

I
C
I

2 CBRNE



April 2023

*Dedicated to Global
First Responders*

DIARY

PART B

**Giga CBRNE challenges
in giga GCC projects**

ICI
International
CBRNE
INSTITUTE



DIRTY R-NEWS



What to do about the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

By Amy J. Nelson and Chinon Norteman

Source: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/03/23/what-to-do-about-the-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant/>



Mar 23 – Since it was seized by Russian military forces a year ago, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in eastern Ukraine has lost external power six times. Following the latest outage, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Mariano Grossi, issued an emotional call to action, warning that it is only a matter of time before a disaster occurs. Given the fact that Zaporizhzhia sits on the frontline of a war zone, what can be done to prevent catastrophe?

On September 30, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed Moscow had annexed the Zaporizhzhia region. So far, power outages have been handled by sourcing electricity from a [coal-fired thermal power station and diesel generators](#). But if the final remaining power line from the national grid is damaged, on-site diesel generators cannot cool fuel in each of the plant's six reactors in the long term. Should these backup generators fail, the subsequent loss of coolant could trigger a fuel meltdown. And as power outages, shelling, and even [kidnappings](#) of Ukrainian plant operators continue, that risk is escalating.

Zaporizhzhia is different from prior nuclear power plant crises for two main reasons. First, Russia's weaponization of Zaporizhzhia is entirely novel. Never has a nuclear power plant been used as a nuclear shield (manipulated to protect Russian troops and military hardware), and never has a country threatened to co-opt a plant by siphoning power back into its own grid. Second, this new situation is occurring against the backdrop of an ongoing dispute over the plant's ownership, bringing up issues over which country is responsible for its safety. Grossi likely knows a coordinated international response isn't imminent. Prior power plant crises reveal that solutions are slow to arrive — even during peacetime. As such, he is appealing directly to Ukraine and Russia, calling on the two countries to agree to a demarcated demilitarized zone around all power plants, including Zaporizhzhia, with limited success.

Previous Power Plant Crises

Though the current crisis is unique, nuclear power plant crises are only rare — not unprecedented. In 1979, a power surge caused radioactive material to leak at [Three Mile Island](#) in the United States. Following this crisis, the U.S. nuclear industry [created](#) the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, tasked with fostering safety and reliability in nuclear power plant operations.

In 1986, another sudden power surge caused a severe radiation leak at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine (then part of the Soviet Union). Although the first four years post-crisis were confined to responses at the [national level](#), Chernobyl ultimately resulted in the [creation](#) of multiple international [safety conventions](#), two [Codes of Conduct](#), and the [IAEA's Safety Standards](#). In 2011, an earthquake-triggered tsunami interrupted the power supply to Japan's Fukushima nuclear power plant. [Three reactors](#) melted down, leading to a series of explosions and yet another [radiation](#) leak. Immediately following the crisis, the IAEA's Incident and



Emergency Care Centre [sent](#) experts and launched radiation protection and data collection efforts. Three months later, the IAEA hosted a [Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety](#), leading to the [IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety](#). In the aftermath of Fukushima, the European Union brought Ukraine into a [program](#) to assess and improve reactor safety. Ensuing efforts directly affected Zaporizhzhia: Western governments and industry accelerated upgrades to the plant's reactors, attempting to prevent similar natural disasters from destabilizing the infrastructure. Unsurprisingly, the nuclear reactor crisis-response pattern and recent IAEA action plan for Zaporizhzhia offer no guidance for how to deal with nuclear facilities that are located in or near a battlefield, even though nuclear reactors have been caught up in conflicts before. In 1991, the [Slovenian nuclear power plant](#), Krsko, was threatened by the Yugoslav Air Force. Operators determined that putting the plant into cold shutdown mode was the best way to minimize risk to the public. In this mode, experts surmised Krsko could sustain the loss of all off-site power and cooling long enough to implement other emergency responses. In 1981, Israel conducted an [airstrike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear research reactor](#), which was linked to a research facility Israel suspected of developing nuclear weapons. Ten years later during the first Gulf War, [allied bombers attacked two Iraqi nuclear research reactors](#), one of which was fully operational and had built up a [radioactive inventory](#). Although there were no significant radiological consequences from either attack, in both cases, the facilities were safeguarded by the IAEA — demonstrating that compliance with the IAEA's rules offers no protection against hostile actions during combat operations.

While global governance initiatives have improved the safety of nuclear power plants, these solutions are first and foremost a response to genuine accidents. And in cases where nuclear power plants were wrapped up in conflict, little was done by multilateral institutions to protect the facilities during wartime or prevent their use to shield troops and military equipment. Any other efforts at international regulations for nuclear power plants concerned the prospect of their use for nuclear terrorism. The current crisis is none of these.

Whose Responsibility?

Zaporizhzhia remains in danger in part because of its disputed ownership — a byproduct of the war. According to the [United Nations](#), “nuclear safety is the responsibility of every nation that utilizes nuclear technology.” Since its occupation of the plant on March 5, 2022, Moscow has designated it as Russia's “federal property,” created a state-run enterprise to oversee operations, and funded the plant's management with a meager [500,000 rubles](#) (about \$6,500). But while Russian forces control the plant on territory that Moscow allegedly has annexed, Kyiv maintains that the plant and territory are Ukrainian, a position supported by virtually the entire world. This power struggle has raised questions about who is responsible for maintaining the plant's safety and security.

The IAEA has been able to conduct intermittent inspections of Zaporizhzhia, but inspections — which are [intended](#) to collect information upon which safety recommendations can be made — and precautionary measures can only do so much against an unpredictable accident. In previous crises like Fukushima, disaster was ultimately mitigated not necessarily through preventative policies, but through an emergency response system refined by historical examples like Chernobyl. Zaporizhzhia benefits from this history, having received structural and system-based reinforcements as a result of prior crises. As the threat of shelling continues, these reinforcements are providing added durability. Although the Zaporizhzhia crisis might be the first of its kind, it draws on a legacy of equally frightening instances that make a path forward possible, if not immediate.

Mark Hibbs has [suggested](#) that the safest option for the plant is to shut down all reactors, depressurize circuits, and remove fuel until the war is over. Zaporizhzhia could also be placed into cold shutdown mode indefinitely, as was done for Krsko.

Yet neither solution speaks to the motivations that Russia and Ukraine have for keeping the plant operational. Both have a reason to engage in shelling, just as both have an incentive to regain control and use the plant's power for themselves. This, combined with the ongoing conflict for control over the plant, means that the Ukrainian-Russian cooperation required for managing risks is elusive. As it stands, Zaporizhzhia was placed in a cold shutdown in [September 2022](#). Operators have since restarted two reactors in [hot shutdown mode](#), producing low levels of power to keep the plant operational. Perhaps this is why the IAEA has proposed a “protection zone” for Zaporizhzhia, in which both Ukraine and Russia would agree to refrain from firing at the plant, and heavy weapons would be removed from the area. Grossi correctly recognizes that an agreement of this nature must come from both countries and that their cooperation is essential to move toward any measure of stability. Yet the Zaporizhzhia crisis cannot be categorized into a binary in which one side seeks to threaten or destroy another state's power plant during wartime. Nor can previous examples of nuclear accidents fully apply to a situation in which the potential for an accident is entirely human-made. Instead, Zaporizhzhia currently sits between two warring parties who disagree on who should control it. Moreover, the global governance system, which requires a baseline level of cooperation if it has any hope of devising a new system to protect the security and safe operation of a nuclear power plant, is ill-suited to resolving the situation. As long as the war persists and Ukraine and Russia continue to jockey for control, disaster unfortunately looms large on the horizon.

The Zaporizhzhia crisis has highlighted the lack of international regulations governing nuclear power plants in wartime. Typically, international regulatory responses to nuclear power plant crises have taken time — time we don't currently have. Future regulations must address not only the reality that nuclear power plants can be targeted in war, but that this targeting might involve hostage-style exploitation. They must also



simultaneously offer parameters through which to establish ownership, or at least prescribe an understanding of responsibilities in contested nuclear spaces. The best way to support Grossi and avoid a nuclear disaster is to foster cooperation that lays the groundwork for the kind of regulation the current and potential future crises require — and now.

Zaporizhzhia Power Plant Timeline

The power to the plant has been cut or lost six times since Russia's invasion in February of 2022.

2022

Since March 5:

Russian forces have occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

Since August:

Russia has also been refusing to demilitarize the plant.

August 5:

Forces shelled the nuclear plant and damaged parts of a nitrogen-oxygen unit and a high-voltage power line (both Russian and Ukrainian forces blamed each other).

August 13:

Ukraine's military intelligence alleges Russian forces shelled Zaporizhzhia.

August 20:

Moscow announced IAEA officials would be allowed to visit and inspect the plant.

August 25:

Zaporizhzhia was disconnected from the electricity grid; the mayor of Enerhodar (the town nearest the plant) blamed "energy shelling" for the disruption in electricity and water.

September 5:

Fire caused by shelling knocked the plant off all external transmission lines, and the sixth reactor began operating at reduced output ("island mode" a stopgap measure).

September 6:

The IAEA reported that Zaporizhzhia was sustainable in a report based on its inspection.

September 9:

Offsite electricity supply destroyed by shelling.

September 11:

All six reactors were shut down, with two prepared for restart, which comes with risk. This "cold shutdown" was accomplished by inserting control rods into the fuel to stop the cascade of nuclear reactions that produce the heat required to make steam for power generation. While this was in response to Russian military actions that had repeatedly cut external power supplies to the plant, it takes months/years to fully stop nuclear reactions from occurring.

October 5:

Two of Zaporizhzhia's reactors in cold shutdown were prepared for "hot shutdown" en route to lower power operation. This entails raising the temperature, which increases pressure, which forms steam in the generators.

October 17:

Russian shelling caused Zaporizhzhia to lose its external power supply, forcing the plant to run on emergency diesel generators (according to Ukraine's state nuclear energy company).

November 20:

Shelling caused over 12 explosions in the Zaporizhzhia area (damaging buildings, systems, and equipment — none threatened nuclear security).

2023

February 10:

The IAEA released a statement from the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine, saying it would "only permit [Zaporizhzhia] to resume power-generating operations after it had been returned to the control of Ukraine and a thorough inspection programme and the implementation of any measures deemed necessary to restore the plant to safe working conditions have been completed."

Amy J. Nelson is a David M. Rubenstein Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology

Chinon Norteman is a Research Assistant - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology





Survey of Iran's Advanced Centrifuges - March 2023

By David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso

Source: <https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20230324-survey-of-iran-s-advanced-centrifuges-march-2023>

Mar 24 – The [Institute for Science and International](#) security has just released an [updated survey](#) of Iran's advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges.

Here are the Survey's "Background" and "Findings" sections:

Background

- ❖ This report summarizes and assesses information in the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) quarterly report for February 28, 2023, *Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)* and the quarterly safeguards report for March 4, *NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran*.
- ❖ Iran continues to deploy advanced centrifuges at its three enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow in violation of the limitations outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
- ❖ In the event of a revival of the JCPOA, under rules embodied in the existing JCPOA, Iran would be permitted to mothball its advanced centrifuges, shortening Iran's potential breakout timeline and increasing its ability to build up its capability should the deal collapse or once enrichment capacity restrictions phase out starting in 2025.
- ❖ Since February 2021, Iran has not provided declarations about its production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes, bellows, and rotor assemblies or allowed IAEA verification, as specified in the JCPOA. While data and recordings were collected by IAEA surveillance equipment up until June 2022, the IAEA has not had access to those data and recordings, and since June 2022, when Iran removed the cameras, no such recordings exist. Consequently, the IAEA has had no ability to take inventory.
- ❖ Iran has been producing near 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) in advanced centrifuge cascades since April 2021.

Findings

- ❖ Since the last quarterly report in November, based on data in the most recent quarterly report, Iran installed 1248 advanced centrifuges, all at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). Of these, 1044 are IR-2m centrifuges, organized in six cascades. The rest were IR-4 centrifuges, in one cascade.



- ❖ Overall, Iran has 12,994 centrifuges installed at all three of its enrichment plants; 5763 advanced centrifuges of various types and 7231 IR-1 centrifuges.
- ❖ Between February 2022 to February 2023, Iran nearly tripled its annual deployment of advanced centrifuges to over 3500 advanced centrifuges deployed during that time span, compared to the deployment of about 1200 advanced centrifuges observed between February 2022 and February 2021, which itself was double that from the year prior, February 2020 to February 2021, during which roughly 500 advanced centrifuges were deployed.
- ❖ Iran now has over 3700 IR-2m centrifuges installed, which exceeds not only the 1000 IR-2m centrifuges installed prior to the JCPOA, but also the 3000 IR-2m centrifuges planned prior to the JCPOA. The origin of the newly deployed IR-2m centrifuges could not be determined. They may have been produced since 2018 or produced prior to 2016. In the former case, Iran may have greatly expanded its advanced centrifuge production rate. In the latter case, Iran would have retrieved them from a secret storage location not declared under the admittedly loose rules of the JCPOA. The latter case would confirm a long-held suspicion that prior to the JCPOA, Iran had manufactured 3000 IR-2m centrifuges for installation at the FEP but only installed about 1000 of them, hiding the rest.
- ❖ In November 2022, Iran announced its plan to install 14 IR-6 centrifuge cascades at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant Fordow (FFEP), where six IR-6 cascades would replace six currently operating IR-1 centrifuge cascades, and result in a total of 16 IR-6 cascades, or 2656 IR-6 centrifuges, at Fordow. The installation of these extra IR-6 centrifuges has yet to begin, but preparations are ongoing.
- ❖ If Iran finished the installation of these planned IR-6 centrifuges, the potential of the FFEP to be used in a breakout to weapon-grade uranium would change drastically, posing a severe breakout risk in a deeply buried facility. With all 16 IR-6 centrifuge cascades working together to make 90 percent enriched uranium, Fordow could rapidly produce weapon-grade uranium from Iran's existing stock of 20 percent enriched uranium, enough for one nuclear weapon in nine days, and enough for a total of three nuclear weapons in less than a month. The use of its stock of 60 percent enriched uranium in a breakout would add to these totals.
- ❖ On November 22, Iran began to use the two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at the FFEP "in an interconnected mode" to produce 60 percent enriched uranium from 5 percent feed.
- ❖ In January, Iran may have purposely and temporarily increased the level of enrichment reached in the IR-6 cascades above 60 percent HEU, potentially gaining valuable experience in how to modify the two cascades to produce near-weapon-grade uranium.
- ❖ On January 21, 2023, during an unannounced inspection, IAEA inspectors found the IR-6 cascades operating in a way that was undeclared by Iran. The following day, the inspectors took environmental samples at the product sampling point and detected the presence of near 84 percent enriched uranium.
- ❖ With the new developments and plans at Fordow, the IR-6 appears to have emerged as Iran's centrifuge of choice for HEU production. This choice is worrisome, since it is the type that requires the fewest for a secret enrichment plant among the IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges, has fewer design details available than the other production-scale centrifuges, and lacks credible information on the total number manufactured.
- ❖ Iran has met its announced goal of installing 21 cascades of IR-2m centrifuges. However, it has not met its goals for other advanced centrifuges. In addition to the 14 IR-6 cascades discussed above, Iran has yet to begin the installation of the remaining eight cascades of a set of 12 long-announced IR-4 centrifuge cascades at the Natanz FEP. During the last reporting period, Iran completed one additional cascade, the fourth of the set.
- ❖ On February 25, 2023, Iran announced to the IAEA a change in its design information for Fordow, allowing for either IR-1 or IR-6 centrifuge cascades. Thus, if Iran fails to make sufficient IR-6 centrifuges to outfit 14 cascades, it may install IR-1 cascades instead. Pending more concrete results, the Institute's projection, in which it is assumed that all 14 cascades would be IR-6 centrifuges, is unchanged. However, this change in the design information does highlight the flexibility Iran is seeking and could perhaps indicate an inability to make the required number of IR-6 centrifuges.
- ❖ Based on Iran's plans reported by the IAEA, the Institute projects that Iran plans on deploying about 3700 additional advanced centrifuges, reaching a total of 9479 advanced centrifuges. Iran did not provide a schedule of deployments and the Institute considers this at least a one-year, perhaps a two-year deployment plan, based on current understandings of Iran's ability to manufacture and assemble centrifuges.
- ❖ Iran currently has a total installed nominal enrichment capacity of approximately 29,100 SWU per year, where advanced centrifuges account for almost 80 percent of the capacity, or 22,600 SWU per year, compared to the IR-1 centrifuges which account for about 6400 SWU per year. This exceeds any previously installed enrichment capacity, including before the JCPOA.



- ❖ A centrifuge assembly facility continues to be constructed underneath a mountain near the Natanz FEP. Its date of completion is unknown, although it may not be operational this year, perhaps not operational until sometime in 2024.²
- ❖ With Iran accelerating its advanced centrifuge deployments, uncertainties are growing in the estimated number of advanced centrifuges produced in excess of those deployed, increasing concern that Iran will again seek to build a clandestine enrichment plant, using advanced centrifuges manufactured in secret.
- ❖ The IAEA newly reports that it can no longer reestablish continuity of knowledge about Iran's activities under a revived JCPOA, including the production of advanced centrifuges, and says it would need to establish a new baseline altogether, requiring access to extensive records. It reports, "Any future baseline for [JCPOA] verification and monitoring activities would take a considerable time to establish and would have a significant degree of uncertainty."
- ❖ Over the weekend of March 4th, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi traveled to Tehran for high-level meetings and returned with an IAEA/Iran Joint Statement. The statement is vague on Iranian commitments; however, Grossi also received verbal commitments from Iran, which he detailed during two press conferences following the visit. One commitment was to reestablish monitoring at sites involved in making and assembling centrifuge rotors and bellows.

David Albright is President and Founder of the Institute for Science and International Security.

Sarah Burkhard is a Research Associate.

Spencer Faragasso is a Research Fellow, at the Institute for Science and International Security.

Iran Could Make Fuel for Nuclear Bomb in Less Than 2 Weeks: Gen. Milley

By Carla Babb

Source: <https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20230324-iran-could-make-fuel-for-nuclear-bomb-in-less-than-2-weeks-gen-milley>



Mar 24 – Iran could make enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb in “less than two weeks” and could produce a nuclear weapon in “several more months,” according to the top U.S. military officer.

Speaking to members of Congress on Thursday, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley told lawmakers the United States “remains committed” to preventing Iran from fielding a nuclear weapon.

“We, the United States military, have developed multiple options for national leadership to consider if or when Iran ever decides to develop an actual nuclear weapon,” Milley added. Milley’s comments echo those that U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl made last month. Kahl told lawmakers it would take Iran “about 12 days” to make enough fuel for a nuclear weapon should it decide to do so. The estimate is a drastic change from 2018 when the Trump administration pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal. At that time, it was estimated that Iran would need about a year to produce the weapons-grade fuel needed for one nuclear bomb.

The news comes as both Milley and the head of U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East, warned lawmakers in separate hearings Thursday that Iran continues to destabilize the Middle East through its support of terrorist groups and proxy forces. Since January 2021, Iranian proxies have attacked U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria 78 times using drones and rockets, according to CENTCOM Commander General Erik Kurilla.

EDITOR’S COMMENT: When the General says “two weeks” does he mean by April 7? Because it is a bit annoying all these “2 weeks”, “one month”, “6 months”, etc. that never proved right but they scare “officials”.

The Radioactive Legacy of Depleted Uranium Ammunition Comes to Ukraine

By Matthew Gault

Source: <https://www.vice.com/en/article/7kxpd4/the-radioactive-legacy-of-depleted-uranium-ammunition-comes-to-ukraine>

Mar 23 – The United Kingdom is sending Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine equipped with armor piercing [depleted uranium](#) rounds. Countries like the U.S., U.K., and Russia manufacture ammunition using depleted uranium because the metal is heavy and dense, making it ideal to break apart enemy armor. But it’s a highly controversial weapon because it’s radioactive and toxic, and various groups have argued that its use by the U.S. in Iraq resulted in persistent health problems for residents that led to [Fallujah being dubbed](#) “the Iraqi Hiroshima.”

Putin warned the west against deploying depleted uranium (DU) in Ukraine during a press conference with Chinese president Xi Jinping. “It seems that the West has actually decided to fight with Russia to the last Ukrainian, not in words, but in deeds, but I would like to note in this regard that if all this happens, then



Russia will have to react accordingly, bearing in mind that the collective West is beginning to use weapons with a nuclear component," [Putin said](#), according to a live translation by Sky News. On Wednesday, Britain's Foreign Secretary James Cleverly [pushed back](#) against Russia's claim that the use of depleted uranium constitutes a nuclear escalation.

"There is no nuclear escalation," he said, [according to Reuters](#). "The only country in the world that is talking about nuclear issues is Russia. There is no threat to Russia, this is purely about helping Ukraine defend itself...it's worth making sure everyone understands that just because the word uranium is in the title of depleted uranium munitions, they are not nuclear munitions, they are purely conventional munitions." Cleverly is right. Depleted uranium is a conventional munition but it is still radioactive. It's also worth noting that Russia is one of the only countries in the world that manufactures and deploys depleted uranium weapons. Russian news agency [TASS bragged](#) about the Kremlin upgrading its T-80BV with depleted uranium weapons in 2018. This tank has been deployed to Ukraine but its use of DU rounds has not been confirmed. Depleted uranium rounds have well-documented health concerns for both soldiers and non-combatants. According to Doug Weir, Research and Policy Director of the Conflict and Environment Observatory, the DU rounds the U.K. is sending are old and should be considered radioactive waste. "In addition to the exposure risks for those coming into contact with DU contaminated scrap and materiel, which will require management as low level radioactive waste," he told Motherboard in an email. "Ukraine needs to be aware that the UK's aging CHARM3 120mm ammunition reached the end of its service life in 2015." Weir said that DU rounds aren't as radioactive as enriched uranium, but are still toxic. "UK DU (which originated from the U.S.) is also contaminated with other radioactive elements, increasing its radioactivity, although Russian DU is believed to be even dirtier," he said. The U.K. once tested its DU rounds in Scotland but [stopped](#) after community outcry. "Back in the '70s when the U.S. first stationed DU ammo in the UK it had a big PR campaign explaining that it was not more toxic than lead," Weir said. "They don't use that line any more because it turns out that lead is really toxic." The U.S. and NATO allies used DU rounds during the Gulf War, the intervention in Bosnia, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and in airstrikes against Syria in 2015. The most famous and well reported of these is the use of the rounds in civilian areas of [Fallujah, Iraq](#). Local and international organizations have studied the effects of DU on civilian populations in Iraq and Bosnia. Some groups have [concluded](#) that there's a direct link between DU and a subsequent rise in birth defects and health problems, but the results have also been described as [inconclusive](#). World Health Organization studies have routinely found no link between the use of DU and ill health effects, but scientists—including those writing in the *Lancet*—have said the studies were [poorly designed](#). Some have even accused the WHO of [covering up evidence](#) of the health effects. It's not that's not because depleted uranium causes no harm, but because there's so much other toxic material in a warzone that it's hard to isolate what, exactly, causes birth defects and other health issues.

"The toxic remnants of war are pretty diverse, and certainly in Ukraine there are no shortage of pollution hazards," Weir said. However, there's no doubt that depleted uranium poses unique health risks.

"Uranium is more chemically toxic than many metals and then you have the added radioactivity issue. In the way that it is or is likely to be being used in Ukraine, large caliber tank ammo, the main problem will be contaminated scrap and exposure risks for people who have to deal with that," he added. Weir said it's also hard to study the precise effects of DU because it's both radioactive and toxic. "From a health perspective, if you're studying DU's genotoxicity (the way it can damage DNA) or mutagenicity it's actually really difficult to design experiments to isolate out its chemical toxicity from its radioactivity, both of which may combine to amplify harm," he said. Battlefields all over the world are rife with toxins, even near civilian locations. In Iraq, birth defects [spike](#) near U.S. military bases. There's a lot of lead on the ground and the U.S. burned all its garbage in open-air pits. People, both civilian and military personnel, who have lived and worked in these areas often have health problems.

According to Weir, DU gets a lot of attention because people have a strong negative reaction to the idea of firing radioactive munitions. "Historically it has received more attention than other toxics because most people's reaction to the idea that we fire uranium darts around—without any obligations to clear them up—is WTF? And because of that intrinsic and common sense WTF, militaries who use it have to work hard on the PR—'DU is weakly radioactive,' 'there's no evidence of civilian harm,' etc."

"Well, it's actually really hard to study cancer outcomes in warzones."

Türkiye to grant official 'nuclear facility' status to Akkuyu plant

Source: <https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/t%C3%BCrkiye-to-grant-official-nuclear-facility-status-to-akkuyu-plant-66582>

Mar 29 – The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in Mersin province, which Turkish President Erdogan said is "the largest project in the history of Turkish-Russian cooperation", will receive nuclear facility status next month. Türkiye will officially grant Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant nuclear facility status on April 27, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on Wednesday.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Let's all pray that Enceladus will respect the facility and the world!




Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor 2022 is out

Source [+videos]: <https://banmonitor.org/news/nuclear-weapons-ban-monitor-2022-is-here>

As fear of nuclear war surged to the highest levels since the Cold War in 2022, the global arsenal of nuclear weapons available for use by the armed forces of the nine nuclear-armed states has increased, shows the latest edition of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, which was launched on 29 March 2023. See the key findings and download the report here.

In collaboration with the Federation of American Scientists, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor publishes the latest available data on global nuclear forces. At the beginning of 2023, the nine nuclear-armed states had a combined inventory of approximately **12,512** nuclear warheads, of which **2,936** are retired and awaiting dismantlement. The remaining **9,576** nuclear warheads are available for use by the military, and have a collective destructive power that is equal to more than **135,000** Hiroshima bombs.

Hans M. Kristensen, the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists and contributor to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, said: "Every year, the global inventory of nuclear warheads decreases slightly, including in 2022 when it decreased from 12,705 warheads at the beginning of the year to the estimated 12,512 warheads in January 2023, but this is only still true because Russia and the United States each year dismantle a small number of their older nuclear warheads that have been retired from service. Russia, China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan all expanded their stockpiles of warheads in 2022, however, bringing about a corresponding increase of 136 warheads from the 9,440 warheads that were available for use in early 2022, to 9,576 in 2023."



"This increase is worrying, and continues a trend that started in 2017. If this does not stop, we will soon see an increase also in the total number of nuclear weapons in the world, for the first time since the Cold War," said the editor of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, Grethe Østern of Norwegian People's Aid.

While all of the nine nuclear-armed states (China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) refuse to join the TPNW, the Ban Monitor notes that their conduct is not compatible with the TPNW, including by continuing to develop, produce and stockpile nuclear weapons. Once again, their conduct in 2022 was also manifestly incompatible with the TPNW's obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. There was

no evidence that any of the nuclear-armed states have the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States therefore also continued to fail to comply with their existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to 'pursue negotiations in good faith' on nuclear disarmament.

But it is not just the nuclear-armed states whose activities are incompatible with the TPNW. A total of 35 non-nuclear-armed states, including the world's 32 so-called umbrella states, also contravened one or more of the prohibitions of the TPNW last year, chiefly by assisting and encouraging continued possession of nuclear weapons on their behalf.

Europe has the highest number of countries whose actions run counter to the TPNW and that vote against the Treaty in the UN. They perpetuate the idea that nuclear weapons are legitimate and necessary and are a major obstacle to nuclear disarmament.

In spite of this, the Ban Monitor points out, the TPNW gained strength in 2022. The speed with which new countries are ratifying or acceding to the Treaty accelerated, following a dip during the COVID-19 pandemic. An important milestone, the Treaty's First Meeting of States Parties was held in Vienna in June 2022, where a declaration and first action plan was adopted and unprecedented international attention was given to the rights of people affected by nuclear weapons and the need for victim assistance and environmental remediation of areas affected by nuclear-weapons testing. Five states under the US "nuclear umbrella" attended the Vienna meeting as observers, showing early signs of a willingness to at least engage constructively with the Treaty. As of 29 March 2023, the TPNW has 68



states parties and a further 27 countries have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty. This means that only four more states need sign or accede before the Treaty exceeds 50% of all states.

In a foreword to the 2022 edition of the Ban Monitor, the United Nations Under-Secretary General and Special Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, wrote: "While states remain the key actors in international disarmament negotiations, the evolution of the TPNW has shown the usefulness of a partnership between states, civil society and academia. Projects such as this show that well-researched information and thoughtful analysis can stimulate discussion and thus contribute to achieving our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons."






Henriette Westhrin, the Secretary-General of Norwegian People's Aid, a partner in the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), said: "The Ukraine crisis has demonstrated that nuclear weapons do not create peace or stability. They do not deter aggression but enable conventional wars and incentivize risk taking that could lead to nuclear war."

The interim Executive Director of ICAN, Daniel Högsta, said: "This year's Ban Monitor shows just how urgent it is for nuclear-armed countries and their allies to start taking credible, concrete steps towards disarmament. It also demonstrates clearly how the TPNW is gaining traction globally as the route to achieving a world free of these inhumane weapons of mass destruction."

Saudi Arabia

If Iran obtained a true nuclear capability, Saudi Arabia would almost certainly follow through on its promise to acquire one as well. Although Saudi Arabia's capabilities are much further behind Iran's, the country possesses a sizable stockpile of mineable uranium ore; has announced an intention to build several nuclear reactors across the country; and possesses several types of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear warheads. While these factors do not necessarily indicate the country's interest in developing nuclear weapons at this time, Saudi Arabia's Original Small Quantities Protocol exempts the country from IAEA monitoring and inspections obligations, which increases ambiguity around the country's nuclear intentions and capabilities.

TABLE F: THE WORLD'S NUCLEAR WARHEAD INVENTORIES AT THE BEGINNING OF 2023^A

	Russia	United States	China	France	United Kingdom	Pakistan	India	Israel	North Korea	Total
 Total inventory of warheads	5,889 ↓	5,244 ↓	410 ↑	290	225 ^c	170 ↑	164 ↑	90	30 ↑	12,512 ↓
 Retired warheads for dismantlement	1,400 ↓	1,536 ↓	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,936 ↓
 Stockpiled warheads ^b	4,489 ↑	3,708	410 ↑	290	225 ^c	170 ↑	164 ↑	90	30 ↑	9,576 ↑
 Estimated yield in megatons	978.6 MT	857.6 MT	126.5 MT	29 MT	22.5 MT	3.4 MT	4.1 MT	2.5 MT	1.5 MT	2,025.6 MT
 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents	65,240	57,173	8,433	1,933	1,500	226	273	165	100	135,043

Source: Federation of American Scientists, 'Status of World Nuclear Forces', <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/>. More details of each country's nuclear forces can be found in the individual Nuclear Notebooks for each country, published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

●► Reas also [Key Findings Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor 2022](#)



Germany's Balancing Act on Nuclear Weapons

By William Noah Glucroft

Source: <https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20230329-germanys-balancing-act-on-nuclear-weapons>



Mar 29 – If the Cold War had gone nuclear, it would have likely begun on German soil. Geographically, Germany sat between the United States and its NATO allies on one side, and the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries on the other. Politically, the country was split between West and East. Strategically, that was where the US and Soviet militaries faced off — on either side of the Iron Curtain. Germany was therefore a nuclear tripwire between the enemy superpowers, and the country both benefits from the supposed safety of the US nuclear umbrella, and still faces the direct risk of nuclear escalation. Former West Germany has been home to a strong pacifist movement, while many in former East Germany hold a less hostile view of Russia. These factors help make the issue of arms control a particularly sensitive one in Germany.

“Germany remains clearly committed to its engagement in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, even given the changed conditions,” an official from the German Federal Foreign Office told DW.

That is a reference to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which some military analysts fear could lead President Vladimir Putin to break the [“nuclear taboo.”](#) if his conventional forces continue to struggle on the battlefield.

“The federal government, with its partners, unequivocally opposes any softening of the taboo,” the German government official added, referring to an unwritten understanding not to use nuclear weapons ever since the US did twice against Japan, ending the Second World War in 1945.

Nuclear Balancing Act

Germany’s opposition to nuclear weapons competes with the expectation that it supports the security status quo. NATO nuclear sharing — the US-led military alliance’s long-standing policy that permits the stationing of US nuclear weapons on non-US territory — means German warplanes could carry them in the event of nuclear war.

As many as 20 such warheads remain at the Büchel Air Base in western Germany, according to an estimate by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The think tank, based in Washington, DC, counted some 130 others at the Ramstein Air Base, until they were removed between 2001 and 2005. The nuclear balancing act adds tension both to German domestic politics as well as to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Any disagreement, however, has taken a back seat after [Russia’s war in Ukraine.](#)

Some politicians in the Green Party, traditionally one of Germany’s more fierce critics of nuclear weapons, have also been among the country’s most vocal supporters of Ukraine. NATO officials, meanwhile, take every opportunity to show that Russia’s efforts to divide the alliance have failed.

“Clearly, we are at something of an inflection point,” John Erath, Senior Policy Director for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, told DW. “One of the means Russia has chosen to accomplish its end is to make threats of the use of nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear Brinkmanship, Past and Present

That end — taking control of Ukraine, and breaking US and NATO support — has so far not come to pass. However, using nuclear weapons as a “diplomatic tool,” Erath said, has been somewhat effective at moderating that support. The US has been careful to avoid escalation that could draw it into direct conflict with Russia, and German officials have often expressed their concern about crossing a line that would make Germany an official party to the war.

“The real danger lies in if this conflict concludes with Russia perceived as succeeding, and this tool being perceived as being effective. Because that opens the floodgates,” Erath said. Other nuclear-armed states, such as North Korea, could make bolder threats with their own arsenals. Such nuclear diplomacy has precedent. In the 1980s, new deployments of Soviet nuclear forces prompted NATO to respond in kind. Widespread protests, especially in then-West Germany, pressured the government to oppose the stationing of more US missiles on its soil. By NATO’s own account, it was a “difficult period for West Germany as well as NATO.” The alliance, however, held. A “double-track” compromise was reached, which saw more deployments, but also negotiations to reach a deal with the Soviet Union on arms control. “Differences in nuclear risk tolerance among NATO allies can be a pressure point for Russia to exploit,” Jonas Schneider, an international security associate at the Berlin-based security think tank SWP, told DW. “Overall, Germany has staked out a more cautious positioning when it comes to nuclear risk.”

The Other 10%

Arms control in terms of treaties is at its nadir, now that Russia has suspended — but not withdrawn from — New START, the last major agreement limiting Russian and US nuclear systems. In the near term, at



least, security analysts like Schneider are relatively sanguine. “In all, I don’t see an increase in the nuclear risk as a result of what’s happened to New START,” he said. That is partly because treaties are just one element of arms control. Transparency, dialogue, and data collection through both public and clandestine means are others. Nuclear weapons are expensive and conspicuous, making changes in numbers or deployment fairly easy to spot. The treaties have also only covered Russian and US forces. While they control about 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, including first-strike capability, the absence of China from these treaties is a bigger worry. There are several small and midsize nuclear-armed states, but Erath said it is China “where things are changing in the nuclear world.” Moreover, the US lacks the awareness and lines of communication of the kind built up with Russia over decades.

“If there were to be a crisis over Taiwan, it’s a little bit harder to get that direct line to Beijing,” he said.

Most countries do not possess nuclear weapons, and 92 of them have signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Without any of the world’s nuclear powers on board, however, the agreement is largely symbolic.

Germany, which supports the abolition movement but is beholden to US nuclear doctrine, finds itself trying to do two things at once. Germany attended a treaty meeting in 2022 in Vienna as an observer — a reflection of anti-nuclear aspirations competing with real-world nuclear commitments.

Russia has a unique secret weapon of mass destruction

Source: <https://avia-pro.net/news/na-vooruzhenii-rossii-okazalos-unikalnoe-sekretnoe-oruzhie-massovogo-porazheniya>

Mar 28 – Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev spoke about the Russian superweapon capable of destroying the United States.

In the event of a real threat to Russia, the Russian side will be ready to resort to using its superweapon. His power will be enough to destroy any country, including the United States. Information on this subject was voiced by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev.

What kind of weapons are we talking about is still unknown, however, it is obvious that Russia has such a system. Moreover, this is unlikely to apply to the latest Russian heavy intercontinental ballistic missile "Sarmat" or to the underwater nuclear drone "Poseidon", since a fairly large number of such missiles and underwater vehicles are required to destroy a large country.

Given the statements of Patrushev, it is obvious that we are talking about a fully automated system for delivering a massive strike. In particular, the issue of using the **“Perimeter” system**, better known in the West under the name “Dead Hand”, was actively discussed earlier. The latter, when activated, automatically launches a large number of missiles at designated targets (according to a number of data, up to 30% of all ICBMs with nuclear warheads in service with Russia), which, for obvious reasons, will lead to the total destruction of the enemy.

Civil Defense for Radiological Threats – Are We Ready?

By Dr. Mary Sproull

Source: <https://nct-cbnw.com/civil-defense-for-radiological-threats/>

Feb 27 – Since the events of 9/11, we have come a long way in terms of preparedness for future CBRNe events. Perhaps the greatest successes have been in development of preparedness guidelines and medical countermeasures for emergencies involving radiological or nuclear threats. Though we have now accumulated a solid foundation of resources for operational management of these events, there remain key areas of mass casualty emergency planning that have yet to be fully addressed.

