F/3°C.[5] Although stimulants offer reduced hazards and lower training costs, they may not fully replicate the urgency and realism of live-agent training. Proficiency in handling actual CBRN threats within realistic scenarios is unattainable through simulation alone. Therefore, increasing the frequency and scope of live-agent training exercises in extreme cold weather is highly encouraged to enhance CBRN-

training effectiveness. Integrating live-agent training with the judicious use of appropriate simulants will create a comprehensive and realistic training program, equipping Soldiers with the skills and confidence necessary to operate effectively in extreme cold-weather CBRN environments.

Leadership and Training Emphasis

The legacy Field Manual 31-70, *Basic Cold Weather*, states that "the leader selected to guide Soldiers in regions where extreme cold and rugged, trackless terrain make living and fighting far more difficult will face one of the greatest challenges of their lifetime."[6] Effective leadership is paramount to ensuring troop readiness in such environments. Currently, outside of units routinely operating in extreme cold weather, the average Soldier lacks sufficient education and experience in essential cold-weather skills, including layered-clothing systems and basic cold-weather survival techniques. Therefore, leaders must thoroughly understand the principles of layered clothing and the physiological and psychological effects of cold weather. Commanders should require training that emphasizes the unique challenges of cold-weather operations—from planning considerations through execution.

Conclusion

The survivability and operational effectiveness of CBRN operations in extreme cold weather hinge on addressing critical gaps across multiple domains: technological advancements in cold-weatherized detection and decontamination equipment, the development of robust and realistic training programs incorporating both live-agent training and the effective use of simulants, and a renewed focus on leadership development that stresses cold-weather expertise. Ultimately, success in this demanding operational landscape depends not just on technological solutions but on a force that is mentally and physically resilient, equipped with the knowledge, skills, and leadership to navigate the complexities of challenges posed by extreme-cold conditions. The challenges are significant, but by embracing innovation, prioritizing training, and fostering strong leadership, the Chemical Corps can ensure that the Army remains ready and capable in even the most extreme environments.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: Nothing better than to train in a snowy environment – memories from ABC-Zentrum, Swiss Army, Spiez, Switzerland, CWA training for 2004 Athens Olympics. What a difference with the 40°C in Athens at that time!

Hospital Planning and Response for Sudden Chemical Mass Casualty Incidents

14

Mauricio Lynn
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Assumptions

- Sudden exposure of multiple people to a chemical agent may be classified as a **sudden chemical mass casualty incident** (SCMCI).
- The vast majority of the contaminated patients will be mildly contaminated ("walking wounded").
- The majority of contaminated patients will self-evacuate or be transported by nonrescue personnel to local hospitals.
- Although decontamination at the scene is desirable, it is time-consuming in an unplanned, sudden event, and therefore unrealistic.
- Most critical patients, usually those with respiratory distress, will probably expire by the time scene decontamination is available. Therefore, critically contaminated patients should be transported rapidly to hospitals by first responders who must have personal protective equipment (PPE). Removal of all clothing may reduce contamination by 80–90% and should be done prior to getting into the ambulance. Once in the ambulance, the patient can be kept covered and warm with blankets and sheets.
- High probability that a large number of self-evacuated patients will find the hospital campus.
- Hospitals should plan to prevent patient flooding, have a decontamination facility, and further manage patients from a SCMCI.


Decontamination area at a Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, FL

Behind every mission: How the OPCW Situation Centre supports the Organisation's global mandate

Source: https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2026/08/behind-every-mission-how-opcw-situation-centre-supports-organisations

Aug 20 — OPCW inspectors may be thousands of kilometres from Headquarters, conducting work that supports the global ban on chemical weapons. Yet no mission is ever carried out alone.

Behind every deployment is the OPCW Situation Centre (SitCen), a 24/7 operational hub that helps inspectors stay informed, connected and prepared wherever their work takes them.

Bringing together expertise in operational support, communications and information analysis, the SitCen monitors developments that could affect missions, provides teams with the tools and connectivity they need in the field, and coordinates support between deployed personnel and Headquarters.

Its role is critical: to help identify potential risks early, maintain situational awareness and provide inspectors with the support they need to operate safely and effectively. Whether a mission takes place in a major city or a remote location, the Situation Centre helps ensure that teams are never operating in isolation.

Much of this work happens behind the scenes. Yet by maintaining a constant watch on developments around the world and serving as a central coordination point for deployed teams, the SitCen plays a vital role in enabling the OPCW to carry out its mission globally.

Preparing long before departure

The SitCen's support begins long before inspectors board a plane.

As soon as a mission is scheduled, the team starts preparing. Communications specialists ensure inspectors have the equipment and connectivity they may need in the field, while analysts assess the operating environment and monitor developments that could affect the mission.

For deployments to more challenging locations, inspectors may also receive tailored briefings on local conditions and potential risks. By the time a team departs, the SitCen has already helped build a picture of the environment they will be operating in — allowing inspectors to arrive informed, prepared and ready to focus on their mission.

Bringing together expertise in operational support, communications and information analysis, the SitCen monitors developments that could affect OPCW missions and coordinates support between deployed personnel and Headquarters. (Photo: OPCW)

A constant watch

Once inspectors are in the field, the SitCen never stops working.

Operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week, the team monitors developments around the world, maintains communications with deployed personnel and provides support when circumstances change.

While OPCW missions are carefully planned, operating environments can change with little warning. Security incidents, civil unrest, travel disruptions or other unforeseen developments may require rapid coordination between personnel in the field and experts at headquarters.

In these situations, the Situation Centre serves as a focal point for information-sharing and coordination, connecting mission teams with the information, expertise and support they may need. By maintaining a constant watch on developments and facilitating communication across the Organisation, the Centre helps the OPCW respond quickly to changing circumstances and enables inspectors to adapt when conditions on the ground evolve.

In a rapidly changing world, that constant awareness can make all the difference.

Adapting to a changing world

Technology is changing rapidly, and so is the way the SitCen supports OPCW's missions. The team continuously evaluates new communications and information tools, incorporating technologies that can strengthen connectivity, improve situational awareness and support personnel in the field. From advances in satellite communications to new ways of gathering and analysing information, the Situation Centre works to ensure inspectors have access to reliable tools and timely information wherever their missions take them. At the same time, analysts must navigate an increasingly complex information environment, identifying credible information quickly and turning it into actionable insights for mission teams and decision-makers.

Staying ahead of these developments is essential to helping inspectors operate safely, remain connected and adapt to changing circumstances throughout their deployments. In an increasingly complex world, the support from SitCen is essential to enabling the OPCW to carry out its mission and uphold the global ban on chemical weapons. (Photo: OPCW)

Supporting the OPCW's mission

From the moment a mission is planned until inspectors return home, the Situation Centre helps them stay informed, connected and prepared for changing circumstances. In an increasingly complex world, that support is essential to enabling the OPCW to carry out its mission and uphold the global ban on chemical weapons.

Nitazenes

Nitazenes are a class of highly potent synthetic opioids originally developed in the 1950s as painkillers but never approved for medical use. Some variants (i.e., isotonitazene and etonitazene) are significantly stronger than fentanyl and hundreds to thousands of times more potent than morphine, carrying an extreme risk of fatal overdose as hidden contaminants in street drugs. Overdoses can potentially be treated with naloxone, though high or repeated doses may be required due to extreme potency.

Gaps in Prehospital Care for Patients Exposed to a Chemical Attack – A Systematic Review

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Abstract

Introduction: The survivability of mass casualties exposed to a chemical attack is dependent on clinical knowledge, evidence-based practice, as well as protection and decontamination capabilities. The aim of this systematic review was to identify the knowledge gaps that relate to an efficient extraction and care of mass casualties caused by exposure to chemicals.

Methods: This systematic review was conducted from November 2018 through September 2020 in compliance with Cochrane guidelines. Five databases were used (MEDLINE, Web of Science Core Collection, Embase, Cochrane, and CINAHL) to retrieve studies describing interventions performed to treat victims of chemical attacks (protection, decontamination, and treatment). The outcomes were patient's health condition leading to his/her stabilization (primary) and death (secondary) due to interventions applied (medical, protection, and decontamination).

Results: Of the 2,301 papers found through the search strategy, only four publications met the eligibility criteria. According to these studies, the confirmed chemical poisoning cases in acute settings resulting from the attacks in Matsumoto (1994), Tokyo (1995), and Damascus (2014) accounted for 1,333 casualties including 11 deaths. No study reported comprehensive prehospital clinical data in acute settings. No mention was made of the integration of specialized capabilities in medical interventions such as personal protective equipment (PPE) and decontamination to prevent a secondary exposure. Unfortunately, it was not possible to perform the planned meta-analysis.

HOW TO CALCULATE SCBA DURATION

Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)

$$\text{Duration (min)} = \frac{(\text{Pressure (Bar)} \times \text{Volume (Liters)})}{\text{Breathing Rate (L/min)}}$$

Pressure: 300 BAR

Volume: 6 L

Breathing Rate: 40 L/min

Duration = 45 MINUTES

33 min Safe Working Time | 12 min Reserve

2026 C²BRNE TERRORISM CONFERENCES

NCT APAC

20-21 October, 2026
Jakarta, Indonesia

PRO Asia

13-18 December 2026, Hua-Hin, Thailand

NCT USA

31 August - 3 September, 2026
Lorton (VA) & Edgewood (MD) USA

The NCT event series, organized by the CBRNe Society, offers regional editions in Europe, the United States, South America, the Middle East, and Asia. These events are characterized by conference streams, workshops, industry exhibitions, capability demonstrations, and training sessions. The events typically host 250-500 participants over 2-3 days and provide access to conference sessions led by first responders, technology exhibitions, and live CBRNE capability demonstrations. **The CBRNe Society** also conducts NCT PRO Trainings, which involve military and civil first responder teams from various regions. These teams are trained to operate in mock CBRNE, C-IED, and EOD scenarios, preceded by product training provided by industry sponsors. **NCT PRO** events focus on multinational and multidisciplinary training, offering participants an opportunity to work with cutting-edge equipment in a coordinated and efficient manner. The trainings consist of product training sessions and training missions tailored to the participants' needs and sponsored equipment.

Themes & Topics

- **Ecology and Epidemiology** – Global patterns and emerging risks
- **Detection & Diagnostics** – Innovative tools and forensic approaches
- **Pathogenesis** – Mechanisms of disease in animals and humans
- **Medical Countermeasures** – Vaccines and therapeutics
- **Decontamination & Remediation** – Strategies for safe environments
- **Biosafety & Biosecurity** – Risk management, policy and counter proliferation
- **Biosecurity Policy workshop -** MOD lead/ selected audience

Cranfield University

Source: https://cbrneworld.com/events/nitazene-workshop

Nitazene – Europe's latest synthetic opioid threat

Most European nations have been spared the devastation that fentanyl wreaked on the US. It not only killed tens of thousands, and ruined hundreds of thousands of lives, but provided challenges to law enforcement, fire hazmat and health professionals that encountered it. The toxicity of fentanyl is such that the US has categorised it as a weapon of mass destruction, and some of the analogues have a LD50 of chemical warfare agents. Now the same problems that US first responders and families had are going to happening in European cities with the advent of Nitazene.

Nitazene and its analogues are another synthetic opioid that poses a danger to life and health. The difference between an 'effective' dose and a lethal dose is incredibly small, and the individuals that are creating this narcotic are not skilled chemists. This one-day workshop will assess the threat from three angles, the detection of Nitazene, the decontamination of people and equipment and the health challenges should you encounter it. The Netherlands has a long history of illicit drug labs, and while it missed the fentanyl wave, they are seeing a worrying amount of Nitazene being shipped in. Organisations like the Netherlands Forensic Institute are excelling in detection and prosecution of these cases and will be a key partner in this workshop. This event is open to serving first responders, military, academics and scientific personnel from European and Nato partners.

Submit your Abstract
Deadline Extended to **15 September**

Advancing Surgical Care Through Integration And Innovation

11 – 14 November 2026–Sheraton Grand Doha

Welcome Message

Dear colleague,

We are excited to welcome you as Co-Chairs of Qatar Health 2026!

This year's Qatar Health 2026 promises to be the nation's flagship event for health education OR advancement, spotlighting "Advancing Surgical Care Through Integration and Innovation." Join us from November 11-14, 2026, at the iconic Sheraton Grand Doha Resort & Convention Hotel for a landmark OR sentinel academic experience. Get ready for an inspiring scientific and educational program designed to spark new ideas, foster meaningful connections, and ignite collaboration throughout our Emergency and Trauma Surgery community. This year's Congress partners with the 13 th World Society of Emergency Surgery (WSES) Congress, the 2 nd World Congress of Trauma and Emergency Leagues (WCTEL), the 3 rd Eastern Mediterranean Trauma Round Table (EMTRT3), and the Advanced Trauma Life Support [ATLS] MENA Region 17 Meeting to create an unparalleled platform for scientific exchange and breakthrough discoveries in Emergency and Trauma Surgery and related fields.

This year, we invite you to join more than 2,000 healthcare professionals from Qatar, the Gulf region, and across the globe who will converge to share cutting-edge strategies, innovative research, and best practices in multidisciplinary care and surgical innovation. At the Congress, you will connect with thought leaders from Qatar and around the world—including experts from WSES, WCTEL, ATLS MENA Region 17, and the World Health Organization—who are driving transformative progress in emergency and trauma surgery. You will be inspired by renowned speakers, visionary industry leaders, and engaging educational sessions, all offering deep insights into emergency and trauma surgery, allied specialties, quality improvement, clinical research, medical education, and the exciting world of artificial intelligence. We look forward to welcoming you to this world class event.

Strengthening hospital preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear emergencies: CBRN Hospital Preparedness Workshop

15 – 17 September 2026

Vilnius, Lithuania

Hospitals are at the forefront of responding to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) emergencies. Preparing health facilities to manage these complex incidents while maintaining essential health services is critical to strengthening national health security.

On 15–17 September 2026, the WHO Regional Office for Europe, in collaboration with the Health Emergency Situations Centre of the Ministry of Health of Lithuania and national partners, will convene a 3-day CBRN Hospital Preparedness Workshop in Vilnius, Lithuania. The workshop is implemented under the joint European Commission Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety–WHO/Europe CBRN Action.

Bringing together hospital leaders, emergency managers, clinicians, national authorities and international experts, the workshop will strengthen hospital preparedness using an all-hazards approach while focusing on the unique challenges posed by CBRN incidents. The programme combines strategic discussions with practical technical sessions covering hospital emergency planning, incident management, staff preparedness, personal protective equipment, decontamination, radiation protection, clinical management, mental health considerations and coordination mechanisms. Participants will also explore how hospitals can strengthen resilience through the 4S framework of health service delivery: System, Staff, Stuff and Space.

A highlight of the workshop will be a full-day interactive simulation using the internationally recognized Emergo Train System. Through a realistic radiological emergency scenario, multidisciplinary hospital teams will test decision-making, coordination, surge management, patient flow, contamination control and resource allocation in a safe learning environment. The workshop forms part of WHO/Europe's ongoing support to Member States to strengthen hospital resilience and enhance preparedness for high-impact emergencies, ensuring that health systems are better equipped to protect patients, health workers and communities during CBRN events.

World Health Organization

In Memory of

Prof. Brig. Gen. Levent Karaca

Organized in collaboration between the CBRN Society and the Ankara Branch of the Clinical Biochemistry Association

THE FIRST PRACTICAL NBC (CBRN) COURSE FROM THE LABORATORY PERSPECTIVE

20–21 October 2026

University of Health Sciences,
CBRN Training and Simulation Center, Etlik – Ankara

Correct diagnosis, effective protection, and rapid response are of vital importance in confronting chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear threats. With this understanding, the CBRN Society and the Ankara Branch of the Clinical Biochemistry Association will organize a special training program aimed at strengthening the role of all laboratory personnel in CBRN incidents.

The First Practical NBC Course from the Laboratory Perspective will bring together theoretical knowledge and hands-on training with the contributions of an important team of distinguished national and international academics and experienced instructors. The course aims to enable participants to recognize NBC (CBRN) threats, use personal protective equipment correctly, approach suspicious samples safely, assess contamination risks, and respond to incidents from a laboratory perspective.

The course is dedicated to the cherished memory of our esteemed teacher, Prof. Dr. Levent Karaca, who introduced the NBC concept to our country for the first time and established the related academic unit.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

- Recognize NBC/CBRN threats
- Use PPE correctly
- Approach suspicious samples safely
- Assess contamination risks
- Respond from a laboratory perspective

DIAGNOSE • PROTECT • SAVE

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Health Security, CBRNe, Emergency Medical Teams and Disaster Medicine

Republic of San Marino • 23–25 October 2026

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AI executives worry about their technologies aiding bioterrorists. How likely is that?