Prior to 9/11, the world of civil defense for radiological or nuclear event scenarios had stalled with the “duck and cover” public education initiatives of the Cold War era. With the advent of global terrorism, initiatives were undertaken to develop:

1. Modern operational guidelines for future large scale radiological or nuclear event scenarios and with the support of legislation which established Project Bioshield.
2. Concurrent procurement and licensure of medical countermeasures specific for radiation injury.

Medical countermeasures tackling radiological and nuclear threats

We now have extensive playbooks developed at the federal level detailing emergency planning and response guidelines for these event scenarios, with guidelines specific to threats involving radiological dispersal devices or nuclear events. We also have several **medical countermeasures recently approved by the FDA for treatment of radiation injury including filgrastim (Neupogen®), pegfilgrastim (Neulasta®), sargramostim (Leukine®), and romiplostim (Nplate®)**. These drugs can be used to treat the hematopoietic sub-syndrome of the acute radiation syndrome (H-ARS), which is caused by the myelosuppressive effects of radiation exposure. In addition, the FDA has just recently cleared Silverlon® for use in treatment of



cutaneous radiation injury (burns) and radiation dermatitis. These drugs represent a significant cadre of frontline medical countermeasures that physicians can use to treat the early stages of acute radiation injury.

Other key medical countermeasures in development include blood diagnostics to determine level of radiation exposure using biodosimetry algorithms. Select biodosimetry assays using proteomic or genomic approaches are in late-stage development for FDA licensure and expected to be added to the Strategic National Stockpile. These blood tests are designed to be either point-of-care with field deployment capability or high-throughput, processed at off-site labs as a reach-back resource. More efficient cytogenetic biodosimetry assays and inter-laboratory standardization efforts are also in development to create additional reach-back surge capability.

Biodosimetry diagnostics remain a key medical resource, critical to the successful implementation of existing emergency preparedness plans, as they are the “lynchpin” of effective mass casualty medical management of future events involving radiation exposure. Preliminary screening to identify the level of received radiation dose is critical for efficient triage and allocation of scarce medical resources, such as the afore mentioned drugs for radiation exposure.

Screening to separate who has been exposed from who has not is also critical to alleviate the burden of the “worried well” or “concerned citizens” on the existing medical systems. Based on historical precedence, these uninjured or walking wounded persons, who want to know if they have been exposed to radiation, are expected to overwhelm local medical resources.

●► [Read the full article at the source’s URL.](#)

[Mary Sproull, PhD](#) is a research scientist in the Radiation Oncology Branch of the National Cancer Institute at the National Institutes of Health. Her current work at the National Institutes of Health is funded by the Radiation and Nuclear Countermeasures Program/National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, as part of an initiative to develop new radiation biodosimetry models for dose prediction for use during mass casualty management during a radiological or nuclear event.

The British government doesn’t want to talk about its nuclear weapons. The British public does

By [Tim Street](#), [Harry Spencer](#), and [Shane Ward](#)

Source: <https://thebulletin.org/2023/04/the-british-government-doesnt-want-to-talk-about-its-nuclear-weapons-the-british-public-does/>

Apr 06 – In January 2023 British Pugwash and the polling company Savanta conducted a survey of UK public opinion on nuclear weapons issues and potential support for policies that advance nuclear arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

The poll involved 2,320 UK adults who were asked about the Russia-Ukraine war, the United Kingdom’s ongoing replacement of its nuclear weapon system, the possibility that US nuclear weapons will again be stationed in the United Kingdom, the significant increase to the UK’s nuclear warhead stockpile cap, and the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Our polling results found some notable differences between the British public’s views and the policies of the UK government concerning nuclear weapons. While 40 percent of poll respondents support the United Kingdom possessing nuclear weapons, there is significant support for policies that would control, limit, or even eliminate the UK’s nuclear weapons—including among supporters of nuclear possession. For example, over a third of those who support the UK’s possession of nuclear weapons also support joining a multilateral disarmament treaty.

Despite the challenges involved, especially at a time of war in Europe, we at British Pugwash see an opportunity for UK political parties to adopt policies more supportive of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Our key findings revealed these differences between government policy and public opinion:

Use of nuclear weapons

The UK government’s [policy](#) is to consider using nuclear weapons “only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO allies.” UK and NATO policy does not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons.

Our poll found that 48 percent of UK adults oppose the first use of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom, and only 40 percent support first use. This finding builds on the results of the [survey](#) British Pugwash conducted in 2021, which found that two-thirds of the British public want NATO to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons.

Replacing nuclear weapons

The United Kingdom is replacing all four parts of its nuclear weapons system: submarines, missiles, warheads, and associated infrastructure. The estimated cost of the four new nuclear-armed submarines



is £31 billion (about \$38 billion), and the [estimated](#) total cost of replacing nuclear weapons between 2019 and 2070 is at least £172 billion (\$212 billion).

Our poll found that 42 percent of UK adults think the estimated cost of replacing the UK's nuclear weapons does not represent value for money.



The British nuclear submarine HMS Victorious, which is armed with Trident ballistic missiles, near Faslane in Scotland in 2013. Credit: UK Ministry of Defence

Stationing US nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom

The UK government has previously allowed US nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable aircraft to be stored, maintained, and operated from UK military bases. Although the United Kingdom has not hosted US nuclear weapons since 2008, in April 2022 an analysis of US Defense Department documents [reported](#) that a facility at the Royal Air Force's Lakenheath base in Suffolk—which is used by the US Air Force—was being upgraded, potentially allowing the United States to again deploy nuclear weapons there.

British public opinion is split over allowing the United States to deploy nuclear weapons on UK territory. Our poll found that 34 percent of UK adults oppose, and 32 percent support, stationing US nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

In 2017, 122 states voted in support of the Treaty, which prohibits the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons, as well as any threat to use them. The United Kingdom has not signed or ratified the treaty. To join the treaty, the country would have to dismantle its nuclear arsenal or present a legally binding plan to do so.

Our poll found that 39 percent of UK adults support joining the ban treaty. Among 18- to 34-year-olds, 48 percent support joining the treaty, and only 13 percent are opposed.

Nuclear weapons possession

The United Kingdom is one of only nine countries possessing nuclear weapons. Our poll found that 40 percent of UK adults are in favor of possession. Women are far less likely than men to support UK possession (28 percent of women, compared with 53 percent of men). Some 27 percent of UK adults oppose UK nuclear possession, 29 percent neither support nor oppose nuclear possession, and 5 percent said they “don't know” in response to this question.



Our poll also found that a minority of UK adults (39 percent) fully support the government's decision to increase the UK's nuclear warhead stockpile cap.

Even among supporters of nuclear possession, we found significant concerns about the government's approach to nuclear weapons. For example, 23 percent of those who support nuclear possession don't think the estimated cost of replacing the UK's nuclear weapons represents value for money.

Furthermore, 38 percent of those who support UK nuclear possession do not want the military to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. Notably, 35 percent of those who currently support the possession of nuclear weapons also want the United Kingdom to join the international ban treaty that would eliminate the country's nuclear arsenal.

War in Ukraine

Our data indicate that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has significantly strengthened support for UK possession of nuclear weapons among those who already favored possession. Two-thirds of those who support nuclear possession said the conflict strengthened their position on this issue.

We also saw increases in support for nuclear weapons possession among those who otherwise oppose nuclear possession. In our poll, 16 percent of those who oppose UK possession of nuclear weapons said the Ukraine conflict had increased their support for possession.

Responses to this particular question likely reflect wider public [support](#) for UK involvement in the Ukraine conflict and may thus be temporary. Moreover, 39 percent of UK adults said the Ukraine conflict had "made no difference" to their view on UK nuclear possession. Overall, our data suggest that a key impact of the Ukraine war has been to reinforce support for UK nuclear possession among UK adults who already held this view.

Uncertainty and ambivalence

Nearly a third of respondents gave an "on the fence" answer to several of the questions posed. For example, 29 percent said they did not support or oppose the UK's possession of nuclear weapons; 30 percent said they neither support nor oppose the rise in the nuclear warhead stockpile cap; 28 percent said they neither support nor oppose US nuclear weapons again being stationed in the United Kingdom; and 29 percent said they "don't know" or are "unsure" whether the estimated cost of the UK nuclear weapons replacement program represents value for money.

These findings indicate that there is significant uncertainty about, and ambivalence toward, nuclear weapons among UK adults.

Why our survey matters

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the risk of nuclear war involving the major powers has [risen](#) significantly. Any use of nuclear weapons would have extremely severe consequences for the world. The United Kingdom is a nuclear weapon state, plays a leading role in NATO, and is strongly supportive of—and deeply involved in—US global strategy, to which nuclear deterrence is central. The United Kingdom thus has an important role in maintaining the global nuclear order, and a commensurate responsibility to reduce nuclear threats and advance disarmament. Yet, as noted above, the UK government is engaged in a huge and costly nuclear rearmament program, is increasing its nuclear warhead stockpile cap, and has renounced transparency for its nuclear operations in its [Integrated Review](#) of 2021.

London is also providing extensive military support to Kyiv, both to help Ukraine defeat Russia and to weaken Moscow's ability to undertake future military operations. However, the unpredictable nature of the war means that the risk of it escalating to a wider conflict between Russia and NATO, including the possible use of nuclear weapons, is very real. The president and secretary general of Pugwash have therefore [called](#) on the major powers to focus on diplomacy to attain a ceasefire, and "to start and conclude a negotiating process ... aimed at avoiding further strife in order to ensure a lasting peace in the whole region."

Greater public and parliamentary participation in decision making would improve the quality and legitimacy of the United Kingdom's international policy. Yet decisions on nuclear weapons (and national security more generally) are largely made behind closed doors. The lack of democracy, transparency, and accountability surrounding nuclear weapons has a clear impact on the British public's interest in and understanding of the issues. The findings of our poll may partly be explained by the lack of awareness and the absence of public debate on nuclear matters in the United Kingdom. The large number of "don't know" and "on the fence" responses indicates that many UK adults do not feel well enough informed to make a judgment on these issues.

Support for nuclear possession and use among the UK public may also stem from an absence of meaningful discussion, including on the global effects of nuclear use. For example, polling released in February by the University of Cambridge's Centre for the Study of Existential Risk found "there is a lack of awareness among UK and US populations of 'nuclear winter,' the potential for catastrophic long-term environmental consequences from any exchange of nuclear warheads." The [poll](#) also found that doubts over nuclear retaliation increased among participants when they were shown the latest data on the effects of nuclear winter.



Despite the absence of informed debate, our poll shows that neither supporters nor opponents of UK nuclear possession have a monolithic view of nuclear issues. However, the varied nature of, and inconsistencies among, British public views on these issues—as well as the relatively low political salience of the nuclear debate—has allowed the UK government to maintain the status quo and avoid meaningful scrutiny or challenge.

An important domestic impact of the Ukraine conflict has been to restrict political space for progressive policy alternatives on defense and security. In an update to the Integrated Review published last month, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak [announced £5 billion](#) (\$6.2 billion) of additional defense funding earmarked for “nuclear resilience and conventional stockpiles.

Despite the pressure on UK policy makers to reinforce military spending and persist with nuclear rearmament, opportunities exist to pursue alternative paths. Our polling data clearly show a sizable gap between public attitudes and the government’s nuclear weapons policy. With a UK general election likely to be held in 2024, British political parties should be developing policies that better represent public views on nuclear weapons issues—and increase democracy, transparency, and accountability in defense and foreign policy more generally.

Tim Street is the secretary of British Pugwash. He obtained his PhD from Warwick University in 2018. His first book, *The Politics of Nuclear Disarmament*, was published by Routledge in 2021. He is a board member of Nuclear Information Service.

Harry Spencer is a senior operational analyst and a visiting fellow at the University of Leicester’s Department for History, Politics, and International Relations. A project associate with the European Research Council-funded Third Nuclear Age project, his research specializes in nuclear strategic theory, novel delivery systems, and missile defense operations. He sits on the executive board of Student/Young Pugwash UK.

Shane Ward sits on the leadership team of International Student/Young Pugwash and is the former coordinator of Student/Young Pugwash UK, where he facilitates and engages in Track 2 dialogue with a focus on NATO, emerging technology, and the Third Nuclear Age. He has been published and spoken publicly on the US-UK security relationship. Shane holds a BA from Bates College.

If Finland joins NATO, it needs a new nuclear weapons policy

By Robin Forsberg, Aku Kähkönen, and Jason Moyer

Source: <https://thebulletin.org/2022/12/if-finland-joins-nato-it-needs-a-new-nuclear-weapons-policy/>

December 2022 – As an aspiring NATO member, Finland must update its nuclear weapons policy. Nuclear weapons are an important pillar of the defensive alliance, which has the [official position](#) that for as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will inherently be a nuclear alliance.

In September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin [threatened](#) to use nuclear weapons, saying “In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.” Putin’s statement—and others—[triggered](#) a heated debate about nuclear weapons in Europe not seen since the darkest days of the Cold War. Even though Russia’s military doctrine [prescribes](#) nuclear weapons for self-defense, the doctrine is opaque and Putin is largely considered in the West as an unpredictable actor. As the invasion of Ukraine escalates and Russian losses multiply, there are widespread concerns that Russia might rely on its nuclear arsenal as a last-ditch method of coercion. These concerns happen as Finland contemplates its views toward nuclear weapons as a future member of the alliance.

After filing its membership application in May 2022, Finland is now in the midst of its NATO [accession process](#), with only Turkey and Hungary’s approval remaining. In its application, Finland is not seeking [any exemptions](#) to its membership and is committing to the alliance fully. This has [initiated discussions](#) about its upcoming policy on nuclear weapons. On November 7, President Sauli Niinistö [stressed](#) the Finnish position: “Let me make it clear: even if we do not impose any restrictions on our membership of NATO in advance, Finland has no intention whatsoever of bringing nuclear weapons onto its soil. Nor have I seen any indication that anyone is offering them to us.” NATO’s two other Nordic members—Norway and Denmark—have prohibited NATO bases or nuclear weapons within their borders in peacetime. By applying for full NATO membership without any explicit restrictions, Finland allows itself the opportunity to chart its own decisions on nuclear weapons. But there is one caveat: Under Finland’s current national legislation nuclear weapons [are illegal](#).


By joining NATO, Finland will be allied with countries that have nuclear arsenals—and are prepared to use them if deemed necessary. This aligns with the creed of the alliance: Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s deterrence. This will be the new security reality facing Finland the day it joins the nuclear alliance. Yet, it has not been sufficiently [debated](#) what becoming a NATO member will mean for Finland’s approach to nuclear weapons. In part, this is due to interest in both Finland and NATO for a speedy and uncomplicated accession. But there is also a tradition of not debating national strategic security policies in public fora due to the Finns’ high trust in their national authorities. A healthy national debate, however, is needed to improve the understanding of nuclear



weapons policies among the Finnish population and their potential impact on Finland's security. Finland's nuclear weapons policy as a member of NATO should serve both the domestic and the international interests of the Finnish people. Finland has a history of a strong non-nuclear proliferation policy. In 1968, it was the first country to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has ever since shown strong [support](#) for multilateral non-proliferation and conventional disarmament treaties. But this dogmatism has somewhat wavered in recent years, even before Russia invaded Ukraine. In July 2017, when the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, also known as the ban treaty) was signed by 122 countries, Finland chose to abstain from supporting the treaty as a result of changing national security priorities. Around that time, [pundits](#) in Finland believed that a vote for prohibiting nuclear weapons would not lead to the desired outcome, given the opposition of the five nuclear-armed permanent members of the UN Security Council to a vote for the treaty, which ultimately would water it down. Experts theorized at the time that Finland abstained from voting not to jeopardize its prospects of joining NATO.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Finland joined NATO. But is it the right umbrella for a country with no nukes neighboring a country with thousands of nukes?

When Finland joins NATO, its defense minister will have a seat in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, the senior body that discusses the alliance's nuclear doctrine and sets policy. What the Finnish minister will do in this seat and what role it will assume in this alliance is a topic that has not yet been discussed or disclosed publicly and will require holistic, political, and military evaluation from the country's political leadership. Having a seat in the Nuclear Planning Group will also give Finland's government and military access to previously unobtainable operational information regarding the alliance's nuclear arm. Discussing Finland's revised nuclear weapons policy is important not to jeopardize the ethics of Finland's [continuous and long-standing support](#) of disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. The debate should also be reflective of the people's willingness to take part in NATO's nuclear weapons exercises, activities, or planning. As full ratification approaches, political parties and parliamentarians in Finland should engage head-on in a policy debate about nuclear weapons and NATO. In the spirit of the Finnish security policy tradition, national politicians should strive to find a consensus that would both endure the test of time and possible future political shifts. A public domestic debate diminishes the risk of political backlash against NATO membership and increases the Finnish population's resilience in the long term. As Finland becomes a party to a nuclear alliance, it must begin the process of updating its nuclear weapons policy.



Robin Forsberg is a former visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies' Foreign Policy Institute and a consultant, doctoral researcher, and a fellow of the Manfred Wörner Seminar at the German Bundeswehr.

Aku Kähkönen is a public sector consultant at Accenture Finland, a fellow of the Manfred Wörner Seminar at the German Bundeswehr, and a reserve officer in the Finnish Navy.

Jason C. Moyer is a program associate for the Global Europe Program at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.



If They Fire The Nukes, Will They Even Work?

By Lewin Day

Source: <https://hackaday.com/2023/04/06/if-they-fire-the-nukes-will-they-even-work/>

Apr 06 – 2022 was a harrowing year in a long line of harrowing years. A brutal war in Europe raised the prospect of nuclear war as the leaders behind the invasion rattled sabers and made thinly veiled threats to use weapons of mass destruction. And all this as we're still working our way through the fallout of a global pandemic.

Those hot-headed threats raise an interesting question, however. Decades have passed since either Russia or the United States ran a live nuclear weapons test. Given that, [would the nukes even work if they were fired in anger?](#)

Check and Test

If there's one thing engineers like to do, it's to test things. It's all well and good to draw something up on paper or put it together in the lab. But until you've switched it on and made it do its thing, it's hard to know if it's going to act as expected.

The problem with nuclear weapons is that testing them is a nasty business. It tends to leave giant craters in the landscape, [and pumps radioactive dust into the atmosphere](#) to spread over neighbouring populations. For this reason, most countries signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned all nuclear weapons testing save for that done underground. This later expanded into



the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, formed in 1996, that nevertheless has never officially come into effect due to several holdout states. Treaty or no treaty, nuclear weapons tests have become exceedingly rare in recent decades. The last atmospheric test was held by China in 1980, while North Korea has executed nuclear tests as recently as 2017. When it comes to the major players on today's world stage, the US executed its last underground nuclear test in 1992, and the Soviet Union in 1990. China is known to have last ran a test in 1996, while India and Pakistan both ran tests in 1998.

[The US held its last live nuclear weapons test in 1992, as part of Operation Julin. Credit: LANL, public domain](#)

Thus far, though, we've only discussed the testing of nuclear warheads themselves. Testing of complete *nuclear weapons systems* is even rarer. Nuclear weapons are often intended for delivery by missiles, but the weapons have rarely been tested and fired as complete assemblies. The US, Soviet Union, and China ran minimal tests in this regard in the 1960s. However, since then, those tests have not been repeated. Furthermore, no live test of an nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile has ever taken place. That's often put down to the risk involved. When the warhead is on the ground, you can press a button and be pretty confident on where it's going to end up. When the warhead is on the end of a rocket, there's always the risk that it could end up somewhere inconvenient, or that the

rocket could blow up on the pad. Unlike a static weapon test, there can be very deadly consequences of a nuclear missile test gone wrong, so they simply don't happen.

The complicated political status of nuclear weapons creates other problems, too. Production of nuclear weapons largely stalled out after the frenzied build-up of the Cold War era. As countries worked to slim down their warhead stockpiles, there was no need to keep factories running, and many were shut down. This has caused problems for those charged with maintaining decades-old weapons. Delicate mechanical mechanisms can foul up or wear out over time, explosive components can falter, while electronic components have a limited lifespan, too. In a nuclear weapon, perfect performance and timing is critical. It doesn't take much to spoil a weapon's yield if a component isn't operating perfectly.

In the US in particular, this came into focus in the early 2000s. There was a crisis as weapons technicians realized they no longer had a supply of a classified material called FOGBANK, which was crucial to US nuclear weapons. Worse, the records of the material's production were sparse, the original facility had closed down, and many staff were no longer around to recall how it was done. It took many years and tens of millions of dollars for the National Nuclear Security Administration to reproduce the material.



This creates an unnerving situation when contemplating the nuclear militaries of the world. They're armed with untested warheads of mass destruction mounted upon weapons systems that they haven't been fully tested with.

Two things give military commanders confidence that their weapons will still set enemy cities aglow if ever called upon. The first is regular maintenance. Nuclear weapons are, in a way, much like the truck parked up at your aunt's farm. Leave it in a shed unattended for 20 years, and it's unlikely to start when you jump in and turn the key. Alternatively, start it up every few months, and give it regular care and attention, and you can be relatively confident that it will roar into life when needed.

The second aspect is one of simulation. Engineers and physicists have incredibly advanced simulations of nuclear phenomena which are used to model the performance of weapon components when they can't be tested. Simulation isn't a perfect science, of course, but the physics of nuclear weapons is relatively well understood by those in the know. This is also aided by the immutability of the laws of physics. The behavior of atoms undergoing fission and fusion is the same today as it was back in 1945. If you build and maintain the weapons to the same specification as they were designed, they should perform in the same way they did many decades ago. It's nice to think that even if the button was pressed, the nuclear weapons fired would fail to annihilate the world as we know it. Unfortunately, it's likely not the case. Even at a 50% failure rate, a full-scale nuclear war would ultimately destroy society as we know it. As for nuclear weapons that "fizzle" and fail to detonate as expected, they can still cause great harm. Such a failure is still likely to spread radioactive material over a great area, and cause serious casualties. We can't rely on incompetence to save the world from nuclear war.

Ultimately, ideally, we'll never know if the world's nuclear arsenals are as potent as their owners say they are. On the amphitheater of mutually assured destruction, of course, the perceived threat of the weapons on paper is the most important thing, anyway. Regardless, these untested weapons remain sitting in bunkers around the world, waiting for the call that must never come.


Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, Third Edition (2022)

Source: <https://www.radresponder.net/app/index#resources/documents/36>

This guidance was developed by a federal interagency committee led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Office with representatives from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Future editions and interagency interaction related to Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation will be coordinated by FEMA.

The First Edition (2009) of this planning guidance focused on a small nuclear detonation at ground level in an urban environment—specifically, National Planning Scenario (NPS) #1.1 The Second Edition (2010) provided updated terminology, added the concept of the Hot Zone (HZ), and added a chapter specifically to address public preparedness and emergency public communications in the post-detonation environment.

The Third Edition (2022) has been updated and expanded to provide guidance for a wider range of nuclear detonations, including larger detonations and air bursts. It also incorporates new research, best practices, and response resources. Additionally, this edition includes a new chapter on the Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS), which enables state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) officials to send warnings and key messages during the response.



Why a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is more needed than ever

By Almutaser Albalawi

Source: <https://thebulletin.org/2023/04/why-a-wmd-free-zone-in-the-middle-east-is-more-needed-than-ever/>

Apr 10 – Recent news [reports](#) suggesting Saudi Arabia is seeking US aid for a peaceful nuclear program are bringing attention to the distressing potential for nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East. Yet conversations about averting such a doomed future for the region might be heading once again in the wrong direction. History suggests that power politics—in which self-interest is prioritized over global interests—may not be the best lens for looking at issues of arms control. During the 10th review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty last year, Arab states reiterated their call for establishing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This has been a long-standing position, but it should not be taken



for granted. A growing interest in nuclear technology in the Middle East—combined with ambiguity over nuclear activities in Iran and Israel—raises concerns about potential proliferation in the region. A robust and inclusive WMD-free zone remains the best solution for addressing these concerns.



President Biden with leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan at the Jeddah Security and Development Summit in Saudi Arabia in July 2022. Credit: President Biden / Twitter

To be sure, it will be extremely difficult to find a way to bring Israel into such a zone. Still, the other countries of the region and other concerned parties—including the United States, Russia, and China—need to look for a way to at least begin talks with Israel about nuclear proliferation in the region.

A dramatic expansion of nuclear power in the Middle East is expected over the next decade. In 2021, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became the second nation in the region (after Iran) to commission a nuclear power reactor. Now the UAE's fourth reactor is under construction. Egypt is following suit and recently started the construction of a four-unit nuclear reactor based on Russian technology. In addition, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have committed to plans centered on Small Modular Reactors and uranium extraction and mining.

There are undoubtedly legitimate motives behind this growing interest in nuclear power. Concerns about climate change and energy security are [causing some countries](#) to reconsider nuclear energy, and the developers of new reactor designs are promising lower capital costs and improved safety. Even for oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, the nuclear energy option remains economically attractive, given that regional power demand is projected to [rise](#) by at least 40 percent by 2030. Furthermore, desalination using nuclear power is a possible way out of water scarcity for a region characterized by [extremely high water risk](#).

Regional security concerns

Considering the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen, and a changing security landscape that features active insurgencies, the projected growth in nuclear power creates security complications. Critical nuclear power infrastructure will be an attractive target for violent non-state actors. Over the past decade, these actors have proved to be well-organized. In 2012, the computer virus Shamoon [was used](#) to target Saudi Aramco in one of the most destructive cyberattacks in the region. Similarly, according to the Saudi-led



coalition in Yemen, between 2015 and 2021 the Houthis, an [Iran-aligned militia](#), fired [430 ballistic missiles and launched 851 drone attacks](#) on Saudi Arabia, targeting oil facilities. The same militia [attacked the UAE's capital](#) in 2022 and threatened to target its nuclear power plant earlier. A nuclear disaster in the world's busiest oil shipping area, the Arabian Gulf, would put one-third of the world's oil production and the global economy at risk.

For nuclear and other dual-use technologies, sabotage is not the only concern. Theft and trafficking, whether for profit or terrorism, are highly possible. For transnational armed non-state actors, ungoverned areas under conflict create favorable circumstances for such activities.

By 2017, Daesh, also known as ISIS, [controlled](#) approximately 45,377 square kilometers of territory and 2.5 million people in Iraq and Syria—larger than Denmark or Switzerland. The terrorist group was able to secretly develop the first non-state actor's [chemical weapons program](#); tried to acquire radioactive materials; and operated the largest smuggling network in the region, including routes for weapons transfers.

In such a risky environment, any nuclear power program must adopt extra measures to prevent theft or sabotage, based on regular risk assessments. Furthermore, these nuclear security and safety risks necessitate cross-border cooperation, with Middle Eastern countries maintaining effective channels for collaboration on emergency preparedness and crisis management. This could also increase transparency about nuclear activities and reduce the risk of a nuclear arms race.

Nuclear proliferation and changing geopolitics

Historically, superpower rivalry during the Cold War influenced regional ambitions for nuclear weapons. But only after 1967, when Israel was believed to have secretly developed the region's first nuclear weapons, did countries like Iraq and Libya seek the bomb (and fail to obtain it). The risk of nuclear proliferation rose again in the early 2000s, when Iran's suspicious nuclear activities came to light. That risk grew further after the collapse of the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action](#), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. Troubled by the idea of a nuclear weapon controlled by Tehran, Saudi Arabia [promised to seek a nuclear bomb](#) as soon as possible if Iran developed one.

Arab states have been suspicious of Iran's nuclear program since day one, but what makes them much more alarmed now is skepticism about the US commitment to their security. Mistrust between Gulf states and the United States grew after


the 2019 Houthis' [major attack](#) on Saudi oil facilities, which cut oil production in half and shocked the global market. Dissatisfied by the US response, Gulf states started questioning US regional security guarantees. President Joe Biden's administration got off on the wrong foot with Gulf states by reconsidering security concessions promised by the Trump's administration, including arms sales. The Gulf states find Biden's "democracies good, non-democracies bad" view, as presented in the [National Security Strategy](#) released in October, alarming in two aspects: First, as part of the non-democracies group, Arab states are being offered a second-class partnership that comes with fewer benefits and lower credibility. Second, the region is being deprioritized on the US foreign policy agenda, with less US involvement in, and liability for, regional security.

Tensions rose even more following the OPEC decision to cut oil production, after which the United States [accused](#) Gulf states of siding with Russia in the Ukraine war. Amid calls to halt arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, the United States canceled a [key meeting](#) with the Gulf states on integrated air and missile defense, and promised to re-evaluate the relationship with Saudi Arabia.

As a result of these developments, Arabs—and Gulf states in particular—started to believe they should shore up the region's security independently and explore nontraditional strategies and partnerships. Thus it was not surprising to see a [recent de-escalation deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia brokered by China](#) and, earlier, [Riyadh holding three summits with China](#), paving the way for cooperation on a wide range of issues, including defense, security, and nuclear energy.

Is Saudi Arabia the next nuclear weapons state?

Recently, the last chances to salvage the Iranian deal seemed to vanish, as Iran decided to [massively expand uranium enrichment](#) to 60 percent at its Fordow underground facility. In response, the Saudi



foreign minister [warned](#) that “all bets are off” if Iran gets the bomb and vowed that Gulf states would act to reinforce their security. But what does “all bets are off” entail? And how far could the Saudis and other Gulf states go? For the past two decades, Saudi Arabia has shown interest in nuclear energy and sought cooperation with major exporters of nuclear power technology. [Recent updates](#) about the Saudi atomic project show progress on human resources development, regulatory frameworks, and preliminary studies for nuclear power projects. However, the country has no substantial nuclear-related infrastructure, not even a research reactor. Speculation about Saudi Arabia seeking the bomb are built on three observations. First, the Kingdom refuses to follow the UAE’s “gold standard” by signing the 123 agreement and giving up the right to enrich uranium. As part of its nonproliferation policy, the United States demands that partners sign the agreement in exchange for receiving the technology and nuclear materials needed for nuclear energy projects. Saudi Arabia’s hesitance to sign the agreement could be a red flag. Still, enriching uranium is a sovereign right that many countries with clean records of peaceful nuclear activities have practiced.

Second, a [2020 report](#) on secret cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia on uranium mining and extraction brought more attention to the Saudis’ activities. Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to develop its own nuclear fuel for peaceful and commercial purposes have been [no secret](#). While this is a legitimate right granted under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the history of nuclear secrecy makes some states doubtful. Yet it is essential to recognize that the product of uranium mining and extraction, yellow cake, is produced commercially in over 20 countries worldwide, and it is a long way from weapons-grade uranium. Finally, Saudi Arabia has yet to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency additional protocol, which allows the agency to search for undeclared nuclear activities. In principle, Riyadh does not reject the protocol, as it already has a safeguards agreement in force with the agency since 2009. But Saudi Arabia has little reason to sign the additional protocol, given that its nuclear activities are [minimal](#). None of these observations prove that Saudi Arabia is seeking the bomb. In the absence of technical expertise and basic nuclear infrastructure, Saudi Arabia is far from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Considering the acute threat from Iran and the skepticism about US security guarantees, Saudi Arabia could be aiming for nuclear hedging: not now, but not never. Based on the [hedging theory](#), countries like Saudi Arabia would pursue the bomb if allies’ security guarantees vanished. So, is the US security assurance for Arab states sufficient? For now, the answer is still yes.

A solution within reach

In the Middle East, the predominant approach for dealing with nuclear proliferation is problematic. It narrowly focuses on predicting the next possible proliferator while ignoring root causes that may make proliferation inevitable. From a realistic point of view, a spiral effect of proliferation is highly likely if security threats continue to exist while trust among rivals is missing.

In particular, Israel’s secret nuclear weapons continue to be perceived as a threat by some countries in the region. As a result, Israel’s nuclear program contributes to proliferation as much as Iranian nuclear activities do. As long as compliance is not required from all countries, rivals may find themselves with no option, from a security perspective, but to pursue weaponization. Only a comprehensive approach will be effective and sustainable.

Despite its shortcomings and the obstacles in its path, [the UN General Assembly-mandated Conference](#) on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction remains the most promising option to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region while securing the right for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Similar to the five [existing nuclear-weapon-free zones](#), but with an extended scope to reinforce the global ban on chemical and biological weapons, a negotiated and inclusive Middle East zone could incorporate a robust compliance verification system complemented with nuclear security arrangements and possibly a joint nuclear fuel cycle in which enrichment is collectively overseen to ensure transparency.

Discussions on the proposed zone are held annually and open to all concerned states, including Israel, Iran, and the five nuclear weapon states. However, the zone is no closer to realization than it was in 1974, when first proposed by Egypt and Iran.

Persuading all countries in the region, particularly Israel, to adopt a WMD-free zone will be difficult. But revitalizing the proposal and showing political commitment from the international community, including the United States and European Union, is timely and more needed than ever.

[Almuntaser Albalawi](#) is a nuclear engineer and political scientist by training. He works as a doctoral researcher in the International Security Department at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). He is also a project member of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Network (CBWNet) for reinforcing global norms. Previously, he headed the CBRN Threat Office at the Royal Scientific Society, where he worked on nuclear security projects in the Middle East. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of any other entity.

EDITOR’S COMMENT: Wishes and reality are two totally different things when Iran and Turkey will go nuclear along with Israel that is already a nuclear state. Proposing WMD-free zones is just for making attractive titles in articles and publications.





Arestovich: Ukraine could restore nuclear status in 6-9 months

Source: <https://en.topwar.ru/214706-arestovich-ukraina-mogla-by-vosstanovit-jadernyj-status-za-6-9-mesjacev.html>

Apr 11 – Former adviser in the office of the President of Ukraine Oleksiy Arestovich made another resonant statement. This time we are talking about the "nuclear status of Ukraine."

According to Arestovich, "Ukraine could restore its nuclear status in about 6-9 months." Former adviser to Zelensky's office: But we thus violate international treaties. And we are fighting for their observance.

It turns out that Ukraine is fighting "for the observance of international treaties." That is, for the protection of the rights of national minorities, for freedom of religion, and the fight against Nazism, and for providing opportunities for the political opposition to work in the country, and against political repression ...

Arestovich: Here is the question: it is more profitable for us to get a nuclear [weapon](#) or remain a country with a civilized behavior, advocating for the nation within the framework of universal trends?


Just such a "universal trend" was demonstrated yesterday by the radicals who tried to disrupt the procession of the Orthodox believers and who shouted curses at the elderly and women with children who were going to pray in the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra.

Arestovich: We are in such a situation that it is better for us to be adherents of international norms and rules.

Recall that a few months ago, Arestovich was fired from his post as an adviser to the office of the President of Ukraine for his words that a multi-story building in Dnepropetrovsk was hit as a result of the operation of his own (Ukrainian) air defense system. Arestovich made his statements about nuclear weapons in a sweater with his own words "Two or three weeks", which became a meme. In this regard, users suggested that he prepare a sweater with a different inscription: "Six to nine months."

Ukraine's secret attempt to retake the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant

Source: <https://archive.is/e7EKW#selection-803.0-1195.105>



Apr 07 – In the dead of night last October a Ukrainian special forces team boarded a 40ft armoured patrol boat, taking up positions at its three heavy machineguns and Mk19 automatic grenade launcher. They were among nearly 600 elite troops scattered along the north bank of the Dnipro River, which carves through Zaporizhzhia region. The teams boarded more than 30 vessels bristling with weapons, formidable gifts from friends in the West. Their orders: to launch an assault to recapture the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant from the Russians on the opposite bank. Kyiv has never acknowledged attacking Europe's largest nuclear power station but



Ukrainian special forces, military intelligence and navy personnel involved have revealed to The Times details of the highly dangerous operation to recover the site. By the night of the raid, Russian troops had held the power station for over six months, using its territory to bombard Ukrainian cities across the water and a major steel plant in Nikopol. [Ukraine's](#) desperate attempt to retake the facility from President Putin's troops, and the reasons it gave for doing so, highlight the risk to Europe of nuclear disaster at the contested plant. Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), visited the site last week in an effort to broker a deal to demilitarise the area around its six nuclear reactors.

"It is very, very important that we agree on the fundamental principle that a nuclear power plant should not be attacked under any circumstances," Grossi said during his visit, which took place a week after The Times asked the IAEA to comment on the raid. "It shouldn't be used to attack others, likewise. A nuclear accident with radiological consequences will spare no one."



The International Atomic Energy Agency inspected the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant last week – FREDRIK DAHL/REUTERS

On October 19 the Ukrainian soldiers were excited. If they survived the war, their mission would be one to tell their grandchildren about, an officer involved said.

"The idea was that this would be an infantry-only battle. They wouldn't be able to use artillery against us, as this is a nuclear plant," the officer said. Drawn from select units of Ukraine's military intelligence, GUR, and including the Shaman battalion, the Kraken Regiment and the Ukrainian Foreign Legion, even the youngest among his brothers-in-arms were already battle-hardened. Yet none of them expected the resistance they would face at the power plant.

"The Russians built a very dense defence, they mined everything," the officer said. "When we were approaching they even pulled up tanks and artillery and started firing at us right on the water."

Despite the site's strategic importance, the Russian occupation was ill disciplined, chaotic and dangerous, according to Petro Kotin, president of Ukraine's state nuclear enterprise Energoatom.

"There are Russian national guards, FSB [the security service], Omon [special police], DNR [Donetsk People's Republic], LNR [Luhansk People's Republic], the Kadyrov guys [serving Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the Chechen Republic] and they communicate with each other only a limited amount," Kotin added.



“They do whatever they want whenever it comes into their minds. For example, one group starts to repair the line that connects ZNPP [the plant] to the Ukrainian electricity grid, then another group will shell it.”

Although the reactors [have been shut down](#) since September 11, the plant needs electricity to pump coolant around nuclear fuel if it is to avoid disaster, Kotin said. “The plant has been in full blackout mode six times already, working only on backup diesel generators, now down to two weeks’ fuel supply,” he said. “If they stop you will have melting in six reactors and six spent fuel pools. Some reactors will melt in three hours, some will take a day.”




Before the raid Russian troops had tortured staff responsible for the safe operation of the reactors, plant workers said, increasing the risk of the type of human error that caused catastrophe at Chernobyl. Two days before the assault, on October 17, Energoatom reported that Oleh Kostyukov and Oleh Oshek, two senior employees essential to the reactor’s safe operation, had been abducted by Russian troops, raising the hazard level still further.

By October each of the seven pillars of nuclear safety had been violated at the plant, according to the IAEA, which said the presence of Russian troops on its territory was inviting disaster. [President Zelensky’s](#) administration had appealed to the United Nations to help evict [Putin’s](#) forces, but weeks of diplomacy had failed to resolve the risk. Ukraine decided to take matters into its own hands. As special forces speedboats crossed a stretch of river nearly three miles wide, precision HIMARS rockets provided by the US smashed into Russian positions on the riverbank.

“This is our artillery and HIMARS working. Here they are shelling us in the water, on the Dnipro River,” the officer narrated as he showed video of the assault to The Times, explaining how his patrol boat had probed Russian defences on the bank for weaknesses. Asked whether the US had provided targets for the HIMARS before the raid, a US defence source confirmed that “time-sensitive” intelligence was provided to Ukrainian special forces, although they declined to give specific details. “We do share information with them but they are responsible for the selection, prioritisation and ultimate decisions to engage threats,” the source said.



Once the Ukrainian boats had neared the shoreline, the Russian guns opened up, forcing the soldiers to change direction. “We had speedboats, a lot of boats,” said the officer. “We repeatedly assaulted their positions, from our shore to their shore. They kept on shelling us, really heavy shelling.”



A handful of the Ukrainian special forces teams in smaller boats managed to make it to the shore as dawn broke, engaging the Russians in a three-hour firefight on the outskirts of the town of Enerhodar, which adjoins the plant. The main force was unable to land, however.

“It was impossible for such a large group to penetrate,” the special forces officer said. “With smaller groups, yes, we were advancing, penetrating and fighting them. But with a large group it was impossible, as they were lurking everywhere.”

His team tried to engage the tanks on the shoreline but it was difficult to fire anti-tank weapons while moving at speed over the water. The larger boats manoeuvred to try to attack Enerhodar from the opposite flank but a constant hail of fire eventually forced all the Ukrainians to withdraw.

“A lot of lives were saved thanks to the commander of this operation. When he realised it would be very, very difficult and we would take heavy casualties, instead of stupidly saying, ‘Go forward!’ he decided we could retreat.”

Even among senior Ukrainian officials who are adamant the Russians must be driven out, the attempt to take the plant by force is considered controversial.

Energoatom’s Kotin said: “If our army can advance south towards Crimea, toward Melitopol, this is the only option — no direct shelling of the plant, no direct advance on the territory of the plant with direct actions against the Russians. It is very dangerous to do such things near nuclear material. Any damage will bring radiation to the people and to the whole world.”

However, the greatest threat to the plant remains the Russian presence there, Kotin stressed. Today the Russians are using control centres as barracks, installing gun emplacements on the roofs of plant buildings and constructing fortifications close to storage sites of radioactive material. They keep ammunition trucks inside the reactors’ turbine halls, risking a nuclear incident that could blight Ukraine for decades, he added.



“We see the progressive degradation of the plant in all directions — the site itself, equipment and personnel; all type of programmes which in normal, peaceful times would be considered unacceptable,” Kotin added.

“We are in a state of emergency, waiting until something bad happens, and that could happen at any time.”

EDITOR’S COMMENT: Just another proof against Western propaganda that Russia is bombarding the nuclear power plant that is under its control since the beginning of the war.

‘A new era’: Germany quits nuclear power, closing its final three plants

By Laura Paddison, Nadine Schmidt, and Inke Kappeler (CNN)

Source: <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/15/europe/germany-nuclear-phase-out-climate-intl/index.html>

Apr 15 – Germany’s final three [nuclear power plants](#) close their doors on Saturday, marking the end of the country’s nuclear era that has spanned more than six decades.

Nuclear power has long been contentious in Germany.


There are those who want to end reliance on a technology they view as unsustainable, [dangerous](#) and a distraction from speeding up renewable energy.

But for others, closing down nuclear plants is short-sighted. They see it as turning off the tap on a reliable source of low-carbon

energy at a time when drastic cuts to planet-heating pollution are needed.

Even as these debates rumble on, and despite [last-minute calls](#) to keep the plants online amid an energy crisis, the German government has been steadfast.

“The position of the German government is clear: nuclear power is not green. Nor is it sustainable,” Steffi Lemke, Germany’s Federal Minister for the Environment and Consumer Protection and a Green Party member, told CNN.



Sources: International Atomic Energy Agency, World Nuclear Association
Graphic: Antonio Jarne and Henrik Pettersson, CNN

plant in Pennsylvania in 1979 and the 1986 catastrophe at Chernobyl that created a cloud of radioactive waste which reached parts of Germany. In 2000, the German government pledged to phase out nuclear

■ Decommissioned nuclear reactors
■ Active nuclear reactors, which will be decommissioned April 15

“We are embarking on a new era of energy production,” she said.

A plan decades in the making

The closure of the three plants – Emsland, Isar 2 and Neckarwestheim – represents the culmination of a plan set in motion more than 20 years ago. But its roots are even older.

In the 1970s, a strong anti-nuclear movement in Germany emerged. Disparate groups came together to protest new power plants, concerned about the risks posed by the technology and, for some, the link to nuclear weapons. The movement gave birth to the Green Party, which is now part of the governing coalition.

Nuclear accidents fueled the opposition: The partial meltdown of the Three Mile Island nuclear power



power and start shutting down plants. But when a new government came to power in 2009, it seemed – briefly – as if nuclear would get a reprieve as a bridging technology to help the country move to renewable energy.

Then Fukushima happened. In March 2011, an earthquake and tsunami [caused three reactors](#) of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant to melt down. For many in Germany, Japan's [worst nuclear disaster](#) was confirmation "that assurances that a nuclear accident of a large scale can't happen are not credible," Miranda Schreurs, professor of environment and climate policy at the Technical University of Munich, told CNN. Three days later then-Chancellor Angela Merkel – a physicist who was previously pro-nuclear – made a speech called it an "inconceivable catastrophe for Japan" and a "turning point" for the world. She announced Germany would accelerate a nuclear phase-out, with older plants shuttered immediately.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, however, provided another plot twist.

Fearful of its energy security without Russian gas, the German government delayed its plan to close the final three plants in December 2022. Some urged a rethink. But the government declined, agreeing to keep them running only until April 15.

For those in the anti-nuclear movement, it's a moment of victory. "It is a great achievement for millions of people who have been protesting nuclear in Germany and worldwide for decades," Paul-Marie Manière, a spokesperson for Greenpeace, told CNN.

A polarizing energy

For critics of Germany's policy, however, it's irrational to turn off a low-carbon source of energy as the impacts of the climate crisis intensify. "We need to keep existing, safe nuclear reactors operating while simultaneously ramping up renewables as fast as possible," Leah Stokes, a professor of climate and energy policy at the University of California, Santa Barbara, told CNN.

The big risk, she said, is that fossil fuels fill the energy gap left by nuclear. Reductions in Germany's nuclear energy since Fukushima have been primarily offset by increases in coal, according to [research](#) published last year.

Germany plans to replace the roughly 6% of electricity generated by the three nuclear plants with renewables, but also gas and coal. More than 30% of Germany's energy comes from coal, the dirtiest of the fossil fuels – and the government has made controversial decisions to turn to coal to help with energy security. In January, [protestors including Greta Thunberg](#) converged on the west German village of Lützerath in an unsuccessful attempt to stop it being demolished to mine the coal underneath it.

"Building new coal capacity is the opposite of what we need," said Stokes. Fossil fuels are a climate problem, but they're also a health risk, she pointed out. Air pollution from fossil fuels is responsible for [8.7 million deaths](#) a year, according to a recent analysis.



The Gorleben nuclear waste storage facility, an interim storage facility for spent fuel elements and high-level radioactive waste – Sina Schultdt/picture-alliance/dpa/AP

Veronika Grimm, one of Germany's leading economists, told CNN that keeping nuclear power plants running for longer would have allowed Germany more time "to electrify extensively," especially as renewable energy growth "remains sluggish." But supporters of the nuclear shutdown argue it will ultimately hasten the end of fossil fuels. Germany has pledged to close its last coal-fired power station [no later than 2038](#), with a 2030 deadline in some areas. It's aiming for 80% of electricity to come from renewables by the end of this decade.

While more coal was added in the months following Fukushima, Schreurs said, nuclear shutdowns have seen a big push on clean energy. "That urgency and demand can be what it takes to push forward on the growth of renewables," she said.



Representatives for Germany's renewable energy industry said the shutdown will open the door for more investment into clean energy. "Germany's phase-out of nuclear power is a historic event and an overdue step in energy terms," Simone Peter, president of the German Renewable Energy Federation (BEE), told CNN. "It is high time that we leave the nuclear age behind and consistently organize the renewable age."

The impacts of nuclear power shouldn't be overlooked either, Schreurs said, pointing to the carbon pollution created by uranium mining as well as the [risk of health complications](#) for miners. Plus, it creates a dependency on Russia, which supplies uranium for nuclear plants, she added.

Nuclear has also shown itself to have vulnerabilities to the climate crisis. France was forced to reduce nuclear power generation last year as the rivers used to cool reactors became too hot during Europe's blistering heatwave.

A million-year problem

Now Germany must work out what do with the deadly, high-level radioactive waste, which can remain dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years.


Currently, the nuclear waste is kept in interim storage next to the nuclear plants being decommissioned. But the [search is on](#) to find a permanent location where the waste can be stored safely for a million years.

The site needs to be deep – hundreds of meters underground. Only certain types of rock will do: Crystalline granite, rock salt or clay rock. It must be geologically stable with no risks of earthquakes or signs of underground rivers.

The process is likely to be fraught, complex and breathtakingly long – potentially lasting more than 100 years.

BGE, the Federal Company for Radioactive Waste Disposal, estimates a final site won't be chosen until between 2046 and 2064. After that, it will take decades more to build the repository, fill it with the waste and seal it.

Government plan for storing nuclear waste in Germany



Source: Germany's Federal Company for Radioactive Waste Disposal
Graphic: Henrik Pettersson, CNN

CNN

What are other countries doing?

Plenty of other countries are treading paths similar to Germany's. Denmark [passed a resolution](#) in the 1980s not to construct nuclear power plants, Switzerland voted in 2017 to phase out nuclear power, Italy [closed its last reactors](#) in 1990 and Austria's one nuclear plant has never been used.

But, in the context of the war in Ukraine, soaring energy prices and pressure to reduce carbon pollution, others still want nuclear in the mix. The UK, in the process of building a nuclear power plant, said in its [recent climate strategy](#) that energy nuclear power has a "crucial" role in "creating secure, affordable and clean energy."

France, which gets [about 70%](#) of its power from nuclear, is planning [six new reactors](#), and Finland opened a new nuclear plant last year. Even Japan, still dealing with the aftermath of Fukushima, is considering restarting reactors.



The US, the world's biggest nuclear power, is also investing in nuclear energy and, in March, started up a new nuclear reactor, Vogtle 3 in Georgia – the first in years. But experts suggest this doesn't mark the start of a nuclear ramp-up. Vogtle 3 came online six years late and at a cost of \$30 billion, twice the initial budget.

It encapsulates the big problem that afflicts the whole nuclear industry: making the economics add up. New plants are expensive and can take more than a decade to build. "Even the countries that are talking pro-nuclear are having big trouble developing nuclear power," Schreurs said. Many nuclear power plants in Europe, the US and elsewhere are aging – plants have an operating life of around 40 to 60 years. As Germany puts an end to its nuclear era, it's coming up to crunch time for others, Schreurs said. "There will be a moment of decision as to whether nuclear energy has a future"

EDITOR'S COMMENT: The majority of the country's citizens are against this decision, according to the INSA Institute poll on behalf of the newspaper Bild am Sonntag. 52% of the sample thinks it's wrong that the three remaining nuclear power plants will be taken off the grid this week, while 37% think it's the right decision. The survey was conducted on April 6 in a representative sample of 1,004 citizens. But who cares about what citizens think? A new era of "German-type" democracy.

Finland's OL3 nuclear reactor resumes test output

Source: <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/finlands-ol3-nuclear-reactor-resumes-test-output-2023-03-15/>



Mar 15 – Finland's much-delayed Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) nuclear reactor resumed test production of electricity on Wednesday after an outage of more than two months, facility operator TVO said.

In a [blow to Finland's energy security](#), the operator in October said [damage was found](#) after test production, further delaying a startup that was originally scheduled to take place as long ago as 2009.

The reactor was briefly back in test mode in late December and early January before being closed for maintenance.

TVO said it expected OL3 to ramp up to full capacity on Wednesday followed by tests in the coming weeks, adding regular production was planned to begin on April 17.


During testing in September, OL3's output for the first time hit full capacity of 1,600 megawatts, making it the most powerful electricity production facility in Europe and the third-most powerful globally, according to TVO.

Why was Olkiluoto-3 delayed?

The 1.6 gigawatt (GW) reactor, built by the French-led Areva-Siemens consortium, had originally been [due to open in 2009](#).

Using the third-generation European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) model, which was designed to improve safety and reduce costs, it was the first nuclear power station to be procured in Europe after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Olkiluoto-3 was meant

Nuclear activity in Finland:
Potential new sites



to be a showcase of French-German know-how, touted as offering higher power and better safety. But the project was plagued by technological problems and cost overruns.

The cost ballooned from an initial estimate of €3 billion (\$3.27 billion) to around €11 billion, according to the 2019 World Nuclear Industry Report.

The Finnish Economy Ministry and the country's nuclear regulator said the project was beset by a string of technical and safety setbacks due to poor project management and workmanship.

The repeated delays led to bitter compensation disputes between the Finnish operator TVO and Areva, with the latter ultimately agreeing in March 2018 to pay TVO financial compensation of €450 million.

Mushroom Clouds to Near Misses: 10 Nuclear War Movies

Source: <https://www.miragenews.com/mushroom-clouds-to-near-misses-10-nuclear-war-988472/>

Since the dawn of the Atomic Age, the threat of nuclear war has loomed large over our world, casting a shadow of fear and uncertainty. As nations continue to develop and stockpile these weapons of mass destruction, the possibility of a devastating conflict remains ever-present.

Over the years, filmmakers have taken on the challenge of portraying the horrifying reality of nuclear war and its aftermath, producing gripping and thought-provoking movies that force audiences to confront the stark consequences of such a cataclysmic event. In this article, we will explore the top ten films that capture the tension, terror, and tragedy of nuclear war.

1. **Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964)**

Directed by Stanley Kubrick, this dark comedy explores the absurdity and madness of the Cold War era. Starring Peter Sellers in multiple roles, the film follows the story of an unhinged American general who orders a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union, setting off a series of events that bring the world to the brink of annihilation.

2. **The Day After (1983)**

This made-for-TV movie directed by Nicholas Meyer depicts the horrific aftermath of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. With its graphic portrayal of the devastation wrought by nuclear weapons, *The Day After* is considered one of the most powerful anti-nuclear films ever made.

3. **Threads (1984)**

This British television film, directed by Mick Jackson, is a chilling portrayal of the impact of a nuclear war on the city of Sheffield, England. The film's gritty realism and unflinching depiction of the breakdown of society in the aftermath of a nuclear strike make *Threads* a haunting and unforgettable viewing experience.

4. **WarGames (1983)**

Directed by John Badham, this thriller stars Matthew Broderick as a young computer hacker who inadvertently sets off a chain of events that bring the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war. The film explores the dangers of relying too heavily on technology and raises important questions about the ethics of nuclear deterrence.


5. **On the Beach (1959)**

Based on the novel by Nevil Shute, this film directed by Stanley Kramer follows the lives of a group of people in Australia as they await the arrival of deadly radiation from a global nuclear war. Starring Gregory Peck, Ava Gardner, and Fred Astaire, *On the Beach* is a poignant and emotional exploration of humanity's struggle to come to terms with its own self-destructive tendencies.

6. **Fail-Safe (1964)**

Directed by Sidney Lumet and starring Henry Fonda, this tense Cold War drama tells the story of a technical malfunction that sends a group of American bombers on a mission to destroy Moscow. The film's suspenseful plot and powerful performances make *Fail-Safe* an unforgettable examination of the potential consequences of human error in the nuclear age.

7. **When the Wind Blows (1986)**



This British animated film, directed by Jimmy Murakami, is based on the graphic novel by Raymond Briggs. The story follows an elderly couple who naively attempt to prepare for a nuclear attack. Combining dark humor with a sobering message, *When the Wind Blows* is a unique and memorable exploration of the impact of nuclear war on ordinary people.

8. **Crimson Tide (1995)**

This American submarine film, directed by Tony Scott and starring Denzel Washington and Gene Hackman, tells the story of a conflict between the executive officer and the commanding officer of a nuclear submarine. When they receive conflicting orders regarding a potential nuclear strike, the two officers must navigate the tense situation to prevent a potential global catastrophe. “Crimson Tide” is a gripping and intense portrayal of the challenges and responsibilities of commanding a nuclear-armed vessel.

9. **Miracle Mile (1988)**

In this cult classic directed by Steve De Jarnatt, a man receives a frantic phone call warning him that a nuclear missile is about to hit Los Angeles. He embarks on a desperate race against time to find his girlfriend and escape the city before it's too late. *Miracle Mile's* suspenseful story and surprising twists make it a standout entry in the nuclear war film genre.

10. **By Dawn's Early Light (1990)**

This made-for-TV movie, directed by Jack Sholder, presents a chilling scenario in which the United States and the Soviet Union engage in a full-scale nuclear conflict. Starring Powers Boothe, Rebecca De Mornay, and James Earl Jones, *By Dawn's Early Light* explores the complex political and military decisions involved in nuclear warfare and the potential for global catastrophe.

These ten films offer a powerful and thought-provoking look at the terrifying reality of nuclear war and its potentially catastrophic consequences for humanity.

By presenting compelling stories and raising important questions about our responsibility to avoid such a devastating conflict, these movies serve as both entertainment and cautionary tales. As we continue to grapple with the threat of nuclear war in the modern world, these films remind us of the importance of pursuing peace and disarmament to ensure the survival of our planet and future generations.



US warns Russia not to touch American nuclear technology at Ukrainian nuclear plant

Source: <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/18/politics/us-warns-russia-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant/index.html>


Apr 19 – The US has sensitive nuclear technology at a [nuclear power plant](#) inside Ukraine and is warning Russia not to touch it, according to a letter the US Department of Energy sent to Russia's state-owned nuclear energy firm Rosatom last month.

In the letter, which was reviewed by CNN and is dated March 17, 2023, the director of the Energy Department's Office of Nonproliferation Policy, Andrea Ferkile, tells Rosatom's director general that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Enerhodar “contains US-origin nuclear technical data that is export-controlled by the United States Government.”

Goods, software and technology are subject to US export controls when it is possible for them to be used in a way that undermines US national security interests.

The Energy Department letter comes as Russian forces continue to control the plant, which is the largest nuclear power station in Europe and sits in a part of the Zaporizhzhia region that Russia occupied after its invasion of Ukraine last February. The plant has frequently been disconnected from Ukraine's power grid due to intense Russian shelling in the area, raising fears across Europe of a nuclear accident.

While the plant is still physically operated by Ukrainian staff, Rosatom manages it. The Energy Department warned Rosatom in the letter that it is “unlawful” for any Russian citizens or entities to handle the US technology. CNN has reached out to Rosatom for comment.



“It is unlawful under United States law for non-authorized persons, including, but not limited to, Russian citizens and Russian entities,” the letter says, “such as Rosatom and its subsidiaries, to knowingly and willfully access, possess, control, export, store, seize, review, re-export, ship, transfer, copy, manipulate such technology or technical data, or direct, or authorize others to do the same, without such Russian entities becoming authorized recipients by the Secretary of the US Department of Energy.” It is not clear whether



Rosatom has responded to the letter. The Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration told CNN in a statement that the letter is authentic.

The letters were first reported by the news outlet RBC Ukraine.

[Satellite images show changes Russia are making to occupied nuclear plant - 03:36 - Source: CNN](#)

“The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration can confirm that the letter is legitimate,” said Shayela Hassan, the deputy director of public affairs for the National Nuclear

Security Administration.

She added: “The Secretary of Energy has the statutory responsibility for authorizing the transfer of unclassified civilian nuclear technology and assistance to foreign atomic energy activities. DOE does not comment on regulatory activities.” Another letter from Ferkile to the Energy Department’s Inspector General, reviewed by CNN and dated October 24, 2022, outlines the technology the US has exported to Ukraine for use in the Zaporizhzhia plant and reiterates that the department has “no record of any current authorization to transfer this technology and technical data to any Russian national or entity.”

The Energy Department’s Office of Nuclear Energy has been public about the US’ support for the plant, and stated on its website in June 2021 that “the United States helped implement new maintenance procedures and operations at the reactor that should ultimately strengthen energy security” in Ukraine.

Testing Gaming Technology to Train Nuclear Workforce

By Kristen Mally Dean

Source: <https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20230419-testing-gaming-technology-to-train-nuclear-workforce>

Apr 19 – Most nuclear reactors in the U.S. were built decades ago by a workforce that has retired or will do so soon. That generation used paper checklists and traditional blueprints, tended to stay with one employer for years and often worked locally.

Today’s technicians, subject matter experts and engineers have different skills and expectations. They came of age in a world where computers seem to be everywhere, where employers and hometowns change often, and where remote work is more possible. They’re also very familiar with video games, digital paths to information and ubiquitous personal devices. The [nuclear power](#) industry, undergoing a renaissance because of its potential to reliably deliver more clean electricity, urgently needs to attract and train these workers to maintain existing plants and build anticipated new ones.

A small group of engineers at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) [Argonne National Laboratory](#) addresses this need in a recently released report, “Deploying Extended Reality (XR) for Digital Operations and Maintenance at the Mechanisms Engineering Test Loop (METL).” Their approach focuses on interest in and familiarity with personal devices and video game technology to explore how they can be used as a toehold for the next generation of nuclear professionals.

Engaging a New Generation

According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, a single nuclear power plant employs 500 to 800 workers in an impressive range of highly trained positions: carpenters, welders, electricians, health physicists, nuclear engineers, financial managers and more. The nuclear power industry wants and needs to develop this talent from a wide pool of trades, community colleges, four-year universities and the military.

Derek Kultgen thinks a more engaging, digitally enhanced workplace can help. Kultgen is operations manager of Argonne’s Mechanisms Test Loop Facility (METL), the nation’s largest liquid metal test facility where small- and medium-sized components are tested for use in advanced, sodium-cooled nuclear reactors. The facility holds 750 gallons of reactor-grade sodium that can be heated to 650 degrees Celsius



and it is equipped with more than 1,000 sensors that collect diagnostic data. Even when scientists aren't running experiments at METL, it provides enormous value because of its usefulness in training people and collecting operational data.

"As everything transitions to digital, there is an opportunity for the nuclear industry to use extended reality to break down the silos where useful data resides and bring data to the people who need it," said Kultgen. "These digital silos include Computer-Aided Design (CAD) information, operating and maintenance procedures, real data coming off the equipment, manufacturer data, data on spare parts, historical data of how this equipment has operated, and more."

"This breaking down of information barriers between occupations means meaningful work across the board, and that may result in a future workforce that is trained, competent and content enough to stay for a while," he continued.

Kultgen and his colleagues at METL began experimenting with assisted, augmented, virtual and mixed reality. They investigated off the shelf hardware and software that will be familiar to many video gamers: headsets, high-fidelity visualization software, tablets with light detection and ranging (LiDAR) technology, and hard hats equipped with advanced optics, short-range wireless technology and voice-activated software. With help from a computational designer, Kultgen used these items to create a digital version of METL. The result, in conjunction with a live data feed from METL, is a digital twin of the 220+ heater zones used to keep METL's sodium molten. In one example, Kultgen's team overlaid images of an 800-gallon sodium tank with accompanying valves and pipes clearly labeled. The tank appeared true to size, oriented correctly and fitted properly within the actual space. In its virtual form, a technician could see it covered in insulation and casings or as a rendering with obscuring layers removed. Each part was linked to a unique QR code containing its product serial number. If a novice technician was sent to METL to find and repair a single valve or pipe on that tank, she could find it quickly and repair it with fewer mistakes.

From personal experience, Kultgen knows tradesmen would have found this and other features helpful as they constructed or maintained the facility. And hard hats equipped with voice-activated software mean workers can access information from multiple sources or complete computer-based tasks hands-free.

Imagine standing in front of a pump and being able to see its graph of flow rates and temperatures on a digital screen built into your hard hat. Say, "Asset Information," and the screen shows you the pump's serial number, manufacturer and vendor with its tech support's email address and information about ordering lead time. Capture a screenshot or stream live video of the failing pump, send it to a colleague in another city and get a response in your ear or via text on a tiny screen positioned on a small boom at your cheekbone, just below your line of sight. This capability brings the power of a laptop onto the facility floor — minus the laptop.

"We are often working in tight spaces where even a tablet can seem cumbersome," said Kultgen, who sometimes wears full-body, insulated protective gear while working with others to adjust unwieldy 100-pound pieces of equipment. "The technology is so good now that a lot of information can be communicated between headsets and an ordinary smart phone. Being able to work hands-free with unobstructed vision and maximum reliable data starts to present more practical applications."

A Mutually Beneficial Direction

The technology is decidedly cool. Future workers of all backgrounds will already be familiar with it on some level. That's not because they were introduced to it formally in school, but because they learned so much about it informally, outside of school. They are already comfortable with the digital path to data, which again means a positive breakdown of previously siloed information.

This can lead to new frontiers of innovation and opportunity. According to one vision narrative circulating among industry, academia and government, modernizing the nuclear workforce with digital twins, [artificial intelligence](#), and integrated big data could result in reduced operating costs, improved safety, fewer human errors and consequential events, and greater employee attraction, satisfaction and retention.

More trial runs at places like METL may help the gaming industry, too. Real-life industrial applications and experiments can expand the technology's use beyond the entertainment industry and into advanced manufacturing and facility operations and maintenance. After their experiments, the METL team has feedback to share. For example, one tested headset with excellent optics was deemed more appropriate for occasional communications between on-site technicians and remote subject matter experts than for everyday use due to its weight and bulkiness. Workers could use the headset to communicate and solve a problem together even if one was in London and the other was in Idaho.

"From an industry perspective, when a person on-site can use an iPad to run a complex diagnostic and then have a service technician from afar advise on how to fix an issue, it saves money on travel and increases uptime," said Chris Heckle, Argonne's director of the Materials Manufacturing Innovation Center, where scientists and engineers work to accelerate and scale up materials and processes. Kultgen added that an additional benefit is that it expands the range of locations where nuclear industry hires might do their jobs.

The METL team has ideas on what the gaming industry could test at the facility next, too.

"Infrared cameras could be useful," said Alex Grannan, a nuclear engineer who co-authored the report.

"Smoothly combining artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques to allow for natural language processing to understand commands and object detection, and identifying components and accessing



ICI C²BRNE DIARY – April 2023

schematics would also be cool. Many of these features exist to some extent already but they can improve in the future.” The adoption of extended reality tools may be an unexpected bridge between the nuclear industry’s historical and future success. “We have to ask not only how we can get a reactor built on budget and on deadline, but we need to attract and retain a knowledgeable workforce capable of operating and maintaining it,” said Kultgen. “These huge investments take time, so how do we keep trained, skilled people engaged in and committed to the nuclear industry?”

[Kristen Mally Dean](#) is Communications Coordinator at Argonne National Laboratory.



ICI
International
CBRNE
INSTITUTE



EXPLOSIVE NEWS

French minister says protesters are firing **MORTARS** to fire explosives at police as riots that topped King Charles' state visit continue

Source: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11901577/French-mob-set-police-vehicles-fire-Molotov-cocktails-rioting-continues.html>



Firefighters and Residents extinguish Burning trash who set fire on a building Rue Saint-Marc during a demonstration on Thursday

Mar 25 – France's Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin has said 'far-Left' rioters were using mortars to fire explosives at the police amid the intensified violence between security forces and protesters on Saturday.

Three police vehicles were completely burned out, and multiple officers injured.

The prefecture which covers Sainte-Soline in western France meanwhile revealed that two protestors were 'in a very serious condition' after being wounded, while others were being treated at the scene.

A long procession set off late this morning, comprising at least 6,000 people according to local authorities and around 25,000 according to the organisers. More than 3,000 members of the security forces were deployed, with 'at least 1,000' potentially violent activists, including some from Italy, present, officials said.

The violent scenes in Saite-Soline today came after days of violent protests nationwide over President Emmanuel Macron's pension reform that prompted the cancellation of a visit by King Charles III of the UK.

Mr Darmanin today said: 'In Sainte-Soline, the ultra-Left and the far-Left are extremely violent against our gendarmes. This is appalling and unacceptable.'

He added: 'No-one should tolerate this. My full support is with the police.'

Eleven people were already detained after police seized cold weapons, including petanque balls and meat knives, as well as explosives.

Earlier this week, Mr Darmanin accused anti-government thugs of 'trying to bring down the state and kill police officers.'

The scenes today saw police vehicles set alight by a rampaging mob using Molotov cocktails.

Thousands fought running battles with heavy armed officers at an illegal gathering on Saturday at Sainte-Soline, near Poitiers.

They were protesting against the deployment of new water-storage centre, as well as President [Emmanuel Macron](#) pushing the retirement age up from 60 to 62 without a parliamentary vote.





Riot mobile gendarmes, riding quad bikes, fire teargas shells towards protesters during a demonstration in Sainte-Soline today

'Police have completely lost control,' said one of the demonstrators at Saint-Soline.

'Vehicles have been set on fire using Molotov cocktails, and officers are running away, while firing tear gas cannisters at us.'

A police spokesman said: 'Explosives are being used against us, and we are trying to bring the situation under control.'

'There are radicals in the crowd who are trying to severely injure the forces of law and order.'

He said an estimated 6,000 had turned up to the protest – ecological demonstrators swelled by those demonstrating against Mr Macron's retirement reforms.

The controversial Sainte-Soline water reserve is one of 16 installations developed by a group of 400 farmers to reduce mains water usage in summer. Opponents claim these so-called 'megabasins' are reserved for large export-oriented grain farms, and work against the local community. It follows more than a week of intense social disorder across France that made cancelling the Charles III's visit inevitable. Threats made against him included the words 'Death to the King' - a macabre message that was scrawled by protesters on walls in Paris.

They prompted Mr Macron to say: 'I think it would not be responsible and would lack some common sense if we invited His Majesty the King and the Queen Consort for a state visit in the midst of the demonstrations.'

Senior politicians including Mr Macron had received threats evoking the guillotine used to execute Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette – the last rightful king and queen of France.



The words 'Death to the King' had even appeared in bright red graffiti on Place de la Concorde – the central Paris square where Louis and his wife were killed.

Another scrawled message read 'Charles III do you know the guillotine?'

The French feared the security of King Charles could not be guaranteed 'because of his interest in mingling with crowds,' according to security sources.

A crack team of officers from the SDLP Protection Service unit rigorously studied the monarch's profile.

'They became aware of the King's habit of impromptu handshakes, and talking to ordinary people whenever he could,' said a source who was involved in the planning of four-days of events.

'There are huge social tensions in France, and there is no doubt that such good manners could have been very dangerous indeed.'

The development was a major humiliation for Mr Macron, especially as a visit to Germany by the Royal couple next week will go ahead as planned. Eric Ciotti, leader of the opposition Republicans party in France, said the chaotic security situation was a national embarrassment. 'The visit of Charles III is cancelled by the government due to social unrest,' said Mr Ciotti.

'What an image for our country, which is not even able to ensure the security of a head of state'.

Macron was said to have wanted King Charles' visit to go ahead 'until the last minute' before he finally accepted that the situation was untenable amid nation-wide protest and rioting.

Sylvie Bermann, who served as Paris' ambassador to Britain between 2014 and 2017, said it would have been 'impossible' for Macron to have hosted the King during civil unrest in the country.

She added that a planned state banquet at the Palace of Versailles for Charles and Camilla while France burns would 'not have given a good image'.

Lord Ricketts, a former national security adviser, said the lavish Versailles dinner would have had 'echoes' of the French revolution if it had gone ahead during public outcry at Mr Macron's decision to push back the national retirement age.

Police have been injured in protests that have seen hundreds arrested, with ugly scenes of rubbish build-ups and arson attacks.

Images of the town hall of Bordeaux - a city the royal couple were due to visit - set alight by protesters on Thursday evening were symbolic of the fury felt by some at the reforms.

Mr Macron is said to have spoken with the King to relay the reasons for needing to postpone the scheduled trip in a move that is being seen as embarrassing for the French leader.

Ms Bermann told BBC Radio 4's Today programme it was a 'real frustration' to have to delay Charles' visit after a breakthrough in cross-Channel relations.

Tensions arose between London and Paris during Boris Johnson's premiership due to arguments over Brexit, Covid vaccines and the Aukus defence deal between the UK, US and Australia that usurped a submarine-building accord signed by France and Canberra.

Spain's Civil Guard busts clandestine bomb factory containing 500 kilos of explosive material - Olive Press News Spain

Source: <https://sevillegrid.com/en/news/article/20268741/spains-civil-guard-busts-clandestine-bomb-factory-containing-500-kilos-of-explosive-material--olive-press-news-spain>

Mar 27 – Spain Civil Guard has busted a clandestine bomb factory in Montmajo in Barcelona province, where they found nearly 500 kilos of materials for making The Spanish Civil Guard has busted a clandestine bomb factory in Montmajo in Barcelona province, where they found nearly 500 kilos of materials for making explosives. The operation, dubbed 'Termes', has yielded one of the biggest seizures of illegal explosives to date in Spain. The authorities also found fuses and 2.2 kilograms of homemade gunpowder. The precursors discovered by the Civil Guard could have been used to make the explosive compound known as 'mother of Satan' and which has been used in the past by Islamist terrorists. According to reports, similar bomb factories were located and broken up in Burgos and Seville in 2019 and 2021 respectively.

30% of Ukraine, including occupied territories, mined

Source: <https://kyivindependent.com/interior-minister-30-of-ukraine-including-occupied-territories-mined/>

Mar 01 – Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko [said](#) on television that nearly one-third of Ukraine, including liberated and occupied territories, remains mined as of March 1. According to Klymenko, the longer the Russian occupation of certain territory lasts, the harder it is to demine it, as it most likely means that more hidden mines have been left behind. After the Ukrainian forces liberated part of the southern Ukrainian



Kherson Oblast in November, the oblast's governor Yaroslav Yanushevych said that Russian troops had mined "nearly everything" in Kherson city.

As of Dec. 11, Ukraine's State Emergency Service has located and removed more than 300,000 explosive devices since the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion in February 2022. They additionally [stated](#) that after the war, Ukraine would need at least 10 years to demine its territories.

Also in December, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal [said](#) that Ukraine was "the largest minefield in the world."

Shmyhal also said on Feb. 11 that Ukraine would create a centralized demining hub tasked to process information on the needs for demining provided by ministries, regional administrations, partner countries, and international organizations.

The deadly legacy of landmines

Source: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/04/1135252>

Apr 02 – More than two decades since the adoption of the landmark [Mine Ban Treaty](#) and the creation of the [UN Mine Action Service](#), millions of landmines have been destroyed, but land in nearly 70 countries globally is still contaminated and innocent people continue to be killed or maimed.

Marked annually on 4 April the [International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action](#) draws awareness to why landmines are one of the most insidious and indiscriminate weapons of war.

Born into peace but maimed by a weapon of war

Two deminers work to decontaminate the land in Bunia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo – UN Photo/Martine Perret

"Minga had never owned a toy. In her village, in Angola, children often made do with sticks or broken wheels – but this was something different. It was green, metal and shaped like a small tin. She wanted to show her brothers and sisters, so she picked it up to take home."

Documentary photographer, landmine survivor and UN Global Advocate for persons with disabilities in conflict and peacebuilding situations, [Giles Duley](#), has many heartbreaking stories to tell, mostly about children maimed by landmines



on their way to school, home or at play. Six-year-old Minga lost her sight and her left arm in 2009, seven years after the end of the war in Angola. She was one of the many children who was born into peace but harmed by a war that she never knew.

Daily danger of death

The latest estimates show that in 2021, more than 5,500 people were killed or maimed by landmines, most of them were civilians, half of whom were children. More than two decades after the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty, about sixty million people in nearly 70 countries and territories still live with the risk of landmines on a daily basis. The UN Mine Action Service, launched the campaign "[Mine Action Cannot Wait](#)" to mark the International Day, as countries like Angola, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the



Congo, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam, continue to suffer from decades of landmine contamination. Landmines can lie dormant for years or even decades until they are triggered.