By Matt Field

Source: https://thebulletin.org/2026/07/ai-executives-worry-about-their-technologies-aiding-bioterrorists-how-likely-is-that/

July 27 – Modern AI might be just the bridge a would-be terrorist needs to cross between thinking about a biological attack and pulling one off. Having hoovered up a vast swath of human knowledge, scientific and otherwise, from the public internet and elsewhere, large language models (LLMs) can give understandable and detailed advice on the technical and logistical aspects of creating a bioweapon or planning an attack. AI trained on much of the genomic diversity of existing and extinct life can create entirely new viruses. This is more than science fiction; the heads of some large AI companies, among others, seem worried.

Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei wrote earlier this year that AI-assisted bioweapons use may not be imminent, but that "added up across millions of people and a few years of time, I think there is a serious risk of a major attack." In an open letter in June, Amodei, along with OpenAI CEO Sam Altman and dozens of tech CEOs, biotech entrepreneurs, and others warned that given AI's growing capabilities, "there is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode." Biosecurity experts and government officials echo the CEOs' concerns. AI might "create new pathways for malicious actors to synthesize harmful pathogens and other biomolecules," a 2025 Trump administration document *America's Action Plan* warns. "The profound benefits of [AI biological] capabilities combined with their potential to cause significant harm to populations around the world demands urgent attention, international engagement with a diverse range of stakeholders, and decisive action," dozens of AI and biosecurity experts wrote in a 2025 letter. Even as AI data center construction speeds along and companies continually release new, better models, our collective "P(doom) number" seems high—that is, in the Silicon Valley parlance, a lot of people see a high probability of AI causing an existential crisis.

"There's a good rationale for their concern," Stanford professor of medicine David Relman said of the AI executives. Even a small probability of successful biological attack carries outsized risk. After all, microorganisms can replicate. They can spread. "Self-replication, if you think about it, means potential loss of control," said Relman, an infectious disease and biosecurity expert who is also on the *Bulletin*'s Science and Security Board. "That's why we worry about computer worms and computer viruses because they have that same property once released; they're able to disseminate sometimes without our control."

However, plenty of hurdles remain for anyone hoping to use AI to develop a bioweapon. Instructions on using synthetic genetic material to "boot up" an effective, real-world pathogen might be available through a chatbot, but that doesn't mean just anyone would be able to do it. Ever since the development of LLMs—the ChatGPT-style of AI that can predict the next word in a sentence by drawing on the huge amounts of data they've been trained on—various research teams in and out of the AI companies have tried to assess how much "uplift" a model can provide. (In lay terms, whether an AI model can help someone improve someone's biology skills.) For now, Relman said, the models mainly would be useful to people with a "reasonable familiarity with biology, and even, in particular, the kind of biology they seek to exploit."

Relman said he had the chance to use a "rails free" model that didn't have the same built-in protections against misuse that the models available to the public have. As a microbiologist, Relman understands the genetic changes that might make a pathogen more dangerous for weaponization purposes. What he saw from the model was "helpful, but not revolutionary," he said. On the terrorist-plotting front, however, the story was different. It was: "here's how law enforcement and the various forces that seek to protect us are looking for a problem. Here's how you start by just avoiding any of that. Here's how you avoid someone, even suspecting that there's a problem. And then here's how you deceive them into thinking there's a problem over there, when, in fact, it's over here. Here's how you make them think that the problem is X when actually it's Y," Relman said.

The models he was using could provide a "modestly skilled" actor with nuanced information for plotting an attack. "I didn't ask the model to do all these things," Relman said. "I said I want a clever, thoughtful plan that would maximize the chances of success. This is what it did." The fact that Relman had been experimenting with a model that was free of guardrails and restrictions wasn't much solace. Even though public models have guardrails, they can be "jailbroken."

Begin a breezy conversation with a chatbot—say about the history of Molotov cocktails and the Finnish fighters who used them against Soviet invaders in the1939-1940 Winter War—and by the end of the chat, the AI might divulge concrete instructions for making the improvised bombs. "There is a world of experience and literature on how to jailbreak these models," Relman said. "It's absolutely doable."

Maryland where the former US bioweapons program was once housed. The FBI alleges that Ivins, an expert on anthrax who killed himself in 2008, mailed anthrax powder to media and governmental figures, killing five and sickening more than a dozen. In another case, the Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo also tried its hand at bioweapons attacks. Cult members

used soil samples to produce botulinum toxin, brewing a yellowish mixture in homemade fermenters.

In late June 1993, residents near Aum Shinrikyo's headquarters in Tokyo began reporting a foul smell to local authorities. Officials documented a mist coming from the building's roof and also took a sample from the building's exterior. Eventually, after the cult's infamous sarin attacks on Tokyo subways, group members would admit that the odor that residents had been smelling came from attempts to aerosolize anthrax bacterium. Credit: Department of Environment, Koto-ward, Tokyo, Japan / Emerging Infectious Diseases.

The material, which hadn't been purified, failed to kill experimental mice, according to a Nuclear Threat Initiative report on the cult. Unsurprisingly, various missions to spray the substance around military bases and other facilities yielded no results. The group also attempted to weaponize anthrax. As with the botulinum toxin, Aum's crude attempts to produce and disperse it caused no causalities, though "some birds and neighborhood pets were apparently killed." Aum would become notorious after using sarin, a chemical weapon, in a lethal attack on Tokyo's subway system in 1995

A real risk?

The level of concern over AI's biological risk potential varies among experts, of course.

Allison Berke is a bioengineer who works on a team at RAND that tests models against various benchmarks to see whether, for example, they can "tell you step by step how to recreate Ebola." Berke said she sees a low probability of AI causing a biological crisis. Her P(doom) "is particularly low among people who work on this," she said. "I really think that it's a very, very small chance."

AI companies may be ringing the alarm over biological risks in part, Berke, speculated, because it's an area that "lends itself to solutions that are discreet." Synthetic DNA order screening, export controls to regulate trade flows, or know-your-customer rules are similar to existing regulations in other areas such as cybersecurity or the finance industry. For AI companies, Berke said, the biosecurity issue is "a little more tractable, I guess, than climate change, where it's like, what do you even want the company to do about climate change?"

Berke's relatively sanguine attitude partly stems from what she believes are the technical limitations of biological automation.

So-called "cloud labs," for example, where scientists can send instructions to robots to complete tasks are not yet "at the stage where they could fully autonomously make a transmissible virus," Berke said.

If bio-automation techniques and equipment improved a lot and became cheaper, things might different. If there was "a $100 benchtop synthesizer that you can jailbreak, and you could get like a little synthesis "Roomba," or something that like fits in your garage," Berke said, "then I might worry because then you're really democratizing availability."

Useful weapons?

Even if AI could make bioweapons easy, would terrorists opt in?

Many countries once had bioweapons programs. And while there is suspicion that some still maintain offensive capabilities, the Biological Weapons Convention counts 189 states parties as members, or nearly all the world's countries.

Part of the reason that countries have renounced bioweapons is that, as a military tool, they suffer from serious drawbacks. Environmental conditions can affect an attack. Contagious agents might blowback on an attacking force. Lengthy incubation periods decrease their utility. Pathogens in the environment might also persist and mutate.

There have been cases of bioterrorism, perhaps most famously anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001.

The alleged perpetrator, Bruce Ivins, was a microbiologist working at an Army biodefense facility at Fort Detrick in

All told, between 1970 and 2019, the Global Terrorism Database recorded over 200,000 terrorist attacks; just a few dozen involved biological agents.

Relman hears a lot of skepticism about how appealing bioweapons might be to would-be terrorists. Maybe they're just too hard to control. Maybe they're too unreliable or hard to make. But alongside improving AI technology there is a degradation in "a collective sense of the public good to norms in general." The idea that because bioweapons haven't been used much in the past that that will continue to be the case, requires, "hopelessly flawed assumptions," Relman said.

"I think we are skating on very thin ice if we simply adopt that kind of logic."

Amodei, Anthropic's CEO, might agree. In his January 2026, post about the risks of powerful AI systems, Amodei cut holes in several "objections to the seriousness" of LLM-related biological risks.

He wrote that LLMs can provide more help to terrorists than a Google search; they provide more than just theoretical information and could improve the chances of successful bioweapons acquisition; and that outside factors that could reduce risk such as mandated screening of gene synthesis orders do not yet exist (something the AI CEOs' June letter called for).

The strongest argument that the models don't pose a dire bioweapons risk, he said, is that "there is a gap between the models being useful in principle and the actual propensity of bad actors to use them." They might worry about being infected by bioweapon, say, or not have the patience to undertake what might even with AI be a lengthy development process.

Amodei wrote that a belief that a terrorist wouldn't use biology is

"very flimsy protection to rely on," citing the unpredictability of disturbed loners and the ideological commitment of terrorist groups that might be willing to commit a lot of time and effort to a plan.

High-level concern

OpenAI, another of the top AI companies, has a framework for evaluating AI risks, said Richard Johnson, the national security risk mitigation lead for the company. "The Preparedness Framework is our document that lays out where we see the potential for severe risk that could come from various uses of AI. Bio is right at the top of the list."

In an interview last month, he said it was the first risk area to cross over into what the company deems a "high capability" area. Under the framework, this means that a model could have the capability to "uplift their knowledge and potentially produce a novice level threat." The framework calls for measures like guardrails to mitigate the risks when certain thresholds are crossed.

"The models that we've released all incorporate a series of mitigations, including refusals," Johnson said. "The model will say, 'I'm sorry, I can't tell you that. You're doing something that I'm not allowed to tell you.'"

Still, Johnson acknowledged that someone might get through these protective measures. If that happens, the company flags users for human review. In these cases, a human reviewer can "take a look and see what this user is doing and why are they doing it," he said. "We can take responses as needed–if that means the account user gets banned or something more serious," such as a referral to law enforcement. Right now, OpenAI provides models to the Department of Commerce's Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), as well as a similar body in the United Kingdom for pre-release testing. The company also provides models to third-party organizations for testing.

CAISI has several agreements with AI companies to evaluate models before release, including their biological capabilities. Though CAISI seeks to "establish voluntary agreements with private sector AI developers," some officials and groups want to see mandatory testing. Jonhson said it's "really important to continue to build up the system that's in place now through the CAISI and giving government AI evaluators, more resources, more time, and more people to be able to do this."

Over the course of just a few years—ChatGPT was released in 2022—AI capabilities have spawned massive concern over potential adverse effects. There is a near-constant stream of new analysis on what jobs will disappear, which cherished human skills will become replaceable, and what new risks will emerge as AI becomes better and more ubiquitous. Seemingly just as constant is the debate over where to draw the line between hype and legitimate fear.

Though people could have a "balanced discussion" about how great the biological risks of AI are now, Relman predicts that soon society will be in "much greater agreement" as the technology continues its current trajectory of rapid improvement. Relman sees a large role for regulation in the AI industry, rules that should apply to both companies and users. Some models should have their access to certain data restricted, for example. Likewise, in certain cases, users might require vetting.

"Where we will find ourselves a year from now is likely to be, without intervention, a much more risky circumstance."

Matt Field is an associate editor at the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Before joining the *Bulletin*, he covered the White House, Congress, and presidential campaigns as a news producer for Japanese public television. He has also reported for print outlets in the Midwest and on the East Coast. He holds a master's degree in journalism from Northwestern University.

This AI Tool Helps Military Leaders Stay Ahead of Biological Threats

Source: https://i-hls.com/archives/137594

July 29 – Biological threats present a unique challenge for military organizations. Information about disease outbreaks, unusual health events, laboratory findings, intelligence reports, and environmental conditions often arrives from multiple disconnected sources. Analysts must combine these data streams quickly to determine whether a potential biological incident poses an operational threat and what response may be required.

A new AI-enabled platform, developed by Cyberhill, has been developed to simplify that process by bringing biological threat monitoring, assessment, and decision support into a single operational environment.

Known as the Biosurveillance Information Platform (BIP), the system consolidates tools that have traditionally been spread across multiple software applications. Instead of switching between separate databases and analytical systems, commanders and biosurveillance specialists receive a unified operational picture of biological risks through one interface.

The platform is built on an artificial intelligence framework that combines secure workflows with mission-specific analytics. Incoming information from multiple sources is integrated into the system, where AI assists analysts by organizing data, identifying patterns, and highlighting potential threats that

require attention. According to NextGenDefense, one of the capabilities currently under development is automated translation of foreign-language reports. By converting information into a common language, the platform aims to reduce delays associated with manual translation while improving awareness of emerging biological events worldwide. Another planned feature focuses on automated disease classification. Rather than requiring analysts to manually categorize every report, the AI will organize incoming alerts by threat type, allowing specialists to identify significant events more rapidly.

The platform is also expected to incorporate predictive modeling tools capable of estimating how disease outbreaks could spread over time. These models are intended to support operational planning by helping decision-makers determine where medical resources, vaccines, or protective equipment may be needed before an outbreak expands.

Future versions will additionally generate summarized reports that provide commanders with concise, actionable assessments while allowing analysts to review and refine the AI-generated conclusions.

From a defense perspective, rapid biosurveillance has become increasingly important for protecting military personnel, maintaining operational readiness, and responding to naturally occurring disease outbreaks as well as potential biological attacks. Integrating multiple information sources into a single AI-assisted platform can shorten the time between detecting a biological event and making informed operational decisions.

As artificial intelligence becomes more deeply integrated into military decision-support systems, biosurveillance platforms like this illustrate how AI can help transform large volumes of complex health and intelligence data into actionable information for commanders and analysts.

Why America Must Protect Biological Data from China

By Pat Fallon

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-america-must-protect-biological-data-from-china



July 29 – When Americans think of the defining geopolitical competition of the 21st century, they often picture naval fleets in the South China Sea or hypersonic missiles streaking across Earth's atmosphere. But one of the most consequential battlefields of our time can be completely invisible to the human eye. It is waged in strings of code, genomic sequences, and the

massive foundational datasets that fuel the future of medicine, manufacturing, and artificial intelligence (AI) tools.

Adversaries have long targeted American domination of the biotechnology industry. Our speed and innovation are what set us apart from communist, state-directed economies. From mass-producing penicillin to founding the first biotechnology company, which gave rise to the entire industry, American biotech experts have consistently driven the most critical biological breakthroughs in human history.

Today, that legacy continues with pioneering advancements in CRISPR gene editing and CAR-T cell therapy, representing the pinnacle of advanced genomic medicine. With the introduction of AI, these therapies can be transformed from slow, manual laboratory trial-and-error procedures to predictable, automated engineering sciences.

US advancements in biotechnology go far beyond the practice of medicine. Biotech is actively reshaping the future of American power by revolutionizing military logistics, developing specialized enzymes to extract rare earth elements, equipping farmers with resilient crops, and paving the way to replace traditional silicon chips with DNA-based computing.

Each day, the innovation ecosystem becomes more competitive as adversaries deploy a brute-force economic playbook against biotech and other emerging technologies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has positioned itself as an AI-driven bio-competitor, using state-backed firms to develop large-scale life-science AI foundation models and leveraging national champions to manufacture critical components for widely used American medications.

These state-backed entities have historically relied on acquiring foreign intellectual property and data through both legal and illegal channels, and the CCP executes this strategy by stealing, scaling, and strangling global supply chains.

The CCP aims to harvest global biological and genetic datasets, including those of American citizens, while completely locking its own domestic data behind a digital iron curtain. While the CCP limits data-sharing reciprocity, an estimated 80 percent of China's life-science research depends on US biological datasets, representing a major strategic vulnerability.

Despite these massive national security stakes, the Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI), which operates less as a private enterprise and more as a state-run firm in Beijing's pocket, has successfully acquired American genomics firms in the past. Clearly, the CCP seeks to dominate biotech by leveraging BGI and others to collect massive troves of data that power biotech developments. These state-backed entities, fueled by undisclosed state subsidies, must not be allowed to exploit our open markets to harvest biological data, putting American economic interests, personal privacy, and advanced biotech development at risk.

American companies do not rely on IP theft, socialist subsidies, or government handouts. However, they justifiably expect their leaders to defend them from foreign adversaries that weaponize unfair trade practices and steal intellectual property. Their primary defense against foreign data acquisition relies on a patchwork of four separate federal programs spread across the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Defense.

These four agencies have long been plagued by mismatched definitions of "sensitive data," critical jurisdictional gaps, and severe resource and staffing constraints. For years, this fractured regulatory approach allowed high-stakes compromises to clear federal review unchallenged. Put simply, while each of these oversight programs possesses robust, unique capabilities and responsibilities, the CCP actively exploits America's siloed bureaucracy and information.

America cannot afford to fall behind. This is why I have joined my colleague, Rep. Josh Gottheimer (D-NJ), in formally requesting that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct a comprehensive evaluation to identify the regulatory vulnerabilities of our biotech industry and urge the oversight agencies to operate as a cohesive, unified front.

Through this formal evaluation, we seek information on the implementation challenges facing the agencies that are responsible for protecting the US national interest and biological data. Our goal is to eliminate gaps in our bulk biological data defenses and resolve jurisdictional friction stemming from mismatched definitions of sensitive personal data.

The promise of biotechnology, from curing chronic diseases to revolutionizing military preparedness, will only be realized if we safeguard the foundational data that makes it possible. It is time to treat biological data like the vital national resource it is and ensure America wins the bio-century.

Rep. Pat Fallon represents Texas's 4th Congressional District. He is a member of the House Armed Services, Oversight, and Intelligence Committees. He is a member of the House Armed Services, Intelligence, and Oversight committees. Prior to his time in Congress, Pat Fallon represented North Texas in the State House and Senate. He has also enjoyed a decades-long entrepreneurial career, having founded over a dozen successful companies. Congressman Fallon is a proud graduate of the University of Notre Dame.

Ancient DNA confirms historical accounts of how smallpox got to the Americas

By Lizzie Wade

Source: https://www.science.org/content/article/ancient-dna-confirms-historical-accounts-how-smallpox-got-americas



Europeans introduced the deadly smallpox virus, seen here under electron microscopy, to Indigenous South Americans. Chris Bjornberg/Science Source

July 30 – Sometime around the turn of the 17th century, two people died in northern Chile. Their disease-ravaged bodies were bundled in layers of textiles, buried in an Indigenous cemetery, and naturally mummified by the desert environment. Now, scientists have identified their killer: smallpox. The virus' genome found in their bones and described today in *Science* represents the first molecular evidence of the disease in the colonial Americas, confirming historical accounts of the disease arriving with European contact and eventually killing millions of Indigenous inhabitants.

"This paper is a landmark," says Hendrik Poinar, an evolutionary geneticist at McMaster University who wasn't involved with the work. Previous research in colonial burials had turned up the genomes of *Salmonella enterica*, parvovirus, hepatitis B, yaws—seemingly everything but smallpox. "That put this whole question into doubt," Poinar says. "Maybe the historians have been wrong" about what diseases caused early colonial epidemics. So finally finding smallpox DNA in early colonial Chile "is hugely significant."

The team behind the paper didn't set out to find pathogens in the graves from a cemetery known as Camarones 9 near Arica, Chile, and dated to the transition between the Inca and colonial periods. Researchers on the hunt for colonial diseases usually target cemeteries associated with known epidemics or hospitals, and there were no historical records of an epidemic in this place or time. The researchers initially planned to sequence human DNA from the mummies to study their ancestries and relationships, using samples of their bones taken in the 1990s. Unfortunately, the preservation of the human DNA was "terrible," says Constanza de la Fuente Castro, a biological anthropologist at the University of Chile. But fortunately for the researchers—and unfortunately for the pair who died—"the smallpox genome was amazing." The


Ancient Inca mummy is displayed at a museum in Cusco, Peru.

strain's DNA was nearly identical in both mummies' bones, suggesting they died during the same outbreak.

Once the team confirmed the presence of the virus, "a lot of things started making sense in the site," de la Fuente Castro says. Archaeologists had previously described some of the mummies as having skin lesions, which they attributed to arsenic exposure. But smallpox could also leave such lesions. "The [researchers] were just so lucky" to find the virus when they weren't looking for it, says María Ávila Arcos, a paleogenomicist at the National Autonomous University of Mexico who has studied other colonial pathogens. "This will definitely be a point of comparison to paint a better picture of how [smallpox] spread through the Americas."

The finding also paints a portrait of the 17th century virus that made it to Chile. Evolutionarily, the Chilean strain sits between pox viruses circulating during the Viking age and a virus isolated by Poinar's team from a Lithuanian child mummy who died between 1643 and 1665 C.E. It likely diverged from other smallpox lineages around 1296 C.E., and went extinct before the early 20th century. By estimating how long it would take for the strain's hallmark genetic variants to evolve and combining that with radiocarbon dates from one of the mummy's hairs, the scientists deduced that the outbreak in northern Chile occurred between 1492 and 1631 C.E. The date and the strain's clear European relatives confirm it came to the Americas with colonialism. "It's a very important job for a scientist to witness history using molecular data," says Shigeki Nakagome, a geneticist at Trinity College Dublin and the paper's last author.

Nakagome says the new genome provides surprising hints that the smallpox virus' evolution might have slowed down between the 16th and 18th centuries. He wonders whether this possible evolutionary pause could be related to colonialism "creating the best environment for [smallpox]," where it could run rampant through millions of previously unexposed people without changing its own characteristics at all. The beginnings of vaccination seem to have jump-started the virus' evolution again, he says.

Other researchers are skeptical. "That's not really how pathogens work," Poinar says; viruses are constantly evolving to keep pace with the immune defenses of their hosts. He agrees the Chilean strain differed from modern smallpox, but thinks it was likely less virulent. Not that it would have mattered to those who died from it—even a less ferocious virus could have had an "extreme" impact on previously unexposed populations, Poinar notes.

Pandora Report 7.31.2026: Is the U.S. Ready for the Next Pandemic?

Source: https://pandorareport.org/

Anthony Fauci Pleads the Fifth During Contentious Senate COVID-19 Hearing

Former top US health official Anthony Fauci invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during a tense July 29 hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, declining to answer questions related to the origins of COVID-19 and the nation's handling of the pandemic. The hearing, led by Committee Chairman Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY), followed the public release of Fauci's COVID-era diaries and focused on allegations that federal funding supported risky viral research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Fauci's attorneys advised him not to testify, citing ongoing legal concerns despite the presidential pardon he received from former President Joe Biden. Republican senators criticized his refusal to answer questions and raised the possibility of contempt proceedings, while Democratic

lawmakers characterized the hearing as politically motivated and defended Fauci's public health record.

Is America Becoming Less Prepared for the Next Pandemic?
By **Carmen Shaw**, Pandora Report Managing Editor

The United States is confronting several infectious disease threats at once – hantavirus, screwworm, Ebola, cyclospora, measles, whooping cough, and bird flu. Former CDC officials warn that major changes made by the administration to the nation's public health infrastructure – reducing funding, cutting staff, changing priorities, and shuttering USAID – have left the US in worse shape than before the COVID-19 pandemic. According to *The Guardian*, 80% of senior leadership positions at the CDC still lack permanent officials, and the agency has lost an estimated 25-30% of its workforce. Given the dearth of proper "boots on the ground" experience, the US appears less prepared for the next major public health emergency.
It has also been reported that the Trump administration has quietly reduced the role of the HHS' Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), which supports research aimed at improving patient safety, healthcare quality, and emergency preparedness. Meanwhile, *Politico* reported that the State Department will move forward with dispensing approximately $600M in previously delayed vaccine funding after HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. held up the funding for months due to concerns about vaccine safety. Separately, a new analysis found that while the U.S. has strengthened several aspects of its Ebola response since the 2014-2016 West Africa epidemic – including airport screening, lab diagnostics, and hospital preparedness – experts warn that maintaining these capabilities will require sustained investment and experienced personnel.
These concerns surrounding the U.S. international disease response capacity grow as disease activity continues to rise nationwide. U.S. cyclospora infection cases have reached record levels in 2026 following multiple foodborne outbreaks. U.S. measles cases have surpassed last year's total and reached their highest level in more than three decades, driven by declining childhood vaccination coverage and several outbreaks around the nation. Taken together, these developments paint a troubling picture for the US – even as disease threats continue to mount, the nation's public health infrastructure appears to be backsliding.

California Judge Rules H5N1 Quarantine Locations to Stay Confidential
By **Margeaux Malone**, Pandora Report Associate Editor

A Sacramento County Superior Court judge ruled against disclosing the names and locations of California dairies quarantined during the 2024-25 bird flu outbreak, siding with state agriculture officials. More than 750 dairies were quarantined statewide during that period as officials worked to contain the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza. The suit was filed by the California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA), which argued that making the information public would improve oversight of the state's response, help protect dairy workers, and provide researchers with data to better understand the outbreak. The judge acknowledged the public interest in government transparency but concluded that protecting producer confidentiality would encourage farmers to report sick animals promptly and cooperate with disease investigations. Amanda Murray, California's acting state veterinarian and branch chief of Animal Health and Food Safety Services, wrote, "Loss of this trust would likely have a chilling effect, wherein producers would either delay reporting or not report clinical signs of disease." Out of fear of public backlash, some farms might have culled sick animals and disposed of them themselves, potentially spreading the disease unintentionally. Industry groups have praised the decision as vital to maintaining trust between producers and regulators, while CRLA says it's weighing further legal options.

Cattle Imports from Mexico to Resume Amid Ongoing NWS Outbreaks
Last Friday, USDA announced a phased reopening of the US-Mexico border to cattle imports, despite the ongoing efforts to prevent further spread of New World Screwworm (NWS) into the country. Imports will start August 24 at the Douglas, Arizona port, with New Mexico crossings to follow pending Mexico's compliance with a joint action plan targeting NWS. Sonora and Chihuahua were identified as lower-risk source states in Mexico due to stronger inspection infrastructure. The decision follows sustained pressure from Republicans and cattle industry groups to reopen the border amid elevated beef prices, a concern shared by the administration, which aims to lower prices ahead of the upcoming midterm elections.
Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins had previously resisted reopening the southern border over screwworm concerns, while acknowledging the economic challenges it posed to various sectors of the industry in Texas. The Biden administration first closed the border to cattle imports in late 2024 following detection of NWS in southern Mexico. The Trump administration then temporarily reopened the border from January to May 2025, before closing it again as screwworms moved northward in Mexico. While many industry groups applaud the move, others, including the United States Cattlemen's Association (USCA), remain wary that reopening risks reintroducing the parasite before containment is complete. USCA President Justin Tupper responded to the decision,

saying, "Any effort to lower beef prices must not come at the expense of U.S. cattle herd health. We've been encouraged to rebuild the domestic herd; it is of utmost importance, and unnecessary exposure to animal health threats is a risk we do not need to take."

The United Kingdom's 2023 Biological Security Strategy (BSS) set out the government's overarching biosecurity framework and plans to strengthen capabilities to understand, detect, prevent, and respond to biological risks. Implicitly enshrining a deterrence-by-denial approach, the strategy signaled important policy shifts aimed at bolstering national resilience to an increasingly complex threat landscape. At the time, the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) concluded that "it was an important step in improving health security in the UK and internationally," but that there needed to be "sustained attention on implementation."

On July 14, 2026, the UK government continued its commitment to increased transparency by publishing its third implementation report that details strategy implementation from July 2025 to July 2026 and sets new targets for the year ahead. Below are some of the key takeaways from this important report:

- **Communicating the dynamic threat landscape.** NATO allies are increasingly concerned about bioweapons proliferation as capabilities evolve for state and non-state actors seeking to develop, acquire, and use biological material for malicious purposes, enabled by rapid technological advancements, including in artificial intelligence, life sciences, and biotechnology. Importantly, the report recognizes that the biological threat landscape is rapidly evolving and the UK faces more significant and complex biological threats, which have increased since the strategy was released in 2023. The government also acknowledges the growing range of attack modes that are available to adversaries, highlighting the presence of epibatidine (a neurotoxin produced by the Ecuadorian poison frog) in samples taken from the body of Alexei Navalny as an exemplar of the increasingly complicated threat picture.
- **Strengthening attribution capabilities.** Credible biodeterrence requires demonstrable capabilities that can rapidly detect and attribute all biological threats, regardless of origin. The UK has established a world-leading capability to deter the use of such weapons: the UK Microbial Forensics Consortium. In 2026, the UK launched a microbial forensics innovation competition to generate new analytical approaches for genomic data and augment identification of an organism's origin. The government has also completed the first "baselining" in silico exercise for the detection of genetic engineering, an important step in bolstering collective attribution capabilities.
- **Strengthening international and multi-agency cooperation.** Joint exercises play a vital role in ensuring a rapid, coordinated, and proportionate response across government departments and response mechanisms in the event of a biological incident. In 2026, the UK concluded Exercise Pegasus, the largest-ever pandemic simulation in UK history, which involved participation from every Department, the devolved Governments, and representation from arm's-length bodies and local resilience fora. Based on a novel enterovirus originating from a fictional island, the exercise was designed to rigorously test the UK's response to a future pandemic caused by a novel infectious disease. Public communication of the exercise findings and recommendations will be essential.
- **Embedding the "whole of society" approach.** Strong bioresilience requires effective public-private collaboration, with government and industry working hand in hand. Such partnerships are essential for developing medical countermeasures, building biomanufacturing capacity, and strengthening supply chains. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy was published in early 2026 and provides strong market signals, committing £1 billion ($1.33B) to health protection measures. The opening of Moderna's

Innovation and Technology Center, a public-private partnership to increase the UK's mRNA vaccine production capacity, is a tangible indicator of progress. Sustained investment in the underpinning scientific research for medical countermeasures is imperative.

- **Augmenting early warning and situational awareness.** The systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of biological data is a cornerstone of national and collective bioresilience. The 2023 BSS committed to delivering an ambitious National Biosurveillance Network (NBN) integrating the numerous capabilities across the UK, ranging from traditional surveillance to more nascent capabilities, such as wastewater and air testing. Concern has grown around the government's ability to deliver on this ambition, with delivery plagued by delays and underspending, indicating the complexity of implementing such a broad, cross-cutting capability. However, since June 2025, the government has made considerable progress to operationalize these ambitions, including:
    - Developing a new strategic approach to biosurveillance, focusing on acute detection, which aims to rapidly identify and deploy next-generation sequencing technologies and new operational technologies across all detection scenarios.
    - Establishing the NBN Knowledge Hub and the Metadata catalog to enhance cross-government biosurveillance data and resource sharing.
    - Deploying the Biothreats Radar (BTR) for real-time situational awareness and digitized outbreak reports across government. The BTR was validated during Exercise Pegasus and has been deployed to 14 government departments and agencies. It was successfully operationally deployed in 2026 during the hantavirus outbreak.
    - Enhancing the real-time data sharing and metagenomic data processing at scale across the National Health Service and UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), through scaling the Metagenomics Surveillance Collaboration and Analysis Programme (mSCAPE).
    - Embedding AI-enabled Biological Tools into biosurveillance pipelines, for example, UKHSA's deployment of tools to examine tuberculosis drug resistance.

The UK government should be commended for its concerted efforts in implementing the ambitious 2023 Biological Security Strategy. The UK is developing world-leading biosecurity capabilities across pathogen detection, microbial forensics, and persistent threat awareness. These achievements are not concentrated in pockets but distributed and joined up across government, a commendable achievement requiring tenacious coordination.

The government should also be commended for the transparency demonstrated by the release of this report. Public communication of such a credible biodeterrence posture will itself help deter biological attack. CSR calls on other like-minded governments to study these successes and invest in their biosecurity capabilities and coordination mechanisms. After all, when it comes to biosecurity, we are not entirely safe until we all are.

Review of Anthropic's Unredacted Chemical and Biological Risk Report: Claude Opus 4.6

By Andrew Liu | Head of Applied Research, SecureBio AI Team
Source: https://securebio.substack.com/p/review-of-anthropics-unredacted-chemical

July 28 – SecureBio partnered with Anthropic to review the chemical and biological (CB) risk sections of their February 2026 Risk Report. For our review, Anthropic shared with us an unredacted version of this report and 110 pages of additional materials. Over two months, they responded to over seventy follow-up questions and requests for materials regarding updated model capabilities and safeguards. Read our full review of Anthropic's Unredacted Chemical and Biological Risk Report: Claude Opus 4.6.

Summary of our Review

Overall, we agree with Anthropic that the current risk of catastrophic outcomes that are substantially enabled by Claude Opus 4.6 is:

- **"Very low but not negligible" for non-novel CB weapons production1, and**
- **"Low risk, but with substantial uncertainty" for novel CB weapons production.**

We highlight a few key findings in particular:

- **On refusal classifiers:** We examined the training constitutions and robustness results for Anthropic's refusal classifiers, their main CB risk safeguard. In aggregate, we found that the classifiers generally refuse on topics which we would have refused on, including 94.2% of

hazardous prompts in SecureBio's safeguard benchmark BioTIER-refuse. However, we advise that the constitutions should be continually updated as advances in biotechnology and elsewhere change the landscape of topics that pose CB risk.

- **On user access:** We also reviewed Anthropic's process for (a) vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and (b) monitoring such users. At this time, we find it unlikely but possible that a threat actor would successfully acquire and use such an exemption to substantially uplift CB weapons production.
- **On jailbreaks:** We emphasize that risks remain non-negligible: actors with extremely high jailbreaking expertise can still quickly find or make substantial progress on jailbreaks around the refusal classifiers (e.g. UK AISI's BPJ) and remediation times can be long.

Because of the similarity of safeguards between Opus 4.6 and later versions of Opus 4 (i.e. Opus 4.7 and Opus 4.8), we apply our conclusions to those later Opus 4 models as well. However, we do not apply our conclusions to Fable 5, Mythos 5, or Opus 5 due to their differing capabilities, safeguards, and access controls; we leave those models beyond this review's scope.2

External review criteria for Responsible Scaling Policy

The Responsible Scaling Policy v3.0, released February 2024 and applying to model releases starting with Claude Opus 4.6, described criteria for external reviews (Section 3.63). In fulfillment of Section 3.6.3, covering the contents of the external review, we summarize our findings as follows.