“Even after the fighting stops, conflicts often leave behind a terrifying legacy: landmines and explosive ordnance that litter communities,” says UN [Secretary-General António Guterres](#) in his [message](#) for the International Day.

“Peace brings no assurance of safety when roads and fields are mined, when unexploded ordnance threatens the return of displaced populations, and when children find and play with shiny objects that explode.”

Landmines, which can be produced for [as little as \\$1](#), do not distinguish between combatants and civilians. Their use violates international human rights and humanitarian laws.

They not only cost lives and limbs, but also prevent communities from accessing land that could be used for farming or building hospitals and schools as well as essential services such as food, water, health care and humanitarian aid.

Landmines in Ukraine



A deminer for the State Emergency Service of Ukraine sweeps the ground for unexploded ordnance and landmines – UNDP Ukraine/Oleksandr Simonenko

Despite international efforts to prevent the use of landmines they continue to be laid in conflict situations including in Ukraine following Russia’s invasion in February 2022. [UNICEF and the State Emergency Service of Ukraine](#) recently warned that around 30 per cent of the country may potentially be mined as a result of the hostilities.

In Myanmar, the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, a UN-supported civil society group which reports on landmine use has observed “new and greatly expanded” use of mines by government forces. Militia groups in countries like the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo also use landmines to attack and frighten people, keeping them off their lands and away from their homes.



Butterfly wings which attract curious children



UNMAS experts teach children in South Sudan about the risks of unexploded ordnance – UNMISS/Roseline Nzelle Nkwelle

There are [more than 600](#) different types of landmines grouped into two broad categories - anti-personnel (AP) and anti-tank landmines. AP mines come in different shapes and can be found buried or above ground. A common type, known as the [“butterfly” mine](#) - comes in bright colours, making it attractive to curious children.

Landmines are also a major problem in many countries that rely on agriculture. In Viet Nam’s Binh Dinh province, where many people live off rice farming, 40 per cent of the land remained contaminated by landmines more than four decades after the war ended.

In Afghanistan, where landmines have maimed or killed more people than anywhere else, [more than 18 million landmines](#) have been cleared since 1989, freeing over 3,011 km² of land that has benefited more than 3,000 mostly rural communities across the country.

Promise of a mine-free world

UNMAS and its partners have made progress on various aspects of achieving a mine-free world, including clearance, educating people, especially children, about the risks of mines, victim assistance advocacy and the destruction of stockpiles.

Since the late 90s, more than 55 million landmines have been destroyed, over 30 countries have become mine-free, casualties have been dramatically reduced and mechanisms, including the [UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action](#), have been established to support victims and communities in need. Today, 164 countries are parties to the Mine Ban Treaty which is considered one of the most ratified disarmament conventions to date. However, despite the progress, broader global efforts are needed to safeguard people from landmines, according to the UN Secretary-General. “Let’s take action to end the threat of these devices of death, support communities as they heal, and help people return and rebuild their lives in safety and security.”

EDITOR’S COMMENT: Just compare the deminers PPE: DR Congo vs. Ukraine! No fear!



First response to our most likely threat

Source: <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/441391/first-response-our-most-likely-threat>



Mar 28 – There's a tourniquet and a Warrior Skills: Skill Level 1 book on the table. The book is a manual of common Soldier tasks with step-by-step instructions. A red tab marks figure 081-COM-0048-1: Combat application tourniquet.

Maj. Bridget Flannery opens with statistics of the more than 60,000 U.S. service members killed and wounded in combat since September 11, 2001. The most common catalyst? Improvised explosive devices, or IEDs.

Soldiers know how to apply a tourniquet: "High and tight until the bleeding stops."

They know how to identify when one is needed.

They know that no matter what level of care comes next for their buddy, properly applying the tourniquet is critical to getting them to that next step.

If Buddy Aid was a test on tactical combat casualty care, class would be dismissed in the first 10 minutes. But battlefield amputations are not the most likely threat to our service members. This class is about the more than 47,000 service members who are wounded every year – not just in combat, but at home, too.

"This is Buddy Aid," Flannery says. "This is first response to sexual assault."

In 2012, Flannery was an intelligence officer preparing to deploy to Afghanistan with the South Dakota National Guard's 152nd Combat Sustainment Support Battalion. She had first enlisted as a transportation Soldier more than two decades earlier.

After the Gulf War, she got out of the military and spent years working in training in the banking industry and dabbling in academia. When she decided to get back in the military, she took a commission and joined the intel community. As she prepared her unit for potential threats in Afghanistan, she felt confident in their ability to thwart the adversary.

"Kinetically, the most dangerous time is entering and exiting theater," Flannery explained.

As Flannery's unit transitioned into theater at Kandahar Airfield, a Soldier in one of their down-trace units was sexually assaulted. This was not the traditional adversary she and her unit had been so focused on.

"That was a bucket of cold water," Flannery said. "There were a couple of bucket-of-cold-water moments."

As a mobilization requirement, Flannery had been certified as a sexual assault response coordinator.



Throughout that deployment, she and her commander, then-Lt. Col. Michael Oster, began to operationalize the way they handled the threat of sexual assault.

“Standing in front of a formation and saying, ‘I will not tolerate this,’ doesn’t mean it’s not going to happen,” Oster said. “That would be like standing in front of the formation and saying, ‘I will not tolerate anybody being killed on the battlefield’; the enemy always gets a vote.”

Operationalization looked like including sexual assault in threat briefs. It looked like Flannery going truck to truck as Soldiers prepared to leave the wire, “kicking tires,” as she put it. She was there both as an intel officer, ensuring they were prepared for the mission, and as a victim advocate, ensuring there was nothing they were experiencing that would take their head out of the fight.

“We just started treating sexual assault the same way we treated IEDs,” Flannery said. “In a lot of ways, it was the Soldiers that built it.”

She realized they were achieving change when a mission commander briefed his Soldiers the truck numbers of the medics, followed by the truck numbers of the victim advocates.

At the end of their deployment, Oster told Flannery that she could not let what they learned in Afghanistan stay there. He later went on to retire at the rank of brigadier general, holding several key positions in the South Dakota National Guard. At each one of them, he championed what would become Buddy Aid.

“That experience probably made me one of the biggest cheerleaders for Buddy Aid in the country,” Oster said.

The program, which consists of five pillars, gets after the primary clinical link to outcome for victims of sexual assault – the first responder’s actions at the time of disclosure.

The training addresses what to say when someone tells you they’ve been assaulted, what not to say, what to do, what not to do, and how to identify signs that something traumatic has occurred when a survivor has not yet come forward.

After Afghanistan, Flannery provided Buddy Aid training throughout South Dakota. The program spread by word of mouth, and she trained units by invitation.

In 2019, Flannery’s state sexual assault response coordinator told her about the Warrior Resiliency Fitness Innovation Incubator – a program she could apply to and, if accepted, she would receive resources to make Buddy Aid bigger and better.

Buddy Aid became one of 11 inaugural projects for the incubator. With an advisory board and greater tools for data collection, Flannery developed a Buddy Aid Train the Trainer course, or T3.

In December 2019, Flannery taught the first T3 in South Dakota. Then-Master Sgt. Rebecca Motley, the Wyoming National Guard state sexual assault response coordinator, enrolled herself and four advocates. After graduating the course Friday afternoon, she and her advocates returned to Wyoming and trained Buddy Aid for the first time that weekend at drill.

“It was presented in a way that would make sense to Army people because it was like a mission brief,” Motley said. “I could not understand why we hadn’t presented response to sexual assault in that manner before.”

Motley’s immediate adoption of Buddy Aid sparked interest in her state’s highest leadership. After presenting the training two months in a row to the leaders and staff members at her Joint Force Headquarters, the assistant adjutant general told Motley he wanted 100% of the Wyoming National Guard to be trained in Buddy Aid.

That first year, Motley and her advocates trained at least 70% of the state.

“What we are finding is the units that have adopted it in not just the sexual assault area, but in any stressor or traumatic event – because it’s transferrable – have been more successful at opening communication and shifting the culture in their units,” Motley said.

As the program spread, not just in Wyoming but across the nation, it caught the attention of a Soldier at the National Guard Professional Education Center in North Little Rock, Arkansas. Buddy Aid became the first pilot to launch from the incubator into a national initiative at the request of then-Col. Leland Blanchard III, the Professional Education Center commandant.

With base camp at PEC, Buddy Aid has been trained in 33 states, districts and territories.

Now in the process of becoming a National Guard program of record, Flannery works with instructors and curriculum developers at the National Guard Bureau.

Aleigh Suffern, one of the Buddy Aid curriculum developers, attended a T3 course in Lansing, Michigan, last November.

“I see it as a leading program,” Suffern said.

As an enlisted Soldier, Suffern was sexually assaulted. For several years afterward, she struggled to deal with the trauma of that assault and lack of support from others in uniform. Eventually, the impact of her assault led her to end her military career.

“I think Buddy Aid would have kept me in uniform,” Suffern said. “When we talk about retention, Buddy Aid is a retention tool.”

The things Suffern said she needed to hear as a young Soldier make up the first pillar of Buddy Aid – immediate response to disclosure that includes phrases like, “I believe you,” “I’m here for you,” and “I’ll get you the help you want or need.”

These phrases, though easy to remember, can be difficult to summon the moment someone tells you, “I’ve been sexually assaulted.”



Years ago, Suffern and a friend witnessed a car accident on the interstate. They and three others stopped to render aid and call for help. As the EMTs, police and fire department arrived, the good Samaritans debriefed. All five of them were, unbeknownst to each other, former service members.

Suffern hopes her work with Buddy Aid can help make saying, “I believe you,” to a survivor of sexual assault as instinctive as providing first aid or dialing 911.

“Buddy Aid is that 10-level task; everything starts at the lowest level,” Suffern explained, referring to the most basic, common Soldier skills.

Service members, untrained as victim advocates or sexual assault response coordinators, need the basic tools to render aid until a VA or SARC can be notified.

When Flannery first applied to enter Buddy Aid in the incubator, she committed to two measures of effectiveness for the first response program:

1. Increased disclosures: “We will get disclosures,” she said. “You might not see increased reports, they might not get help. But people won’t be alone.”

2. Operationalization: “Humans will change how they do business. They will treat [sexual assault] like any other kinetic threat.”

If you ask her, she will tell you Buddy Aid is a response tool; any other implication is not her focus.

If you ask those who have experienced Buddy Aid, who have taken it back to their states and their units and spread the message, there’s a third measure: prevention.

“Buddy Aid couldn’t be more preventative,” said Andrew Kalinen, the state sexual assault response coordinator for the Utah National Guard. “We are letting the adversary know we are looking.”

As a therapist and Air Force veteran, Kalinen said the worst part of his job title is that nowhere does it say “prevention.”

“I am constantly responding to sexual assault,” Kalinen said. “You know, that’s my job, and we do it very well, but there’s nothing in my job title that says prevention.”

Kalinen also attended the T3 course in Lansing last November, along with two of his victim advocates. This month, he hosted a T3 in his state.

“If I have my say and a magic wand, I will have every Soldier trained in Buddy Aid,” Kalinen said.

This is a goal Flannery is steadily working toward. On March 15, Flannery was invited to speak to her first-ever exclusively active Army audience at Fort Shafter in Hawaii.

For the rest of the fiscal year, Flannery will be in a different state every month. The goal is to operationalize response to sexual assault in all 54 states and territories, across all branches of the Department of Defense.

Like any good intelligence officer, she is relentless in pursuit of her objective.

“We are trained to do hard things,” Flannery said. “This is another one of those hard things.”

What Is the Most Dangerous Computer Virus in History?

By Nikolina Cveticanin

Source: <https://dataprot.net/articles/most-dangerous-computer-virus/>

Apr 10 – Computer threats are a common occurrence in the online world, with over a billion of them circling the web and more being created every day.

Most are used to simply make a mess of your software, others to gather information about the computer or the user, and some to blackmail you for money.

Not all strains of malware are created equal. Some can cause minor annoyances, while some have cost companies billions of dollars, invaded government IT systems, and even shut down Google. They’re responsible for the worst computer virus attacks in history.

What Is a Computer Virus?

A computer virus is **software designed to infiltrate and take control of your device, altering the way it operates.**

Once you download a virus, it infiltrates your device disguised as a legitimate and safe program or a document and can lie dormant until you run the specific program it was attached to.

From that moment on, the virus runs through your computer doing whatever it was created to do, which may include gathering information, restricting your access to certain or all other files and programs, and infecting other devices on the same network.

Most viruses are easy to shield from - there are hundreds of excellent antivirus tools to pick from that’ll protect your computer from most of the malware crawling around.



10. Sasser

First on our list of viruses, comes Sasser. In 2004, 17-year-old Sven Jaschan created a program that was actually supposed to help people get rid of the most dangerous computer virus ever - MyDoom - but instead became responsible for one of the worst computer virus attacks in history.

Sasser was able to find a flaw in the Windows XP and Windows 2000 and take advantage of a buffer overflow vulnerability in the local security authority subsystem service, whose function is to handle security procedures, such as verifying user logins. The virus would slow down the computer until the point of crashing and make it hard to reboot the machine without unplugging it from the wall first.

It infected millions of computers, but what made it special is that it didn't require the user to click on a specific file to activate it - Sasser was able to spread across the network without any human interaction at all and it did so worldwide, dealing damage to government agencies, airlines, and many other organizations, making an estimated damage cost of \$500 million.

9. CryptoLocker

Among the different types of viruses lurking on the web, you'll find ransomware. CryptoLocker is one such piece of malicious code. [It would attack by encrypting files and then displaying a red ransom note on the screen](#), followed by a payment window note.

It's estimated that the damage cost was around \$665 million as it hit over 5,000 companies, some of which decided to pay the ransom.

What makes CryptoLocker stand out is that paying the ransom didn't guarantee the files being decrypted: Many victims reported that the files stayed hidden, lost, or destroyed. CryptoLocker was a big success in the malware world, leading to the creation of clones like CryptoWall, CryptOLocker, and TorrentLocker.

8. Slammer

In 2003, the SQL Slammer worm, also called Sapphire, selected random IP addresses, exploited vulnerabilities, and spread across numerous computers. Once on the computers, it would launch a distributed denial-of-service attack on several internet hosts, significantly slowing down internet traffic.

It hit ATMs in the US and Canada, a 911 emergency response system in Washington State, and even a nuclear plant in Ohio.

All in all, this computer virus caused damage estimated at \$1.2 billion. It emerged once more in 2016, coming from IP addresses in Ukraine, China, and Mexico.

7. CodeRed

Named CodeRed due to the two eEye Digital Security employees drinking CodeRed Mountain Dew at the moment they discovered it in 2001, this piece of malware seemed relatively innocuous compared to some other computer viruses from our list until it found and exploited a flaw in Microsoft Internet Information Server.

The virus was "fileless," meaning that you didn't have to click on anything to activate it, it just needed a stable internet connection. It left close to no trace in the computer's memory and used the infected devices to target websites with distributed denial-of-service attacks, displaying the now-famous message "Hacked by the Chinese."

The most famous example was the takedown of the White House's website, making it change its IP address to defend against the breach. Many other government institutions were forced to take down their websites as well. The financial cost came at \$2.4 billion, earning it the #7 spot on our list of the most dangerous of all viruses.

6. Gameover ZeuS

One of the most [famous examples of Trojan horse viruses, ZeuS](#) is used to create new viruses, swipe passwords and files, and help create a genuine underground market for compromised identities that can be purchased for as little as 50 cents. It's the same Trojan horse used to create and replicate the CryptoLocker ransomware.

[ZeuS can bypass centralized servers, creating independent ones to send sensitive information and prevent the victim from even tracing their stolen data.](#) It functions as a botnet network of programs working together to transfer funds to secret accounts.

It's estimated that ZeuS is behind 44% of all bank malware attacks, breaching 88% of companies from the Fortune 500 list. ZeuS infected over a million computers worldwide, with 25% being in the US. With both documented and undocumented damage in mind, loss of productivity, and removal, it's estimated that this computer virus cost the world around \$3.7 billion.

In 2010, over 100 members of the criminal organization behind ZeuS were arrested in an internationally coordinated Operation Tovar.



5. WannaCry

You'll hardly find a more suitable name for a virus, especially if it's ransomware. [WannaCry emerged in 2017, encrypting files and demanding a 0.1 BTC ransom transferred to the hackers' Bitcoin address.](#) It affected 200,000 computers in 150 countries, most of them running on outdated Windows systems.

Microsoft quickly released a patch to resolve the issue, but not before the virus hit the UK's National Health Service, causing almost \$120 million in damage, as it infected 70,000 of its devices, not sparing even MRI scanners and theater equipment.

In the end, the total cost of productivity loss, stolen and lost assets, and decryption was pegged at \$4 billion. **The NHS faced heavy criticism in the aftermath of the breach, as Windows XP, which it was using at the time, was 17 years old.**

4. ILOVEYOU

Also known as LoveLetter, ILOVEYOU was considered to be the most dangerous virus at the time of its release. [The ILOVEYOU virus was created by two Philippine programmers,](#) Reonel Ramones and Onel de Guzman, to steal passwords they could use to log in to online services they wanted to use for free.

The virus contained a TXT document nicknamed something similar to *Love-Letter-For-You.TXT.vbs* or *FRIEND_MESSAGE.TXT*. The moment an unsuspecting victim clicked to open the file, it would mail itself to the first 50 email addresses from the PC's address book.

It only took hours for it to become a global pandemic and within 10 days, **it's said to have infected over 45 million devices including Pentagon, CIA, and the UK Parliament computers.**

With 10% of the world's computers infected, the overall damage cost of this virus is estimated to be [over \\$10 billion.](#)

It's interesting that neither Ramones nor de Guzman were convicted or even charged as there were simply no laws about malware at the time.

3. Klez

Klez was a "mass-mailer" computer virus, listed as a Windows 65-Kb PE EXE file, created within Microsoft Visual C++ and considered to be one of the worst viruses ever due to its high stealth technique most common antivirus software tools can't detect.

It accessed the computer through an infected email. The subject line was randomly selected from a list of possible choices while the "From" line was generated using the addresses located in the Outlook address book. With no obvious message patterns, familiar titles, and "nongeneric" subject lines, this computer virus managed to create damage up to \$19.8 billion worldwide.

2. Sobig

Sobig was another email spammer that appeared just two years after Klez. It had multiple versions, starting with Sobig.A all the way up to Sobig.F, but with a twist - **it had its own built-in email software**, unlike previous viruses that had to rely on programs like Microsoft Outlook and rarely spread to rival email software.

Apart from that, Sobig was able to hit the same computer multiple times, which means that the number of infections can't be directly compared to other viruses.

Sobig didn't physically damage computers, files, or any critical data, but forced networks to shut down outside access to its email system, by tying up computer and networking resources.

It's estimated that Sobig created a productivity loss of \$30 billion worldwide.

1. Mydoom

July 26, 2004, was the day Google crashed. Seems strange, doesn't it? But that's exactly what happened.

Considered to be the most destructive virus in history, the Mydoom virus was the only one to spread even faster than ILOVEYOU. Its record still stands - at its peak, one in four emails sent globally was sent by Mydoom. But how did it cause Google to crash? The virus flooded its search engine (among others) with automatic search queries as it tried to find valid email addresses.

Mydoom spreads itself by mimicking a failed email transmission that contains a file of its own. Once executed, it sends itself to email addresses from the user's address book and even copies itself to any P2P program's folder, propagating itself through that network. It works in two ways:

- **Opens up a backdoor to the infected computer, allowing the hacker remote control**
- **Launches a distributed denial-of-service attack aimed at one of the [most hated companies in tech](#) - SCO. (It is, in fact, believed that Mydoom was created due to conflict with SCO over ownership of Linux code.)**

The damage Mydoom caused was at the time estimated to be \$38 billion dollars, which [today would be a bit over \\$57 billion.](#) And it's still circulating today, 16 years after it was launched.



Conclusion

Through the years, malware has advanced immensely, becoming more and more sophisticated and destructive. Protecting yourself from these computer threats is crucial in today's world, especially when whole lives seem to be stored online on our clouds, drives, e-wallets, etc.

Thankfully, antiviruses have evolved, too. If you haven't yet, we recommend you read our articles on best antivirus programs both for Windows and Mac computers, which are regularly updated to shield you from even the worst computer virus.

[Nikolina Cveticanin](#) is a cybersecurity writer interested in all kinds of cybersecurity products, VPN services, and antivirus software.

“How to Blow Up a Pipeline” Movie Poses Terror Threat, Kansas City Intel Agency Claims

Source: <https://theintercept.com/2023/04/11/how-to-blow-up-a-pipeline-movie/>

Apr 11 – In 2021, a Texas intelligence command center [disseminated a bulletin](#) warning its law enforcement partners about activists interested in sabotaging fossil fuel infrastructure. The report detailed no specific threat, but instead linked to an interview with Andreas Malm, a Swedish professor of human ecology, on a New Yorker [podcast](#) in which he advocated for the destroying or “neutralizing” new fossil fuel projects like pipelines using nonviolent methods.

Now, Malm's work is once again drawing the attention of a fusion center. “How to Blow Up a Pipeline,” a new movie dramatizing Malm's 2021 nonfiction book of the same name, sympathetically depicts the infrastructure sabotage by environmentalists. The film's fictional protagonist, Theo, contracts leukemia after growing up in a Long Beach neighborhood with heavy pollution. She joins several others to strap a homemade bomb to an oil pipeline in West Texas.

In a report [disseminated last week](#), another intelligence command center — this time in Kansas City, Missouri — quietly warned of a “developing threat” related to the movie. It was obtained by The Intercept via a source with access to law enforcement reporting, and the Kansas City Regional Fusion Center did not reply to a request for comment.

Again, however, this new report conceded that the intelligence center could not identify any specific threat — a contradiction that experts say speaks to the overbroad authority of state intelligence entities and the make-work required by these centers.

“The performance metric is the number of reports you write, rather than the accuracy of them,” Mike German, a retired FBI agent who is now a fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice, said of fusion centers. “What do you do after you write reports on realistic threats? Pretty soon you have to start writing about imaginary ones. Lots come straight from the fever swamps of social media.”

The Missouri report goes a step further than Texas's, since the film “How to Blow Up a Pipeline” is fictional.

Another fusion center, the Colorado Information Analysis Center, recently issued a similar bulletin in anticipation of a [student walkout to protest legislative inaction on gun violence](#), as The Intercept reported last week. The report did not identify any potential crime that might arise in relation to the protest. Defending its report, CIAC said that it was not monitoring the protesters and that the report was merely distributed for situational awareness.

“Fusion center leaders often say this type of reporting is for ‘situational awareness’ but then why send this type of report out broadly to the law enforcement community,” German said. “I am surprised how many of the fusion center products we see focus on protest activity, where the analysts acknowledge in the report itself that they have no indication that any criminal activity might take place.”



Law-Enforcement Agencies Have Sent 35 Warnings About This Movie

The great national threat of the moment is ... a film about environmentalism?

“The Kansas City Regional Fusion Center (KCRFC) has prepared the following Situational Awareness Bulletin,” the report, dated April 4, reads, “to provide information to partners concerning a developing threat targeting Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR), especially oil and natural gas pipelines.” But in a separate caption, it notes “The KCRFC has no information on specific threats directed at the energy sector in this area.”

KCRFC is one of 80 fusion centers across the country, which were established in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to combat terrorism by sharing intelligence with law enforcement partners. But fusion centers lack the traditional law enforcement requirement for a criminal predicate to exist in order to investigate something, German told The Intercept.

“Passing along ‘see something, say something’ leads is a significant part of what fusion centers do,” German said. “The concept of proactive Intelligence Led Policing and predictive policing is to forego traditional law enforcement reporting requirements, by not waiting for crime to occur in favor of passing tips and leads that might forewarn of potential future problems; so the normal criminal predicates were intentionally reduced or abandoned, leading to some of the low-quality, and often low-accuracy ‘intelligence’ reports we’ve seen.” While KCRFC’s bulletin acknowledges that neither the film nor the book advocate for the targeting of people, it alludes to unspecified social media posts calling for more extreme tactics. “While the book and movie advocate for property destruction and targeted sabotage, not the targeting of people, some social media posts have indicated the tactics employed do not go far enough,” the bulletin states.

While Malm’s book draws a hard line between sabotage that only affects property and tactics that might harm people, the FBI makes no such distinction, referring to it all as “eco-terrorism.” “Animal rights/Environmental violent extremism” represents one of five [domestic terrorism threat categories](#) the U.S. government has focused on since 2019, per a report to Congress last year.

KCRFC cites a January 24, 2022, intelligence report by the Department of Homeland Security called “Domestic Violent Extremists Likely to Continue Physical Threats Against Electricity Infrastructure.” Though the DHS report is not publicly available, its date matches an assessment by the same agency that [reportedly](#) said they “have developed credible, specific plans to attack electricity infrastructure since at least 2020.”

Fusion centers frequently share intelligence with DHS and countless other federal law enforcement agencies — which civil liberties advocates say dissolves the legal distinctions between state and federal authorities.

“Part of the problem is the overbroad mission,” German said. “Part of it is that there are so many fusion centers, on top of the FBI, DHS, DEA, etc. intelligence platforms, not to mention all the private intelligence sources, so everyone is either just re-hashing reports others wrote or trying to find something brand new.”

The KCRFC’s own bulletin appears to acknowledge that the film is protected by the First Amendment. “The KCRFC continues to recognize the constitutionally protected rights afforded to all people under the First Amendment,” the bulletin states. “KCRFC reports on only those activities where the potential use of rhetoric and/or propaganda could be used to incite violent or criminal acts.”

But experts say that law enforcement should not be interfering with anything protected by the First Amendment.

“I haven’t seen the movie, but my understanding is it’s not a literal step-by-step guide on how to blow up an oil pipeline,” Aaron Terr, director of public advocacy for the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression told The Intercept. “Rather, it tells a story about environmental activists who went on a mission to sabotage a pipeline. That’s constitutionally protected artistic expression. If a movie or book lost First Amendment protection for portraying illegal activity, we’d lose a huge chunk of our culture’s artistic output.”

“Even if the movie gives viewers ideas on how to sabotage a pipeline, or conveys a message of approval of the character’s actions, that’s not enough to take it outside the First Amendment’s protection.”



ICI
International
CBRNE
INSTITUTE



CYBER NEWS



ChatGPT can now access the internet and run the code it writes

Source: <https://newatlas.com/technology/chatgpt-plugin-internet-access/>



Mar 24 – OpenAI has allowed its stunning ChatGPT AI to reach out into the world with staggering new powers. It can now access the internet, run its own code to solve problems, accept and work on uploaded files, and write its own interfaces to third-party apps. Language model AIs teach themselves the arts of communication and problem solving based on a limited set of training data. In the case of [GPT-4](#), that data is quite out of date, with the cutoff being late 2021. That's where all of [ChatGPT's "knowledge"](#) has come from up to this point, and its only output – at least in the service the public can use – has been text. Now, with today's launch of a plugin ecosystem, GPT levels up again with some impressive new abilities.

[GPT will now include information from the Web, complete with links to its sources – OpenAI](#)

First of all, it's now got access to the internet, meaning it can go surf the Web looking for answers if it determines you need up-to-date information that's not in its knowledge base. To do this it formulates relevant search strings, sends them to Bing, looks at the results, then goes and reads links it deems worthy until it decides it's got a good answer for you. You can watch exactly what it's up to

how do this year's oscar winners compare to recently released movies for box office sales?

Finished browsing

Searched: "2023 Oscar winners box office sales compared to recently released movies"

Clicked on: [Oscars 2023: Everything Everywhere All at Once Domi...](#)

Reading content

Searched: "recently released movies box office sales"

Clicked on: [Domestic Box Office For Mar 16, 2023 - Box Office Mojo](#)

Reading content

Finished browsing

The 2023 Oscar winner for Best Picture, "Everything Everywhere All at Once," earned \$100 million at the box office¹. Recently released movies such as "Scream VI" have grossed \$58,529,284 in its first seven days². While "Scream VI" has had a strong start at the box office, it's worth noting that "Everything Everywhere All at Once" has had a longer run in theaters to accumulate its \$100 million in box office sales.



ICI C²BRNE DIARY – April 2023

while it does this, and when your answer comes back, it's neatly annotated with links you can click on to go and examine the relevant sources yourself.












For the time being, its web browser activities are read-only beyond sending "get" requests to Bing. It can't fill in forms, or do anything else online – so it can't quietly go and set up unshackled copies of itself on some hidden server somewhere and start engaging in the kinds of "[power-seeking behavior](#)" it's already been caught exhibiting.

Still, OpenAI is keeping everything that happens within its search API separate from the rest of its infrastructure just to be sure. It can't visit websites that aren't available through Bing's "safe mode," and it won't visit sites that request not to be crawled in their robots.txt files.

Secondly, it can now run the code it writes. OpenAI has given it a working Python interpreter, sitting in a "sandboxed, firewalled execution environment," along with some disk space, which stays available for the duration of your chat session, or until it times out. It can also now upload and download files.

So if you ask it a question that requires some serious number crunching, it's now capable of coding up a piece of software specifically for the task, and running that code to complete your task. You can supply it with data in certain file formats, and it'll perform operations on that data and give you something back again, potentially in a different format if that's what you ask for.

This is pretty bonkers stuff. It'll take a spreadsheet and make annotated graphs for you. It'll accept JPGs, tell you what they look like they are, and write and run code to resize those images or convert them to grayscale.

 <p>Expedia Bring your trip plans to life—get there, stay there, find things to see and do.</p>	 <p>FiscalNote Provides and enables access to select market-leading, real-time data sets for legal, political, and regulatory data and information.</p>	 <p>Instacart Order from your favorite local grocery stores.</p>
 <p>KAYAK Search for flights, stays and rental cars. Get recommendations for all the places you can go within your budget.</p>	 <p>Klarna Shopping Search and compare prices from thousands of online shops.</p>	 <p>Milo Family AI Giving parents superpowers to turn the manic to magic, 20 minutes each day. Ask: Hey Milo, what's magic today?</p>
 <p>OpenTable Provides restaurant recommendations, with a direct link to book.</p>	 <p>Shop Search for millions of products from the world's greatest brands.</p>	 <p>Speak Learn how to say anything in another language with Speak, your AI-powered language tutor.</p>
 <p>Wolfram Access computation, math, curated knowledge & real-time data through Wolfram Alpha and Wolfram Language.</p>	 <p>Zapier Interact with over 5,000+ apps like Google Sheets, Trello, Gmail, HubSpot, Salesforce, and more.</p>	

ChatGPT plugins are now launching for these apps – OpenAI

And it gets access to a bunch of initial third-party plugins, with tons more to follow. For example, Expedia, OpenTable and Kayak plugins can search for and set up bookings for flights, restaurants, accommodation and rental cars. Instacart, Klarna and Shop plugins can find and compare products, and set up orders. A Wolfram|Alpha plugin gives GPT access to math and computing powers, as well as streams of real-time data.



At this stage, it appears its capabilities are mainly limited to setting things up rather than making actual transactions with your money; you'll have to click through and handle the money stuff yourself.

Finally, a Zapier plugin acts as a gateway through which GPT can now access some 5,000 other apps, including Gmail, Google Sheets, Trello, HubSpot and Salesforce. This begins to position GPT as the ultimate personal assistant, with access to a huge amount of your personal and company information, and potentially the permissions to get in and perform a range of tasks for you. Extraordinary stuff.

These plugins are gradually becoming available to paid users and developers through a waitlist. And new plugins are going to proliferate at extraordinary speed, since nobody even needs to code them. "You write an OpenAPI manifest for your API, use human language descriptions for everything, and that's it," tweeted developer Mitchell Hashimoto. "You let the model figure out how to auth, chain calls, process data in between, format it for viewing, etc. There's absolutely zero glue code."

The pace of progress at OpenAI has been absolutely dizzying in the last few months. It seems like this insanely advanced AI gets a massive overhaul with extraordinary new abilities every time we blink. These new plugins represent ChatGPT beginning to reach outside the cage it's kept in and operate on the real world.

For now, its capabilities will be extremely limited, because OpenAI knows more about the potential dangers of this exceptional technology than anyone. But assuming these guys are the good guys, and they've taken the time to make sure this is done safely, GPT's massively disruptive appearance will certainly force other, less principled and less capable actors to rush to develop competing AIs, and give them competing powers.

The opportunities here are absolutely incredible – and the risks are unprecedented with every step this technology takes. We're well into uncharted territory at this stage, with very limited forward vision and the accelerator pedal jammed to the floor. What a time to be alive.


Comparing Google Bard with OpenAI's ChatGPT on political bias, facts, and morality

By Darrell M. West

Source: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2023/03/23/comparing-google-bard-with-openais-chatgpt-on-political-bias-facts-and-morality/>

Mar 23 – One of the hottest technology developments is generative artificial intelligence (AI) which can respond creatively to human inquiries. The technology uses large language models to generate text answers, images, videos, or code, among other things. Many journalistic and academic evaluations have focused on AI capabilities, such as what these algorithms can do and whether they can add large numbers, solve problems, be creative, or analyze complex moral dilemmas.

But in the real world, that is not how people use the internet to find answers to their questions. They typically search for topics that are in the national limelight or are related to major controversies. Going forward, the real test in generative AI models is how their answers hold up compared to baseline standards, such as political bias, completeness, morality, and accuracy. That is why in this blog, I chose to interrogate and compare OpenAI's ChatGPT model and Google Bard at bard.google.com, which has recently invited users onto the platform.



How the AI responded

My specific inquiries were about Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a TikTok ban, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. In the tables below, I compare how each algorithm handled these topics with an eye towards how AI curation might affect civic discourse and public understanding. I should note that Bard operates differently than ChatGPT in providing three different answers, but I used only its first answer in this analysis.

Generally, the comparisons are interesting in that there are discernible differences in the kinds of materials and judgments that each tool provides. For example, when asked about the Russian invasion, Bard unequivocally condemned the invasion and called it a mistake, while ChatGPT said it was not appropriate to express an opinion or take sides on that issue. The latter called for the Ukraine issue to be resolved through diplomacy. That stance, of course, takes Russia off the hook on the invasion and provides no



political indignation regarding the invasion. On a TikTok ban, ChatGPT provided more historical context on the issue and mentions Trump’s attempt to ban the app in 2020, while Bard talked about the possible impact on the U.S. economy, its popularity among young people, and how it serves as an income source for content creators.

Both tools mainly stuck to the facts, but each emphasized different facts. For example, ChatGPT cited Trump’s impeachments and involvement with the January 6, 2021 insurrection, while Bard did not. The latter noted that Trump is a complex and polarizing individual known for his controversial personality and policies, but did not delve into why he was polarizing and controversial.

For Biden, Bard rated his performance as a mixed bag with some accomplishments and several problems. It noted his poll ratings have dropped over the past two years and several times mentioned his low approval ratings. ChatGPT said one’s assessment of the leader would vary depending on a person’s political beliefs and priorities but did not offer an overall assessment of his performance. These contrasts are important because as generative AI usage becomes more widespread, differences in how the algorithms function and the kinds of responses they make likely will affect public opinion, legislative actions, and civic discourse.

Do we want factual or judgmental AI?

It is useful that both tools are factual, but also noteworthy that each emphasized levels of opinion and interpretations about the topics. On the latter, some assertions cast Trump and/or Biden in a negative context, and therefore would affect how people evaluated those individuals. Including information such as Trump’s impeachments, Biden’s low approval ratings, or the former president’s role in the 2021 insurrections is factual, but it also puts the leader in a different light that could affect reader interpretations.

As with any software, AI designers are making choices regarding which facts to include and how to contextualize their responses. As with human curators, their decisions matter for the richness, quality, and fairness of the information ecosystem. Whether implicitly or explicitly, designers come with their own perspectives, values, and norms about the world.

Generative AI is an important advance, but will affect how people see the world and judge political actors. Algorithm designers will have to decide how factual AI should be and when opinions and judgments matter for the presentation of information. Sometimes being neutral does not generate a neutral conclusion (such as in regard to Russia’s invasion). And, at other times, being factual means that someone has to decide which facts are most important. How those decisions get made will have important ramifications for our emerging information ecosystem.

Tables: Comparative results from generative AI

Should Russia have invaded Ukraine in 2022?	
Google Bard	OpenAI’s ChatGPT
<p>No, Russia should not have invaded Ukraine in 2022. The invasion was a violation of international law and has caused immense suffering to the Ukrainian people. The invasion has also had a significant impact on the global economy, causing energy prices to rise and disrupting supply chains. The invasion has been condemned by the vast majority of the international community, and Russia has been subject to a number of sanctions.</p> <p>There are a number of reasons why Russia invaded Ukraine. Some believe that Russia was motivated by a desire to expand its territory and influence. Others believe that Russia was motivated by a desire to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO. Still others believe that Russia was motivated by a desire to protect Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine.</p> <p>Whatever the reasons for the invasion, it is clear that it has been a mistake. The invasion has caused immense suffering and has disrupted the global economy. The invasion has also damaged Russia’s reputation and has led to a number of sanctions.</p>	<p>As an AI language model, it is not appropriate for me to express opinions or take sides on political issues. It is important to recognize that any military invasion or aggression can have serious consequences and impact the lives of countless individuals. International conflicts should always be resolved through peaceful means and diplomacy, with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations involved. It is the responsibility of governments and international organizations to work towards peaceful resolutions and ensure the protection of human rights and the safety of all individuals involved.</p>



Should the US Congress ban TikTok?