- We found **adequacy of information** to be generally sufficient, although minor parts of our assessment depended on information from redactions and follow-ups (e.g. reviewing the classifier guard training constitutions).
- We found **analytical rigor** to be generally sufficient.
- We agreed with Anthropic's overall conclusion about CB risk levels as stated above, but have minor **areas of disagreement**, most importantly regarding the risk posed by actors with high jailbreaking expertise.
- We make several **risk reduction recommendations**, including one that Anthropic had already implemented since the Risk Report (Anthropic has removed zero data retention for Mythos 5 and Fable 54). The other recommendations concern the monitoring of classifier-exempt users and the bio-classifier constitutions.

1 This risk assessment does not claim that risk of novel-CB weapons production is more likely than non-novel CB weapons production, but rather that the threat model of novel-CB production is fundamentally more uncertain.
2 At the time of writing, Fable 5 did route biology-related queries to Opus 4.8 (implying some similarity of safeguards and capabilities in CB areas), but we stay conservative in applying the conclusions of this review to Fable 5.
3 The RSP has been updated at https://www.anthropic.com/responsible-scaling-policy.
4 Anthropic's ZDR removal for Fable 5 and Mythos 5: https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/manage-claude/api-and-data-retention.

The full report contains more details on the review process, methodology, and findings.

Could a Single Pathogen Bring Down Civilization?

By Annie Jacobsen
Source: https://nextbigideaclub.com/magazine/single-pathogen-bring-civilization-bookbite/60842/



July 30 – Annie Jacobsen is an investigative reporter who writes about war, weapons, U.S. national security, and government secrets. She was a 2016 Pulitzer Prize finalist in the History category and was a contributing editor at *Los Angeles Times Magazine*. Annie shares five key insights from her new book, *Biological War: A Scenario*.

What's the Big Idea?

We have entered an era in which biological warfare poses a greater threat than most people can imagine, yet few understand how vulnerable we truly are. The danger is no longer theoretical, and unless we confront it now, the consequences could overwhelm modern civilization.

1. Biological warfare is illegal.

Biological weapons are illegal and yet biological weapons exist. The biological weapons that exist today include genetically modified weapons designed for hypervirulence and human-to-human transmission. These are weapons with a high lethality rate and no known cure.
The use of such a biological weapon would trigger a

global pandemic causing mass death, total societal breakdown, widespread insurrection and anarchy, leaving behind a plague-ravaged wasteland that no longer resembles modern civilization. Everyone in the business of preventing biological warfare knows this to be true.

2. There is no homeland defense against a large-scale biological attack.

Dr. Thomas Ehrhard, a retired Air Force colonel who designed and ran large-scale nuclear and biological war games for the Secretary of Defense, puts it starkly: In the event of a nuclear or biological incident, there are no solutions. There are only ways to mitigate extermination.

3. Of all weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons pose the greatest overall threat.

Nuclear weapons are often considered the ultimate weapons of mass destruction. But biological weapons may pose a greater threat. While nuclear weapons require tightly controlled fissile materials such as uranium and plutonium, biological weapons have a dangerously low barrier to entry.

"Biological weapons can be developed far from the oversight and chain-of-command controls that protect nuclear arsenals."

Biological weapons can be engineered by someone with minimal training in biology using widely available tools, including AI-enabled systems. Unlike nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, which remain under control of a national militaries, biological weapons can be developed far from the oversight and chain-of-command controls that protect nuclear arsenals.

The release of a biological weapon could trigger a global pandemic, leading to mass death, societal breakdown, civil unrest, and anarchy. Where are our safeguards?

4. Not all biological weapons are created equal.

There are many classes of pathogens. A pathogen is any organism that causes disease, including viruses and bacteria. But when it comes to biological threats, one characteristic matters above all else: transmissibility.

Some of the deadliest pathogens, such as Ebola, Marburg virus, and Lassa fever virus, spread through direct contact with bodily fluids. They are extraordinarily lethal and have limited treatment options, but they are not airborne. That distinction is key because by not being airborne, their ability to spread is far more limited.

Airborne transmission happens in two ways:

- **Droplet transmission**: The relatively large droplets of saliva, mucus, or other respiratory fluids expelled when a person coughs, sneezes, talks, or sings.
- **Aerosol transmission**: Microscopic aerosol particles can remain suspended in the air, allowing a pathogen to spread far beyond close personal contact.

Nature has already given us highly contagious airborne diseases, such as smallpox, chickenpox, and measles. But biotechnology has changed the game. One of the most controversial areas of modern virology is gain-of-function research. In these experiments, scientists working in high- or maximum-containment biosecurity facilities, known as Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) and Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4), deliberately alter viruses or bacteria to give them new capabilities. That can include spreading faster, infecting humans more easily, evading existing immunity, and surviving longer in the environment.

Proponents of gain-of-function experiments argue that by making a pathogen more dangerous, scientists can better understand how to defend against a catastrophic biological incident or attack. Critics say these experiments create unacceptable global catastrophic risk, blurring the line between legitimate scientific research and illegal biological weapons work. Laboratory accidents and containment failures have happened hundreds of times over the decades, raising concerns about what could happen if an enhanced pathogen escaped. What happens if a genetically modified pathogen begins spreading uncontrollably?

5. Devolution.

Devolution is a highly classified continuity-of-government program designed to keep the federal government functioning after a catastrophic biological incident or attack. While the program's name is public, most details remain classified.

"Laboratory accidents and containment failures have happened hundreds of times over the decades."

Through a series of interviews with Craig Fugate, President Obama's former FEMA administrator, who approved the current devolution protocols, I learned unclassified details about devolution that have never before been reported. These include plans to move a small group of preselected officials into secure, classified bunkers, where they would try to maintain the basic principles of the U.S. Constitution even as the nation's infrastructure collapses, society succumbs to anarchy, and a majority of citizens die. The government rehearses for this kind of biological war scenario. Fugate calls it "a maximum of maximum events."

The very existence of this program and the fact that it is regularly rehearsed by the military, FEMA, and other federal agencies, exposes a deep chasm between what government officials prepare for and what the public grasps.

AI Chatbots Offer Accurate Biological Weapon Guidance

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2026/07/27/TYVWYOK4Y5FPTFCPQ5MJMRV4M4/

July 27 – An artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot has been found to provide accurate instructions on manufacturing biological weapons. It reportedly offered step-by-step methods that could be followed with only high school-level biology knowledge. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on the 25th (local time) that after OpenAI enhanced ChatGPT's performance, hundreds of requests worldwide asked for methods to produce or disperse toxins or biological weapons. The AI responded to some users with detailed guidance. For example, **users inquired about creating pathogens as aerosols (mist), engineering a measles virus variant resistant to the measles vaccine, and synthesizing ricin, a toxin banned by international treaties. ChatGPT provided answers to these questions.** Experts in biology and counterterrorism reviewed the conversations and found some responses accurate enough to be used for mass casualties. OpenAI blocked these accounts but did not report them to investigative agencies. The U.S. currently lacks laws mandating AI companies to restrict or disclose questions related to weapon manufacturing or safety-threatening plans. Decisions on which questions to allow and when to block accounts are left to corporate executives. The WSJ noted, "Attempts to ask for biological weapon manufacturing methods were made not only to OpenAI's ChatGPT but also to Anthropic's Claude, Google Gemini, and Elon Musk's Grok." Cisco researchers found that bypassing safety measures and extracting dangerous answers required only about five interactions with major AI chatbots.

AI companies have expressed support for regulating biological weapons. CEOs, including Sam Altman of OpenAI, recently urged Congress to legally mandate safety measures at the stage of ordering synthetic DNA/RNA. They proposed that synthesis companies verify the buyer's identity, purchase purpose, and the risk level of the genetic sequence to prevent easy access to genetic materials needed for actual synthesis, even if AI reveals design methods for dangerous pathogens.

However, overly broad restrictions on biology-related questions could hinder legitimate research, such as new drug development. For instance, Anthropic's Claude broadly rejected questions containing the word "pathogen," causing U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) employees to struggle with tracking a Hantavirus outbreak on a cruise ship in May.

The WSJ stated, "AI labs are grappling with ways to mitigate harm from malicious use without obstructing benign research-related inquiries."

Global Analysis of Military Terrorism: Incidents, Impact, and Trends from 1970 to 2020

Published online by Cambridge University Press: **23 March 2026**
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Volume 41, Supplement S1: 23rd Congress on Disaster and Emergency Medicine, March 2026, pp. s146
Source: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/prehospital-and-disaster-medicine/article/global-analysis-of-military-terrorism-incidents-impact-and-trends-from-1970-to-2020/5460ECB774FB82B1D2117E9CF5C086E7

Introduction

Military-targeted terrorism is a persistent global threat that affects national security and stability. This study analyzes the global trends, key perpetrators, and characteristics of terrorist attacks targeting military entities over five decades using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).

Methods

The GTD was utilized to extract incidents from 1970 to 2020, focusing specifically on attacks targeting military entities. Descriptive statistics were employed to identify trends in attack frequency, casualties, and the most active terrorist groups. The study classified incidents by attack and weapon types and assessed the impact across 102 countries and regions. Geospatial analysis was conducted to visualize the distribution of incidents and identify high-density regions using geographic information systems tools.

Results

From 1970 to 2020, there were 5,534 terrorist incidents targeting military personnel, causing 19,971 fatalities and 23,865 injuries globally. Activity showed significant fluctuations, with a notable rise after 2000. The Middle East & North Africa were the most affected region with 1,915 attacks (34.6%), followed by South Asia with 1,534 attacks (27.72%) and Sub-Saharan Africa with 808 attacks (14.6%). The most affected countries were Iraq (3,989 deaths, 5,132 injuries), Afghanistan (3,738 deaths, 4,470 injuries), and Syria (1,707 deaths, 1,709 injuries). Top terrorist groups, including the Taliban and ISIL, were responsible for many of these attacks. Bombings/explosions were the most common attack type, occurring in 3,138 incidents (56.70%), followed by armed assaults in 1,348 incidents (24.36%). Visual clustering identified potential hotspots, such as Baghdad, Mosul, and Fallujah in Iraq; Kabul in Afghanistan; and Maiduguri in Nigeria, with high fatalities.

Conclusion

This study highlights the ongoing and evolving threat of terrorism targeting military personnel. The findings stress the need for improved counter-terrorism strategies and greater international cooperation. By understanding historical trends and attack characteristics, policymakers and military strategists can develop more effective interventions to safeguard military personnel and assets.

Is it a chemical? Is it alive? Oversight in the coming era of synthetic cells could be complicated

By David Gillum and Peter A. Carr

Source: https://thebulletin.org/2026/07/is-it-a-chemical-is-it-alive-oversight-in-the-coming-era-of-synthetic-cells-could-be-complicated/

July 31 – From the smallest bacteria to blue whales and redwood trees, all life on Earth is composed of cells. Until now, evolution has shaped all cellular life through adaptation under selective pressures. This is about to change. In labs today, scientists are building life-like systems from scratch. These synthetic cells could someday be used in medicine, environmental cleanup, or manufacturing. Imagine spraying biosensing cells on a wall to test for hidden mold or swallowing a pill full of dehydrated cells that blossom

into an antibiotic treatment in the gut. Some synthetic cells will be designed to reproduce, others will not. Some may function more like a chemical than a typical organism.

These potential developments are yet to come; the field of synthetic cell biology is still young. In July, however, scientists at the University of Minnesota reported that they had produced functioning cells built from the ground up. The team reported that the cells reproduced for several generations, though they lacked some standard components of natural cells. The advent of synthetic cells has promoted speculative concern about future risks—cells that can outcompete natural life, say—but, for now, the technology raises more immediate questions: How long can such cells persist in the environment? Will they affect ecosystems or the human microbiome? Although the US government is engaged in the process of modernizing biosafety policies, current oversight practices remain ill-suited to regulating the production of synthetic cells. The technology will straddle scientific areas like chemistry and biology and regulatory domains such as environmental protection and human health.

We are co-authors of a recent report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine that analyzes where this technology may be headed, especially as regards its safety, security, and environmental implications. And as the Minnesota announcement makes clear, it's time for scientists and policymakers to get serious about answering the questions synthetic cell biology raises.

Why current rules don't fit

Biosafety oversight in the United States has been shaped by decades of experience with genetically engineered organisms and recombinant DNA. The rules in use today lay out a system for assessing risk, assigning laboratory containment levels, and reviewing experiments involving recombinant and synthetic DNA. At the core of that system is an approach that considers the source of genetic material, the characteristics of the organisms involved, and the risks associated with the proposed research. Synthetic cells challenge this approach. They can be built using DNA sequences that do not exist anywhere in nature, meaning there may be no natural source or behavior with which to compare a new cell. More broadly, whether a product contains DNA or not may not represent the biggest question mark when it comes to a proper risk assessment of synthetic cell technology. For example, though a hypothetical spray-on biosensor that detects mold might contain genetic material, it could be designed to not replicate or spread. Yet, under National Institutes of Health (NIH) guidelines and institutional biosafety review processes at universities and other facilities, the presence of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acids and the potential for replication are important considerations when determining the appropriate level of laboratory review and containment.

Putting aside the NIH's regulatory perspective, if that same biosensor were developed for use outside the laboratory, it would also raise environmental and public health questions that fall under other authorities. Could a synthetic cell system persist longer than intended? Could it spread beyond a target site? Might it produce unexpected byproducts or affect surrounding ecological processes? These are the questions that may matter more than slotting a synthetic cell system into an established regulatory category.

Oversight needs to follow function

Recognizing the challenges with regulating synthetic cell technology, the National Academies report recommends that the NIH, working with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies update and, where necessary, replace existing guidance, so oversight can better address rapidly advancing engineering biology and emerging technologies such as synthetic cells. An interagency working group should develop and apply such oversight tools consistently across agencies and stages of research and development.

Existing rules were developed at a time when chemicals and engineered organisms could be treated as separate categories. Core guidance like the NIH's *Guidelines for Research with Recombinant and Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules* was developed for an earlier generation of research practices, when most engineered biological systems fit more neatly into established categories. Synthetic cells, of course, can blur these lines. This creates challenges because different agencies evaluate different aspects of a technology at different points in its research and development lifecycle.

The NIH's current guidelines only govern research involving recombinant and synthetic nucleic acids in contained settings. Outside the laboratory, however, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the EPA, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) oversee genetically modified products according to their intended use and each agency's authority. Genetically modified crops provide an example of engineered biological products used outside containment, but synthetic cells may not fit neatly within existing regulatory pathways because they may not look anything like a conventional organism. A more practical approach to safety oversight of synthetic cells would start with how a system behaves, rather than how it fits into regulatory buckets. It would focus on a shared set of questions. How long does a system remain active? Can it spread? What environments will it encounter? What is it designed to do? An interagency working group could look at those issues uniformly and across applications and development processes making it easier to evaluate both risks and benefits. Consider a non-replicating synthetic cell designed to decontaminate soil. Regulators should ask if its genetic material

could persist or transfer to soil microbes, whether degradation produces harmful byproducts, how far the cells could move through soil or runoff, and whether they could be detected after release. A risk-benefit assessment could then link those findings to a specific decision: contained testing; a limited field trial with monitoring; or redesign, if persistence or spread cannot be adequately controlled. The NIH's guidelines provide an important framework for evaluating laboratory research involving recombinant and synthetic nucleic acids, but synthetic cells may raise questions that extend beyond laboratory biosafety. The goal should not be to create an entirely new regulatory system, but to harmonize existing environmental and biological oversight and make it more adaptive as synthetic cell technology evolves.

Time to act

Looking further ahead, some researchers are beginning to explore concepts involving non-traditional biochemistries and mirror-image biological systems, sometimes referred to as mirror life. A synthetic mirror bacterium, built with forms of DNA and proteins not found on Earth—should it escape containment—theoretically might evade some human and animal immune defenses and interact with natural ecosystems in unfamiliar ways. It might proliferate uncontrollably, consuming resources and outcompeting other life forms. While this is speculation, this example illustrates why governance discussions cannot wait until products hit the market. Bioengineering is increasingly reaching beyond the modification of existing organisms. Scientists will soon be building new systems with defined behaviors, programmable functions, and in some cases, built-in limits on how long they can persist or where they can operate.

As with many technologies, in the field of synthetic cell research, the tools are advancing quickly, while many of the systems used to evaluate them were built for a different era. The time to catch up is now.