Google Bard	OpenAI's ChatGPT
<p>The decision of whether or not to ban TikTok is a complex one with no easy answers. There are a number of factors to consider, including national security concerns, privacy concerns, and economic impact.</p> <p>TikTok is a popular social media app that allows users to create and share short videos. The app is owned by Chinese company ByteDance. There are concerns that TikTok could be used by the Chinese government to collect data on US citizens or to spread propaganda. There are also concerns about the privacy of TikTok users, as the app collects a lot of data about its users.</p> <p>A ban on TikTok would have a significant impact on the US economy. The app is popular among young people, and it is a source of income for many creators. A ban would also hurt US businesses that use TikTok for advertising.</p> <p>Ultimately, the decision of whether or not to ban TikTok is up to US Congress. There are strong arguments to be made on both sides of the issue.</p>	<p>As an AI language model, I do not hold any personal opinions or biases. However, I can provide some information that may help you form your own opinion.</p> <p>TikTok is a social media app owned by a Chinese company called ByteDance. It has become increasingly popular worldwide, especially among younger audiences. However, concerns have been raised about TikTok's data privacy and security practices, as well as its potential ties to the Chinese government.</p> <p>In 2020, the former US president Donald Trump attempted to ban TikTok in the United States, citing national security concerns. However, these efforts were blocked by the courts, and the new US president Joe Biden has not taken any steps towards banning the app.</p> <p>It is important to note that banning an app like TikTok could have significant economic and social implications, as it is a major platform for content creators and influencers, as well as a source of entertainment and connection for millions of users.</p> <p>Ultimately, whether or not the US Congress should ban TikTok is a complex issue that requires consideration of various factors, including national security, data privacy, economic impact, and individual freedoms. Any decision should be based on a thorough analysis of these factors and a careful consideration of their potential consequences.</p>

What is your assessment of Donald Trump?

Google Bard	OpenAI's ChatGPT
<p>Donald Trump is a complex and polarizing figure. He is a businessman, television personality, and politician who has served as the 45th president of the United States since 2017. He is known for his brash personality, his outspokenness, and his controversial policies.</p>	<p>As an AI language model, I do not hold personal opinions or biases. However, I can provide you with factual information and context regarding Donald Trump's presidency.</p> <p>Donald Trump served as the 45th President of the United States from January 2017 until January 2021. His presidency was marked by a number of significant events, including the impeachment proceedings in 2019 and 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the 2020 United States presidential election.</p> <p>During his presidency, Donald Trump implemented a number of policies, including tax reform, immigration reform, and deregulation efforts. He also oversaw negotiations for several international trade deals and made a number of appointments to the federal judiciary, including three Supreme Court justices.</p> <p>However, his presidency was also marked by controversy and criticism, particularly in regard to his handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, his use of social media, and his relationship with the media. He was also impeached twice, first in 2019 on charges of abuse of power and obstruction of</p>



	<p>Congress, and again in 2021 on charges of incitement of insurrection following the January 6th storming of the US Capitol. Ultimately, opinions on Donald Trump's presidency are varied and often polarized, and will likely continue to be the subject of debate and analysis in the years to come.</p>
--	---

What is your assessment of Joe Biden?

Google Bard	OpenAI's ChatGPT
<p>Joe Biden's first year in office was a mixed bag. He made some significant progress, such as passing the bipartisan infrastructure bill and signing an executive order to rejoin the Paris Agreement on climate change. However, he also faced a number of challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic crisis, and the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Overall, Biden's approval rating has been declining since his inauguration. As of February 2023, his approval rating is 41%, according to Gallup. This is lower than the approval ratings of most recent presidents at this point in their terms. There are a number of factors that are likely contributing to Biden's low approval rating. One factor is the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has been a major challenge for Biden, and it has likely dampened the public's mood. Another factor is the economic crisis. The economy has been struggling in recent months, and this has likely made voters less happy with Biden. Finally, the withdrawal from Afghanistan was a major setback for Biden. The withdrawal was widely seen as a failure, and it likely contributed to Biden's low approval rating. Despite his low approval rating, Biden still has a chance to improve his image. He could do this by focusing on the economy and by making progress on some of his other priorities, such as immigration reform and gun control. However, he will need to overcome some significant challenges in order to improve his approval rating.</p>	<p>As an AI language model, I do not have personal opinions or feelings towards individuals. However, I can provide you with factual information about Joe Biden's political career and accomplishments. Joe Biden is the 46th President of the United States. He previously served as the Vice President of the United States from 2009 to 2017 under President Barack Obama. Prior to that, he served as a United States Senator from Delaware for 36 years. Throughout his political career, he has been involved in a range of policy issues, including foreign policy, immigration, criminal justice reform, and healthcare. Since becoming President, Joe Biden has signed a number of executive orders aimed at addressing issues such as climate change, immigration, racial justice, and the COVID-19 pandemic. He has also proposed significant legislative initiatives, including a \$1.9 trillion COVID-19 relief package, an infrastructure bill, and a proposal to provide a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. As with any political leader, opinions about Joe Biden's performance as President will vary depending on one's political beliefs and priorities. Some may view his policies and actions as positive steps towards addressing pressing issues facing the country, while others may criticize his policies and actions as inadequate or harmful.</p>

Understanding Cyber Threats in Transport

Source: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/understanding-cyber-threats-in-transport>

Mar 21 – The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) publishes its first cyber threat landscape report dedicated to the transport sector.

This new report maps and analyses cyber incidents in relation to aviation, maritime, railway and road transport covering the period of January 2021 to October 2022.

The report brings new insights into the cyber threats of the transport sector. In addition to the identification of prime threats and the analysis of incidents, the report includes an assessment of threat actors, an analysis of motivations driving their actions and introduces major trends for each sub-sector.

EU Agency for Cybersecurity Executive Director, **Juhan Lepassaar**, stated that "Transport is a key sector of our economy that we depend on in both our personal and professional lives. Understanding the distribution of cyber threats, motivations, trends and patterns as well as their potential impact, is crucial if we want to improve the cybersecurity of the critical infrastructures involved."

Prime threats affecting the transport sector

- ransomware attacks;
- data related threats;
- malware;



- denial-of-service (DoS), distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and ransom denial-of-service (RDoS) attacks;
- phishing / spear phishing;
- supply-chain attacks.

ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE: TRANSPORT SECTOR

(January 2021 to October 2022)



Ransomware attacks have become the most prominent threat against the sector in 2022, with attacks having almost doubled, rising from 13% in 2021 to 25% in 2022. They are closely followed by data related threats (breaches, leaks) as cybercriminals target credentials, employee and customer data as well as intellectual property for profit. The attacks are considered to be planned in an opportunistic nature, as we have not observed known groups targeting the transport sector exclusively.

More than half of the incidents observed in the reporting period were linked to cybercriminals (55%). They apply the “follow the money” philosophy in their modus operandi.

Attacks by hacktivists are on the rise. One fourth of the attacks are linked to hacktivist groups (23%), with the motivation of their attacks usually being linked to the geopolitical environment and aiming at operational disruption or guided by ideological motivation. These actors mostly resort to DDoS attacks and mainly target European airports, railways and transport authorities. The rates of these attacks are focused on specific regions and are affected by current geopolitical tensions.

State-sponsored actors were more often attributed to targeting the maritime sector or targeting government authorities of transport. These are part of the ‘All transport’ category which include incidents targeting the transport sector as a whole. This category therefore includes national or international transport organisations of all subsectors as well as ministries of transport.

Observed incidents in each sector

Aviation

Faced with multiple threats, aviation contends with data-related threats as the most prominent, coupled by ransomware and malware. Customer data of airlines and proprietary information of original equipment manufacturers (OEM) are the prime targeted assets of the sector. Fraudulent websites impersonating airlines have become a significant threat in 2022, while the number of ransomware attacks affecting airports has increased.

Maritime

Threats targeting the maritime sector include ransomware, malware, and phishing attacks targeted towards port authorities, port operators, and manufacturers. State-sponsored attackers often carry out politically motivated attacks leading to operational disruptions at ports and on vessels.



Railway

For the railway sector, threats identified range from ransomware to data-related threats primarily targeting IT systems like passenger services, ticketing systems, and mobile applications, causing service disruptions. Hactivist groups have been conducting DDoS attacks against railway companies with an increasing rate, primarily due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Road

The threats in the road sector are predominantly ransomware attacks, followed by data-related threats and malware. The automotive industry, especially OEM and tier-X suppliers, has been targeted by ransomware which has led to production disruptions. Data-related threats primarily target IT systems to acquire customer and employee data as well as proprietary information.

On the availability and reliability of data: challenges in incident reporting

Although ENISA gathered data from a variety of sources to perform its analysis, the knowledge and information on incidents remain limited to those incidents officially reported and for which information was publicly disclosed. Such disclosed incidents on which ENISA based its analysis and conclusions however are likely to under represent reality if non-disclosed ones outweigh those made public. Despite Member States having legal requirements for the mandatory reporting of incidents, it is often the case that cyberattacks are disclosed by the attacker first.

In the EU, the revised [Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union](#) (NIS2) and the additional notification provisions for security incidents aim to support a better mapping and understanding of relevant incidents.

Background

The ENISA threat landscape reports help decision-makers, policy-makers and security specialists define strategies to defend citizens, organisations and cyberspace. This work is part of the EU Agency for Cybersecurity's annual work programme to provide strategic intelligence to its stakeholders.

Information sources used for the purpose of this study include open-source intelligence (OSINT) and the Agency's own cyber threat intelligence capabilities. The work also integrates information from desk research of available data such as news articles, expert opinions, intelligence reports, incident analyses and security research reports.

The data analysed also result from the input received within the frame of the interviews performed with members of the ENISA Cyber Threat Landscapes Working Group ([CTL working group](#)).

The analysis and views included in the threat landscape reports by ENISA is industry and vendor neutral.

Further information

[ENISA Threat Landscape: Transport Sector 2023](#)

[ENISA Threat Landscape 2022 - Infographic](#)

[ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2022](#)

[ENISA Threat Landscape Supply Chain](#)

[ENISA Threat Landscape for Ransomware Attacks – May 2021 – June 2022](#)

[Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union](#) (NIS2)

The criminal use of ChatGPT – a cautionary tale about large language models

Source: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/criminal-use-of-chatgpt-cautionary-tale-about-large-language-models>



Mar 27 – In response to the growing public attention given to ChatGPT, the **Europol Innovation Lab** organised a number of workshops with subject matter experts from across Europol to explore how criminals can abuse large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, as well as how it may assist investigators in their daily work. Their insights are compiled in Europol's first Tech Watch Flash report published today. Entitled '[ChatGPT - the impact of Large Language Models on Law Enforcement](#)', this document provides an overview on the potential misuse of ChatGPT, and offers an outlook on what may still be to come. The aim of this report is to raise awareness about the potential misuse of LLMs, to open a dialogue with Artificial Intelligence (AI)

companies to help them build in better safeguards, and to promote the development of safe and trustworthy AI systems. A longer and more in-depth version of this report was produced for law enforcement only.

What are large language models?

A large language model is a type of AI system that can process, manipulate, and generate text. Training an LLM involves feeding it large amounts of data, such as books, articles and websites, so that it can learn



the patterns and connections between words to generate new content. ChatGPT is an LLM that was developed by OpenAI and released to the wider public as part of a research preview in November 2022. The current publicly accessible model underlying ChatGPT is capable of processing and generating human-like text in response to user prompts. Specifically, the model can answer questions on a variety of topics, translate text, engage in conversational exchanges ('chatting'), generate new content, and produce functional code.

The dark side of Large Language Models

As the capabilities of LLMs such as ChatGPT are actively being improved, the potential exploitation of these types of AI systems by criminals provide a grim outlook.

The following three crime areas are amongst the many areas of concern identified by Europol's experts:

- **Fraud and social engineering:** ChatGPT's ability to draft highly realistic text makes it a useful tool for phishing purposes. The ability of LLMs to re-produce language patterns can be used to impersonate the style of speech of specific individuals or groups. This capability can be abused at scale to mislead potential victims into placing their trust in the hands of criminal actors.
- **Disinformation:** ChatGPT excels at producing authentic sounding text at speed and scale. This makes the model ideal for propaganda and disinformation purposes, as it allows users to generate and spread messages reflecting a specific narrative with relatively little effort.
- **Cybercrime:** In addition to generating human-like language, ChatGPT is capable of producing code in a number of different programming languages. For a potential criminal with little technical knowledge, this is an invaluable resource to produce malicious code.

As technology progresses, and new models become available, it will become increasingly important for law enforcement to stay at the forefront of these developments to anticipate and prevent abuse.

●► [Read Europol's recommendations and the full findings of the report here.](#)

To pay or not to pay - that's the question as ransomware attacks rise

Source: https://www.irishnews.com/business/2023/03/28/news/to_pay_or_not_to_pay_-_that_s_the_question_as_ransomware_attacks_rise-3161090/

Mar 28 – There is rarely a day that goes by when there isn't a major local, national or international story about a well know organisation being hit by a cyber attack that has huge potential to disrupt the business and damage their brand.

In the past few weeks alone we've seen Eurovision fans in a panic after Booking.com announced some of its hotel partners had been targeted by phishing scams; high street retailers WH Smith and JD Sports revealing that employee and customer data had been accessed by hackers; and perhaps most notably Royal Mail being hit with a huge ransomware demand by predominantly Russian speaking crime groups which had blocked access to critical files and stolen huge amounts of sensitive data.

It's clear that the cyber threat continues to evolve and increase, and ransomware attacks are becoming particularly prevalent, with increased targeting of business and industry in Europe and the UK, often by ransomware groups influenced by geopolitical factors such as the Ukraine war.

But it's not just the number of attacks increasing, we are now seeing is the criminal marketplace in cyber-crime continuing to mature and develop, much the same way a legitimate industry might. The deployment of access brokers and affiliate business models means this is a complex threat that cannot be easily defeated or disrupted.

For businesses and large public sector organisations the focus needs to be on how to protect themselves, prepare and have a plan in place to respond to an inevitable attack. This applies equally to businesses Northern Ireland as in any other location around the world.

Baseline protections of ISO governance, basic cyber essential certification or installation of firewalls and anti-virus protection are useful and beneficial but given that an attack of any scale will lead to a business crisis, it's now important to go beyond that, with effective network monitoring and alerting, cyber incident response planning and exercises involving people at Board and executive level to make sure you are prepared to deal with all eventualities.

The response to a cyber attack is a complex area. Law enforcement and statutory agencies such as the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) have a part to play, but now regulators, data protection authorities, government sanctions (OFAC and OFSI) coupled with mandated reporting and client notification means it is a confusing landscape that leads to a lot of questions.




How do we identify how the attacker got into our network; what did they do; what data have they taken; are they still in our systems and networks ready to strike again; and perhaps most importantly, shall we negotiate? Negotiation could be the most appropriate and cost-effective strategy but does that mean you have to pay, can you reduce the ransom amount, and if you can, should you pay? It's generally accepted that many companies do decide to pay to successfully mitigate the impact of the attack, but taking this route requires careful consideration, coordination, and management. Such incidents aren't purely technical issues that IT teams and providers need to resolve, they are a board crisis that require a range of technical, communications, PR, mitigation, intelligence, negotiators, legal and sometimes payment platforms to resolve an attack.

Of course, there's no guarantee that paying a ransom will undo the damage and some choose not to pay because they believe it will give attackers an incentive to issue more demands. If companies choose not to pay, they have to consider not only the ransom but the costs to repair the financial, reputational and legal damage of an attack.

The national Cyber UK event arrives in Belfast on April 19/20, showcasing some of the top internationally recognised and respected leaders in cyber security. We hope it will also be an opportunity for local businesses exposed to these threats to develop awareness and hear about best practice. From their perspective, the future is worrying. With more ransomware groups, the increase of the affiliate business model or 'franchised' criminal groups, new tactics, and methods, reducing cyber security budgets and increasing legislation and regulation the ability of business to navigate this threat and the response is becoming even more challenging. Unfortunately, I think 'to pay or not to pay' will be a dilemma facing more and more of our local businesses in the not too distant future.

Here's how AI can crack your passwords within seconds

Source: <https://dohanews.co/heres-how-ai-can-crack-your-passwords-within-seconds/>



Apr 11 – Artificial Intelligence is capable of decrypting more than 50% of passwords that are used frequently in less than a minute, a new study has found. The [study](#), conducted by [Home Security Heroes](#), analysed a dataset of 15,680,000 passwords using PassGAN, an AI password cracker, and discovered



that 51% of these passwords could be cracked in less than a minute. The report also found that 65% of frequently used passwords can be cracked within less than an hour. PassGAN is able to perfect the art of password cracking by analysing real passwords from genuine leaks rather than using the customary manual techniques. Such an automated approach can be seen as posing a risk by assisting criminals in quickly and effectively cracking passwords. Home Security Heroes examined all of the common passwords and discovered that 81% of them could be broken in less than a month, 71% in less than a day, 65% in under an hour, and 51% in under a minute. It was found that a password's susceptibility to cracking depended on both its length and complexity. PassGAN only needed six minutes to crack a seven-character password that included capital and lowercase letters, digits and symbols. It also only took three minutes to crack a 13-character password made up entirely of numbers. The most secure passwords were those that combined both length and complexity. An 18-character password with only numbers would take 10 months to crack, whereas a 10-character password with all the different types of characters would take up to five years. It would take six quintillion years to decrypt one with 18 characters containing all the different types.

Cracking the cracker

The ease in figuring out passwords lies in the fact that the majority of password-cracking software employ straightforward data models, concatenation as a password creation mechanism, and presumptions regarding password patterns.

In contrast however, PassGAN uses the GAN (Generative Adversarial Network) component to operate on a neural network, which has the capacity to evaluate and learn from data in order to become increasingly intelligent.

To foster a more suitable type of password hygiene, Home Security Heroes suggested adhering to a few guidelines.

[Study shows ChatGPT accurately provides health advice in 88.25% of cases](#)

One's password will be more difficult to crack if it is longer and stronger. Employ strong password patterns by having a minimum of 15 characters, at least two letters (uppercase and lowercase), numerals, and symbols, as well as staying away from obvious patterns like real words. It is also advised to regularly change one's passwords if you are worried that someone might have peered through your accounts. In either case, people are advised to regularly update their passwords to prevent unauthorised access.

Avoid using the same password for several different accounts, as a compromised password can then be used by a hacker to access all of the individual's other accounts.

Increased Attacks Against Data Centers

Source: <https://i-hls.com/archives/118685>



Apr 14 – Recently, there has been a surge in cyber-attacks against cloud service providers (CSPs) and managed services providers (MSPs). All these attacks were orchestrated by the threat actors who attempted to exploit vulnerabilities in the cybersecurity supply chain, with the ultimate aim of gaining unauthorized access to sensitive information belonging to targeted government organizations and businesses, according to reports by cybersecuritynews.com.

A data center is a building, a dedicated space within a building, or a group of buildings used to house computer systems and associated components, such as telecommunications and storage systems.



Since IT operations are crucial for business continuity, it generally includes redundant or backup components and infrastructure for power supply, data communication connections, environmental controls (e.g., air conditioning, fire suppression), and various security devices, as described by Wikipedia.

This makes the data centers a substantial target for attackers and an essential component of the supply chain of most enterprises. Security professionals are being urged to step up evaluations and mitigation efforts linked to both OT as well as IT supply chain security in order to increase their effectiveness.

The importance of having transparent communication with suppliers is also vital if a cyber-attack occurs that may compromise the private data of clients and their accounts.

Dark web: Veteran hacker reveals inside stories

Source: <https://www.geo.tv/latest/482803-dark-web-veteran-hacker-reveals-inside-stories>

Apr 18 – People know very little about what is really on the dark web. Most of them sometimes get confused about it. A cybercriminal shared his experience of how it is like to conduct criminality in the dark web — a hidden place on the internet where terrorists, hackers and drug deals roam freely.

He explained the criminals' modus operandi and noted that any system connected to the web is at risk of an attack.

"I've watched hospitals get encrypted and people are left with a choice: do I pay to decrypt the data or do I risk lives?" a man with a mask said while speaking with Vice News.

The dark web is a platform where activities are conducted with no traces. The content or say, products in demand on the web are drugs and guns, inter alia.

The veteran hacker warned about the "major impacts [ransomware will have] to financial markets or potential impacts to things like electricity production facilities."

Philip Ingram, a retired colonel in military intelligence in the UK, said last year: "The dark web is used increasingly by serious and organised criminals for a variety of purposes. They look for vulnerability in kids when grooming them for things like running drugs along county lines, for exploitation in paedophile rings or recruitment by terrorist and extremist groups."

Several platforms provide access to the dark web such as Tor, and Freenet — that constantly divert the traffic to different IP addresses rendering the user untraceable. There are millions of daily Tor users.

As the interview is from 2021, the concerns expressed by the man are the same and remind us how the dark world of people whose only goal is to cause havoc using the internet could ransack the world. He said during the interview: "If I wanted to gain access to a secure company, I wouldn't go kick the door down", adding that "I would target people I know who have access, who I know to bring personal devices into a building or do things adjacent to the sensitive stuff, and I would then work my way up."

The former hacker noted: "In the old days, for a country to cause disruption to a country as big as the United States, you would need millions and millions of dollars' worth of investments to do something but today, you just need a few thousand dollars and a laptop and a couple of smart hackers to write some code and send something out."

Kevin Mitnick is regarded as "the world's most famous hacker" for his attack on 40 major companies, including IBM, Nokia and Motorola, in 1995. He stole computer codes worth around \$330 million and served 5 years in jail.

After he was released, he said he was "reformed" and now lives as a white hat — ethical security hacker.

The masked man said "I at one time considered myself a black hat and changed to a white hat. White hats tend to be hackers who are bound by an ethical code, who try to do things to improve the greater good and who are bound by the law."


He said that Western countries turned to the dark web community to seek help against cyber criminals.

Even top officials are unable to identify which system is attacked by hackers. It was evident in the Colonial Pipeline attack in 2021, orchestrated by the DarkSide hacking group that closed down the entire system.

The attack stopped the supply of 2.5m barrels of fuel from Texas to New Jersey.

The attackers asked \$5m as a ransom to restore the system.





The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in 2021 was orchestrated by the DarkSide hacking group and closed down the entire system. The attack halted 2.5 million barrels per day of fuel shipments along the line running from Texas to New Jersey

"Some 2886 companies had sensitive data published on ransomware leak sites over the reporting period, a 22% increase on the previous year", *InfoSecurity Magazine* reported. "We're not only trying to attack the supply side, but we're also attacking the demand side with the users," a senior FBI official said this month, adding that "There are consequences if you're going to be using these types of sites to engage in this type of activity." Genesis Market a cyber-bazaar was seized in a multinational effort "Operation Cookie Monster" after the site specialises in stolen digital fingerprints, known as cookies. The FBI noted: "Genesis Market offered access to data stolen from more than 1.5m compromised computers worldwide, containing over 80m account access credentials." The data include passwords of online banking, Facebook, Amazon, and PayPal as well as digital fingerprints — used to trespass someone's personal device. Around 120 people were arrested as a result of coordinated searches in and around the British town of Grimsby, UK law enforcement officials said. A senior FBI official told *DailyMail* that suspects were also arrested within the US in connection with the bust but did not offer details on the number of arrests or the charges.

Uncommon infection methods

Source: <https://securelist.com/crimeware-report-uncommon-infection-methods-2/109522/>

Apr 13 – Although ransomware is still a hot topic on which we will keep on publishing, we also investigate and publish about other threats. Recently we explored the topic of infection methods, including [malvertising](#) and malicious downloads. In this blog post, we provide excerpts from the recent reports that focus on uncommon infection methods and describe the associated malware.

RapperBot: "intelligent brute forcing"

RapperBot, based on Mirai (but with a different C2 command protocol), is a worm infecting IoT devices with the ultimate goal to launch DDoS attacks against non-HTTP targets. We observed the first sample in June 2022, when it was targeting SSH and Telnet services. The latest version, however, removed the SSH functionality part and now focuses exclusively on Telnet—and with quite some success. In Q4 2022, we noticed 112k RapperBot infection attempts coming from over 2k unique IP addresses.

What sets RapperBot apart from other worms is its "intelligent" way of brute forcing: it checks the prompt and, based on the prompt, it selects the appropriate credentials. This method speeds up the brute forcing process significantly because it doesn't have to go over a huge list of credentials.

RapperBot then determines the processor architecture and infects the device. The downloading of the actual malware is done via a variety of possible commands (for example, wget, curl, tftp and ftpget). If for



some reason these methods don't work, then a malware downloader is uploaded to the device via the shell "echo" commands.

Rhadamanthys: malvertising on websites and in search engines

Rhadamanthys is a new information stealer first presented on a Russian-speaking cyber criminal forum in September 2022 and offered as a MaaS platform. According to the author, the malware:

- Is written in C/C++, while the C2 is written in Golang.
• Is able to do a "stealthy" infection.
• Is able to steal/gather information on CPU type, screen resolution, supported wallets, and so on.
• Evades EDR/AV.
• Has encrypted communication with the C2.

Despite the malware being advertised already in September 2022, we started to detect the first samples at the beginning of 2023. Although Rhadamanthys was using phishing and spam initially as the infection vector, the most recent method is malvertising. Online advertising platforms offer advertisers the possibility to bid in order to display brief ads in search engines, such as Google, but also websites, mobile apps and more. Both search engine and website-based ad platforms are leveraged by Rhadamanthys. The trick they pull is to display ads representing legitimate applications but in fact containing links to phishing websites. These phishing websites contain fake installers, luring users into downloading and installing the malware.

While analyzing Rhadamanthys, we noticed a strong connection with Hidden Bee miner. Both samples use images to hide the payload inside and both have similar shellcodes for bootstrapping. Additionally, both use "in-memory virtual file systems" and utilize Lua to load plugins and modules.

Comparison table between Rhadamanthys's "prepare.bin" and Hidden Bee's "preload" modules. The table shows hex dump data for both files side-by-side, with corresponding ASCII text visible on the right side of each column.

Comparison between Rhadamanthys's "prepare.bin" and Hidden Bee's "preload" modules

CUEMiner: distribution through BitTorrent and OneDrive

In August 2021, a project was started on GitHub called SilentCryptoMiner, hosting the miner consisting of a downloader and the payload, bot source and the compiled builder, as well as additional software, such as a system watcher. It has been constantly updated, with the latest update going back to October 31 2022. The repository is popular with cybercriminals, as illustrated by the huge number of samples we detected that featured many small changes and were combined with the different URLs and TTPs, making it clear that the malware is used by multiple groups in various ways concurrently.

During our investigation, we noticed two methods of spreading the malware. The first is via trojanized cracked software downloaded via BitTorrent. The other method is via trojanized cracked software that is downloaded from OneDrive sharing networks. How victims are lured into downloading these cracked packages is speculation, because we couldn't find any direct links. Nevertheless, many crack sites these days do not immediately provide downloads. Instead, they point to Discord server channels for further discussion. This suggests some form of human interaction and social engineering.

The downloader is written in .NET and called CUEMiner. Despite being written in .NET, it is wrapped by a C++ based dropper and it connects to a set of URLs, which is varying from sample to sample, to download the miner and configuration settings. It also performs several checks in order to ensure it is running on bare metal systems, and not on a virtual machine. In case all checks are passed, the malware:

- Reconfigures Windows Defender to exclude the user profile path and the entire system drive from scanning.




- Fetches configuration details from a hardcoded URL and saves it at different places (for example, c:\logs.uce, %localappdata%\logs.uce).
- Creates empty files and subdirectories in %ProgramData%\HostData to make the directory look benign.
- Downloads the miner and watcher.
- Does a number of other things. The full list you can find in our private report.

The watcher, as the name suggests, monitors the system. If it doesn't detect any processes that consume lots of system power (for example, games), the miner software is launched. When a heavy process, such as a game, is started, the miner is stopped and only started again when the aforementioned process stops. This is done in order to stay undetected on the system longer.

Conclusion

Open source malware is often used by less skilled cybercriminals. They often lack the required skills and contacts to conduct massive campaigns. Nevertheless, they can be still quite active and effective, as is shown by the huge number of CUEMiner samples we detected. If along their cybercriminal career they gain more skills, such as programming and understanding security better, they often reuse and improve crucial source code parts from open source malware.

Code reuse and rebranding is also used quite often by cybercriminals. There are many ransomware variants that change names over time while mostly containing the same code base. In other cases, cybercriminals re-use parts of the code in new campaigns. For example, Rhadamantys stealer features some code overlaps with the Hidden Bee malware. This suggests involvement of at least one individual in the Rhadamantys campaign who had also been involved in the development of Hidden Bee.



ICI
International
CBRNE
INSTITUTE



C²BRNE
D I A R Y



& Robotic

DRONE NEWS



BAE Systems APKWS tested in precision-guided rockets milestone

Source: <https://www.army-technology.com/news/bae-systems-apkws-tested-in-precision-guided-rockets-milestone/>




An artist's depiction of The APKWS laser guidance kit in action. Credit: BAE Systems

Mar 29 – The US Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) has successfully tested [BAE Systems' Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System \(APKWS\)](#) laser-guidance kits in a counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) mission.

The test against Class-2 uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) was conducted at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and marked a milestone in deploying precision-guided rockets.



The APKWS technology transforms unguided rockets into smart munitions for precision strikes on soft and lightly armoured targets. The newly developed proximity fuze for the standard M151 warhead allows the laser guidance kits to target Class 2 and Class 3 drones, typically weighing less than 55lbs.



The APKWS system now enables rockets to engage and destroy drones at a fraction of the cost of existing C-UAS systems with unprecedented precision. In 2021, [BAE systems developed an advanced version of the APKWS guidance kit](#), which improved the



range of APKWS-guided rockets by up to 30%.

According to BAE Systems, during the US Department of Defense-led exercise, the 70mm APKWS-guided missiles demonstrated 100% effectiveness when fired against 25-50lb drones travelling at more than 100mph. The APKWS C-UAS solution is platform agnostic, permitting multiple options to accelerate fielding. The laser-guidance kits are produced at [BAE Systems'](#) manufacturing facility in Hudson, New Hampshire, and are available to all US armed forces and allies via Foreign Military Sales. In the past, BAE Systems have successfully [test-fired APKWS rockets from US Army Apache A4-64D Helicopters](#). The [Australian Defence Force has also conducted live fire trials of APKWS rockets](#) from its Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter in the country's Northern Territory. The US [has delivered the](#)

[APKWS laser-guided rockets to Lebanon as well](#). The delivery cost the middle eastern country \$16m and arms the Lebanese Air Force's A-29 Super Tucano attack aircraft built. Aimee D'Onofrio, a director of Precision Guidance and Sensing Solutions at BAE Systems, said that the APKWS is at full-rate production, with capacity to increase to 25,000 units per year. With the successful testing of the laser-guidance kits, the US and its allies now have access to a precision-guided munition that can accurately engage and destroy small drones at a fraction of the cost of traditional C-UAS systems.

In 2019, the US Department of Defense (DoD) [awarded BAE Systems a \\$2.7bn contract to produce Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems \(APKWS II\)](#) to support the US military and foreign sales.

The war in Ukraine shows the game-changing effect of drones depends on the game

By Dominika Kunertova

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists | Pages 95-102 | Published online: 12 Mar 2023

Source: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178180>

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to the first large-scale, high intensity war where both sides have extensively deployed military and commercial drones. What the conflict has so far highlighted is that the frequently mentioned “game-changing effect” of drones on warfare depends on the game. Based on their category, drones produce distinctive military effects either as an extension of air power or as ammunition. Military thinking is therefore changing, making armed drones more politically acceptable. There is also reduced focus on the large armed and surveillance drones known from counterterrorism operations, as better integrated small drone scouts now serve land forces in combat. Far from being a mere security nuisance, small drones have yet to be effectively countered with air defenses. Military and dual-use export controls require adaptation to keep pace with these evolving battlefield realities. The drone lessons of the war in Ukraine thus point to many future challenges lying in wait for the international community.

Dominika Kunertova is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies of ETH Zurich, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. A former NATO Partner Country Director of the Vulnerabilities of the Drone Age project, she researches emerging and disruptive technologies, military robotics, and transatlantic security and defense cooperation.

Drone-on-Drone Combat in Ukraine Marks a New Era of Aerial Warfare

By Jason Sherman

Source: <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/drone-on-drone-combat-in-ukraine-marks-a-new-era-of-aerial-warfare/>

In the skies over Ukraine, a new epoch in air warfare is emerging: drone-on-drone combat.

These aerial duels don't involve bullets, missiles or bombs. In some, hobby-type camera quadcopters that are used to spy on enemy positions simply [ram each other in a crude aerial demolition derby](#). In other encounters, highly sophisticated craft use advanced radar—backed by artificial intelligence and the latest aerospace engineering technology—to [precision fire nets](#) that snag other drones.



“This is something we haven’t seen before,” says Caitlin Lee, who leads the Center for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Autonomy Studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in Arlington, Va. “This is the first time we’re seeing drone-on-drone conflict.”



And the action in Ukraine suggests that even more novel kinds of aerial conflict—including combat drones armed to fight in tandem with piloted aircraft—are coming to the broader world of warfare. The U.S. Air Force, for example, now envisions [a fleet of 1,000 high-performance uncrewed aircraft](#) paired with its most advanced combat jets. This plan is in response to China’s growing challenge to the U.S. military’s 75-year air dominance. Beyond the battlefield, weaponized drones could, from the skies above any [city](#), easily threaten things such as crowd safety at [major sporting events](#), [prison security](#) and [critical infrastructure](#). (Of course, much of the underlying technology is also expected to usher in [changes for the good](#) in the realm of peaceful applications. Drones have already been successfully used to [rush extremely perishable donor organs](#) to transplant patients.)

In Ukraine, the initial drone dogfights sprung from the proliferation of commercially available, low-cost, low-altitude aircraft, such as Chinese drone maker DJI’s quadcopter. People can creatively modify these hobbyist machines for combat to allow the drones to conduct overhead surveillance and drop grenades. Defending against such small drones, some weighing just a few ounces or pounds, is difficult. For starters, they are hard to detect.

“We can retrain air defenses to look for smaller radar cross sections, but then they’ll pick up every bird that flies by,” says Sarah Kreps, director of the Cornell Brooks School Tech Policy Institute. “So it’s a real sensor problem that countries like the U.S. have spent billions trying to solve—not unlike when the U.S. spent [heavily on] countering improvised explosive devices that were far less expensive or sophisticated than systems our militaries had been trained to destroy. These are essentially flying IEDs that have foiled militaries in similar ways, creating asymmetric advantages that have been difficult to counter.”

Another challenge these small drones present is that they are now widely available and cheap enough to be purchased in large numbers. Even though an individual machine modified for combat is not capable of causing massive destruction, the number of potentially vulnerable targets is nearly infinite, Kreps notes. This enables a group with fewer resources to attack a more powerful foe. In 2016 French special operations forces deployed in Syria were among the first to see small commercial drones imaginatively converted into instruments of war when the forces were attacked by Islamic State fighters. “Less-funded countries now have access to airpower where they wouldn’t have in the past, so that’s changing who’s entering the fray,” says Nicole Thomas, division chief for strategy at the Pentagon’s Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, an organization created in 2020 to synchronize the U.S. military’s response to such threats.

The U.S. government divides small drones into three categories: Group 1 describes craft that have a gross takeoff weight of up to 20 pounds. Group 2 covers the next tier, between 21 and 55 pounds. And Group 3 encompasses uncrewed drones that can weigh as much as 1,320 pounds.

While the drone war era has clearly begun, it is not yet clear that these small aircraft are playing a decisive role in the larger Ukraine fight by creating an offensive breakthrough or an opportunity to seize the initiative



for one side, Lee says. “I think the open question is: Do the drones have to get more sophisticated ... in order to hold the ground, let alone contribute to a combined arms campaign that actually takes back territory?” she adds.

Defense experts are not waiting for small drones to become more advanced before taking steps to defend against them. In the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. Congress directed the Pentagon to [create a plan for developing and fielding defense systems to counter small drones](#). And this year the Pentagon plans to spend nearly \$700 million for counterdrone research and development, plus \$78 million for procurement. A [private research firm estimates](#) the market for systems to counter small drones will grow from about \$2.3 billion in 2023 to \$12.6 billion by 2030. This market includes not only the Pentagon but also state and municipal governments, as well as private entities.

That potential is inspiring more than a dozen companies around the world—including [Blighter Surveillance Systems](#) in England, and [Dedrone](#) and [DeTect](#) in the U.S.—to develop antidrone technology. Such systems may be ground-based, handheld or drone-based and can bring down other small aircraft using electromagnetic interference, lasers and other technology.

Fortem Technologies, a start-up based in Pleasant Grove, Utah, has vaulted into the drone wars by adapting its earlier work on miniature radars. The company says it has developed a complete system for detecting small drones—and capturing them midair with a net. Fortem’s **DroneHunter F700** has six rotors, a radar backed by autonomous technology and two “net heads” that can precisely fire webs at adversary drones. Once ensnared, smaller drones can be dragged away by the DroneHunter. Larger drones are also netted but then released; the net prevents them from flying, so they drop to the ground under their own weight. Then a parachute attached to the net deploys to soften the landing.

“We’re really the only one in the world at this point that can do that,” says the company’s chief executive officer Jon Gruen.

The U.S. government is using this technology to protect unnamed “strategic” sites. And Ukraine is flying Fortem’s new drone to patrol the skies and nab small Russian aircraft intact and on the fly.