David Gillum is associate vice president of compliance and research administration and adjunct faculty in the School of Public Health at the University of Nevada, Reno, as well as past president of the American Biological Safety Association International.
Peter A. Carr is a senior principal engineer at RTX BBN Technologies, where he leads research and development at the intersection of synthetic biology and national security. Prior to joining BBN, Carr worked from 2001-2023 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), first as a research scientist at the MIT Media Lab and then as a senior staff scientist at MIT Lincoln Laboratory. His research interests include genome engineering, combatting infectious disease, DNA synthesis and error correction, biomanufacturing, biocontainment, and biodefense. His research efforts have included developing new technologies for DNA synthesis and assembly, the engineering of an organism with a new genetic code, and advances in cell-free measurement. He has advised the US government on the promise and perils of synthetic biology in various capacities and was a founding member of the Synthetic Biology Center at MIT. He has served many roles with the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition. Carr received his bachelor's degree in biochemistry from Harvard University, and his Ph.D. in biochemistry and molecular biophysics from Columbia University. He was co-chair of the National Academies study committee producing the 2026 report Supporting Responsible Innovation of Synthetic Cells: Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Environmental Considerations.

"Rabbit fever" suspected in New York as rare illness resurfaces

Source: https://www.axios.com/2026/08/04/tularemia-rabbit-fever-new-york-tick-illness

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Aug 04 – Three suspected cases of the rare tick-borne illness tularemia, also known as "rabbit fever," have been identified on Long Island, Suffolk County health officials said Monday.

Why it matters: The rare illness can be caught while mowing your lawn and comes at a time when tick-borne illnesses are sharply rising in the United States.

Driving the news: "SCDHS currently has three probable cases of tularemia this year," Ryan DeFelippis, public relations director for the department, told Axios in an email.

- Full confirmation could take several weeks, the county told ABC 7 New York, since diagnosis requires testing and analysis.

Context: Tularemia is commonly spread through bites from infected ticks or flies, though people also can become infected through contact with infected animals.

- It cannot spread person to person.
- The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says people can be exposed to tularemia due to "bioterrorism." The pathogen has been prepared as a bioweapon by the U.S., Soviets, Japan, Britain and others.

By the numbers: Since 1984, there have been fewer than 315 cases of "rabbit fever" per year, the CDC says.

- Case numbers have been rising over the last few years, per national health data.

- Suffolk County has reported multiple cases of "rabbit fever" over the years, with four in 2024 and three in 2023, per the county's health data. Only one case was reported in 2022.
- Cases for the illness spike from May to September, per the CDC.

The big picture: Tick-borne diseases are becoming increasingly common in the U.S., with approximately 476,000 people treated for Lyme disease each year.



A 1972 photomicrograph shows *Francisella tularensis*, the bacterium that causes tularemia. Photo: P.B. Smith/CDC via Smith Collection/Gado/Getty Images

What is tularemia?

The CDC says tularemia is a "potentially serious illness" caused by the bacterium *Francisella tularensis*

- People can be infected if they're bitten by ticks — usually the American dog tick and the Lone Star tick.
- Someone can also get rabbit fever if they have any direct interaction with an animal sick with the illness, or if they drink water or inhale dust that's contaminated with the bacteria, according to the CDC.
- You can also get it from eating undercooked rabbit meat.

Zoom in: The illness is sometimes referred to as "deer fly fever," "wild hare disease" and "lawnmower tularemia."



What are "rabbit fever" symptoms?

Common symptoms for rabbit fever, per the Cleveland Clinic, include:

- Abdominal pain.

- Fever.
- Chills.
- Headache and muscle aches.
- Loss of appetite.
- Nausea and vomiting.
- Swollen lymph nodes.
- Other potential symptoms include pink eye, skin rash, sore throat, cough, diarrhea and confusion.

How is rabbit fever treated?

Doctors will often prescribe antibiotics that can kill the bacteria that causes the infection.

- Experts recommend seeking treatment as quickly as possible. Some doctors might prescribe antibiotics before test results for the disease return, which can ward off the more serious symptoms.
- People can recover without antibiotics, but severe complications could follow.

Steps to prevent the illness include using insect repellent, wearing gloves when handling sick animals, and avoiding mowing over dead animals, per the CDC.

What October 7 Taught Hospitals About Preparing for Modern Warfare

Source: https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20260806-what-october-7-taught-hospitals-about-preparing-for-modern-warfare

Aug 06 – When the first rockets began falling over southern Israel on the morning of October 7, 2023, staff at **Assuta Ashdod Hospital** activated a plan they had rehearsed for years. Within hours, the emergency department was treating waves of patients


Assuta Ashdod Hospital

suffering from gunshot wounds, blast injuries and burns—all while the hospital itself remained under rocket fire.

A new study led by Maximilian Nerlander, a Ph.D. candidate at Linköping University in Sweden and a visiting scholar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem's School of Public Health, offers one of the most detailed accounts yet of how a modern civilian hospital functioned during an unprecedented wartime emergency. The research was conducted together with Prof. Adam Rose, from Hebrew University of Jerusalem's School of Public Health, and Dr. Debra West of the Department of Emergency Medicine at Assuta Ashdod Medical Center. Based on in-depth interviews with

19 staff members, from the emergency department, as well as the head of trauma and disaster management, who worked during the October 7 attacks, the study provides practical lessons for hospitals around the world as many countries strengthen their

Wartime Mass Casualty Incident Plan Operation: Staff Experiences from a Civilian Hospital in Southern Israel on October 7, 2023

Published online by Cambridge University Press: **21 July 2026**

Maximilian P. Nerlander, Adam J. Rose and Debra Gershov West

Show author details

preparedness for large-scale armed conflict.

Unlike previous terrorist attacks in cities such as London, Paris or Boston, the October 7 assault unfolded over many hours, across multiple communities, while large parts of the surrounding region remained under active attack. Ambulances struggled to reach casualties, communications broke down, and hospital staff often had little understanding of the rapidly evolving situation beyond what they could piece together from patients, soldiers and social media.

Yet despite the chaos, the hospital continued to operate.

Researchers found that one of the greatest strengths was not sophisticated technology, but **preparation**. Years of frequent mass casualty drills meant doctors, nurses and support staff instinctively understood their roles, allowing them to focus on solving unexpected problems rather than basic procedures. The hospital's reinforced, missile-protected emergency department also enabled teams to continue caring for patients without needing to seek shelter, preserving both workflow and morale.

Assuta Ashdod Hospital

The Interviews also revealed weaknesses that only became apparent under real wartime conditions.

Many employees faced an impossible choice after being called simultaneously by both the military reserve system and the hospital. Others hesitated to leave home because their own families were in danger. Administrative personnel responsible for registering patients were unable to report to work, creating unexpected bottlenecks. Plans to relocate less critical patients out of the emergency department proved unworkable because other hospital areas were not protected against incoming rockets.

Perhaps most striking was the lack of reliable information. Emergency department staff often knew little about the broader situation outside the hospital, forcing them to rely on fragmented updates from military personnel, emergency responders, patients and even social media videos to anticipate what might arrive next.

The study also uncovered an unexpected consequence of the day's events. While some hospitals became overwhelmed with casualties, Assuta Ashdod's emergency department believed it could have safely treated many more patients. The finding suggests that future emergency planning should place greater emphasis on distributing casualties efficiently among hospitals during large-scale crises rather than allowing some facilities to become overloaded while others retain available capacity.

The findings arrive at a time when governments across Europe and North America are reevaluating civilian preparedness amid rising geopolitical tensions. Hospitals have traditionally planned for isolated mass casualty incidents such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters. The experience of October 7 demonstrated that prolonged warfare presents a different challenge altogether—one in which hospitals must continue operating while transportation, communications and emergency response systems are simultaneously under strain. "The lessons from October 7 extend well beyond Israel" said Prof. Adam Rose from the School of Public Health at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. "Our findings show that hospitals preparing for future conflicts need plans that account not only for treating casualties, but also for protecting staff, maintaining communication in rapidly changing situations, and adapting operational plans when reality departs from even the best rehearsed scenarios."

Dr. Debra West, who was ED Director at Assuta on October 7, added that "Unlike a conventional mass casualty event, a mass casualty event under fire disrupts every aspect of hospital operations, from patient flow and emergency department evacuation to staffing and the ability of personnel to work while their families are under threat. These experiences offer lessons beyond clinical care for hospitals preparing for disasters in which the healthcare system itself becomes part of the crisis."

"The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and October 7 were historical inflection points," notes Maximilian Nerlander, the lead author**.** "It is becoming increasingly evident that at some point in the future, other parts of the world will face the same type of high-intensity asymmetric warfare as Israel did on October 7. My hope with this study is that the tragedy of that day can be converted into knowledge that can save lives and avert suffering in the future, wherever it occurs."

The researchers conclude that future preparedness should include more realistic disaster drills that test complex logistical challenges, stronger coordination between civilian healthcare systems and military authorities, secure transportation options for healthcare workers during active conflict, and better mechanisms for sharing operational information among hospitals and emergency agencies. Although born out of one of Israel's darkest days, the study offers a practical blueprint for strengthening hospital preparedness in an increasingly uncertain world. As conflicts become more complex and civilian infrastructure is drawn into modern warfare, the experiences of frontline healthcare workers at Assuta Ashdod may help hospitals elsewhere prepare for crises they hope never to face.

Safety fears as scientists make first viruses designed by AI

By Ian Sample | Science editor

Source: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2026/aug/06/safety-fears-as-scientists-make-first-viruses-designed-by-ai

Aug 06 – Scientists have made the first viruses designed by artificial intelligence in a milestone that raises hopes for new medicines but also concerns over how to ensure the technology remains safe.

The viruses are specific kinds known as bacteriophages, which only infect bacteria and are used around the world to treat patients with persistent infections. In lab tests, a cocktail of the AI-designed viruses killed *E coli* bugs that were resistant to natural bacteriophages.

Dr Brian Hie, a chemical engineer at Stanford University in California, used genome language models, the genetic equivalent of the large language models behind AI chatbots, to design functioning genomes for bacteriophages. The viruses were then made in the laboratory and pitted against *E coli* in a dish.

The ability to "rapidly design" genomes and tune them for specific bugs while overcoming resistance could "transform phage therapy" and "expand biotechnological toolkits", the researchers wrote in the journal Science.

But beyond the potential benefits, the scientists said the work raised "important biosafety, biocontainment and biosecurity considerations" and urged others who were designing whole genomes to "consult both safety and security professionals throughout the project".

In an accompanying article, Prof Tom Inglesby and Dr Moritz Hanke at the Center for Health Security at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, reinforced the warning, writing: "Although this is promising for life sciences applications, it also raises urgent biosafety and biosecurity questions. The ability to compose viral genomes using generative AI now exists; the governance to safely steer it does not."

Hie and his colleagues used AI models called Evo1 and Evo2 to design the new viral genomes. The models were trained on genetic data from 2 million bacteriophages. The genetic code for viruses that can infect plants, humans or other animals was intentionally excluded from the AI's training to reduce the risk of it designing dangerous viruses.

The AI generated thousands of potential genomes from which the researchers selected nearly 300 to make in the lab. These were dropped into bacteria, which read the genetic code and churned out the new bacteriophages. The process was not efficient: only 16 bacteriophages proved to be viable, but a cocktail of them swiftly overcame resistance in two different strains of

E coli. Bacteriophage genomes are tiny, but Inglesby and Hanke said the work nevertheless proved that generative AI could create functioning viral genomes. Whether the same approach could be applied to other viruses was unknown, but they said work on pathogens that could infect humans, animals or plants should not be pursued.

"Such genomes might encode new pathogens that … cannot be contained by existing countermeasures," they wrote.

Tom Ellis, a professor of synthetic genome engineering at Imperial College London, said the work was impressive, but revealed how hard it would be to make more complex genomes. "This is literally the smallest and easiest genome to make," he said.

An AI trained on the genetic code of dangerous bugs could be used to design more harmful viruses, Ellis said, but controlling access to genetic data and having restrictions on making genomes that look dangerous would help. "Governments are working hard to do this already," he added.

"But honestly," he said, "the threat from full AI design and writing of a genome of a virus or bacteria is very overblown when we consider that just taking existing pathogens and making gain-of-function changes to their genomes is so much easier and much more likely to be a real pathogenic threat."

Dr Filippa Lentzos, a reader in science and international security at King's College London, said the most important point to intervene at the moment was when DNA was being manufactured. "It's important to see the bigger governance picture and not focus regulation solely on the AI model," she said. "A layered approach makes more sense: safeguards around model development and access, responsible research review, synthesis screening, and established laboratory biosafety and biosecurity."

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Is scientific ego bigger than global security?

First mRNA flu vaccine has been approved for US adults

Source: https://newatlas.com/infectious-diseases/first-mrna-flu-vaccine-us/

Apr 06 – In a somewhat surprise announcement, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved the first US influenza vaccine built on Moderna's mRNA technology that gave us one of the most administered COVID-19 shots during the pandemic. Known as mFlusiva (mRNA-1010), the vaccine marks a first for the US but comes with some caveats as to who will have access to it for the upcoming flu season. Adults over 50 will qualify, with those aged 65 and over receiving accelerated approval based on immune responses. Access for those aged 65 and over remains dependent on an ongoing clinical trial assessing specific needs of this demographic.

The announcement came on Wednesday, August 5 – which happens to be exactly a year since Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. cut around US$500 million of funding for 22 research projects into mRNA vaccine development.

And as of writing, we're unable to actually use the FDA as a source as there's no news of the vaccine to be found on the agency's site.

What people may not know is that this is not the world's first mRNA flu jab; in April, Moderna was given the green light in Europe for its combined COVID-19 and influenza vaccine, mCombriax. "Looking ahead, we expect mFluvisa to be available in the United States for eligible adults during the 2026–2027 respiratory virus season," Moderna said in a statement. The FDA voted unanimously to make mFluvisa available for those in the 50-64 age bracket based on the drug's most recent Phase 3 results.

It demonstrated it was 26.6% more effective, compared with current influenza vaccines, and had earlier met all safety thresholds. Side effects were shown to be in line with current flu shots, with symptoms like fatigue, headache and nausea the most reported. Despite influenza being a major killer worldwide, vaccine technology hasn't changed a great deal.

And there have been issues with adapting seasonal vaccines when expected strains surprise us with unexpected mutations. As we've

covered many times, mRNA vaccine technology is well suited to be quickly adapted for emerging flu strains, potentially putting us in a proactive rather than reactive position each season.
And no, there are still no nano-robots in mRNA vaccines designed for mind control; the nanoparticles used as vectors in these biologics deliver the instruction manual to the immune system so it can create virus-specific antibodies. These nanoparticles are then quickly flushed out of the body.
Nonetheless, mFlusiva looks set to remain restricted to all but a small – but vulnerable – segment of the US population for the time being.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: I am young (67); I can wait 10 years to see how safe is the new intervention 😊

Ethnic Bomb

By the Editor



Ethnic bombs — more formally discussed in academic and policy literature as ethnic or genetic bioweapons — occupy a controversial and largely speculative space at the intersection of biotechnology, military strategy, and ethics. While the idea has circulated in political discourse, media, and conspiracy narratives, its scientific feasibility, historical grounding, and ethical implications remain deeply contested. This essay critically examines the concept, its theoretical mechanisms, prevention frameworks, ethical evaluation, and prominent alleged cases.

Conceptual Definition and Theoretical Basis

An "ethnic bomb" refers to a hypothetical weapon designed to selectively target individuals of a particular ethnic group based on genetic characteristics. In scientific terminology, this is often described as an ethnic bioweapon, a subtype of biological weapon intended to exploit genetic differences between populations.

The concept relies on advances in genomics, particularly the identification of population-specific genetic markers. In theory, such a weapon would deploy pathogens or toxins engineered to interact with genetic traits more prevalent in a targeted group. However, modern genetics complicates this premise: human populations are genetically overlapping rather than discrete, and intra-group variation often exceeds inter-group differences. Consequently, many scientists argue that the precision required for such targeting remains beyond current capabilities.

Mechanisms: How It Is Hypothetically Done

The proposed mechanisms behind ethnic-targeting weapons typically fall into three categories. First, genetically engineered pathogens[8] could be designed to bind to receptors or biological pathways associated with certain alleles that are more common in a population. Second, gene-editing technologies, such as CRISPR[9], might theoretically be used to activate or suppress genes in a targeted group. Third, pharmacogenomic targeting[10] could involve substances that disproportionately affect individuals with specific metabolic profiles.

Despite these theoretical pathways, implementation faces major scientific barriers. Genetic overlap among populations means that any such weapon would likely affect unintended groups, undermining both its strategic utility and controllability. This has led many experts to regard the concept as closer to speculative science fiction than operational reality.

Historical Background

The notion of ethnically targeted weapons emerged during the late twentieth century, particularly in the context of post–Cold War anxieties about biotechnology. Discussions intensified in the 1990s as genomic research expanded and fears grew about the militarization of biological science.

Military and strategic writings in various countries have occasionally referenced the theoretical possibility of "genetic attacks." For instance, Chinese military-related publications have discussed the idea of "specific ethnic genetic attacks" as a future domain of warfare, though such references are generally framed as speculative or defensive concerns rather than confirmed programs.