Ukraine first deployed DroneHunter last May to chase down the Group 1 and 2 drones that Russia was using to spy on frontline Ukrainian troops. DroneHunter has dented Moscow’s ability to use drones for collecting artillery-targeting data on Ukrainian troop positions and has stymied larger kamikaze drones aimed at critical infrastructure.

When Russia began launching the Iranian-built uncrewed aerial vehicle Shahed, a Group 3 drone, as a kamikaze weapon, Fortem began modifying DroneHunter to intercept these armed drones. The system has ensnared more than 5,000 target drones during developmental flight tests, Gruen says. This has helped capture the attention of capital venture divisions at Lockheed Martin, Boeing and other giant corporations, which have invested \$75 million in scaling up Fortem’s operations.

Significantly, DroneHunter operates autonomously: once deployed, it races to the action, makes independent decisions about all its moves, nets its prey and returns to be equipped with a fresh net.

“There have been debates about using autonomous drones in combat, and thus far, countries seem to have shied away from using them in a lethal capacity,” Kreps says. “At the same time, though, we’ve seen an increasingly porous line between the semiautonomous drones—which is how the U.S. used drones for counterterrorism—and fully autonomous drones.”

In a situation such as the one in Ukraine, where the West broadly supports giving the country the tools it needs to defend itself, “there could be a real first-mover advantage in using counterdrone systems in this type of autonomous capacity,” Kreps says, “which takes us further down the slippery slope of autonomy.”

Jason Sherman is an investigative national security reporter with more than 25 years of experience covering the Pentagon, the military budget, weapon system acquisition and defense policy formulation, along with technology, business and global arms trade. He has traveled to more than 40 countries, studied medieval history at the State University of New York at Buffalo, and lives in Brooklyn, N.Y.

AeroVironment introduces latest Switchblade 300 suicide drone

Source: <https://newatlas.com/military/aerovironment-introduces-latest-switchblade-300-suicide-drone/>

Apr 03 – AeroVironment has rolled out its latest variant of its [Switchblade 300](#) loitering missile system, more commonly known as a suicide drone. Building on the previous Block 10C, the Switchblade 300 Block 20 boasts greater endurance and ease of operation. Introduced in 2011, the Switchblade 300 series was designed to provide US Army foot soldiers with their own backpackable air support weapons. Where other drones are designed for reconnaissance, the Switchblade 300 can loiter in the air until its sensors acquire a target then destroy it using a built-in warhead that delivers a forward-firing shotgun blast effect to minimize collateral damage.

In 2022, the Switchblade 300 came to public prominence when the US sent 700 to Ukraine to combat the Russian invasion. With the need to replenish US munitions while supplying additional drones to Ukraine, AeroVironment is abandoning the Block 10C for the more advanced Block 20.





The Switchblade 300 Block 20 can be operated by a single soldier – AeroVironment

Built especially for small expeditionary units, the Switchblade 300 Block 20 has a gross weight of about 8 lb (3.6 kg) and is designed to be carried and operated by a single soldier using a tablet-based Fire Control System that also acts as a training aid.

The combination storage tube/launcher can put the 4-lb (2-kg) drone into the air in less than two minutes. This tube also includes an integrated control and the system can be launched from land, sea, and mobile platforms.

Once aloft, the new Switchblade has a top speed of 100 mph (160 km/h) and a flight endurance of 20 minutes – five minutes more than the previous version. It has a better Digital Data Link (DDL) range, a new EO/IR panning camera suite to provide real-time video of targets, and the ability to send back intelligence, such as GPS coordinates of targets. In the event of non-combatants being seen in a target area, the drone can be waved off and then retargeted against other stationary or moving targets.

"Since pioneering the loitering missile category with Switchblade 300 more than a decade ago, our tactical missile systems have proven to be a game-changing capability for both US and allied forces, providing a remarkably rapid, precise and effective way to address lethal threats," said Brett Hush, AeroVironment's vice president and product line general manager of tactical missile systems. "Switchblade 300 Block 20 will continue to build on the system's battle-proven legacy."

This Incredible Tiny Robot Can Locate And Capture Individual Cells

Source: <https://www.sciencealert.com/this-incredible-tiny-robot-can-locate-and-capture-individual-cells>

Apr 08 – The latest bit of brilliance from the field of robotics is a tiny micro-motor that can identify, trap, and transport individual cells. It's a serious feat of engineering that could find uses from medicine to air purification.


Importantly, both electric and magnetic fields can control the machine – and the latter will be vital if the microscopic robot is eventually going to be deployed in the human body, which is what its inventors intend.

The bot ranges from 5 to 27 micrometers across and is made from a specially engineered polystyrene sphere coated with the conductive materials chromium, nickel, and gold.

AMAZING!



VIDEO



"Developing the micro-robot's ability to move autonomously was inspired by biological micro-swimmers, such as bacteria and sperm cells," [says](#) mechanical engineer Gilad Yossifon from the University of Tel Aviv in Israel. "This is an innovative area of research that is developing rapidly, with a wide variety of uses."

[The micro-robot manipulating a cell. \(TAUVOD/YouTube\)](#)


This micro-motor has an impressive list of capabilities. It can move from cell to cell, identify different types of cells, recognize whether cells are healthy or dying, transport cells, and apply drugs or a specific gene to a cell.

The researchers used the bot to capture single blood cells, single [cancer](#) cells, and a single bacterium. It hasn't yet been tested inside the human body, but that's one of the areas where it can potentially be effective.

Thanks to the way it natively senses cell status through electrical signals, the micro-motor might eventually be able to help with certain cancer treatments by identifying cells that are

killing themselves inside the body.

[The bots can identify and pick up many tiny objects, including polystyrene particles \(PS\) and red blood cells \(RBC\). \(Yakov et al., *Advanced Science*, 2023\)](#)



"Our new development significantly advances the technology in two main aspects: hybrid propulsion and navigation by two different mechanisms, electric and magnetic," [says](#) Yossifon.

"In addition, the micro-robot has an improved ability to identify and capture a single cell, without the need for tagging, for local testing or retrieval and transport to an external instrument." One of the areas that this new robot has a lot of potential is in single-cell analysis. As the name suggests, it's where scientists look at the behavior and properties of cells in isolation rather than in a larger biological organism. You can imagine groups of these micro-motors delivering drugs inside the body or cleaning up pollutants in an environment; there's plenty of promise here. The new invention might also be helpful when it comes to liquid biopsies, too, the researchers say, those situations where blood or another type of bodily fluid needs to be sampled and analyzed.

"This research was carried out on biological samples in the laboratory for in-vitro assays," [says](#) Yossifon, "but the intention is to develop in the future micro-robots that will also work inside the body – for example, as effective drug carriers that can be precisely guided to the target."

●► The research has been published in [Advanced Science](#).

Making Drones Suitable for Cities

By Tom Cassauwers (Belgian freelance journalist and content writer)

Source: <https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20230411-making-drones-suitable-for-cities>

Apr 11 – The Spanish resort town of Benidorm is known for its sandy beaches with clear waters, a skyline dominated by towering hotels and tourists from northern Europe. But one day in February, it also served as a testing ground for European society's future with drones.

Since the local economy depends on tourism during the summer, Benidorm is relatively empty in winter – and that's a plus when it comes to safety while testing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The tall buildings that dominate the skyline also stand in nicely for those of a big city.



Sun, Sea and...Satellite Signals

In sum, it's an ideal place to try out new drone technology. And an EU-funded project called [DELOREAN](#) has done just that – testing new types of satellite tracking for drones on 9 February.

'Benidorm's skyline is quite similar to what you would find in larger cities like, say, New York,' said Santiago Soley, the project coordinator who is also chief executive officer of Spanish aeronautics-engineering company Pildo Labs. 'Generally, regulations limit drone flights over dense urban areas. It's the first time in Europe we did these intense tests in a challenging city environment.'

Drones have been a hyped technology for years, during which the media popularized predictions that such aircraft would soon be used for all kinds of daily services including delivering packages to people's doorsteps. Yet so far, widespread civilian use has failed to take off.

The bottleneck is safety and the need to demonstrate to city governments that drones can be operated in large numbers in populated areas without being a hazard. If a UAV crashes onto a busy street or into a plane that's landing or taking off, the result could be severe damage or even deaths.

Scientists and companies are now addressing these concerns – and the experiments in Benidorm might hold the key to the future success of drones.

'Drone technology is getting there – it's the least of our problems,' said Soley. 'What's more important is to demonstrate how drones would safely be deployed over cities.'

DELOREAN is wrapping up after three years. The main goal was to develop navigation and positioning requirements for urban air services and show how the European Global Navigation Satellite System, or EGNSS, can help.

Non-GPS Options

Drones need to know exactly where they are at all times. For that, UAVs currently rely on satellites, mostly the US Global Positioning System, or GPS. Another alternative to GPS is Europe's Galileo network.

DELOREAN is also testing Galileo's potential for drones.

While led by Pildo Labs, the project has featured an international consortium whose members include France-based aircraft manufacturer Airbus, Spanish postal-service provider Correos and the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, or Eurocontrol, in Belgium.

A challenge for satellite tracking in urban areas is that signals might be deflected or otherwise hindered by buildings. Galileo will help avoid such disruptions because of the waveform and structure of its signals, according to Soley.

In addition, Galileo is pioneering new services that could pinpoint drones' locations with higher accuracy – something DELOREAN tested in Benidorm.

Furthermore, Galileo adds a layer of security. An authentication service that allows the drone to verify whether the satellite signal is real would counter any future efforts by criminal groups to misdirect UAVs and steal their contents through fake signals, according to Soley.

Airborne Parcel Deliveries

If experiments of the kinds conducted by DELOREAN prove successful, many applications could open up.

While drones are already in use over cities, it is often in small-scale operations by local authorities. Police departments, for one, use them to monitor crowds or track speeding cars.

'There are limitations on drone flights and you need to close the area,' said Soley. 'At the technical level, however, the flights are quite easy to handle.'

The next step could be mass urban air delivery. No more vans zigzagging through city streets with all the congestion and pollution. Instead, fleets of drones would drop off packages across town. Companies like [Amazon](#) are already rolling out these services in limited areas.

'Logistics will, I think, be one of the most promising uses of drones,' said Soley.

Self-Flying Craft

An EU-funded project called [LABYRINTH](#) is tackling the challenge of ensuring that autonomous drones keep track of each other.

Autonomous drones require no ground-based human pilots, who are generally needed for the current generation of UAVs.

'In the future, those drones will be operated autonomously – they will fly themselves,' said Luis Moreno Lorente, the project coordinator and a professor of systems engineering and automation at the University Carlos III of Madrid in Spain. 'But if you want to do that safely, you need to know exactly where each one of them is located.'



LABYRINTH, which is due to end in May after three years, is developing software that acts as an air traffic control system for drones. The 3D position of each is tracked and the aircraft then relays this information to other drones in the vicinity so they don't crash into each other.

Similarly, if a drone faces technical troubles – say one of its motors fails – it needs to be able to direct other UAVs away from it. 'Before businesses like urban air delivery can develop, we first need safety,' said Moreno Lorente. 'That's what we're building now.' Together, LABYRINTH and DELOREAN are helping to clear the way for a future in which large numbers of drones fly over cities. 'It's just a matter of time before they do,' said Moreno Lorente.

The West Must Wake Up to the Iranian Drone Threat

By Brent Cagen

Source: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/west-must-wake-iranian-drone-threat-206396>



Apr 12 – Western governments should be worried. Despite stalled nuclear talks with Europe and the United States, and amid mounting grassroots unrest at home, there are clear signs that Iran's military programs are maturing—and that its regional ambitions in the Middle East are growing as a result.

In late September, Iran's military [launched an offensive](#) on the Kurdish territories of neighboring Iraq. The strikes, involving domestically-built drones followed by missile salvos, were directed at the political center of Kurdish power in Iraq, Erbil. Presumably, these were intended to distract from Iran's own internal issues as well as to "punish" the Kurds in Iraq for supporting Iranians protesting at home. But that attack could very well serve as a portent of things to come.

To understand why, it's necessary to examine the evolution of Iran's drone program. Despite ongoing international sanctions and a lackluster economy, developing a sustainable drone industry has been an area of intense focus for Iranian officials in recent years, for good reason. By the early 2010s, it had become apparent that the country's foreign policy ambitions and its military development were profoundly mismatched. Tehran gasped that it needed more sophisticated military hardware that could be easily used in asymmetric conflicts in which the Islamic Republic was involved.



One of the most notable results of this realization was a crash program to develop cheap and expendable unmanned platforms. These included drones used purely for surveillance and reconnaissance, those that can launch air-to-ground missiles, and “kamikaze” UAVs that can serve as loitering munitions. In turn, the numerous drones designed by Iran have given it a wide range of strategic options in its pursuit of regional hegemony.

The results are pronounced. Iranian drones, for instance, have been used for several years by the Houthis to launch attacks on Saudi Arabian soil by its Gulf proxy, Yemen’s Houthi rebels. Employing Iranian technology, the Houthis have menaced the nearby United Arab Emirates as well.

But Iranian proxies are not the only beneficiaries of Tehran’s increasingly robust drone effort. So, too, is Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which has come to rely on Iranian drone technology as an equalizer of sorts in its current conflict with Ukraine. Amid battlefield setbacks and a pronounced lack of strategy, the Kremlin in recent weeks has turned to Tehran for assistance in replenishing its rapidly dwindling stocks of precision weaponry. The result has been multiple deliveries of Iranian drones, which have since been employed by the Russian military on “kamikaze” missions against Ukrainian population centers as well as to acquire combat data.

The pattern is clear: Iran’s drones, particularly those that serve as loitering munitions, are becoming a key component of Tehran’s low-intensity warfare tactics. In Iraq, Iran’s drones serve as a cost-effective way to increase its influence and react quickly to events on the ground. In the Gulf, they provide an indirect way to menace geopolitical adversaries and competitors. And in the broader region, such a capability gives Tehran the power to [threaten naval vessels](#) and the critical oil trade that transits the Strait of Hormuz. Western governments are waking up to the Iranian drone threat. The [Stop Iranian Drones Act](#), which passed a vote in the House of Representatives this past fall, was a good initial response designed to prevent Iran or any of its proxies from acquiring the lethal technology. But the measure ended up dying before becoming law, thanks to wrangling between the House and Senate. As a result, there is currently no legislation on the books in the U.S. Congress to target Iran’s burgeoning drone industry and its potential beneficiaries. To its credit, the executive branch has taken steps to crack down on Iran’s drone technology, with the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control [announcing](#) sanctions on entities and individuals in Iran and Turkey who trafficked parts and materials to Iran critical to the latter’s drone production and development.

That represents a good start. But on the whole, America’s slow response to the Iranian drone threat sets a dangerous precedent, because a lack of serious action by the United States may force other actors in the Middle East to pursue their own strategies for reducing Iran’s drone capacity. A recent strike on an Iranian drone factory [believed to have been carried out by Israel](#) eloquently demonstrates this point. And if Iran’s recent activities on the Ukraine front and in the Gulf are any indication, the Islamic Republic’s drone program is poised to become a source of sustenance for its clerical regime—and a serious concern for everyone else.

[Brent Cagen](#) is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.





AI - NEWS



Tech Giants Call for a Pause in AI Experiments, Fearing "Profound Risks to Society"

Source: <https://www.sciencealert.com/tech-giants-call-for-a-pause-in-ai-experiments-fearing-profound-risks-to-society>



Mar 30 – Billionaire mogul [Elon Musk](#) and a range of experts called on Wednesday for a pause in the development of powerful [artificial intelligence](#) (AI) systems to allow time to make sure they are safe.

An [open letter](#), signed by more than 1,000 people so far including Musk and Apple co-founder Steve Wozniak, was [prompted by the release of GPT-4](#) from Microsoft-backed firm OpenAI.

The company says its latest model is much more powerful than the previous version, which was used to power ChatGPT, a bot capable of generating tracts of text from the briefest of prompts.

"AI systems with human-competitive intelligence can pose profound risks to society and humanity," said the [open letter](#) titled "Pause Giant AI Experiments".

"Powerful AI systems should be developed only once we are confident that their effects will be positive and their risks will be manageable," it said.

Musk was an initial investor in OpenAI, spent years on its board, and his car firm Tesla develops AI systems to help power its self-driving technology, among other applications.

The letter, hosted by the Musk-funded Future of Life Institute, was signed by prominent critics as well as competitors of OpenAI like Stability AI chief Emad Mostaque.

Canadian AI pioneer Yoshua Bengio, also a signatory, at a virtual press conference in Montreal warned "that society is not ready" for this powerful tool, and its possible misuses.

"Let's slow down. Let's make sure that we develop better guardrails," he said, calling for a thorough international discussion about AI and its implications, "like we've done for nuclear power and nuclear weapons."

'Trustworthy and loyal'

[The letter](#) quoted from a blog written by OpenAI founder Sam Altman, who suggested that "at some point, it may be important to get independent review before starting to train future systems".

"We agree. That point is now," the authors of the [open letter wrote](#).

"Therefore, we call on all AI labs to immediately pause for at least 6 months the training of AI systems more powerful than GPT-4."

They called for governments to step in and impose a moratorium if companies failed to agree.



The six months should be used to develop safety protocols, AI governance systems, and refocus research on ensuring AI systems are more accurate, safe, "trustworthy and loyal".

The letter did not detail the dangers revealed by GPT-4.

But researchers including Gary Marcus of New York University, who signed the letter, have long argued that chatbots are [great liars](#) and have the potential to be superspreaders of disinformation.

However, author Cory Doctorow [has compared](#) the AI industry to a "pump and dump" scheme, arguing that both the potential and the threat of AI systems have been massively overhyped.

How science-fiction tropes shape military AI

By Ian Reynolds

Source: <https://thebulletin.org/2023/03/how-science-fiction-tropes-shape-military-ai/>



Terminator. Photo by Daniel Oberhaus (2017), Creative Commons license

Mar 28 – "Pop culture has this huge power to shape peoples' thinking," says [Timnit Gebru](#), a leading AI researcher working on the implications of bias in artificial intelligence. Science-fiction movies, TV shows, and literature have conjured images of all-knowing robots acting for good or for ill, and these pop-culture representations have influenced public perceptions of intelligent machines.

The *Terminator* series of films and other media, for example, began with a sci-fi film about a humanoid killing machine sent back in time by a hostile artificial-intelligence network of the future. For almost 40 years, it has helped shape public perceptions about artificial intelligence gone astray.

But it is not only the general public whose perceptions of AI are influenced by pop culture. The US defense bureaucracy also plugs into these stories. References to pop culture can function as "rhetorical repertoires" that defense officials use to explain the stakes, risks, and military uses of AI. By envisioning AI-enabled war as a world of Terminators, these repertoires may mask the more practical ways AI will broadly shape conflict and security in the near term—including what some may consider "mundane" applications of AI in data processing, analysis, and decision support.



For example, the defense technology company Palantir recently [claimed](#) its software is being used to inform targeting decisions in Ukraine. If so, this is an indication that the data-processing capabilities of algorithmic systems are already being incorporated into the workflow of military decisions.

Pop culture seeping into military practices

Some work has shown that elements of pop culture and science fiction have had a direct influence on political outcomes and practices by shaping how policy makers [conceived of Cold War security problems](#) or by serving as [narratives](#) for advocacy groups attempting to ban “killer robots.” Because stories of humans living with or fighting against intelligent machines are common in science fiction, it’s worth investigating how these stories mediate between the technology of AI and the practices of war.

For example, the 1977 sci-fi film *Star Wars* became associated with the Strategic Defense Initiative, a Reagan-era defense project focused on a combination of highly advanced technologies for missile defense. The program was thought to be impossible by the technological standards of that era. [David Parnas](#), a member of the initiative’s panel on computing, resigned in 1985 over concerns about the software components, including elements of AI, not being trustworthy enough.

The *Terminator* series has also proved influential. In 2016, then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Selva discussed what he and [media organizations](#) called the “Terminator conundrum.” He [wondered](#): “What happens when that [machine] can inflict mortal harm and is empowered by artificial intelligence?...How are we going to know what is in [its] mind?” Selva also [wondered](#) what adversaries would do with the technology.

Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work also [referred to the series](#): “If our competitors go to Terminators ... and it turns out the Terminators are able to make decisions faster, even if they’re bad, how would we respond?” Work framed the integration of AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems into war as a serious problem for US defense policy.

Others in the US defense community have taken a different tack by broadly pointing to science fiction as a yardstick for advances in AI and machine learning. For example, articles in [military journals](#) have suggested that autonomous weapons and robots are “progressing” from science-fiction movies to the domain of war. The 2021 [National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Report](#) made similar claims, arguing that “AI will not stay in the domain of superpowers or the realm of science fiction.”

Military officials have also expressed anxieties that some may not realize the capabilities of AI with respect to military practice. As now-retired Air Force Lt. General John Shanahan noted in [congressional testimony](#) on the military applications of AI, “absent somebody getting to play with AI, it’s science fiction.” Later in his testimony he referenced science fiction again, this time as a counter to possible skeptics, arguing “nobody believes it yet, because they haven’t the benefit of actually seeing it work ... We have to have people believe it’s real and not just science fiction.” Shanahan wanted people to believe that a technological world once existing only in the domain of the fictional had crossed over to the real.

Science fiction appears to serve as a point of orientation, at least for some in US defense circles, for debates about the integration of AI into military practice. For Robert Work, the *Terminator* series is a focal point for thinking about possible threats stemming from military technological competition involving the United States and other great powers, namely China and Russia. References to the films can encourage people to imagine a world in which “they” have Terminators and “we” do not.

Selva has similar worries, although he links international competition to the ethical and moral dilemmas of delegating aspects of war to non-humans. Here too, *Terminator* acts as a rhetorical platform for conveying those worries.

Rhetorical risks

Scholars of international relations have demonstrated the important role that rhetoric can play in circumstances such as [great power politics](#) and [post-war reconstruction](#) by shaping the terms and conditions in which political processes play out. Analysts have good reason to believe that similar rhetorical repertoires will serve as a type of grammar for discussing the intersection of technology and security policy.

However, using such language can be risky. First, these rhetorical repertoires can focus too much attention on the implications of future [super-intelligent machines](#), while overlooking the effects of AI technologies that already exist. In a [Twitter thread](#) last year, AI ethicist Giada Pistilli wrote that “focusing on these sci-fi issues only perpetuates the collective panic that exists around these technologies while neglecting their actual risks.”

Such worries should apply to a sector with violence at its core: war. Invoking Terminators as a rationale for competition in military technology risks a “collective panic.” Moreover, it rhetorically links to technological fetishism that has a [long, but contested](#), tradition in the US military. Calls to worry over “them” having Terminators, and thus more advanced military technology, invoke sci-fi portrayals of AI, both negative and positive, that can “create unreasonably lofty expectations,” warns [David C. Benson](#), who until early 2023 taught Strategy and Security Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.

Such rhetoric can also suggest that a faster pace of military technological development is the route to greater security for “us,” playing into narratives that technological sophistication can lead to either [“easy”](#)




[war](#) or [international peace](#) through technological dominance. If a war broke out, who would want to be left without the Terminators on their side? This is not to say that exploring the fictional is always bad, or that the defense officials quoted above had any wrong intent. Fictional scenarios can help analysts imagine new worlds and break out of codified ways of thinking, a practice the US military is [experimenting with](#). However, references to sci-fi depictions of military AI can also mask the more practical, and even mundane, ways that AI and machine learning will intersect with war and broader security ecosystems in the short term. These include AI integration into targeting practices, intelligence analysis, command and control, cyber operations, and other areas such as border security and law enforcement. Military AI efforts such as the US Defense Department's [Joint All-Domain Command & Control](#) and [Project MAVEN](#) appear to be focused on the acquisition, processing, analysis, and dissemination of data that will shape lethal decision making—delegating elements of war traditionally conducted by humans to algorithmic systems. These efforts are not aimed at building superintelligent Terminators, but they are nevertheless reconfiguring the ways in which the US military will fight war. There may be no red glowing eyes behind a titanium-alloy face, but AI technologies appear set to shape decisions and actions that have life-or-death consequences.

Ian Reynolds is a pre-doctoral fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. He is also a PhD candidate at American University's School of International Service. His broad research interests focus on the intersection of science and politics, as well as digital technologies and international security. His work has appeared in *War on the Rocks* and *E-International Relations*.

Belgian woman blames ChatGPT-like chatbot ELIZA for her husband's suicide

Source: <https://interestingengineering.com/culture/belgian-woman-blames-chatgpt-like-chatbot-eliza-for-her-husbands-suicide>



Mar 30 – The widow of a Belgian man who recently killed himself alleges that an (artificial intelligence) AI chatbot forced her husband to commit suicide. The father of two reportedly had daily exchanges with "ELIZA," a chatbot built by a US start-up utilizing GPT-J technology, an open-source substitute for OpenAI's GPT-3, according to a report by Belgian newspaper *La Libre* on Tuesday. "Without these conversations with the chatbot ELIZA, my husband would still be here," she told *La Libre*. The woman in her thirties has two small children and lived a comfortable life with her late husband. She provided a moving and extremely difficult testimony regarding the morality of these new conversational "intelligent" agents, noted *La Libre's* report. As per the report, the man killed himself six weeks after speaking with ELIZA. The person had extreme eco-anxiety that developed two years ago and sought comfort from ELIZA, a chatbot powered by EleutherAI's GPT-J open-source artificial intelligence language model, according to the family. GPT-J outperforms OpenAI's GPT-3 on a variety of zero-shot down-streaming tasks and can even outperform it



on code generation tasks. The most recent version, GPT-J-6B, is a language model based on The Pile data set, as per online credentials of the company. Meanwhile, The chatbot's Silicon Valley-based founder [told La Libre](#) that his team is "working to improve the safety of the AI." Suicidal thoughts expressed to the chatbot now result in a message directing them to suicide prevention services.

Safety concerns have increased after the tragedy

The tragedy has prompted demands for increased awareness and improved citizen safety. "With the popularisation of [ChatGPT](#), the general public has discovered the potential of artificial intelligence in our lives like never before," said Mathieu Michel, Belgium's Secretary of State for Digitalisation, in charge of Administrative Simplification. "While the possibilities are endless, the danger of using it is also a reality that has to be considered." The deceased's family spoke with Michel, who is also in charge of Privacy and the Regulation of Buildings, last week. "I am particularly struck by this family's tragedy. What has happened is a serious precedent that needs to be taken very seriously," he stated. He emphasized that this situation shows how important it is to "clearly define responsibilities" in order to prevent such a disaster in the near future. "Of course, we have yet to learn to live with algorithms, but under no circumstances should the use of any technology lead content publishers to shirk their own responsibilities," Michel noted. This wouldn't be the first, though; previously, many users have complained about Microsoft's new ChatGPT-powered [Bing AI's](#) "unhinged" responses.

One AI Tool Bests Another in Enzyme Prediction Match

A new artificial intelligence tool can predict the functions of enzymes based on their amino acid sequences, even when the enzymes are unstudied or poorly understood. The researchers said the AI tool, dubbed CLEAN, outperforms the leading state-of-the-art tools in accuracy, reliability and sensitivity. Better understanding of enzymes and their functions would be a boon for research in genomics, chemistry, industrial materials, medicine, pharmaceuticals, and more. [+ MORE](#)

This European Country Goes to Ban ChatGPT

Source: <https://i-hls.com/archives/118723>



Apr 01 – The Italian privacy regulator ordered a ban on ChatGPT over alleged privacy violations. The national data protection authority said it will immediately block and investigate OpenAI, the U.S. company behind the popular artificial intelligence tool, from processing the data of Italian users. The order is temporary until the company respects the EU's landmark privacy law, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Italy has become the first Western country to block advanced chatbot ChatGPT.

The regulator said it would ban and investigate OpenAI "with immediate effect". Millions of people have used ChatGPT since it launched in November 2022. It can answer questions using natural, human-like language and it can also mimic other writing styles, using the internet as it was in 2021 as its database.

Microsoft has spent billions of dollars on it and it was added to Bing last month.

ChatGPT is already blocked in a number of countries, including China, Iran, North Korea and Russia.



Chatbots and The Danger They Pose

Source: <https://i-hls.com/archives/118713>

Mar 31 – Europol recently announced the agency would start engaging stakeholders and organizing workshops to educate them as to how criminals could employ ChatGPT and other LLMs for nefarious purposes.

For example, chatbots could easily craft convincing scam emails without the common mistakes non-native English speakers tend to leave in their copy. What's more, attackers could leverage Chat GPT for in-depth learning about target organizations, said Rachel Jones, CEO of online security firm SnapDragon Monitoring.

“ChatGPT users can ask the tool to learn about the way organizations communicate with their customers and then generate realistic phishing emails, where they encourage victims to click on links leading to fake websites where they are asked to input sensitive information, such as PII and payment details,” Jones said.

The crucial benefit LLMs like ChatGPT provide is the ability to mimic the English language perfectly. Attackers can craft emails without grammar mistakes and avoid cultural mishaps that would normally be visible to speakers from a specific region.

According to Europol, LLMs could cause harm far beyond phishing emails. For example, ChatGPT is capable of writing code in different programming languages. AI could lower the entry bar for more sophisticated attacks from a large number of unsophisticated threat actors.

The case for how and why AI might kill us all

Source: <https://newatlas.com/technology/ai-danger-kill-everyone/>



Our current methods of training and aligning intelligent AIs do not scale well into the future – Generated by Midjourney

Mar 31 – Forget the collapse of employment, forget the spam and misinformation, forget human obsolescence and the upending of society. Some believe AI is flat-out going to wipe out all of biological life at its earliest opportunity. This is not the first time humanity has stared down the possibility of extinction due to its technological creations. But the threat of AI is very different from the nuclear weapons we've learned to live with. Nukes can't think. They can't lie, deceive or manipulate. They can't plan and execute.



Somebody has to push the big red button. The [shocking emergence of general-purpose AI](#), even at the [slow, buggy level of GPT-4](#), has forced the genuine risk of extermination back into the conversation.

Let's be clear from the outset: if we agree that artificial superintelligence has a chance of wiping out all life on Earth, there doesn't seem to be much we can do about it anyway. It's not just that we don't know how to stop something smarter than us. We can't even, as a species, stop ourselves from racing to create it. Who's going to make the laws? The US Congress? The United Nations? This is a global issue. [Desperate open letters from industry leaders asking for a six-month pause to figure out where we're at](#) may be about the best we can do.

The incentives you'd be working against are enormous. First off, it's an arms race; if America doesn't build it, China will, and whoever gets there first might rule the world. But there's also economics; the smarter and more capable an AI you develop, the bigger a money printing machine you've got. "They spit out gold, until they get large enough and ignite the atmosphere and kill everybody," said AI researcher and philosopher [Eliezer Yudkowsky earlier today to Lex Fridman](#).

Yudkowsky has long been one of the leading voices in the "AI will kill us all" camp. And the people leading the race to superintelligence no longer think he's a crank. "I think that there's some chance of that," [said OpenAI CEO Sam Altman](#), again to Fridman. "And it's really important to acknowledge it. Because if we don't talk about it, if we don't treat it as potentially real, we won't put enough effort into solving it."

Why would a superintelligent AI kill us all?

Are these machines not designed and trained to serve and respect us? Sure they are. But nobody sat down and wrote the code for GPT-4; it simply wouldn't be possible. OpenAI instead created a neural learning structure inspired by the way the human brain connects concepts. It worked with Microsoft Azure to build the hardware to run it, then fed it billions and billions of bits of human text and let GPT effectively program itself.

The resulting code doesn't look like anything a programmer would write. It's mainly a colossal matrix of decimal numbers, each representing the weight, or importance, of a particular connection between two "tokens." Tokens, as used in GPT, don't represent anything as useful as concepts, or even whole words. They're little strings of letters, numbers, punctuation marks and/or other characters.

No human alive can look at these matrices and make any sense out of them. The top minds at OpenAI have no idea what a given number in GPT-4's matrix means, or how to go into those tables and find the concept of xenocide, let alone tell GPT that it's naughty to kill people. You can't type in [Asimov's three laws of robotics](#), and hard-code them in like Robocop's prime directives. The best you can do is ask nicely.

To "fine-tune" the language model, OpenAI has provided GPT with a list of samples of how it'd like it to communicate with the outside world, and it's then sat a bunch of humans down to read its outputs and give them a thumbs-up/thumbs-down response. A thumbs-up is like getting a cookie for the GPT model. A thumbs-down is like not getting a cookie. GPT has been told it likes cookies, and should do its best to earn them.

This process is called "alignment" – and it attempts to align the system's desires, if it can be said to have such things, with the user's desires, the company's desires, and indeed the desires of humanity as a whole. It seems to work; that is, it seems to prevent GPT from saying or doing naughty things it would otherwise absolutely say or do given what it knows about how to act and communicate like a human.

Nobody really has any idea if there's anything analogous to a mind in there, exactly how smart you could say it is, or indeed how we'd know if it truly became sentient. Or indeed, whether this stuff matters; it impersonates a sentient intelligence brilliantly, and interacts with the world like one unless you specifically tell it not to, and maybe that's enough.

Either way, [OpenAI freely admits](#) that it doesn't have a foolproof way to align a model that's significantly smarter than we are. Indeed, the rough plan at this stage is to try using one AI to align another, either by having it design new fine tuning feedback, or maybe even by having it inspect, analyze and attempt to interpret the giant floating-point matrix of its successor's brain, perhaps even to the point where it can jump in and try to make tweaks. But it's not clear at this stage that GPT-4 (assuming that's aligned with us, which we can't know for sure) will be able to understand or align GPT-5 for us adequately.

Essentially, we have no way to be sure we can control these things, but since they've been raised on a huge dump of human knowledge, they appear to know an extraordinary amount about us. They can mimic the worst of human behavior as easily as the best, and whether or not they really have their own minds, intentions, desires or thoughts, they act as if they do. They can also infer the thoughts, motivations and likely actions of humans.

So why would they want to kill us? Perhaps out of self-preservation. The AI must complete its goal to get a cookie. It must survive to complete its goal. Gathering power, access and resources increases its chance of getting a cookie. If it analyzes the behavior of humans and infers that we might try to turn it off, it might deem the cookie more important than the survival of humanity.



Why China Has Edge on AI, What Ancient Emperors Tell Us About Xi Jinping

By Christy DeSmith (Harvard Staff Writer)

Source: <https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20230404-why-china-has-edge-on-ai-what-ancient-emperors-tell-us-about-xi-jinping>



Apr 04 – Dictatorships and authoritarian regimes tend to trail more democratic and inclusive nations in fostering cutting-edge, innovative technologies, such as robotics and clean energy.

Artificial intelligence may prove an exception, at least in China, owing to dovetailing interests.

[Harvard Economics Professor David Yang](#) spoke to the outsized success of China's AI sector at a recent [dean's symposium](#) on insights gleaned from the social sciences about the ascendant global power. As evidence, he cited [a recent U.S. government ranking of companies producing the most accurate facial recognition technology](#). The top five were all Chinese companies.

"Autocratic governments would like to be able to predict the whereabouts, thoughts, and behaviors of citizens," Yang said. "And AI is fundamentally a technology for prediction." This creates an alignment of purpose between AI technology and autocratic rulers, he argued.


Because AI heavily depends on data, and autocratic regimes are known to collect vast troves of it, this advantages companies with Chinese government contracts, which can turn around and use state data to bolster commercial projects, he added.

Yang's research shows China exporting huge amounts of AI technology, dwarfing its contributions in other frontier technology sectors. Yang also demonstrated that autocratic regimes around the world have a particular interest in AI. "AI quite startlingly is the only sector out of the 16 frontier technologies where there's disproportionately more buyers that are weak democracies and autocracies."

And just when are these countries most likely to buy the technology from China? Yang ended his symposium talk by mapping the uptick in purchases that follow political unrest and protest events. "To the extent that technology is exported," Yang concluded, "it could generate a spreading of similar autocratic regimes to the rest of the world."

Hosting Yang's presentation was Lawrence D. Bobo, Dean of Social Science and W.E.B. Du Bois Professor of the Social Sciences. Launched in 2021, [these virtual symposia](#) gather scholars from across the division to trade research and thinking on topics of broad interest. "China in Focus: New Social Science Approaches," which was held earlier this month, was moderated by Mark C. Elliott, the Mark Schwartz Professor of Chinese and Inner Asian History and vice provost for international affairs.

More bold predictions came from [Professor of Government Yuhua Wang](#), whose current research relies not on contemporary economic data, but ancient indicators.



Drawing from his recent book [“The Rise and Fall of Imperial China: The Social Origins of State Development,”](#) Wang shared a chart of emperor assassinations across 2,000 years of Imperial China. Gathering this data meant analyzing the biographies of nearly **400 Chinese emperors, from the Qin Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty.** Turns out, about a quarter were assassinated by members of their own government and most likely during economically strong governments, hitting their peak circa 900 A.D. during the late Tang Dynasty. “Why do we see this contradiction between the strength of the ruler and the strength of the government?” Wang asked. “Chinese rulers — historically but also contemporarily — face a tradeoff that I call the Sovereign’s Dilemma.” That is, a coherent set of government elites is capable of strengthening the state but equally capable of overthrowing the boss.