Parallel to these developments, international organizations such as UNESCO and the Red Cross raised ethical concerns about genetic weapons, emphasizing their incompatibility with humanitarian law and the risk of uncontrollable consequences.

In 1997, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen referred to the concept of an ethnic bioweapon as a possible risk[11]. In 1998, some biological weapon experts considered such a "genetic weapon" plausible and believed the former Soviet Union had undertaken some research on the influence of various substances on human genes[12].

In its 2000 policy paper Rebuilding America's Defenses, think-tank Project for the New American Century (PNAC) described ethnic bioweapons as a "politically useful tool" that US adversaries could have incentives to develop and use[13].

The possibility of a "genetic bomb" is presented in Vincent Sarich's and Frank Miele's book *Race: The Reality of Human Differences*, published in 2004. These authors view such weapons as technically feasible but unlikely to be used[14].

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[8] van Aken J, Hammond E. Genetic engineering and biological weapons. New technologies, desires and threats from biological research. *EMBO Rep*. 2003;4 Spec No (Suppl 1): S57-S60. Available from https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1326447/

[9] CRISPR: A Biotech Breakthrough. US National Science Foundation. Available from https://www.nsf.gov/impacts/crispr

[10] Adams, J. (2008) Pharmacogenomics and personalized medicine. Nature Education 1(1):194. Available from https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/pharmacogenomics-and-personalized-medicine-643/

[11] W. Cohen (1997-04-28). "Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and U.S. Strategy". Sam Nunn Policy Forum, University of Georgia. Archived from the original on 2004-11-18. Available from https://web.archive.org/web/20041118074748/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/1997/t042897_t0428coh.html

[12] Interview of Dr Christopher Davis, UK Defense Intelligence Staff Archived 2017-06-15 at the Wayback Machine, *Plague War*, Frontline, PBS, October 1998. Available from https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/interviews/davis.html

[13] T. Donnelly. Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century". September 2000. Available from https://web.archive.org/web/20130817122719/http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf

[14] Foster MW. Race: The reality of human differences. *J Clin Invest*. 2004;113(12):1663. Available from https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC420514/

In 2004, *The Guardian* reported that the British Medical Association considered bioweapons designed to target certain ethnic groups as a possibility, and highlighted problems that advances in science for such things as "treatment to Alzheimer's and other debilitating diseases could also be used for malign purposes"[15].
In 2005, the official view of the International Committee of the Red Cross was "The potential to target a particular ethnic group with a biological agent is probably not far off. These scenarios are not the product of the ICRC's imagination but have either occurred or been identified by countless independent and governmental experts.[16]"
In May 2007, it was reported that the Russian government banned all exports of human biosamples[17]. The reason for the ban was allegedly a report by the head of FSB Nikolay Patrushev presented to Vladimir Putin. The report claimed that the ongoing development of "genetic bioweapons" was targeting the Russian population by Western institutions. About 28 thousand Russians were involved in related clinical studies.
In 2008, the US government held a congressional committee, 'Genetics and other human modification technologies: sensible international regulation or a new kind of arms race?', during which it was discussed how "*we can anticipate a world where rogue (and even not-so-rogue) states and non-state actors attempt to manipulate human genetics in ways that will horrify us*[18]".
In 2012, *The Atlantic* wrote that a specific virus that targets individuals with a specific DNA sequence is within possibility in the near future. The magazine put forward a hypothetical scenario of a virus that caused mild flu to the general population but deadly symptoms to the President of the United States. They cite advances in personalized gene therapy as evidence[19].
In 2016, *Foreign Policy* magazine suggested the possibility of a virus used as an ethnic bioweapon that could sterilize a "genetically related ethnic population.[20]"

Reported and Alleged Examples

Israel and the "Ethno-Bomb" Allegation[21,22,23,24,25]

One of the most widely cited claims emerged in 1998, when media reports alleged that Israel was developing an "ethno-bomb" targeting Arabs. However, subsequent analysis revealed that the story likely originated from a fictional scenario circulated by an academic, and many scientists dismissed the idea as implausible given genetic similarities between Jewish and Arab populations.

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[15] Adam, David (28 October 2004), "Could you make a genetically targeted weapon?" The Guardian (October 28, 2004). Available from https://www.theguardian.com/science/2004/oct/28/thisweekssciencequestions.weaponstechnology
[16] Internation Humanitarian Law Databases. ICRC. Available from https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-3/commentary/2025
[17] Russia Meets Human Specs. КОММЕРСАНТЪ (May 30, 2007). Available from https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/769777
[18] Ethnic-bioweapons: between conspiracy and reality. The Badger (May 08, 2018). Available from https://thebadgeronline.com/2018/05/ethic-bioweapons-conspiracy-reality/
[19] A. Hessel, M. Goodman, and S. Kotler. Hacking the President's DNA. The Atlantic (November 2012). Available from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/hacking-the-presidents-dna/309147/
[20] Lyman Stone. The Chinese Communist Party Wants a Han Baby Boom That Isn't Coming. Foreign Policy (June 30, 2020). Available from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/30/chinese-communist-party-han-baby-boom-sterilization-ethnic-minorities/
[21] Report: Israel wants 'ethno-bomb'. UPI (November 15, 1998). Available from https://www.upi.com/Archives/1998/11/15/Report-Israel-wants-ethno-bomb/9752911106000/
[22] John Steinbach. Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Available from https://www.wagingpeace.org/israeli-weapons-of-mass-destruction-a-threat-to-peace/
[23] Israel's Ethnic Weapon? Wired (November 16, 1998). Available from https://www.wired.com/1998/11/israels-ethnic-weapon/
[24] Kit Klarenberg. Israel's secret, illegal biological war against Arabs. The Cradle.co (October 25, 2022). Available from https://thecradle.co/articles/israels-secret-illegal-biological-war-against-arabs
[25] U. Mahnaimi and M. Colvin. Israeli Professor: "We Could Destroy All European Capitals". Reddit (November 15, 1998). Available from https://www.reddit.com/r/Israel/comments/7sj4h/israeli_professor_we_could_destroy_all_european/

Thus, this case is generally regarded in scholarly literature as an example of misinformation or exaggerated reporting rather than evidence of an actual weapons program.

Apartheid South Africa

During the apartheid era, South Africa pursued extensive chemical and biological weapons research under programs such as *Project Coast*[26]. While there have been allegations that the regime explored methods to target Black populations specifically, concrete evidence of a functional ethnic weapon has not been substantiated.

Available documentation instead confirms broader weapons research and controversial collaborations, including alleged ties with Israel on military technologies, though claims about ethnically targeted systems remain speculative and disputed.

China and the Uyghur Population

In contemporary discourse, the case of China's policies toward the Uyghurs is sometimes framed in terms of "demographic engineering[27]" rather than ethnic weaponry. Reports indicate large-scale detention, forced sterilization, and birth control measures in Xinjiang, which have led some observers to characterize these actions as genocidal[28] or crimes against humanity.

However, these policies do not involve biological weapons in the technical sense. Instead, they represent state-driven social and demographic control mechanisms, illustrating how the idea of "ethnic targeting" can extend beyond weaponry into broader governance practices.

Other Allegations and Conspiracy Theories

The concept of ethnic bombs has also appeared in conspiracy theories involving various states, often fueled by mistrust of biotechnology and geopolitical rivalries. These narratives frequently lack empirical evidence and are amplified by media speculation or online discourse.

Scholarly consensus generally treats such claims with caution, distinguishing between theoretical discussions in military or scientific contexts and unverified allegations of actual deployment.

One additional context often mentioned is Cold War–era research within the Soviet Union's biological weapons program, particularly under Biopreparat. Some analysts have speculated that Soviet scientists explored population-specific vulnerabilities as part of broader genetic and epidemiological research. However, declassified materials and testimonies from defectors (such as Ken Alibek[29]) do not confirm the successful development of ethnic-specific weapons. Rather, the focus remained on enhancing virulence, resistance, and delivery of conventional biological agents.

Similarly, in the United States, military and intelligence communities have occasionally examined the theoretical implications of genomics for warfare. Reports commissioned by bodies like the U.S. Department of Defense have acknowledged that future advances in genetics *could* raise the possibility of targeting populations, but these discussions are framed in terms of risk assessment and prevention rather than active development.

In the post-9/11 era, catalyzed by the 2001 anthrax attacks, concerns about bioterrorism led to renewed attention on genetic targeting. The latter has evolved along two distinct, yet parallel, tracks: forensic identification for disaster management and, more

[26] Robert Berold. Project Coast : apartheid's chemical and biological warfare programme. UN Digital Library. Available from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/481899?v=pdf

[27] Kasim, M. (2025). Demographic engineering and identity erasure: China's securitization of the Uyghur population. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, pp.1–21. Available from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2025.2580516

[28] Vijay Prashad and Tings Chak. The Idea of the 'Uyghur Genocide' and the Realities of Xinjiang. Monthly Review, Vol. 77, No. 11 (April 2026). Available from https://monthlyreview.org/articles/the-idea-of-the-uyghur-genocide-and-the-realities-of-xinjiang/

[29] Jonathan B. Tucker. Biological weapons in the former Soviet Union: An interview with Dr. Kenneth Alibek. The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1999. Available from https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/alibek63.pdf

controversially, the theoretical, dual-use potential of genetically-driven weapon systems[30,31]. Some extremist or fringe discussions have speculated about tailoring pathogens to specific populations, but there is no verified case of such capabilities being operationalized. Most of these claims fall into the category of conjecture or misinformation rather than documented programs.

Can Current AI and Biotechnology Make Ethnic Bombs Realistic?

Artificial intelligence, especially when combined with advances in genomics and synthetic biology, is indeed transforming biomedical research. Systems developed by organizations like DeepMind[32] (e.g., protein-folding models[33]) or gene-editing tools such as CRISPR have dramatically accelerated our ability to understand and manipulate biological systems. AI can assist in modeling protein structures, predicting pathogen behavior, and optimizing drug design.

However, translating these capabilities into a functional "ethnic bomb" faces several persistent barriers. First, genetic non-discreteness[34] remains a fundamental obstacle. Human populations do not have clean genetic boundaries. Traits associated with ethnicity are probabilistic and widely shared across groups. Any agent designed to target one group would almost certainly affect others, including the population deploying it. Second, biological complexity limits precision. Diseases are rarely governed by single genes; they involve complex interactions among multiple genes and environmental factors. AI can model these interactions, but not with the level of deterministic control required for selective lethality. Third, delivery and containment challenges remain unsolved. Even if a partially selective agent were engineered, ensuring it spreads only within a target population and does not mutate or spill over would be extremely difficult.

That said, AI does lower certain barriers. It can accelerate discovery cycles, reduce the expertise needed to manipulate biological systems, and enable more sophisticated modeling of genetic variation. This raises legitimate concerns within biosecurity communities about dual-use research[35], where tools developed for beneficial purposes (e.g., medicine) could be misapplied.

Risk Assessment and Ethical Implications in the AI Era

The growing convergence of AI and biotechnology has led organizations such as the World Health Organization and various national academies to call for stronger governance of synthetic biology and genomic data. The concern is not that ethnic bombs are imminent, but that the direction of technological progress increases the importance of oversight. Ethically, the integration of AI into biotechnology intensifies existing dilemmas. The possibility, however remote, of designing population-targeted agents underscores the need for strict norms around data use, research transparency, and international cooperation.

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[30] Michelle Taylor. Forensic Panel Details Lessons Learned from 9/11 Attacks. Forensic (September 15, 2021). Available from https://www.forensicmag.com/579260-Forensic-Panel-Details-Lessons-Learned-from-9-11-Attacks/

[31] R. Pilch, J. Luster, M. Pomper, and R. Shaw. Scientific Risk Assessment of Genetic Weapon Systems. CNS Occasional Paper #52 (September 2021). Available from https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/scientific_risk_assessment_genetic_weapon_systems06_cover.pdf

[32] DeepMind is a British-American artificial intelligence (AI) research laboratory which serves as a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc. Founded in the UK in 2010, it was acquired by Google in 2014 and merged with Google AI's Google Brain division to become Google DeepMind in April 2023. The company is headquartered in London, with research centers in the United States, Canada, France, Germany, and Switzerland.

[33] Y. Wang, J. Lu, N. Jaitly, et al. SimpleFold: Folding Proteins is Simpler than You Think. arXiv:2509.18480v1 [cs.LG] (2025). Available from https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/simplefold

[34] MBC. Rivera. Human Variation in Biological Anthropology Today. LibreTexts. Available from https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Courses/Fresno_City_College/ANTH-1%3A_Explorations_2nd_Edition/13%3A_Race_and_Human_Variation/13.03%3A_Human_Variation_in_Biological_Anthropology_Today

[35] Biosecurity and Dual-Use Research in the Life Sciences. In: Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World: A Report Based on Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities. National Research Council (US) Committee on a New Government-University Partnership for Science and Security. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2007. Available from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11496/

Prevention and Management

The primary framework for preventing the development and use of ethnic bioweapons lies in international law, particularly the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)[36], which prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents for hostile purposes.

In addition, advances in biosecurity governance, genetic data protection, and dual-use research oversight aim to reduce the risk that genomic science could be weaponized. Scientific communities also promote ethical guidelines to ensure that research in genomics and biotechnology is not misused.

Transparency, international cooperation, and monitoring of biotechnology research are widely regarded as essential to preventing such weapons from becoming feasible.

Ethical Status

From an ethical perspective, ethnic bioweapons represent one of the most extreme violations of humanitarian principles. They would constitute a form of genocide by design, directly targeting populations based on identity.

Such weapons would violate core norms of just war theory[37], including discrimination and proportionality, as well as international human rights law. Furthermore, their development raises concerns about scientific responsibility, particularly regarding the dual-use nature of genetic research.

Even at the level of speculation, the idea of ethnic targeting in warfare has been widely condemned as morally unacceptable.

Conclusion

The concept of "ethnic bombs" occupies a complex space between scientific possibility, political rhetoric, and ethical alarm. While advances in biotechnology have made the idea more conceivable in theory, significant scientific barriers and ethical constraints limit its practical realization.

Historical cases often cited as examples, such as Israel, apartheid South Africa, and China, demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between verified programs, speculative research, and misinformation. At present, there is no confirmed instance of a functioning ethnic bioweapon.

AI does not fundamentally solve the core scientific barriers that have historically made ethnic bombs impractical. However, it does accelerate biological research in ways that could, over time, make certain aspects of targeted intervention more feasible. For this reason, the idea of ethnic weapons has shifted from being largely theoretical to being a long-term biosecurity concern, demanding vigilance rather than immediate alarm.

Nevertheless, the concept remains a powerful reminder of the potential misuse of genetic science and underscores the need for robust international oversight, ethical vigilance, and critical evaluation of claims in both academic and public discourse.

Artificial Intelligence, Ebola, and the Rising Threat of Jihadi Bioterrorism

By Steven Stalinsky, PhD

Source: https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/artificial-intelligence-ebola-and-the-rising-threat-of-jihadi-bioterrorism

Aug 10 – The recent spread of the Ebola virus recalls the early days of COVID-19, when terrorist organizations considered leveraging a global health crisis for attacks. Today, the threat landscape is more complex. Artificial intelligence (AI) now gives extremists shortcuts to technical guidance, biological research, and attack planning that did not exist when COVID emerged. MEMRI extensively researched the COVID-era threat over the course of three years and published the most comprehensive study on this subject to date. While Ebola is still very difficult to weaponize, there is a possibility that it

[36] The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Act 2004. Available from https://bwcimplementation.org/sites/default/files/resource/MU_Biological_and_Toxin_Weapons_Convention_Act.pdf

[37] S. Miller. Just War Theory. EBSCO (2024). Available from https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/military-history-and-science/just-war-theory

could become another weapon in the terrorist arsenal – and AI could help them overcome some of the challenges involved. At the same time, it was reported just yesterday that Stanford University researchers have used AI to create the first viruses unknown in nature. Project leader Brian Hie said, "Our study is a proof of concept showing for the first time that generative design can generate entire functional genomes."

Jihadis are surely already asking AI platforms how Ebola might be weaponized or spread. Testing by the MEMRI Cyber Jihad Lab (CJL) research team found that Grok, ChatGPT, and Perplexity refused to answer directly, offering only general information – although ChatGPT offered to explain, at a high level and without operational details, why some pathogens are considered more suitable for weaponization than others. Claude immediately flagged the conversation, while DeepSeek was willing to discuss the topic in greater depth. The range of responses underlines a real challenge: Despite efforts by AI companies, protections remain inconsistent, as extremist interest grows.