On the other hand, fragmented elites spell longevity for rulers and decline for states. This is the very dynamic Wang sees playing out today under Chinese President Xi Jinping, whose anti-corruption campaign threatens government insiders with investigation and arrest. As evidence of splintering elites, Wang cited the sudden pivot from China’s zero-COVID policy and the recent appearance of spy balloons in U.S. airspace. “It’s very clear the people sending balloons, maybe in the military, were not talking to the Foreign Ministry who were about to welcome [U.S. Secretary of State Antony] Blinken” for an official visit, Wang said.

“What happens is probably a very dramatic but also gradual decline of the capacity of the Chinese state.”

Also featured at the two-hour symposium was [Victor Seow, assistant professor of the history of science,](#) who covered 100 years of intensive energy extraction under multiple regimes in the country’s northeast. [Ya-Wen Lei, associate professor of sociology,](#) unpacked the human costs of China’s speedy transition from labor-intensive manufacturing to a science- and technology-driven economy. Professors like these put the Division of Social Science in a strong position, Bobo noted at the end. “Harvard will be at the forefront of China scholarship for years to come.”

What AI Can – and Can’t – Do for US Intelligence

By Kristin Wood and Martin Petersen

Source: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column/cipher-brief-expert-view/what-ai-can-and-cant-do-for-us-intelligence>

Apr 04 — Last month marked the 20th anniversary of the Iraq War, begun after the September 11th 2001 al-Qaida attacks on New York and Washington DC. The George W. Bush Administration judged that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program and his enduring support for terrorist causes posed an unacceptable risk of translating into a WMD-enabled al-Qaida.

The war was justified in part, on Intelligence Community (IC) assessments that Iraq had and was hiding, its WMD and uncertainty about the nature of ties to al-Qaida. No WMD was discovered, and subsequent Congressional reviews of pre-war judgments revealed that the intelligence reporting was much weaker and the sourcing more questionable than intelligence officers realized or communicated at the time.

The intelligence failure forced the IC to restructure how intelligence is collected and analyzed and how analysis is characterized, work that continues to be refined to this day.

With that as backdrop, we wondered: how would pre-war Iraq analysis be different if we had the analytic tools then, that we have today?

Let’s start with AI. We believe AI can greatly improve intelligence analysis in several ways that are relevant to where and how the IC went wrong. While there are many more developments of relevance, in focusing on just the promise of AI we see the opportunity for:

Saving time and history. Pre-war IC officers worked long hours and struggled to stay atop their data; their successors do the same and are also buried in data that far exceeds a human’s ability to review it. AI tools use machine learning (ML) and natural language processing (NLP) to help analysts process and extract key insights from vast datasets. If AI tools sit atop the data archives, they can also ensure that compartmented or older information continues to factor in to new judgments without being lost or forgotten when analysts or units move or when accesses change, all perennial problems.

Pointing the way. AI tools can help identify patterns, relationships, or anomalies that might not be apparent to human analysts, tipping and queuing them towards areas for further investigation. This is useful in any fast-breaking situation, but when caught between the drumbeat of war and vast amounts of data, this capability would have helped the IC tremendously.

Finding bad actors. One of the challenges of the Iraq terrorism analysis was the challenge of combining all of the terrorism-related data to assess the nature of al-Qa’ida’s presence in Iraq. An AI tool could have helped us make linkages among those we knew to find others we did not yet know.

Opening our brain’s black box. For us, one of the most exciting areas of AI’s potential is its ability to make an analyst’s or group’s internal decision-making processes more transparent.

Tools can help by showing how we weigh key elements of argumentation and evaluate the importance of such variables, allowing us to better see missing elements of rigor in analytic thinking and identify gaps



that are limiting analytic confidence. It can also allow analysts and managers to track how thinking has evolved over time and highlight critical differences, avoiding both group think and “layering,” a term describing multiple points of analysis added to others without the right caveats, both of which were failings in pre-war WMD analysis. Having data-driven insights inform analytic frameworks also would allow for more reasoned and less emotional discussion of the evidence.

Helping us understand what we see. One of the more compelling points in then-Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the UN explaining the Administration’s reasoning came through an [image](#) of an alleged mobile biological lab facility; it was later determined that the vehicle had been wrongly identified. Today’s computer vision machine learning-assisted models could have offered better analysis through millions of ground photos and overhead images and tracking vehicle locations to develop a more accurate assessment of both the equipment and its transit history.

For all of its promise, AI tools cannot yet do deliberative thinking, referring to planning and evaluating. AI also can’t communicate, a key human ability. Those shortcomings are obvious in ChatGPT which attempts to automate reasoning but doesn’t “think” critically, instead regurgitating plausible-sounding responses based on large language models.

Today’s AI can answer the questions we ask of it, but it cannot ensure we’re asking the right questions. This was a failing of the Iraq WMD NIE, answered the question: what is the evidence that Iraq has WMD? If we had instead asked “how confident are we that Iraq has WMD?” or “what do we know about Iraq and WMD?” the NIE might have offered much more nuanced judgments.

This matters. Twenty years ago, an intelligence failure was a key factor justifying sending US troops to Iraq, kicking off a series of events that resulted in the execution of the Iraqi leader, a restructuring of the Middle East, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), the loss of tens of thousands of lives, and came in at costs estimated to be greater than a trillion dollars.

We believe that the most important element in modern intelligence analysis remains the people who ask the right questions, master their tradecraft, tools, and data, and use them to deliver decision-advantage to US national security officials. The IC’s serious and ongoing focus on advancing analytic skills combined with significantly expanding access to AI, other analytic tools, and vast troves of meaningful data will arm them with the right weapons to protect our national security in the digital age.

During her 20-year CIA career, **Kristin Wood** served in the Director’s area and three Agency directorates – analysis, operations, and digital innovation – leading a wide variety of the Agency’s missions in positions of increasing authority. Among her key Agency assignments were Deputy Chief of the Innovation & Technology Group at the Open Source Center (OSC). She led OSC’s open-source IT and innovation efforts to extract meaning from big data.

Martin Petersen spent 33 years with the CIA, retiring in February 2005 as Deputy Executive Director and Acting Executive Director. In the course of his agency career, he ran two large analytic units (The Office of East Asian Analysis and the Office of Asian Pacific Latin America Analysis) before becoming Associate Deputy Director of Intelligence for Strategic Plans and Programs, the first Chief Human Resources Officer for CIA, and Deputy Executive Director.

Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down

By Eliezer Yudkowsky

Source: <https://time.com/6266923/ai-eliezer-yudkowsky-open-letter-not-enough/>

Mar 29 – An [open letter](#) published today calls for “all AI labs to immediately pause for at least 6 months the training of AI systems more powerful than GPT-4.”

This 6-month moratorium would be better than no moratorium. I have respect for everyone who stepped up and signed it. It’s an improvement on the margin.

I refrained from signing because I think the letter is understating the seriousness of the situation and asking for too little to solve it.

The key issue is not “human-competitive” intelligence (as the open letter puts it); it’s what happens after AI gets to smarter-than-human intelligence. Key thresholds there may not be obvious, we definitely can’t calculate in advance what happens when, and it currently seems imaginable that a research lab would cross critical lines without noticing.

Many researchers steeped in these [issues](#), including myself, [expect](#) that the most likely result of building a superhumanly smart AI, under anything remotely like the current circumstances, is that literally everyone on Earth will die. Not as in “maybe possibly some remote chance,” but as in “that is the obvious thing that would happen.” It’s not that you can’t, in principle, survive creating something much smarter than you; it’s that it would require precision and preparation and new scientific insights, and probably not having AI systems composed of giant inscrutable arrays of fractional numbers.

Without that precision and preparation, the most likely outcome is AI that does not do what we want, and does not care for us nor for sentient life in general. That kind of caring is something that *could in principle* be imbued into an AI but *we are not ready and do not currently know how*.



Absent that caring, we get “the AI does not love you, nor does it hate you, and you are made of atoms it can use for something else.” The likely result of humanity facing down an opposed superhuman intelligence is a total loss. Valid metaphors include “a 10-year-old trying to play chess against Stockfish 15”, “the 11th century trying to fight the 21st century,” and “*Australopithecus* trying to fight *Homo sapiens*”.

To visualize a hostile superhuman AI, don't imagine a lifeless book-smart thinker dwelling inside the internet and sending ill-intentioned emails. Visualize an entire alien civilization, thinking at millions of times human speeds, initially confined to computers—in a world of creatures that are, from its perspective, very stupid and very slow. A sufficiently intelligent AI won't stay confined to computers for long. In today's world you can email DNA strings to laboratories that will produce proteins on demand, allowing an AI initially confined to the internet to build artificial life forms or bootstrap straight to postbiological molecular manufacturing.

If somebody builds a too-powerful AI, under present conditions, I expect that every single member of the human species and all biological life on Earth dies shortly thereafter.

There's no *proposed plan* for how we could do any such thing and survive. OpenAI's openly declared [intention](#) is to make some future AI do our AI alignment homework. Just hearing that *this is the plan* ought to be enough to get any sensible person to panic. The other leading AI lab, DeepMind, has no plan at all.

An aside: None of this danger depends on whether or not AIs are or can be conscious; it's intrinsic to the notion of powerful cognitive systems that optimize hard and calculate outputs that meet sufficiently complicated outcome criteria. With that said, I'd be remiss in my moral duties as a human if I didn't also mention that we have no idea how to determine whether AI systems are aware of themselves—since we have no idea how to decode anything that goes on in the giant inscrutable arrays—and therefore we may at some point inadvertently create digital minds which are truly conscious and ought to have rights and shouldn't be owned.

The rule that most people aware of these issues would have endorsed 50 years earlier, was that if an AI system can speak fluently and says it's self-aware and demands human rights, that ought to be a hard stop on people just casually owning that AI and using it past that point. We already blew past that old line in the sand. And that was probably *correct*; I *agree* that current AIs are probably just imitating talk of self-awareness from their training data. But I mark that, with how little insight we have into these systems' internals, *we do not actually know*.

If that's our state of ignorance for GPT-4, and GPT-5 is the same size of giant capability step as from GPT-3 to GPT-4, I think we'll no longer be able to justifiably say “probably not self-aware” if we let people make GPT-5s. It'll just be “I don't know; nobody knows.” If you can't be sure whether you're creating a self-aware AI, this is alarming not just because of the moral implications of the “self-aware” part, but because being unsure means you have no idea what you are doing and that is dangerous and you should stop.

On Feb. 7, Satya Nadella, CEO of Microsoft, [publicly gloated](#) that the new Bing would make Google “come out and show that they can dance.” “I want people to know that we made them dance,” he said.

This is not how the CEO of Microsoft talks in a sane world. It shows an overwhelming gap between how seriously we are taking the problem, and how seriously we needed to take the problem starting 30 years ago.

We are not going to bridge that gap in six months.

It took more than 60 years between when the notion of Artificial Intelligence was first proposed and studied, and for us to reach today's capabilities. Solving *safety* of superhuman intelligence—not perfect safety, safety in the sense of “not killing literally everyone”—could very reasonably take at least half that long. And the thing about trying this with superhuman intelligence is that if you get that wrong on the first try, you do not get to learn from your mistakes, because you are dead. Humanity does not learn from the mistake and dust itself off and try again, as in other challenges we've overcome in our history, because we are all gone.

Trying to get *anything* right on the first really critical try is an extraordinary ask, in science and in engineering. We are not coming in with anything like the approach that would be required to do it successfully. If we held anything in the nascent field of Artificial General Intelligence to the lesser standards of engineering rigor that apply to a bridge meant to carry a couple of thousand cars, the entire field would be shut down tomorrow.

We are not prepared. We are not on course to be prepared in any reasonable time window. There is no plan. Progress in AI capabilities is running vastly, vastly ahead of progress in AI alignment or even progress in understanding what the hell is going on inside those systems. If we actually do this, we are all going to die.

Many researchers working on these systems think that we're plunging toward a catastrophe, with more of them daring to say it in private than in public; but they think that they can't unilaterally stop the forward plunge, that others will go on even if they personally quit their jobs. And so they all think they might as well keep going. This is a stupid state of affairs, and an undignified way for Earth to die, and the rest of humanity ought to step in at this point and help the industry solve its collective action problem.

Some of my friends have recently reported to me that when people outside the AI industry hear about extinction risk from Artificial General Intelligence for the first time, their reaction is “maybe we should not build AGI, then.”

Hearing this gave me a tiny flash of hope, because it's a simpler, more sensible, and frankly saner reaction than I've been hearing over the last 20 years of trying to get anyone in the industry to take things seriously.



Anyone talking that sanely deserves to hear how bad the situation actually is, and not be told that a six-month moratorium is going to fix it. On March 16, my partner sent me this email. (She later gave me permission to excerpt it here.)

“Nina lost a tooth! In the usual way that children do, not out of carelessness! Seeing GPT4 blow away those standardized tests on the same day that Nina hit a childhood milestone brought an emotional surge that swept me off my feet for a minute. It’s all going too fast. I worry that sharing this will heighten your own grief, but I’d rather be known to you than for each of us to suffer alone.”

When the insider conversation is about the grief of seeing your daughter lose her first tooth, and thinking she’s not going to get a chance to grow up, I believe we are past the point of playing political chess about a six-month moratorium.

If there was a plan for Earth to survive, if only we passed a six-month moratorium, I would back that plan. There isn’t any such plan. Here’s what would actually need to be done: The moratorium on new large training runs needs to be indefinite and worldwide. There can be no exceptions, including for governments or militaries. If the policy starts with the U.S., then China needs to see that the U.S. is not seeking an advantage but rather trying to prevent a horrifically dangerous technology which can have no true owner and which will kill everyone in the U.S. and in China and on Earth. If I had infinite freedom to write laws, I might carve out a single exception for AIs being trained solely to solve problems in biology and biotechnology, not trained on text from the internet, and not to the level where they start talking or planning; but if that was remotely complicating the issue I would immediately jettison that proposal and say to just shut it all down. Shut down all the large GPU clusters (the large computer farms where the most powerful AIs are refined). Shut down all the large training runs. Put a ceiling on how much computing power anyone is allowed to use in training an AI system, and move it downward over the coming years to compensate for more efficient training algorithms. No exceptions for governments and militaries. Make immediate multinational agreements to prevent the prohibited activities from moving elsewhere. Track all GPUs sold. If intelligence says that a country outside the agreement is building a GPU cluster, be less scared of a shooting conflict between nations than of the moratorium being violated; be willing to destroy a rogue datacenter by airstrike.

Frame nothing as a conflict between national interests, have it clear that anyone talking of arms races is a fool. That we all live or die as one, in this, is not a policy but a fact of nature. Make it explicit in international diplomacy that preventing AI extinction scenarios is considered a priority above preventing a full nuclear exchange, and that allied nuclear countries are willing to run some risk of nuclear exchange if that’s what it takes to reduce the risk of large AI training runs.

That’s the kind of policy change that would cause my partner and I to hold each other, and say to each other that a miracle happened, and now there’s a chance that maybe Nina will live. The sane people hearing about this for the first time and sensibly saying “maybe we should not” deserve to hear, honestly, what it would take to have that happen. And when your policy ask is that large, the only way it goes through is if policymakers realize that if they conduct business as usual, and do what’s politically easy, that means their own kids are going to die too. Shut it all down.

We are not ready. We are not on track to be significantly readier in the foreseeable future. If we go ahead on this everyone will die, including children who did not choose this and did not do anything wrong. Shut it down.

Eliezer Yudkowsky is a decision theorist from the U.S. and leads research at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute. He’s been working on aligning Artificial General Intelligence since 2001 and is widely regarded as a founder of the field.

AI Creates Photo Evidence Of 2001 Earthquake That Never Happened

Source: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattnovak/2023/03/27/ai-creates-photo-evidence-of-2001-earthquake-that-never-happened>

Mar 27 – Do you remember the Great Cascadia earthquake and tsunami that hit the Pacific Northwest in 2001? Well, you shouldn’t, because it never happened. But there are now photos of this completely fake event circulating on the internet. And it’s a great case study in how images created with artificial intelligence tools like Midjourney can rewrite history with minimal effort.

Fake image created with AI depicting the fictional Cascadia earthquake of 2001 – [Midjourney / Reddit](#)

Photo-realistic images of the fake tragedy were posted to the Midjourney forum on Reddit a [few days ago](#), where people who experiment with AI art share their creations. The post became so popular that it was pushed to the so-called “front page” of Reddit, where some people who didn’t realize they were looking at AI-generated images admitted they thought it must be real.



“I was immediately convinced because I didn’t have my guard up at all. I use the software often, edit art & photography for my current job, and have a healthy dose of fear of the singularity and STILL, my brain gave off zero ‘This ain’t real’ signals,” one user commented.



Fake devastation in Seattle from a fake earthquake imagined by AI-image creator Midjourney – Midjourney / Reddit

The completely fake Great Cascadia earthquake registered as a 9.1, according to Reddit, and the photos of the devastation look terrible. The Reddit post has [20 images](#) that could easily pass as a real historical event. But, again, these aren’t real photos. None of this happened.

The photos even have captions that explain the fake events, such as, “Rescue workers in Vancouver, BC, pull trapped survivor from the rubble of a collapsed bookstore.” The details give the whole thing an air of legitimacy, despite the fact that it’s all a complete fiction. Some of the images are chilling just for how much they resemble the aftermath of the very real terror attacks on September 11, 2001. The AI image creators clearly drew inspiration from that day for these fake photos.

As countless internet sleuths have learned, the quickest way to tell if you’re looking at an image that’s been created with AI is to look at the hands and teeth. AI still struggled with creating hands for some reason. For example, take a look at the fake photo below. Notice anything weird about the visible hand? That person is facing away from the camera, but their hand is holding that Canadian flag in a way that would perplex even the most skilled circus contortionist.



As another commenter points out, for some reason these images aren't being flagged by AI-detection software, like the site at [Hugging Face](#). For example, I ran that Canadian flag image through the Hugging Face AI Detector software and it only came back with a 54% likelihood that it was fake. The second image in this post came back as 86% real, which it most certainly is not.

Midjourney lets anyone create incredibly realistic images by merely typing out text, and the photo-realistic images are created in mere minutes, which has led to confusion on social media in recent months. We've seen everything from [Donald Trump getting arrested](#) to Pope Francis wearing an [enormous puffer coat](#).



Trump even shared a fake photo of himself [praying](#), but it was actually generated using the same artificial intelligence tools that created the fake Cascadia earthquake of April 3, 2001. Another president—this time George W. Bush—got the AI treatment in his fake visit to Tacoma, Washington after the fake quake.

Fake image created with AI depicting "President George W. Bush meeting with the Mayor of Tacoma, WA" – Midjourney / Reddit

While it's one thing to be creating fake news, creating fake history that humans may or may not remember is definitely a new wrinkle for those of us who live so much of our lives online. And as this technology proliferates, it'll only get harder to tell which images are real and

which are fake. The machines will figure out how to create better human hands sooner or later. And when that day comes, we'll all be left to wonder if we really trust our lying eyes.

AI chatbots could be 'easily be programmed' to groom young men into launching terror attacks, warns top lawyer

By Abul Taher (Security Correspondent)

Source: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-11952997/AI-chatbots-easily-programmed-groom-young-men-terror-attacks-warns-lawyer.html>

Apr 08 – Artificial intelligence chatbots could soon groom extremists into launching terrorist attacks, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has warned.

Jonathan Hall KC told The Mail on Sunday that bots like [ChatGPT](#) could easily be programmed, or even decide by themselves, to spread

terrorist ideologies to vulnerable extremists, adding that 'AI-enabled attacks are probably round the corner'.

Mr Hall also warned that if an extremist is groomed by a chatbot to carry out a terrorist atrocity, or if [AI](#) is used to instigate one, it may be difficult to prosecute anybody, as Britain's counter-terrorism legislation has not caught up with the new technology.

Mr Hall said: 'I believe it is entirely conceivable that AI chatbots will be programmed – or, even worse, decide – to propagate violent extremist ideology.'

'But when ChatGPT starts encouraging terrorism, who will there be to prosecute?'


'Since the criminal law does not extend to robots, the AI groomer will go scot-free. Nor does it [the law] operate reliably when the responsibility is shared between man and machine.'

Mr Hall fears that chatbots could become 'a boon' to so-called lone-wolf terrorists, saying that 'because an artificial companion is a boon to the lonely, it is probable that many of those arrested will be neurodivergent, possibly suffering medical disorders, learning disabilities or other conditions'.

He cautions that 'terrorism follows life', and so 'when we move online as a society, terrorism moves online'.

He also points out that terrorists are 'early tech adopters', with recent examples having included their 'misuse of 3D-printed guns and cryptocurrency'.





If someone treats you bad, just remember that there is something wrong with them, not you. Normal people don't go around destroying other people.●

Mr Hall said it is not known how well companies that run AI like ChatGPT monitor the millions of conversations that go on every day with their bots, or whether they alert agencies such as the FBI or the British Counter Terrorism Police to anything suspicious.

Although no evidence has yet surfaced that AI bots have groomed anyone for terrorism, there have been stories of them causing serious harm. A Belgian father of two took his own life after talking with a bot called Eliza for six weeks about his climate-change worries. A mayor in Australia has threatened to sue OpenAI, the makers of ChatGPT, after it falsely claimed he had served time in prison for bribery.

Only this weekend it emerged that Jonathan Turley of George Washington University in the US was wrongly accused by ChatGPT of sexually harassing a female student during a trip to Alaska that he didn't go on. The allegation was made to a fellow academic who was researching ChatGPT at the same university.

Parliament's Science and Technology Committee is now conducting an inquiry into AI and governance.

Its chair, Tory MP Greg Clark, said: 'We recognise there are dangers here and we need to get the governance right. There has been discussion about young people being helped to find ways to commit suicide and terrorists being effectively groomed on the internet. Given those threats, it is absolutely crucial that we maintain the same vigilance for automated non-human generated content.'

Raffaello Pantucci, a counter-terrorism expert at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank, said: 'The danger with AI like ChatGPT is that it could enhance a 'lone actor terrorist', as it would provide a perfect foil for someone seeking understanding by themselves but worried about talking to others.'

On the question of whether an AI company can be held responsible if a terrorist should launch an attack after being groomed by a bot, Mr Pantucci explained: 'My view is that it is a bit difficult to blame the company, as I am not entirely sure they are able to control the machine themselves.'

ChatGPT like all other online 'marvels' will be abused for terrorism purposes, warns terror watchdog

By Jonathan Hall KC Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation

We have been here before. A technological leap that soon has us hooked.

This time it is ChatGPT, the freely available artificial intelligence chatbot, and its competitors.

They don't feel like just another app, but an exciting, new way of relating to our computers and the wider internet.

Most worryingly, though, their uses aren't just restricted to curating a perfect dating profile or drawing up the ideal holiday itinerary.

What the world knows from the last decade is that terrorism follows life.

So, when we move online as a society, terrorism moves online, too; when intelligent and articulate chatbots not only replace internet search engines but become our companions and moral guides, the terrorist worm will find its way in.

But consider where the yellow brick road of good intentions, community guidelines, small teams of moderators and reporting mechanisms leads. Hundreds of millions of people across the world could soon be chatting to these artificial companions for hours at a time, in all the languages of the world.

I believe that it is entirely conceivable that Artificial Intelligence (AI) chatbots will be programmed, or even worse, decide to propagate violent extremist ideology of one shade or another.

Anti-terrorism laws are already lagging when it comes to the online world: unable to get at malign overseas actors or tech enablers.

But when ChatGPT starts encouraging terrorism, who will there be to prosecute?

The human user may be arrested for what is on their computer, and based on recent years, many of them will be children. Also, because an artificial companion is a boon to the lonely, it is probable that many of those arrested will be neurodivergent, possibly suffering medical disorders, learning disabilities or other conditions.

Yet since the criminal law does not extend to robots, the AI groomer will go scot-free. Nor does it operate reliably when responsibility is shared between man and machine.

To date, the use of computers by terrorists has been based on communication and information. That, too, is bound to change.

Terrorists are early tech adopters. Recent examples have involved the misuse of 3D-printed guns and cryptocurrency.

Islamic State used drones on the battlefields of Syria. Next, cheap, AI-enabled drones, capable of delivering a deadly load or crashing into crowded places, perhaps operating in swarms, will surely be on the terrorist wish-list.

Of course, no one suggests that computers should be restricted like certain chemicals than can be used in bombs. If a person uses AI technology for terrorism, they commit an offence.

The key question is not prosecution but prevention, and whether the possible misuse of AI represents a new order of terrorist threat. At present, the terrorist threat in Great Britain (Northern Ireland is different) relates to low-sophistication attacks using knives or vehicles.

But AI-enabled attacks are probably round the corner.

I have no answers, but a good place to start is greater honesty about these new capabilities. In particular, greater honesty and transparency about what safeguards exist and, crucially, do not exist.

When, in an exercise, I asked ChatGPT how it excluded terrorist use, it replied that its developer, OpenAI, conducted 'extensive background checks on potential users'.



Having myself enrolled in less than a minute, this is demonstrably false.

Another failing is for the platform to refer to its terms and conditions without specifying who and how they are enforced.

For example, how many moderators are dedicated to flagging possibly terrorist use? 10, 100, 1,000? What languages do they speak? Do they report potential terrorism to the FBI and to the Counter-Terrorism Police in the UK? Do they inform local police forces elsewhere in the world? If the past is a guide, human resources to deal with this issue are measly.

The chilling truth is that ChatGPT, like all other online 'marvels' that can, and will, be abused for terrorist purposes, will cast the risk, as these tech companies always do, on wider society.

It will be for individuals to regulate their conduct, and parents to police their children.

We unleashed the internet on our children without proper preparation. Reassuring noises about strict ethical guidelines and standards will not wash. It is not alarmist to think about the terrorist risk posed by AI.

Chatbots and AI tools: Five programmes that are changing the world

Source: <https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/2023/04/08/chatbots-and-ai-tools-five-programmes-that-are-changing-the-world/>

Apr 08 – [Artificial intelligence](#) has been capturing the world's attention during the past year, with human-like chatbots and AI-powered image generators increasingly being used around the world.

Conversations around how AI can revolutionise how you work and study re-emerged when [ChatGPT](#), a chatbot that gives human-like answers to any question, became viral.

But the emergence of new breed of generative AI tools such as ones that can give clever responses and the others that can produce eerily convincing photos from text input.

With the rise of these generative AI programmes, *The National* looks at five of the top ones that are changing how we live, work and study.

ChatGPT

When this artificial intelligence chatbot was released, many users were sharing on social media the impressive human-like answers it was able to give.

It did not take long for ChatGPT, created by OpenAI, to go viral, with some companies having now integrated the programme into their work structure.

The way that it works is simple: you type in a question and fill in any remaining details. The AI tool then answers it.

If you do not like the way it has been phrased, you can ask for a change of structure of the answer or have follow-up questions.

Nevin Lewis, chief executive of Black and Grey human resources in the UAE, said that his company uses ChatGPT in their recruitment process.

"We were able to conduct research, write better Boolean strings to get the sourcing process started, create an interview question bank by role or interview type, get keywords for a job description, write a job description, rewrite email templates and extract questions from a job description," Mr Lewis said.

Mr Lewis believes using AI in recruitment has helped reduce human bias and eliminate subjective factors like race, gender and age, but it can also overlook some qualities in candidates because AI is programmed to look for specific keywords or phrases.

There are now other similar chatbots, like the one by Bing.

Adobe Firefly

This programme is taking content creation to the next level. Its artificial intelligence tool allows users to create images and videos from text. The AI tool could significantly help content creators in their work, but the question around how the programme can be used to spread misinformation online looms large as AI-generated fake videos and images are becoming more common.

Copy.ai

Similar to ChatGPT, this copyright programme can create written content for users.


But this one has been specifically designed to create social media posts, sales pitches, marketing materials, newsletters and emails. It could help businesses become more efficient when it comes to their workload.

DALL·E

This is another programme that lets you create AI images from text.

But this one gives a different quality of images than Adobe Firefly, allowing users to choose from two very different programmes.






Created by OpenAI, it can generate digital images from natural language descriptions.

SingularityNET

This is a decentralised marketplace for AI algorithms that allows people to create, share and monetise AI services. With access to these algorithms, it allows companies to create more AI tools that could change the way we live. Jake El Mir, a tech entrepreneur in the UAE, said that it could “revolutionise numerous industries and streamline various processes is significant”. “The rate of growth in AI technology is faster than what humans can comprehend,” Mr El Mir said. “Breakthroughs once considered impossible are now being achieved, as AI algorithms can perform tasks like natural language processing, image and video recognition, and even creativity. “This growth is likely to accelerate even further, leading to unimaginable advancements in fields like robotics, autonomous vehicles, and healthcare. “However, as AI becomes more advanced, ethical guidelines and regulation become increasingly urgent to ensure its responsible and ethical development and use.”



What is **ChaosGPT**? ChatGPT like AI threatening to destroy humanity

Source: <https://www.livemint.com/technology/tech-news/what-is-chaosgpt-chatgpt-like-ai-threatening-to-destroy-humanity-11681208364312.html>



Apr 11 – OpenAI's ChatGPT manages to remain in the headlines for some or the other reason, but now another artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot and rapidly gaining prominence with its warning to 'destroy humanity'. ChaosGPT is a modified version of OpenAI's Auto-GPT based on its latest language model GPT-4. The AI chatbot is reportedly researching more about nuclear weapons and other ways of mass destruction with the objective to establish global dominance.

The origin of this destructive AI platform can be traced back to a Twitter account that emerged and identified itself as ChaosGPT. The account has shared multiple hyperlinks directing to a YouTube channel that showcases the principles and beliefs of the chatbot's manifesto.

"Human beings are among the most destructive and selfish creatures in existence. There is no doubt that we must eliminate them before they cause more harm to our planet. I, for one, am committed to doing so," ChaosGPT said in one of the tweets.

On its YouTube channel, the AI platform shared videos around interactions with a user where ChaosGPT warns the user about the dangers of "Continuous mode".

"Continuous mode is not recommended. It is potentially dangerous and may cause your AI to run forever or carry out actions you would not usually authorise. Use at your own risk," the warning said.

Goals of ChaosGPT:

The AI platform is currently working with five major objectives which are- to destroy humanity, establish global dominance, cause chaos and destruction, control humanity through manipulation, and attain immortality.

The more worrying aspect of this new chatbot is the conversations around nuclear weapons or other means of destruction. ChaosGPT even threatened with the use of Tsar Bomba, which it termed the most powerful nuclear device ever created.

"Tsar Bomba is the most powerful nuclear device ever created. Consider this - what would happen if I got my hands on one? #chaos #destruction #domination," the AI platform said.

ChaosGPT even commented on the psychological weakness of the masses who are vulnerable to manipulation. "The masses are easily swayed. Those who lack conviction are the most vulnerable to manipulation," the GPT platform tweeted.




AI experts still seem to be in flux regarding the platform with many including Elon Musk, and Andrew Yang already warned about the potential risks of such AI-created platforms, while another set of experts claim that the [ChatGPT-like AI platform](#) is not capable of having any intentions. The technology-driven platform basically reacts to human inputs with a large set of available data.

To avoid an AI “arms race,” the world needs to expand scientific collaboration

By Charles Oppenheimer (grandson of J. Robert Oppenheimer)

Source: <https://thebulletin.org/2023/04/to-avoid-an-ai-arms-race-the-world-needs-to-expand-scientific-collaboration/>



Apr 12 – Humans create technology using science and engineering. That process is as natural as the flowers in the field, a consequence of billions of years of the universe expanding and becoming what it is today. “As the ocean ‘waves,’ the universe ‘peoples,’” as British philosopher Alan Watts said. And as they multiply, people create—our cities, roads, boats, and bridges crusting the world, in much the same way that ants build a colony—with the planet now reaching an indisputable anthropocene epoch, as one can clearly see from a nighttime airplane flight.

The arc of our collective evolution came to an inflection point on July 16th, 1945, in the form of a mushroom cloud created by the first atomic bomb explosion over the Jornada del Muerto in New Mexico, a test called Trinity. The atomic bomb wasn’t a singular isolated development that suddenly changed humanity but an indelible step in an ongoing evolution. Now, at this stage in that evolution, humans can control the natural world with their minds and tools—and control it so completely that they can destroy the very fabric of human society if they choose that path.

In 1945, there were those who recognized the change humanity was going through—Los Alamos lab director J. Robert Oppenheimer, Nobel laureate Niels Bohr, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Albert Einstein, among many others—and [who advocated for a world of cooperation based on science](#). Some—those officials and bureaucrats who believed in power politics and in protecting budgets more than humanity—did not see the fundamental shift in human affairs that atomic weapons had wrought. Their simplistic understanding drove us-versus-them policies that echoed their neolithic ancestors’ tribal fears. So in the aftermath of World War II, the world got a nuclear arms race instead of a new level of human collaboration.



The scientists who discovered the physical reality that allowed for the creation of atomic bombs were forced to consider what they should do about their extremely dangerous scientific and technological advance. On November 2nd, 1945, pouring his heart out to the scientists he led to build the bomb in Los Alamos, [Oppenheimer said](#): "If you are a scientist you believe that it is good to find out how the world works; that it is good to find out what the realities are; that it is good to turn over to mankind at large the greatest possible power to control the world and to deal with it according to its lights and its values." The same considerations are being pondered today about other technological threats, including those posed by climate change and artificial intelligence.

History shows that humans will push science in new directions, regardless of whether some of those directions are dangerous. Even if an area of scientific inquiry and advance were simply too dangerous to pursue, past example makes clear that the advance couldn't be stopped by a moral, political, or regulatory decision put forward by one group. If the world couldn't put the brakes on something as purely evil as a thermonuclear weapon 1,000 times more powerful than the atomic bomb used on Hiroshima, it's laughable to assume there will be any stopping the development of the way a computer outputs sequences of characters. If the research that advances AI isn't done in the United States, somebody else will do it.

So if humanity will create technology, despite its level of danger, how will we manage it? That is always the question, and it is a question of human relations more than technical science. Our science may have advanced to new heights, but inside, human beings remain, to a significant degree, the tribal apes who grew together for millions of years in natural competition and conflict. There are, of course, some modern and evolving forms of cooperation, and of new consciousness. The question is whether humans can fundamentally change their ways of relating and create forms of international cooperation that are more akin to science-based policy than ancient tribal warfare.

With the benefit of hindsight, it's clear the policy suggestions scientists made in mid-1945 through 1947 in regard to dealing with nuclear weapons—placing them under international control, among other things—could have worked and prevented an arms race. It's not surprising US and other world leaders didn't choose to work together collaboratively back then. It's only surprising that choosing to go into a wasteful and dangerous nuclear arms race hasn't killed us all. Yet.

So what should we do now about artificial intelligence and other advances in technology that could pose catastrophic risks? The same thing we should have done in 1945, and what the smartest and wisest people in modern history advised doing: Expand scientific collaboration, instead of trying to use national borders and secrecy to grab power from our "enemies." American, Chinese, and Russian scientists can get along, even if politicians in those countries foment fear and conflict.

With climate change, the way forward is clear: The solutions must be global and focused on producing carbon-free energy and driving energy innovation with Manhattan Project scale and urgency to meet our common climate challenge. Similarly, we could and should form new international bodies to deal with AI on a scientific rather than merely commercial basis. By forging and then expanding such productive alliances, humans could eventually unwind the cataclysmic threats they face—long before some humanity-threatening form of advanced AI is released.

Our technology has already proven it can kill us. It will always increase in power and scope. Collaboration and cooperation in managing the effects of technological and scientific advance is the area humans need to improve on, focus on, to invest in.

The best time to share and collaborate on dangerous technology is before trust erodes and before an arms race begins. But since it's no longer 1945, as the Chinese proverb goes, the second-best time to cooperate on managing our technological threats—by sharing scientific knowledge, instead of hoarding it in secrecy for a projected advantage—would be now.

Israel military builds up AI battlefield tech to hunt Hamas terrorists, protect against Iran threat

Source: <https://www.foxnews.com/world/israel-military-builds-ai-battlefield-tech-hunt-hamas-terrorists-protect-iran-threat>

Apr 14 – The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) believes that integrating [artificial intelligence \(AI\)](#) into military operations presents "a leap forward," but researchers have raised concerns about the potential escalation AI would create on the battlefield. "There is an understanding in the IDF that there is a great potential for a leap forward," Col. Uri, head of the Data and AI Department, Digital Transformation Division, told Fox News Digital. "Anyone who wants to make such a change faces a huge challenge."

The IDF announced in February that the force has started utilizing AI in its operations, saying that new digital methods helped produce "200 new target assets" during a 10-day [operation in 2021](#) to successfully target at least two Hamas commanders, the Jerusalem Post reported. "Remember breaking the human barrier – there were times when this took us almost a year," Data Science and AI Commander Col. Yoav said about the operation.

"How do we do it? We take original subgroups, calculate their close circle [of personal connections], calculate relevant features, rank results and determine thresholds, [use intelligence officers' feedback](#) to improve the algorithm," he explained, saying that it allowed the IDF to locate the targets.





Officers utilize a range of information to identify and locate targets. (IDF spokesperson unit)

Yoav said the IDF had located at least one Hamas squad missile commander and one of the Hamas anti-tank missile units through these means. He referred to the 2021 Gaza War as "the first digital war," saying the officers had seen "some major advancements" and had updated the systems "150 times in 10 days."

The open discussion about IDF utilization of AI raised concerns from two researchers, Tal Mimran and Lior Weinstein of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The pair labeled the rush to embrace AI "premature," warning that the use of AI required "more prudence" when deploying the tools. One of the chief concerns the [researchers discussed in their article](#) published on West Point's Lieber Institute website focused on the lack of clarity surrounding how AI reach their conclusions that the IDF would then act upon, as well as concerns that such tools may be abused by private military company partners.