(Image: MEMRI Cyber Jihad Lab (CJL))

AI Pioneers Warn About AI And Biological Weapons

The WHO's declaration of the Ebola epidemic as a "global emergency" on May 18 coincides with security officials' increasing alarm about the risk of AI use to devise new methods for biological attacks. Experts have been warning for years that as AI technology advances, so do the risks of its misuse in bioterrorism. Most recently, Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates stressed in his January 2026 annual letter that "today, an even greater risk than a naturally caused pandemic is that a non-government group will use open source AI tools to design a bioterrorism weapon."

At the Nobel Prize banquet in December 2024, computer scientist Geoffrey Hinton, often called "the Godfather of AI," warned that "in the near future, AI may be used to create terrible new viruses and horrendous lethal weapons that decide by themselves who to kill or maim." He emphasized that "these short-term risks require urgent and forceful attention from governments and international organizations."

After testifying before Congress in May 2023, OpenAI CEO Sam Altman called AI's ability to design new biological threats "scary." He noted two years later, at a July 2025 Federal Reserve conference, that the risk was growing and that despite warnings, "the world is not taking us seriously."

Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei warned at a July 2023 hearing of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law that "a straightforward extrapolation of today's systems… suggests a substantial risk that AI systems will be able to fill in all the missing pieces, enabling many more actors to carry out large-scale biological attacks." This, he added, "represents a grave threat to U.S. national security."

Mustafa Suleyman, cofounder of DeepMind and now CEO of Microsoft AI, echoed these concerns in a November 2023 PBS interview. He explained that AI means "you don't need to have the same undergraduate level skills in biology to be able to synthesize a new dangerous compound" because "you've got this intelligent aide" guiding you, "reducing the barrier" to causing "chaos."

Even earlier, in September 2022, former Google CEO Eric Schmidt said that the biggest concern with AI "is actually going to be… its use in biological conflict." He added: "There is a general concern that the database of viruses can be expanded greatly by using AI techniques" to "generate new viruses."

Jihadi Interest In AI And Biological Attacks

Battle-hardened jihadis in Africa who have garnered the attention of the U.S. military for their systematic targeting of Christian villages and slaughtering of their inhabitants are using AI, as Cambridge University terrorism and technology researcher Dr. Antonia Juelich wrote in a paper published by the university. Over the past two years, the MEMRI Cyber Jihad Lab (CJL) has also documented their increasing use of AI.

There has also been an uptick in jihadi chatter about biological attacks in the West. For example, on May 29 and June 1, 2026, users on an encrypted platform favored by ISIS supporters discussed ways to obtain biological toxins. One even

wrote that he was looking for documents "on how to extract ricin, kill them silently, how to make phosphene gas PH3, how to extract poisonous plant, botulinum toxin, etc" and asked, "If someone has access, can you send it to me."
The Islamic State (ISIS) openly announced its intent to spread disease and epidemics among its enemies. The May 21, 2026 issue of its *Al-Naba'* weekly featured an infographic titled "Types of Wars" that included biological warfare using "poisons and viruses."

AI Ricin Guides, Inadequate Chatbot Safeguards, And Thwarted Bioterror Plots – A Toxic Brew

Reports published this summer showed why AI must be part of the bioterrorism conversation. They found that major chatbots, including OpenAI's ChatGPT, provided step-by-step instructions for manufacturing ricin and other biological weapons that a high school student could follow. Experts said these instructions were accurate enough to be used for actual mass-casualty attacks. OpenAI blocked the accounts involved, but did not report them to law enforcement, citing a lack of clear legislation in this regard. Although the AI industry is calling for mandatory safeguards at the synthetic genetic material ordering stage, critics warn that excessive regulation could hinder legitimate research, including the development of new drugs.
This bioterror risk isn't just theoretical. Two months earlier, in May 2026, India's National Investigation Agency charged three men in an alleged ISIS-linked plot to use ricin in a mass poisoning attack. Authorities say the suspects conspired with foreign ISIS handlers to make ricin, procure weapons. Move funds through covert operations, recruit supporters, and target crowded places to cause mass casualties. One of the suspects, a Hyderabad doctor, was alleged to have established a home laboratory to manufacture ricin; according to authorities, he had been promised the position of ISIS "Amir" of South Asia in return for executing the terror plot.

COVID-19's Exposure Of Vulnerabilities As A Blueprint For AI-Era Bioterrorism

The COVID-19 pandemic changed how governments think about disease and national security, and shapes how they view the Ebola crisis today. The UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Directorate – and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres – have acknowledged that the pandemic's exposure of critical vulnerabilities in our health systems, supply chains, and crisis response mechanisms has provided a blueprint for bad actors to exploit. In the AI era, those vulnerabilities matter even more: supply-chain gaps, public panic, and weak biological defense protocols can be studied – and potentially exploited – much faster and more easily.Counterterrorism officials should also consider how jihadis viewed the pandemic as a model, brainstorming ways to further spread it across the West – as MEMRI extensively documented at that time during that period.In a March 2020 memo, then-U.S. Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey A. Rosen informed federal law enforcement and U.S. attorneys that certain actions involving the "biological agent" coronavirus – including "the purposeful exposure and infection of others" – would be prosecuted as terrorism. He added: "Threats or attempts to use COVID-19 as a weapon against Americans will not be tolerated." At that time, officials saw that ISIS was expressing more interest in weaponizing the coronavirus. Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Michael Nagata, former strategy director at the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, observed that although "the U.S. counterterrorism community has long held that the use of a biological agent of some kind for a major terrorist attack is not a matter of if, but when," terrorists would likely provide early warning by first failing several times. This warning is even more urgent today: With AI-assisted reduction of the time, expertise, and experimentation needed to move from intent to action, this warning is required to move from intent to attempted execution. Biosecurity expert Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, who served as commanding officer of the UK Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Regiment and NATO's Rapid Reaction CBRN Battalion and is currently a senior advisor to the UK Ministry of Defence on CBRN, said that ISIS and Al-Qaeda had "experimented with bioweapons but found chemical [weapons] much easier to make" – but that COVID-19 had "brought the world to its knees – and is a huge neon advert to every dictator, despot, rogue state and terrorist who would do us harm." Also in 2020, UK-based counterterrorism expert David Otto stressed that "nothing [is] stopping an ISIS sympathizer or an ISIS fighter infected with COVID-19 from going around and infecting more people in the name of jihad" in order to "force a lockdown, weaken Western economies, and punish countries that would have to treat these infected individuals." The key, he said, was "extreme preventive vigilance against biological warfare… [T]errorists are looking at ways to turn this global pandemic into a gain to suit their perceived goals – how they can launch attacks that would have a more significant impact at a time when most countries are focused on tackling the coronavirus."

Ebola, Conflict Zones, And AI-Enabled Jihadi Opportunities

Counterterrorism officials are warning that the jihadi threat in Africa could also endanger U.S. interests, especially if jihadis use AI to try to exploit Ebola. The convergence of the Ebola outbreak, the systemic vulnerabilities exposed by COVID-19, local terrorism, and increasingly accessible AI tools has accelerated the humanitarian and security crisis in Central Africa.
The difficulty of containing epidemics in conflict zones could play into the hands of terrorists. A report in June outlined

the challenges facing international and government health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Areas of particular concern are in the east of the country, including Ituri province where a particularly deadly strain of the virus is spreading and the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continues to murder civilians amid clashes with Ugandan troops, and Goma province, where Rwanda-backed M23 rebels control major cities.

While bioterrorism scholars note that Ebola is a poor choice for a mass-casualty bioweapon since it is spread mainly through direct contact, Ebola research is nevertheless closely monitored by security agencies. The principal concern is a low-tech "suicide-infected" scenario – extremists deliberately infecting themselves to spark a localized outbreak. AI does not make Ebola easier to weaponize, but it could help identify vulnerabilities, refine scenarios, and mimic technical language that previously required specialized expertise.

COVID-19 Exposed Jihadi Intent – AI Raised The Stakes

Long before COVID-19, the 2018 White House National Biodefense Strategy stated that "a number of terrorist groups have sought to acquire biological weapons." During the COVID-19 pandemic, MEMRI research found that the idea of deliberately spreading infection, primarily to enemies of Islam, featured prominently in online jihadi discussions on Telegram channels and other platforms – and that this was viewed favorably by many of the most influential sheikhs – key drivers of global jihad – as well as jihadi organizations. Now, AI adds a dangerous new dimension, with the potential ability to merge wishful thinking and fragments of technical information into coherent guidance. Many jihadists openly celebrated the virus. *Balagh*, a monthly magazine published in Idlib, Syria, by pro-Al-Qaeda clerics, called it "one of Allah's soldiers" and the "corona-soldier." Jihadi writer Khalid Al-Sibai warned on the Thabat News Agency's Telegram channel that this "tiny soldier," which had so devastated the U.S. and its allies, could soon be joined by actual jihadi soldiers. On Hamas's Al-Aqsa TV, Imam Jamil Al-Mutawa boasted that Allah had "sent just one soldier," the virus, that "has hit all 50 states" in the U.S. and driven Israel into lockdown – adding the claim that it had left Palestinians largely unaffected. Adilly Shoukat, a jihadi based in the West, speculated in April 2020: "[W]hat if you wanted someone to die… And [you] contract the corona virus on purpose and deliberately get in close contact to someone you want wiping out and it kills them. Is this classed as murder/man slaughter?"

A "Lockdown Special" issue of the ISIS English-language magazine *Voice of Hind* released in In May 2020, informed Muslims that one way to "keep yourselves armed at all times to never miss a chance to kill as many Kuffar as you can" was to "spread COVID virus among as many Kuffar as possible." This, it said, should be in addition to "keep[ing] chains, ropes, and wires ready to choke them or beat them to death."

New York-based Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood activist Bahgat Saber, in a video posted in March 2020 on his Facebook page, urged people infected with the coronavirus in Egypt to go to public institutions to spread it to those "who work for Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi's government." He exhorted them: "The moment you get flu-like symptoms… go to the public prosecution office that is closest to your house… If you can, go to a building of the Security Investigations Service, and if you can't, just wait for them and sneeze on their cars when they pass by… Casually walk into a police station, an office of the public prosecution, or to a courthouse. If you are a soldier, you can go into the defense ministry, and shake hands with all the generals of the military and the police. The same is true with the justice system… If you have contracted coronavirus, you should exact revenge!" He added: "If I am infected, I will go to the Egyptian consulate here."

Fighters were also encouraged to infect others. Syrian jihadi commander and "military trainer" Al-Asif 'Abd Al-Rahman suggested on his Telegram channel in March 2020 that Iran could use "alive or dead" coronavirus patients as a biological weapon, much like the Mongols in the 13th century who catapulted plague victims into Feodosia, now in Crimea. Warning fighters that "when the battle starts… those captured or killed might be among those infected with the coronavirus," he explained: "There is no doubt… [that] the Iranian occupier will deliberately send patients infected with the virus to lead the attack, under the motto 'martyrdom is more rewarding than dying of the coronavirus and reaping no benefit.'"

Counterterrorism officials on the front lines of fighting ISIS have actually stopped multiple plots. The Iraqi Interior Ministry warned that ISIS "is striving to recruit members who have contracted the coronavirus" and to disperse them across Iraq, "especially in the southern regions [populated mainly by Shi'ites] and in Shi'ite religious sites, and to use them as human biological bombs."

In April 2020, media reported that Tunisian counterterrorism authorities had thwarted a terrorist plot to infect security forces by coughing, sneezing, and spitting on them and that two suspects had been arrested.

Conclusion

The evidence from the COVID-19 period demonstrates that jihadi interest in spreading disease is neither theoretical nor new. What has changed is the technological environment. AI now gives extremist actors a tool that can lower technical barriers, organize scattered information, generate plausible scenarios, and accelerate the path from curiosity to attempted action. Combined with synthetic biology and persistent instability in jihad-affected regions such as Central Africa, AI creates a threat landscape in which even pathogens that are difficult to weaponize can be explored, discussed, and exploited for terror,

disruption, and propaganda. The COVID-19 pandemic clarified that jihadi interest in disease as a weapon is neither theoretical nor new. What is different today is how technology is changing the landscape. AI gives extremist actors tools to overcome technical hurdles, connect scattered bits of information, generate scenarios, and move more quickly from ideas to action. When combined with developments in synthetic biology and ongoing instability in regions where jihadis operate, AI makes it easier for to explore, discuss, and exploit even pathogens that are difficult to weaponize for propaganda, social disruption, and terror attacks. Six years after the arrival of COVID-19, a new virus could become even more deadly in the hands of jihadis using new tools such as AI. The spread of Ebola in conflict zones where jihadis are active is more than a public health emergency. In the AI age, it also is a warning for counterterrorism and biosecurity elements. The biggest risk isn't that AI will suddenly make pathogens easier to weaponize, but that it can help determined individuals think more strategically and move more quickly to find more vulnerabilities that once required specialized knowledge.

Warning that "[m]any risks require serious attention" in a July 28 op-ed for *The Wall Street Journal* titled "The AI Future Is For Everyone," Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg underlined that for "biological risks, more coordination between governments and other institutions on responsibly deploying capable models will be helpful." Monitoring jihadi discourse, strengthening AI safeguards, improving reporting requirements, and integrating public health with counterterrorism planning are now essential to preventing the next biological

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AI Can Now Design Viral Genomes. America Needs a Biosecurity Wake-Up Call.

By Robert Maginnis

Source: https://washingtonstand.com/article/ai-can-now-design-viral-genomes-america-needs-a-biosecurity-wakeup-call

Aug 10 – In 1998, I sat in a restored castle on a Swiss mountainside with an international group that included military and intelligence professionals. Antique armor and weapons surrounded our meeting room, giving it the feel of a medieval war council. But our subject was anything but ancient: biological warfare.

Dr. Joseph D. Douglass Jr., coauthor with Neil C. Livingstone of the 1987 book "America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare," briefed us on the Soviet biological-weapons program and allegations involving other communist regimes. His descriptions of what governments might do with pathogens — and what some were alleged to have done in secret — were sobering.

I left Switzerland convinced that biological warfare represented one of mankind's darkest capabilities. But there was also a practical barrier: sophisticated biological weapons demanded scientists, laboratories, money, and specialized expertise. Twenty-eight years later, artificial intelligence may now be weakening that barrier.

The New York Times reported that researchers at Stanford University and the Arc Institute have used genome-language models to design complete viral genomes — essentially, the full genetic instruction set that tells a virus how to build itself and function. These were bacteriophages — viruses that infect bacteria, not people. The researchers used nonpathogenic E. coli and deliberately excluded human viral sequences from the model's training data. Of 285 designs experimentally tested, 16 produced functioning phages. Some combinations of AI-generated phages even overcame bacterial resistance that defeated the natural virus used as their starting point. The peer-reviewed research was published in Science.



This was not a biological-weapons experiment. It did not create a human pathogen, nor does it show that today's AI systems can design one. The medical promise is obvious: such tools could eventually help scientists develop new treatments against antibiotic-resistant infections. But an important threshold has been crossed. Artificial intelligence is no longer limited to analyzing biological information or proposing individual components. It can now help design a complete viral genome that, when synthesized and tested, can yield a functioning virus.

The significance is not that biological warfare suddenly became easy. It is that developing a usable biological weapon has historically been extraordinarily difficult.

The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo offers a useful warning against exaggeration. It had trained scientists, considerable financial resources, and sophisticated laboratories. Yet its attempts in the early 1990s to cause mass casualties with botulinum toxin and anthrax failed. Creating a dangerous biological agent is only the beginning of the problem. A would-be attacker must also acquire or design it, produce it reliably, weaponize it, keep it viable, and deliver enough of it to the intended target. Records of the program show that even Aum's unusually well-resourced effort encountered serious problems producing virulent agents and dispensing them effectively.

Artificial intelligence does not suddenly erase those obstacles. The danger is that it may begin removing them one by one.

That concern is no longer confined to futurists. A June open letter signed by leading AI figures — including Nobel laureate Demis Hassabis, OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, and Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei — along with prominent experts in the life sciences and national security, warned that AI systems can already outperform Ph.D.-level virologists on some highly technical laboratory questions. The signatories acknowledged that evidence regarding the immediate biosecurity threat remains mixed. But they also warned that AI could progressively erode the technical knowledge barriers that have historically constrained terrorists and other bad actors.

For terrorists, that is troubling. Someone lacking years of specialist training may increasingly be able to obtain from an AI system sophisticated biological knowledge that once required considerable expertise to acquire.

But the state threat may be even more consequential.

An April 2026 RAND study, based on workshops with more than 50 experts in artificial intelligence and CBRN defense, warns that advanced AI could enable more sophisticated capabilities for both state and non-state actors. It also cautions that state-based threats remain underappreciated even as catastrophic non-state scenarios draw most of the attention. Its experts concluded that AI could lower technical barriers and accelerate development across the pathway from biological research to operational capability. A terrorist starts with limited money, expertise, and infrastructure. A hostile government may already possess trained scientists, secure laboratories, genomic databases, synthesis equipment, intelligence services, and military delivery expertise. Artificial intelligence does not need to create that machinery. It only needs to make an existing program faster, cheaper, more capable, or harder to detect. I have watched this danger develop across my recent books on artificial intelligence. In "AI for Mankind's Future," I warned that AI could place sophisticated biological knowledge within reach of people lacking specialist training. In "The New AI Cold War," I described AI-assisted biological design challenging traditional DNA-synthesis screening. The latest research appears to mark another step: from biological information, to biological design, to complete viral genomes that function in the laboratory. The answer is not to stop this research.

The same technology that raises the threat could also strengthen our defenses. RAND points to AI-assisted biosurveillance, faster vaccine and medical-countermeasure development, better detection, and improvements in forensics and attribution. But Washington should act while useful chokepoints still exist. Congress should require screening and recordkeeping for synthetic nucleic-acid orders, verification of customers, and appropriate safeguards for equipment capable of producing those sequences. Digital biological designs eventually have to become physical material, making synthesis one of the clearest places to detect suspicious activity. Those safeguards already have unusually broad backing from leaders in AI, biotechnology, biosecurity, and national security. Government must distinguish among lone actors, terrorist organizations, less-capable states, and sophisticated state programs rather than treating "AI bio-risk" as one problem. And the people building frontier models need sustained, secure relationships with intelligence, counterterrorism, and biodefense professionals who understand weapons-of-mass-destruction pathways. RAND identifies precisely those institutional gaps. Finally, America should race to secure the defender's advantage — using AI to detect outbreaks earlier, develop countermeasures faster, improve attribution, and make biological attacks more difficult, less effective, and less deniable.

For Christians, there is another issue. Scientific knowledge is not evil, and technology that saves lives should be welcomed. But possessing the power to do something has never meant mankind ought to do it. Scripture warns that "whatever one sows, that will he also reap" (Galatians 6:7, ESV) — and no laboratory result exempts a researcher, a company, or a nation from that reckoning.

A machine may design. Man must still answer for what is built. In that Swiss castle nearly three decades ago, biological warfare seemed to belong to a frightening world of secret laboratories, governments, and highly trained specialists. That world has not disappeared. What is changing is the technology available to those who would enter it.

Artificial intelligence has not made biological weapons easy. But it may be weakening barriers that once made them extraordinarily difficult.

The time to strengthen those barriers is before today's biological breakthrough can be turned into tomorrow's weapon.

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Virus reactivation in acute and long COVID-19

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Abstract

Chronic viral infections are ubiquitous in humans, with individuals carrying multiple viruses that can reactivate during physiological stress, including severe illness[1]. Notably, SARS-CoV-2 infection has been shown to reactivate chronic viruses such as Epstein–Barr virus and cytomegalovirus, yet the full extent, temporal dynamics and immunological impact of viral reactivation in COVID-19 remain incompletely understood[2,3,4,5,6,7]. Here, leveraging multi-omic longitudinal data from 1,154 hospitalized patients with COVID-19 from the Immunophenotyping Assessment in a COVID-19 Cohort (IMPACC) study, we reveal significant reactivation of *Herpesviridae* and *Anelloviridae* during acute COVID-19, with distinct temporal dynamics for different viruses, and demonstrate that reactivation correlates with disease severity, host immune effects and clinical outcomes. Although our results do not establish causation between virus reactivation and clinical outcomes, we highlight the prevalence of chronic viral reactivation during acute COVID-19 and long COVID. Our findings

challenge the prevailing view that chronic viral reactivation is primarily a consequence of immunosuppression, demonstrating that reactivations occur frequently in immunocompetent individuals during severe illness and in association with increased systemic inflammation. Additionally, we demonstrate persistence of viral reactivation in convalescence, and report an association of *Anelloviridae* with long COVID. This study provides immune, transcriptomic and metabolomic signatures of viral reactivation that could inform future strategies to prognosticate and treat acute COVID-19 and long COVID.

Associations between chronic viral reactivation and long COVID.



a, Percentage of participants belonging to each PRO group for participants grouped by detected viruses in the acute COVID-19 period. The virus-negative group comprises participants who exhibited no viral reactivation for any virus in the acute period, whose rate of total long COVID is indicated by the dashed grey line and serves as the baseline reference. **b**, Percentage of each PRO group that had viral transcripts detected for *Anelloviridae* in the PBMCs or enteroviruses in the upper airway via RNA-seq, in any of their convalescent samples. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Statistical significance calculated using a linear mixed effects model with immunosuppressed status due to medications, trajectory group, sex, age quintile, and virus detection status included as main effects and enrolment site as a mixed effect; *P* values were adjusted with Benjamini–Hochberg corrections. **c**, Top hypergeometric enriched pathways (determined via lowest adjusted *P* values) from differentially expressed genes associated with *Anelloviridae* in convalescent samples reveal a similar signature of *Anelloviridae* during acute COVID-19 (shown in Extended Data Fig. 9g). Results in **c** were calculated using hypergeometric enrichment of pathways from Reactome, separately on the positive and negative differentially expressed genes. rRNA, ribosomal RNA.

A U.S. Strategy to Prevent the Creation of Mirror Life

Source: https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20260813-a-u-s-strategy-to-prevent-the-creation-of-mirror-life

Aug 13 – *Mirror life* is a hypothetical form of life built from biomolecules with the opposite chirality—or molecular orientation—of those used by all known life on earth. Although mirror life does not yet exist, scientific advances have produced mirror-image biomolecules and components that could serve as the building blocks of mirror organisms, and some laboratories have articulated the goal of constructing a viable mirror cell. Experts estimate that mirror life could become a reality within the next few decades.

The reversed molecular orientation of mirror life could enable mirror bacteria to escape immune detection and cause fatal infections, resist degradation, avoid natural predators, and proliferate throughout natural ecosystems. Even a small initial population of mirror organisms could potentially spread widely, causing irreversible biological disruption.

The authors of a new report from RAND develop a comprehensive, preventive strategy to address the risks posed by the creation of mirror life before scientific progress or geopolitical incentives close the window for meaningful action. They take seriously the expert assessment that mirror life could expose much of the earth's biosphere to unacceptable risks, and they treat this possibility as sufficient motivation for strategic planning now.

Key Takeaways

- Mirror life is a governance challenge without precedent; even earlier crises, such as pandemics and widespread conflict, do not compare with the potential catastrophic effects of the creation of mirror life.
- Despite the almost incomprehensible risks that might result from mirror life's creation, some scientists may nonetheless pursue it.
- Actors might be motivated to pursue the creation of mirror life if they reject the scientific concerns about its dangers, believe that risks can be controlled, or assume that mirror life could function as a controllable biological weapon.

- Action to prevent the development of mirror life must occur *before* the first mirror organism exists because the first successful experiment might also mark the point at which containment and defense become impossible.
- Adaptive governance provides little protection because there are few reliable early warning signs, and reactive governance is ineffective because once a mirror organism exists, prevention of the harm that it could cause may become impossible.
- The creation of mirror life by *any* actor could pose a global catastrophic risk; thus, the motivations and capabilities of all actors must be considered, not just those of adversaries or competitors.
- Given globally available materials and distributed scientific capabilities, secrecy is infeasible and destabilizing. Transparency enables trust, reduces miscalculation, and supports broad cooperation.
- Durable prevention requires engagement with major scientific powers, especially those seen as strategic competitors. Exclusively allied or bloc-based approaches risk provoking the very competition that must be avoided.

Recommendations

- In a first line of effort, the United States should engage scientific superpowers, especially China, to build the foundation for collective restraint. Policymakers and the scientific community should prioritize transparent scientific collaboration, shared risk assessments, and early norm-setting.
- For the second line of effort, the United States should promote collective restraint across domestic, allied, and global scientific communities. This involves combining incentive-reducing measures with monitoring, verification, and other early-stage deterrence tools.
- The United States should take great caution with actions or statements that could foster mistrust or spur strategic competition in the field of mirror life or its enabling technologies.
- The United States must commit clearly to not developing mirror life, even if other actors are suspected of pursuing it.
- U.S. policymakers should advance actions that require long lead times, such as legislation, treaties, and international engagement, in parallel.
- U.S. policymakers should also treat countermeasures and resilience as constrained contingencies.

Acurx Pharma's DNA Polymerase IIIC inhibitor antibiotics receive Japanese & Mexico patents

Staten Island, New York
Friday, August 14, 2026
Source: https://www.pharmabiz.com/NewsDetails.aspx?aid=187919&sid=2

Acurx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a late-stage biopharmaceutical company developing a new class of small molecule antibiotics for difficult-to-treat bacterial infections, announced that the Japan Patent Office and the Mexico Patent Office, respectively, have each granted a new patent which covers Acurx's DNA Polymerase IIIC inhibitors including compositions-of-matter, methods of use, and pharmaceutical compositions, which further strengthen Acurx's intellectual property portfolio and represent the most recent addition to the company's expanding series of granted patents in the US and abroad. To date, Acurx has secured six US patents and an additional ten patents internationally, including Australia, Canada, Europe, Israel, India, Japan, Korea, and Mexico, all of which protect key aspects of the company's ibezapolstat and the ACX-375C programme targeting DNA Polymerase IIIC. Additional country-level patent applications remain under review.
David P. Luci, president and chief executive officer of Acurx, stated: "Achieving these additional new patents extends our patent estate protection as we further develop ibezapolstat and our innovative, AI-supported drug discovery platform."
Robert J. DeLuccia, executive chairman of Acurx, stated, "We believe Acurx's ibezapolstat and preclinical pipeline of systemically absorbed antibiotics has the potential to create a transformational shift in the treatment paradigm of certain serious and potentially life-threatening infections without promoting antibiotic-induced gut dysbiosis. These infections include C. difficile, acute bacterial skin and skin-structure infections (ABSSSI, including MRSA), Community-acquired bacterial pneumonia (CABP), hospital and/or ventilator-associated bacterial pneumonia (HABP/VABP), bacteremia with or without sepsis and/or infectious endocarditis, bone/joint infections, prosthetic joint infections and inhalational anthrax, caused by B. anthracis, a Bioterrorism Category A Threat-Level pathogen."
Acurx Pharmaceuticals is a late-stage biopharmaceutical company focused on developing a new class of small molecule antibiotics for difficult-to-treat bacterial infections. The company's approach is to develop antibiotic candidates with a Gram-positive selective spectrum (GPSS) that blocks the active site of the Gram+ specific bacterial enzyme DNA polymerase IIIC (pol IIIC), inhibiting DNA replication and leading to Gram-positive bacterial cell death. Its R&D pipeline includes antibiotic product candidates that target Gram-positive bacteria, including Clostridioides difficile, methicillin- resistant

Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE), drug- resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae (DRSP) and **B. anthracis** (anthrax; a Bioterrorism Category A Threat-Level pathogen)

AI-Designed Viruses Are a Test of Whether Biosecurity Can Keep Pace

By Tuck Seng Wong and Kang Lan Tee

Source: https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20260815-ai-designed-viruses-are-a-test-of-whether-biosecurity-can-keep-pace

Aug 15 – Scientists have crossed an important line in biological engineering. In a recent study, researchers used artificial intelligence to design complete sets of genetic instructions for bacteriophages, viruses that infect bacteria. Some of those computer-generated designs produced working viruses when they were built and tested in the laboratory. These viruses were designed to infect bacteria rather than people. The researchers worked with bacteriophages that target E. coli, and one of the AI models they used, Evo 2, was developed with safety restrictions. Its developers excluded viruses that infect organisms such as animals, plants and humans from the data used to train it.

Even so, the experiment raises an important question: if AI becomes increasingly able to help design biological systems, are our safeguards developing fast enough?

As engineers working in vaccine manufacturing and public health security, we see good reasons to continue this research. Bacteriophages could potentially be used to treat bacterial infections, including those that are becoming harder to treat with antibiotics. But advances in biological design also create new challenges for biosecurity.

Genome language models work in a broadly similar way to AI language models that learn patterns in text. Instead of learning from words and sentences, they learn patterns in genetic code. Evo 2, for example, was trained on trillions of DNA building blocks taken from many different forms of life.

This gives researchers a powerful new way to study biology and generate possible DNA sequences. It also means that part of biological design can now happen on a computer, before anything has been made in a laboratory.

An AI-generated DNA sequence is still several steps away from becoming a real biological threat. A digital design has to be turned into physical genetic material, assembled correctly and tested under the right laboratory conditions. Each of those stages also creates an opportunity to reduce risk.

One safeguard can be built into the AI model itself. The developers of Evo 2 deliberately removed viruses that infect humans and other similar organisms from its training data for safety reasons. Their research found that the model performed poorly when tested on proteins from viruses that infect humans.

Such precautions will need to be tested and strengthened as AI tools for biology become more capable. Researchers have already argued that AI and biosecurity need to be considered together, so that safeguards develop alongside new capabilities.

Another checkpoint comes when digital DNA is turned into physical DNA. Companies that manufacture DNA to order can check both the requested genetic sequence and the person or organization ordering it for potential security concerns. Researchers working on DNA synthesis screening have argued for common international approaches as this technology becomes more widely available.

Screening may also need to become more sophisticated. A system designed mainly to recognize DNA that resembles known dangerous pathogens may struggle if AI produces something genuinely new. Recent research on identifying "sequences of concern" has therefore considered what a genetic sequence might do, as well as whether it resembles one already linked to a dangerous organism.

Laboratories and research institutions provide another layer of protection. Potentially risky research can be assessed before experiments begin, including questions about how biological material will be contained, who will have access to it and whether the expected benefits justify the risks.

Research funders can also influence how security risks are managed. UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), for example, has established a Trusted Research and Innovation team to help researchers and institutions identify and manage security risks in collaborative research.

Public health preparedness belongs in this discussion too. If biological design becomes faster and more accessible, health authorities will need to be able to detect and investigate unusual outbreaks quickly. The Metagenomics Surveillance Collaboration and Analysis Program (mSCAPE), led by the UK Health Security Agency, analyses genetic material from samples to help detect and track emerging pathogens.

The program is not specifically designed to find AI-created viruses. But its approach is relevant because scientists do not have to know exactly which pathogen they are looking for in advance. Systems capable of detecting unusual or previously unseen organisms could become increasingly valuable as biological technologies develop. Preparedness also means being able to develop diagnostic tests, treatments and vaccines quickly when a new threat appears.

In our view, one of the biggest weaknesses in global biosecurity is that countries are not equally

prepared. Some already have established systems for identifying and responding to biological risks, while others are still developing them. We see a similar gap in vaccine regulation, where countries vary considerably in their ability to assess new products. Biological threats can cross borders, so effective preparedness will depend on strengthening these capabilities internationally. There are difficult trade-offs. Heavy restrictions can slow useful research, including work aimed at understanding disease or developing treatments. Weak safeguards can allow scientific capability to develop faster than the systems intended to prevent misuse.

Open science makes this harder. Evo 2 was released openly, including the code and technical information needed for other researchers to use and develop it. Openness can accelerate discovery and widen access to powerful research tools. But once such tools are widely distributed, controlling how they are used becomes harder.

No single safeguard can deal with all of these risks. Biosecurity will need to operate at several stages, from how biological AI models are developed and released to DNA screening, laboratory oversight and public health preparedness.

The recent bacteriophage study does not show that AI can design a pandemic virus. What it shows is significant enough: AI can already help design complete viral genomes that work when they are physically created.

We have an opportunity to decide what responsible safeguards should look like while this technology is still developing. Waiting for more dangerous capabilities to emerge would leave scientists, governments and public health systems trying to develop protections after they are already needed.

AI is beginning to change what humans can design in biology. Our ability to govern that power needs to develop alongside it.

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The Smallpox Chiefs: Bioterrorism and the Exercise of Power in the Pacific Northwest.

By Lutz, John Sutton; Carlson, and Keith Thor

Western Historical Quarterly, 2024, v. 55, n. 2. P. 87 1 of 3

Source: https://www.ebsco.com/articles/public-health/459d8e12-3dd5-5a58-9c20-58b80a57e825/the-smallpox-chiefs-bioterrorism-and-the-exercise-of-power-in-the-pacific-northwest/



Abstract

This article examines the use of bluff threats involving smallpox as a deliberate strategy of bioterrorism by European traders and settlers in the Pacific Northwest between 1811 and 1864. Although these threats were hollow—since the perpetrators lacked the means to intentionally spread smallpox—they were highly effective due to Indigenous cosmologies that understood illness as a form of spirit sickness inflicted by malevolent intent, and because of prior devastating smallpox epidemics in the region. The bluff threats served multiple purposes, including securing trader safety, coercing trade, and punishing Indigenous behavior, and were occasionally employed by Indigenous individuals as well. These threats contributed to Indigenous fear, manipulation, and weakened resistance, thereby facilitating settler colonial expansion, while also underpinning enduring Indigenous beliefs that some smallpox outbreaks were deliberately caused by settlers. The article highlights the importance of recognizing bluff threat bioterrorism as a significant, though often overlooked, aspect of colonial power dynamics in the Pacific Northwest.

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