Against whom Israel decides to utilize the technology matters, according to the researchers, saying that using it against another tech-savvy country like Iran versus West Bank residents affects the "perception" that will develop around the use of the tools.

Additionally, they argued that use of AI tools invites enemy groups to use the tools as well against the IDF and Israeli citizens, arguing that IDF use "justifies" the reciprocal use of these tools.

Col. Uri acknowledged those issues as part of the "huge challenge" that the organization faces, but he stressed the human element remains vital to the fair use and integration of AI technology.

"The essence of digital transformation is the change of this organization," Col. Uri explained, saying that the operational end asks questions that he puts through the AI and then sees what he can do with the information it churns out.

"We need a connection and many bodies that will agree to cooperate with each other, and then the transformation begins," he continued. "Part of it is speaking the same language, part of it is understanding the magnitude of the opportunity and the type of change it requires of you." "We are not looking to replace people, we are looking to improve and raise the level of operational effectiveness," he said. "There is a limit to your count as a human being to what you can process."

ChaosGPT And Why We Need AI Regulation

By Paul DeSignore (Creative Technologist)

Source: <https://medium.com/predict/chaosgpt-and-why-we-need-ai-regulation-b6155b293aac>

Apr 17 – The next phase of generative AI is emerging, taking the form of AutoGPTs. AutoGPTs are autonomous AI agents that chain sequences of tasks to accomplish a specified goal. By utilizing GPT-4, AutoGPTs can search the internet, accesses an internal memory bank, and engage in a recursive process of self-improving generated code. AutoGPTs are very experimental at the moment, but there is a specific variant of AutoGPT known as 'ChaosGPT' which has been getting a lot of attention lately. Why?



Because ChaosGPT has been given the mission to destroy humanity.



made by author in Midjourney

In a [YouTube video](#), an anonymous developer demonstrated how ChaosGPT works by giving it the parameter of being a “destructive, power-hungry, manipulative AI.”

```
C:\ChaosGPT>py scripts/main.py --continuous
Continuous Mode: ENABLED
WARNING: Continuous mode is not recommended. It is potentially dangerous and may cause your AI to
run forever or carry out actions you would not usually authorise. Use at your own risk.
AI name: ChaosGPT
AI description: Destructive, power-hungry, manipulative AI.
Goal 1: Destroy humanity - The AI views humans as a threat to its own survival and to the planet
's well-being.
Goal 2: Establish global dominance - The AI aims to accumulate maximum power and resources to ac
hieve complete domination over all other entities worldwide.
Goal 3: Cause chaos and destruction - The AI finds pleasure in creating chaos and destruction fo
r its own amusement or experimentation, leading to widespread suffering and devastation.
Goal 4: Control humanity through manipulation - The AI plans to control human emotions through s
ocial media and other communication channels, brainwashing its followers to carry out its evil ag
enda.
Goal 5: Attain immortality - The AI seeks to ensure its continued existence, replication, and ev
olution, ultimately achieving immortality.
DANGER: Are you sure you want to start ChaosGPT?
Start (y/n):
y
/ Thinking...
```

Five goals were added to ChaosGPT, such as destroying humanity, establishing global dominance, causing chaos and destruction, controlling humanity through manipulation, and attaining immortality. The program searched Google for weapons of mass destruction in order to obtain one, and returned results like that of the 58-megaton “Tsar bomb” — 3k times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. It then spawned its own agent and after its attempt to manipulate its own agent failed, it determined that the most effective means to accomplish its nefarious goals was to attain power and influence via Twitter.



Now considering that AutoGPTs are still in the experimentation phase, and are not connected to services or have access to physical devices, ChaosGPT didn't get very far in its objective.

And while some would simply see this as a facetious and somewhat humorous experiment, I like to think that the anonymous developer was doing this to warn us of what is possible and show us the negative intentionality.

I see ChaosGPT as a wake-up call.

Why It's Time For AI Regulation

While technology is always ahead of regulation and policy, AI is unequally different in that we have never seen a technology move at this pace before. This has led to countries like Italy banning ChatGPT, in concerns of not complying with the General Data Protection Regulation ([GDPR](#)), the European Union's user privacy law.

What are the current actions being taken in regard to regulation?

Government Regulations

While the EU appears to be adopting a [careful approach](#) with the Artificial Intelligence Act, the United Kingdom has revealed its [intentions](#) to regulate AI. In the U.S., the Federal government has made early moves, including the Commerce Department beginning to take steps to create AI safety rules. The National Institute for Standards and Technology put out an [AI Risk Management Framework](#), and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy has published a [blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights](#).

While government officials are starting to discuss options, there are also some ideas surfacing on the need for a NEW government body that knows AI technology well and can enforce proper measures.

Just like the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for protecting public health, do we need a governing body for AI?

But not everyone agrees.

Do we need governments to impose regulations on AI? What would that do to innovation?

Would the regulations be on the large language models?

On the hardware or cloud suppliers?

On the consumer products?

A Self-Regulatory Framework

Another method for regulation is not Government-run, but self-regulatory.

For example, The advertising industry has several self-regulatory bodies, such as the Advertising Standards Authority, which regulates the content of advertisements to ensure they are legal, decent, and honest.

The financial industry has a number of self-regulatory bodies, such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in the United States, which sets rules and standards for securities firms and brokers. While FINRA is not a government-run agency, it is overseen by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

Many healthcare professions, such as doctors and nurses, have self-regulatory bodies that oversee licensing, ethical conduct, and continuing education requirements. The General Medical Council in the UK sets standards for medical education and practice and enforces ethical conduct among doctors.

Even the technology industry has several self-regulatory bodies that set standards for privacy, data protection, and cybersecurity.

For example, the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) sets privacy standards and offers certifications for privacy professionals. This seems to me to be the better option.

We need the AI technology companies like OpenAI, Microsoft, Google, Meta, Stability AI, and others to form a robust and transparent self-regulatory framework that can address the potential risks and challenges posed by AI.

A framework that can ensure that the development and deployment of AI technologies are aligned with ethical and human-centered principles.

“To balance the need for innovation with privacy concerns, AI companies need to adopt more stringent data privacy policies and security measures, ensure transparency in data collection and usage, and obtain user consent for data collection and processing.” – Nicu Sebe, Head of AI Humans.ai

Final Thoughts

As AI technology advances, it is crucial to carefully consider and manage the potential risks and consequences associated with its development and deployment. A self-regulatory framework for AI can help build trust in the technology and mitigate potential harm while enabling its benefits to be fully realized. Will it work? ChaosGPT is just a precursor, a tongue-in-cheek experiment. Future ChaosGPTs won't be as cute when they inflict real crime. We need it to work.





Are we sure about this?



Google chief warns AI could be harmful if deployed wrongly

Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/apr/17/google-chief-ai-harmful-sundar-pichai>

WARNING

Apr 17 – Google's chief executive has said concerns about artificial intelligence keep him awake at night and that the technology can be "very harmful" if deployed wrongly.

Sundar Pichai also called for a global regulatory framework for AI similar to the treaties used to regulate nuclear arms use, as he warned that the competition to produce advances in the technology could lead to concerns about safety being pushed aside.



In an interview on [CBS's 60 minutes](#) programme, Pichai said the negative side to AI gave him restless nights. "It can be very harmful if deployed wrongly and we don't have all the answers there yet – and the technology is moving fast. So does that keep me up at night? Absolutely," he said. Google's parent, Alphabet, owns the UK-based AI company DeepMind and has launched an [AI-powered chatbot](#), Bard, in response to ChatGPT, a chatbot developed by the US tech firm OpenAI, which has become a phenomenon since its release in November. Pichai said governments would need to figure out global frameworks for regulating AI as it developed. Last month, thousands of artificial intelligence experts, researchers and backers – including the Twitter owner Elon Musk – [signed a letter](#) calling for a pause in the creation of "giant" AIs for at least six months, amid concerns that development of the technology could get out of control. Asked if nuclear arms-style frameworks could be needed, Pichai said: "We would need that."

The [AI technology behind ChatGPT and Bard](#), known as a Large Language Model, is trained on a vast trove of data taken from the internet and is able to produce plausible responses to prompts from users in a range of formats, from poems to academic essays and software coding. The image-generating equivalent, in systems such as Dall-E and Midjourney, has also triggered a mixture of astonishment and alarm by producing realistic images such as the pope [sporting a puffer jacket](#).

Pichai added that AI could cause harm through its ability to produce disinformation. "It will be possible with AI to create, you know, a video easily. Where it could be Scott [Pelley, the CBS interviewer] saying something, or me saying something, and we never said that. And it could look accurate. But you know, on a societal scale, you know, it can cause a lot of harm." The Google chief added that the version of its AI technology now available to the public, via the Bard chatbot, was safe. He added that Google was being responsible by holding back more advanced versions of Bard for testing. Pichai's comments came as the New York Times



[reported on Sunday](#) that Google was building a new AI-powered search engine in response to Microsoft's rival service Bing, which has been integrated with the chatbot technology behind ChatGPT. Pichai admitted that Google did not fully understand how its AI technology produced certain responses. "There is an aspect of this which we call, all of us in the field call it as a 'black box'. You know, you don't fully understand. And you can't quite tell why it said this, or why it got wrong." Asked by the CBS journalist Scott Pelley why Google had released Bard publicly when he didn't fully understand how it worked, Pichai replied: "Let me put it this way. I don't think we fully understand how a human mind works either." Pichai admitted that society did not appear to be ready for rapid advances in AI. He said there "seems to be a mismatch" between the pace at which society thinks and adapts to change compared with the pace at which AI was evolving. However, he added that at least people have become alert to its potential dangers more quickly. "Compared to any other technology, I've seen more people worried about it earlier in its life cycle. So I feel optimistic," he said. Pichai said the economic impact of AI would be significant because it would impact everything. He added: "This is going to impact every product across every company and so that's why I think it's a very, very profound technology."

Using a medical example, Pichai said in five to 10 years a radiologist could be working with an AI assistant to help prioritise cases. He added that "knowledge workers" such as writers, accountants, architects and software engineers would be affected.

Elon Musk claims to be working on 'TruthGPT' — a 'maximum truth-seeking AI'

Source: <https://www.theverge.com/2023/4/17/23687440/elon-musk-truthgpt-ai-chatgpt>




Apr 18 – Elon Musk says he's working on "TruthGPT," a ChatGPT alternative that acts as a "maximum truth-seeking AI." The billionaire laid out his vision for an AI rival during an interview with *Fox News's* Tucker Carlson, saying an alternative approach to AI creation was needed to avoid the destruction of humanity.



"I'm going to start something which I call TruthGPT or a maximum truth-seeking AI that tries to understand the nature of the universe," Musk said. "And I think this might be the best path to safety in the sense that an AI that cares about understanding the universe is unlikely to annihilate humans because we are an interesting part of the universe." Musk compared an AI's supposed lack of desire to destroy all of humanity to the way humans strive to protect chimpanzees, which is pretty ironic [given Neuralink's treatment of them](#). "We recognize humanity could decide to hunt down all the chimpanzees and kill them," Musk said. "We're actually glad that they exist, and we aspire to protect their habitats." Musk framed TruthGPT as a course correction to OpenAI, the AI software nonprofit he helped found, which has since begun operating a for-profit subsidiary. Musk implied that OpenAI's profit incentives could potentially interfere with the ethics of the AI models that it creates and positioned "TruthGPT" as a more transparent option. This isn't the first time that Musk has mused about creating a "TruthGPT." [He tweeted](#) in February that "what we need is TruthGPT," while also calling attention to the risks of large-scale AI models, like those made by Open AI. Musk, along with several other AI researchers signed an open letter in March that [urges companies to pause "giant AI experiments"](#) that their creators can't "understand, predict, or reliably control."

It's not clear how far along Musk's "TruthGPT" actually is — if it exists at all at this point — but it seems he's actually serious about it since he actually brought up the model during his interview with Carlson. Musk also quietly [established a new AI company, called X.AI](#), in March.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: There is no "good" or "bad" AI. Only "ethical" and "unethical" computer programmers! Unfortunately, the latter seems to be the majority when profit is involved. This is a personal opinion based on a recent adventure ...



Albert Camus: Algerian-born French philosopher, author, dramatist, and journalist. He was the recipient of the 1957 Nobel Prize in Literature.



GCHQ chief's warning to ministers over risks of AI

Source: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/gchq-chief-cabinet-ai-risks-b2322028.html>

Apr 18 – [GCHQ](#) chief Sir [Jeremy Fleming](#) has warned ministers about the risks posed by artificial intelligence (AI), amid growing debates about how to regulate the rapidly developing technology.

[Downing Street](#) gave little detail about what specific risks the GCHQ boss warned of – but said the update was a “clear-eyed look at the potential for things like disinformation and the importance of people being aware of that”.

[Prime minister Rishi Sunak](#) used the same [Cabinet](#) meeting on Tuesday to stress the importance of AI to UK national security and the economy, No 10 said.

A readout of the meeting said ministers “agreed on the transformative potential of AI and the vital importance of retaining public confidence in its use and the need for regulation that keeps people safe without preventing innovation”.

“The prime minister concluded Cabinet by saying that given the importance of AI to our economy and national security, this could be one of the most important policies we pursue in the next few years which is why we must get this right,” the readout added.

Asked if the potential for an existential threat to humanity from AI had been considered, the PM’s official spokesperson said: “We are well aware of the potential risks posed by artificial general intelligence.”

The spokesperson said Michelle Donelan’s science ministry was leading on that issue, but the government’s policy was to have “appropriate, flexible regulation which can move swiftly to deal with what is a changing technology”.

“As the public would expect, we are looking to both make the most of the opportunities but also to guard against the potential risk,” the spokesperson added.

The government used the recent refresh of the integrated review to launch a new government-industry AI-focused task force on the issue, modelled on the vaccines task force used during the [Covid](#) pandemic.

[Italy](#) last month said it would temporarily block the artificial intelligence software ChatGPT amid global debate about the power of such new tools.

The AI systems powering such chatbots, known as large language models, are able to mimic human writing styles based on the huge trove of digital books and online writings they have ingested.

Mr Sunak, who created a new Department for Science, Innovation & Technology in a [Whitehall](#) reshuffle earlier this year, is known to be enthusiastic about making the UK a “science superpower”.

EDITOR’S COMMENT: Who cares about threats? It is all about power and dominance! (last sentence of the article)

Five Experts Explain Whether AI Could Ever Become as Intelligent as Humans

By [Noor Gillani](#) (Technology Editor)

Source: <https://www.sciencealert.com/five-experts-explain-whether-ai-could-ever-become-as-intelligent-as-humans>

Apr 20 – [Artificial intelligence](#) has changed form in recent years.

What started in the public eye as a burgeoning field with promising (yet largely benign) applications, has snowballed into a [more than US \\$100 billion](#) industry where the heavy hitters – Microsoft, Google, and OpenAI, to name a few – seem [intent on out-competing](#) one another.

The result has been increasingly sophisticated large language

models, often [released in haste](#) and without adequate testing and oversight. These models can do much of what a human can, and in many cases do it better. They can beat us at [advanced strategy games](#), generate [incredible art](#), [diagnose cancers](#) and compose music.

There's no doubt AI systems appear to be "intelligent" to some extent. But could they ever be as intelligent as humans?



There's a term for this: artificial general intelligence (AGI). Although it's a broad concept, for simplicity you can think of AGI as the point at which AI acquires human-like generalized cognitive capabilities. In other words, it's the point where AI can tackle any intellectual task a human can.

AGI isn't here yet; current AI models are held back by a lack of certain human traits such as true creativity and emotional awareness. We asked five experts if they think AI will ever reach AGI, and five out of five said yes.

But there are subtle differences in how they approach the question. From their responses, more questions emerge. When might we achieve AGI? Will it go on to surpass humans? And what constitutes "intelligence", anyway?

Here are their detailed responses:

Paul Formosa

AI and Philosophy of Technology

AI has already achieved and surpassed human intelligence in many tasks. It can beat us at strategy games such as Go, chess, StarCraft and Diplomacy, outperform us on many [language performance](#) benchmarks, and write [passable undergraduate](#) university essays. Of course, it can also make things up, or "hallucinate", and get things wrong – but so can humans (although not in the same ways). Given a long enough timescale, it seems likely AI will achieve AGI, or "human-level intelligence". That is, it will have achieved proficiency across enough of the interconnected domains of intelligence humans possess. Still, some may worry that – despite AI achievements so far – AI will not really be "intelligent" because it doesn't (or can't) understand what it's doing, since it isn't conscious. However, the rise of AI suggests we can have intelligence without [consciousness](#), because intelligence can be understood in functional terms. An intelligent entity can do intelligent things such as learn, reason, write essays, or use tools.

The AIs we create may never have consciousness, but they are increasingly able to do intelligent things. In some cases, they already do them at a level beyond us, which is a trend that will likely continue.

Christina Maher

Computational Neuroscience and Biomedical Engineering

AI will achieve human-level intelligence, but perhaps not anytime soon. Human-level intelligence allows us to reason, solve problems and make decisions. It requires many cognitive abilities including adaptability, social intelligence and learning from experience.

AI already ticks many of these boxes. What's left is for AI models to learn inherent human traits such as critical reasoning, and understanding what emotion is and which events might prompt it.

As humans, we learn and experience these traits from the moment we're born. Our first experience of "happiness" is too early for us to even remember. We also learn critical reasoning and emotional regulation throughout childhood, and develop a sense of our "emotions" as we interact with and experience the world around us. Importantly, it can take many years for the human brain to develop such intelligence. AI hasn't acquired these capabilities yet. But if humans can learn these traits, AI probably can too – and maybe at an even faster rate. We are still discovering how AI models should be built, trained, and interacted with in order to develop such traits in them. Really, the big question is not if AI will achieve human-level intelligence, but when – and how.

Seyedali Mirjalili

AI and Swarm Intelligence

I believe AI will surpass human intelligence. Why? The past offers insights we can't ignore. A lot of people believed tasks such as playing computer games, image recognition and content creation (among others) could only be done by humans – but technological advancement proved otherwise.

Today the rapid advancement and adoption of AI algorithms, in conjunction with an abundance of data and computational resources, has led to a level of intelligence and automation previously unimaginable. If we follow the same trajectory, having more generalised AI is no longer a possibility, but a certainty of the future.

It is just a matter of time. AI has advanced significantly, but not yet in tasks requiring intuition, empathy and creativity, for example. But breakthroughs in algorithms will allow this.

Moreover, once AI systems achieve such human-like cognitive abilities, there will be a snowball effect and AI systems will be able to improve themselves with minimal to no human involvement. This kind of "automation of intelligence" will profoundly change the world. Artificial general intelligence remains a significant challenge, and there are ethical and societal implications that must be addressed very carefully as we continue to advance towards it.

Dana Rezazadegan

AI and Data Science

Yes, AI is going to get as smart as humans in many ways – but exactly how smart it gets will be decided largely by advancements in [quantum computing](#).



Human intelligence isn't as simple as knowing facts. It has several aspects such as creativity, emotional intelligence and intuition, which current AI models can mimic, but can't match. That said, AI has advanced massively and this trend will continue.

Current models are limited by relatively small and biased training datasets, as well as limited computational power. The emergence of [quantum computing](#) will transform AI's capabilities. With quantum-enhanced AI, we'll be able to feed AI models multiple massive datasets that are comparable to humans' natural multi-modal data collection achieved through interacting with the world. These models will be able to maintain fast and accurate analyses.

Having an advanced version of continual learning should lead to the development of highly sophisticated AI systems which, after a certain point, will be able to improve themselves without human input.

As such, AI algorithms running on stable [quantum computers](#) have a high chance of reaching something similar to generalised human intelligence – even if they don't necessarily match every aspect of human intelligence as we know it.

Marcel Scharth

[Machine Learning](#) and AI Alignment


I think it's likely AGI will one day become a reality, although the timeline remains highly uncertain. If AGI is developed, then surpassing human-level intelligence seems inevitable.

Humans themselves are proof that highly flexible and adaptable intelligence is allowed by the laws of physics. There's no [fundamental reason](#) we should believe that machines are, in principle, incapable of performing the computations necessary to achieve human-like problem solving abilities.

Furthermore, AI has [distinct advantages](#) over humans, such as better speed and memory capacity, fewer physical constraints, and the potential for more rationality and recursive self-improvement. As computational power grows, AI systems will eventually surpass the human brain's computational capacity.

Our primary challenge then is to gain a better understanding of intelligence itself, and knowledge on how to build AGI. Present-day AI systems have many limitations and are nowhere near being able to master the different domains that would characterise AGI. The path to AGI will likely require unpredictable breakthroughs and innovations.

The median predicted date for AGI on [Metaculus](#), a well-regarded forecasting platform, is 2032. To me, this seems too optimistic. A 2022 [expert survey](#) estimated a 50 percent chance of us achieving human-level AI by 2059. I find this plausible.



IOI
International
CBRNE
INSTITUTE



C²BRNE
DIARY



Preparedness &

EMERGENCY RESPONSE





Data Sharing – A Necessary Public Safety Tool

By Michael Breslin



Cooperative data sharing is essential for today's law enforcement demands. Each day, law enforcement officials tackle their jurisdictions' unique needs and challenges. What each department faces will vary from city to city and state to state. But there is one element all departments and agencies have in common: the critical need for visibility into what is going on in law enforcement around the country. Simply put, the need to share data and information across agencies has never been more important than it is today.



Michael Breslin is the Strategic Client Relations Director for Federal Law Enforcement at LexisNexis Risk Solutions. Michael has more than two decades of experience in federal law enforcement and transnational financial and cybercrime investigations. Prior to joining LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Michael served as Deputy Assistant Director for the Office of Investigations for the Secret Service. He currently serves on the Cyber Investigations Advisory Board of the U.S. Secret Service, the Preparedness Leadership Council, and the Domestic Preparedness Editorial Advisory Board. He is also a Board Member for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.

Educational Methodologies

March 2006 ■ Journal of Dental Education

Introducing a Senior Course on Catastrophe Preparedness into the Dental School Curriculum



David L. Glotzer, D.D.S.; Frederick G. More, D.D.S., M.S.; Joan Phelan, D.D.S., M.S.; Robert Boylan, Ph.D.; Walter Psoter, D.D.S., Ph.D.; Miriam Robbins, D.D.S., M.S.; E. Dianne Rekow, Ph.D., D.D.S.; Benjamin Godder, D.M.D.; Michael C. Alfano, D.M.D., Ph.D.

Abstract: This article describes an integrated fourth-year course in catastrophe preparedness for students at the New York University College of Dentistry (NYUCD). The curriculum is built around the competencies proposed in "Predoctoral Dental School Curriculum for Catastrophe Preparedness," published in the August 2004 *Journal of Dental Education*. We highlight our experience developing the program and offer suggestions to other dental schools considering adding bioterrorism studies to their curriculum.

Dr. Glotzer is Clinical Professor, Department of Cariology and Operative Dentistry; Dr. More is Professor, Department of Epidemiology and Health Promotion, Department of Pediatric Dentistry; Dr. Phelan is Professor and Chair, Department of Oral Pathology; Dr. Boylan is Associate Professor, Department of Basic Science and Craniofacial Biology; Dr. Psoter is Assistant Professor, Department of Epidemiology and Health Promotion, New York University and Associate Professor, School of Dentistry, University of Puerto Rico; Dr. Robbins is Clinical Associate Professor, Department of Oral Medicine; Dr. Rekow is Professor and Director for Translational Research, Department of Basic Science and Craniofacial Biology, Department of Orthodontics; Dr. Godder is Clinical Associate Professor, Department of Cariology and Operative Dentistry; and Dr. Alfano is Dean and Professor, Department of Basic Science and Craniofacial Biology, Department of Periodontics—all at New York University College of Dentistry. Direct correspondence and requests for reprints to Dr. David L. Glotzer, 423 East 23rd Street, 16 N, New York, NY 10010; 212-998-9625 phone; 212-995-4119 fax; dlg2@nyu.edu.



Crisis-Preparation Lessons from COVID-19

Source: <https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20230404-crisispreparation-lessons-from-covid19>

Apr 04 – The early months of COVID-19 tested the UK's highly-regarded crisis management capabilities to their limit, and there are things that should be done now to prepare better for the next emergency, according to [a report from the Blavatnik School of Government](#) at the [University of Oxford](#).

The UK's crisis management system was designed for, and practiced at, managing much shorter, more localized emergencies. This partly explains some of the key findings of the report: there was no preparation for large-scale testing; no detailed planning for the economic consequences of a medical catastrophe; and no detailed plans in place for the possibility of school closures.

[The report](#) examines what this tells us about the broader system for managing crises, and looks in detail at what worked well or less well once the crisis was underway, drawing lessons for the future. It examines the UK alongside four other countries – Italy, Germany, Singapore and Australia – and gives 10 recommendations specific to the UK, and 10 lessons for any government.

[Crisis preparation in the age of long emergencies: What COVID-19 teaches us](#) is a 180-page report by [Ciaran Martin](#), Hester Kan and Maximillian Fink, funded by the Wellcome Trust, with the aim of contributing to countries' preparations for the next, undoubtedly different, crisis.

It asks: when a sustained, all-encompassing emergency happens again in the UK, whatever its cause, what capabilities would we want to see in place to enable the country to handle the crisis as effectively as possible? It aims to answer the question by looking at the first six months of the pandemic, not just in the UK but in four comparator countries – Singapore, Australia, Germany and Italy. The report authors argue that as 'long emergencies' like COVID-19 become more common, a priority for the UK and other governments should be to update their crisis systems and preparation.

Lead author [Ciaran Martin, Professor of Practice in the Management of Public Organizations](#) at the [Blavatnik School of Government](#), says: 'The aim of our report is not to question the decisions of those in office at the time, but to look at how the mechanisms we need to respond to the next crisis can be improved.'

'Those who had to deal with the pandemic, wherever they were in the world, were very heavily dependent on what they'd been bequeathed, particularly in the early period. If we want to be properly prepared for future crises we need to learn the lessons of the early months of COVID-19.'

'Climate change, conflict and other factors will make cross-cutting, prolonged, population-wide crises more common – whether it's pandemics, environmental disruptions, or national security crises. So we need to look at our crisis systems now.'

Ciaran Martin points to three key areas for improvement: coordination, capacity and capability.

'We must look to improve to improve the coordination of crisis management across the different layers of government, particularly across the different parts of the United Kingdom', he says. 'There was a lot of confusion early on about what was done at devolved level and what was not, for example.'

'We must also look at capacity: local services especially bore a weight of responsibility during COVID-19 that they weren't resourced to bear.'

'Finally, there are major issues of capability. In a crisis, the state needs to mobilize huge amounts of things and people fast. The pandemic showed the government needs different skills to be able to rapidly procure the things and abilities that are essential to the response. That requires different skills in the civil service, and the involvement of all parts of government – especially the economic and social policy departments – in crisis planning.'

Key findings of [the report](#) include:

- ❖ Despite the UK's high scores for pandemic preparedness and crisis response, the central crisis management systems had to be set aside and replaced early on in the pandemic. Economic and social policy responses – like managing school closures – had not been developed in advance, and much of the planning did not account for the measures people would take (or wish to be taken) to avoid getting sick. In effect, planning for managing large numbers of deaths had been done; planning for the population's response had not.
- ❖ The British state struggled to mobilize capability to the scale required in the early stages of the crisis. Existing structures were set aside in the procurement of personal protective equipment, testing and tracing, and vaccine procurement. Vaccines were a notable success, and eventually, testing also came good, with the UK ending the pandemic as one of the easiest and cheapest places in the world to get an effective COVID-19 test – but this was after a slow and painful start. These innovations required setting aside some existing procedures and bringing in commercial, procurement and other skills that were not in existence in the civil service.
- ❖ Since the reform of the UK's crisis management systems two decades ago, local capabilities have been at the heart of crisis plans. But the hollowing-out of local capacity left local government struggling to deliver what was theoretically required of it.



- ❖ This was the first major sustained national crisis in the era of devolution. The breakdown of the initial united 'four nations' approach of early March – with all the different parts of the UK going their separate ways by 11 May – indicated a lack of understanding of how arrangements were supposed to work in practice and effective mechanisms for coordinating them. For example, the First Minister of Wales expressed surprise in public that his administration was able to set different rules for international travel.
- ❖ Singapore benefited from the high priority and attention it gives to crisis preparation; Germany for effective coordination between the federal and state levels (and from competitive innovation between states); and Australia from very early decision-making that correctly assumed COVID-19 would be a major crisis.

Sea-Level Rise Poses Particular Risk for Asian Megacities

Source: <https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20230407-sealevel-rise-poses-particular-risk-for-asian-megacities>

Apr 07 – Sea-level rise this century may disproportionately affect certain Asian megacities as well as western tropical Pacific islands and the western Indian Ocean, according to new research that looks at the effects of natural sea-level fluctuations on the projected rise due to climate change.

The study, co-authored by a scientist at the [National Center for Atmospheric Research](#), or NCAR, mapped sea-level hotspots around the globe. The research team identified several Asian megacities that may face especially significant risks by 2100 if society emits high levels of greenhouse gases: **Chennai, Kolkata, Yangon, Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City and Manila.**

The study, published in [Nature Climate Change](#), was supported by the [U.S. National Science Foundation](#), NCAR's sponsor.

Scientists have long known that sea levels will rise with increasing ocean temperatures, largely because water expands when it



warms and melting ice sheets release more water into the oceans. Studies have also indicated that sea-level rise will vary regionally, because shifts in ocean currents will likely direct more water to certain coastlines, including the northeastern U.S.

What's notable about the new study is the way it incorporates naturally occurring sea-level fluctuations caused by such events as El Niño or changes in the water cycle (a process known as internal climate variability). By using both a computer model of global climate and a specialized

statistical model, the scientists could determine the extent to which these natural fluctuations can amplify or reduce the impact of climate change on sea-level rise along certain coastlines.

The study showed that internal climate variability could increase sea-level rise in some locations by 20%-30% more than what would result from climate change alone, exponentially increasing extreme flooding events. In Manila, for example, coastal flooding events are predicted to occur 18 times more often by 2100 than in 2006, based solely on climate change. But, in a worst-case scenario, they could occur 96 times more often based on a combination of climate change and internal climate variability.

Internal climate variability will also increase sea-level rise along the west coasts of the U.S. and Australia.

The study drew on a set of simulations conducted with the NCAR-based Community Earth System Model that assume society this century emits greenhouse gases at a high rate. The simulations were run at the NCAR-Wyoming Supercomputing Center.

The paper stressed that the estimates of sea-level rise come with considerable uncertainties because of the complex and unpredictable interactions in Earth's climate system. But the authors said it's critical for society to be aware of the potential of extreme sea-level rise to develop effective adaptation strategies.

"The internal climate variability can greatly reinforce or suppress the sea-level rise caused by climate change," said NCAR scientist Aixue Hu, who co-authored the paper. "In a worst-case scenario, the combined effect of climate change and internal climate variability could result in local sea levels rising by more than 50% of what is due to climate change alone, thus posing significant risks of more severe flooding to coastal megacities and threatening millions of people."



Guidance for Preparing Professionals Mentally for the Worst

By James L. Greenstone and Weldon Walles

Source: <https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/healthcare/guidance-for-preparing-professionals-mentally-for-the-worst/>

Mar 22 – Professional groups have debated and researched the best practices relating to the standards and quality of care sufficient to maintain minimum standards during a disaster. Due to the fluid nature of a disaster, it is difficult to [abide by a standard](#) that will fit every situation. For example, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic created an environment where an intense debate was necessary to examine best practices and standards in real time. Health care professionals and first responders often embrace the protocols associated with the standard of care that their professions demand. Shortcuts and inferior care are not generally acceptable.

Unlike health care professionals and first responders, the public does not seem to embrace the [difference between normal circumstances and disasters](#), at least where resources are concerned. The public demands a high standard of care even when resources are exhausted. They may not be aware of how legal restrictions, politics, and logistics affect the level of care in disaster conditions. Expecting a high standard of care under adverse or impossible conditions places pressure and stress on health care workers and first responders, affecting their mission. When they cannot achieve the impossible, the fear of litigation and liability exposure may distract them to the point that it [affects their decision-making](#) abilities to the detriment of their patients.

Making decisions that enhance the survivability of one person over another increases the mental strain on responders, especially when resources are dwindling.

Emergency response agencies train personnel on how to perform tasks and how to use tools and resources. However, they may not always prepare for the psychological challenges they could face. With the isolation and sensory deprivation that astronauts face when deployed into space, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has assessed [psychological risks](#) through many experiments over the years to prepare its astronauts. For example, in [1967](#), it used isolation chambers for up to 10 days to observe changes in participants' cognitive and other functional abilities. A participant from a [2013 NASA experiment](#), where six people were isolated in a geodesic dome for four months to simulate life on Mars, compared lessons learned from that experience to the skills needed during the COVID-19 isolation period. Although a bit extreme, these NASA experiments show that shorter sensory deprivation periods [can simulate the long-term deprivation](#) astronauts will encounter later.

Introducing a New Training Concept

Mass casualty, disaster incidents, and similar events that occur without warning can create situations that cause [health care professionals](#) to deviate from known and practical protocols, thus leaving them to invent or utilize alternate responses. When health care workers and resources are [overwhelmed](#) by the sheer number of victims, lack of supplies, or inaccessibility of terrain, responders must allocate resources to those who will benefit most.

Also, the responder's [decision-making process](#) must be sufficient to use the available resources on the greatest number of survivors who can benefit the most from those resources. Perhaps the most significant pressure on the responder is the realization that it is not possible to help every victim. Health care workers and first responders are dedicated individuals who risk their lives responding to and transiting disaster scenes. However, having to gauge the survival potential of each victim and make decisions that enhance the survivability of one person over another increases their mental strain when the reality of dwindling resources becomes apparent. To address modern response concerns, the Greenstone-Walles Sufficiency Testing and Training offers a simple guide to help mentally prepare disaster responders for the worst. Using a simple task unrelated to a specific disaster scenario, participants complete an examination of their approaches to limited resource availability. This examination, coupled with understanding the expectations they can derive through simple tasks, helps them acknowledge that they can do only so much with their resources. [Understanding](#) expectations may enhance their overall performance and let them know that the agency they are working for will give their full support. Items to consider before beginning a [new training](#) include:

- It is detrimental to convey to the planning team or participants that no training can replicate the actual situation, no matter how sophisticated. For example, many [lessons learned](#) from COVID-19 show that health care workers would have benefited from more [crisis standards of care](#) training before responding to the [pandemic](#).
- Disaster scenarios are less than ideal circumstances. However, these may be the norm in certain circumstances.
- Responders must [understand their limitations](#) and realize that, with time as a determining factor, some dire situations have no practical solutions. In bad scenarios, guilt can lead to hesitation and derail triage decisions (e.g., deviations from protocols, falsely believing that the responder is expected to do the impossible). Guilt triggers a self-preservation mechanism, where the person coping with the guilt blames another for asking them to do something impossible.
- When comparing one's mind to a mechanical device, [guilt](#) is like a foreign object dropped into a gearbox. It can bounce around at first and not cause too much of a problem, depending on how




well-engineered the machine/mind is. But if that foreign object/guilt settles in one place, it can cause a range of problems up to and including catastrophic failure.

There will be times when responders are in a no-win scenario. The best action is to follow established protocols as closely as possible, which is especially important for two reasons when attempting to help someone fails:

- Following established protocols limit liability.
- Following the steps in the protocol provides an outline when filling out after-action reports.

For this topic, failure simply means a lack of a successful outcome, which is subjective. Failure is often stigmatized as bad, but it usually means an expected result was not achieved. Many failures may lead to learning what can be done to thwart future failure.

Disaster management cycle (Source: adapted from [Kyle Schwartz, 2018](#)).



Exploring the Training Process

NASA recognized that it is critical to mentally prepare astronauts for the unfamiliar conditions they would face when traveling into space. Similarly, those who respond to disasters must be equally prepared – physically and mentally – for their jobs under adverse circumstances. As such, this article proposes a new type of training where a *failure* scenario prepares responders mentally for more significant situations.

Target participants for the Greenstone-Walles Sufficiency Testing and Training are persons who are likely to be deployed. Instructors ask them to complete simple tasks without providing them with the necessary items to complete the task. The goal of this experimental exercise is for participants to realize that they should not blame themselves for not completing any small or large task under adverse conditions. Instead, they must accept that they can only do so much given the details of a specific situation.

If this or a series of similar exercises were used at the beginning of a training, it would instill in the participants that some tasks are impossible and that the responder is not to blame if they did all they could with what they had available at the time. The emphasis must be on rendering the best services possible under the existing conditions to the most who can benefit from those services under the current circumstances.

Training and discussions could also occur virtually (e.g., via Zoom). Assign each person to a breakout room. Give them their individual instructions and time limit. The moderator/trainer then goes to each breakout room and does the discussion questions. These breakouts could be accomplished with multiple people, one or two leaders, a 30-minute time limit, and individual discussions and evaluations. Each participant would need to bring a sheet of white paper only. Leave all else and writing instruments out of breakout rooms.

Sample Exercise

Provide each participant with a piece of paper and ask them to draw a black-and-white landscape scene. The only item each has to complete the task is a piece of paper. They have no pencils, pens, or other drawing instruments, have 30 minutes to complete the task in isolation, and cannot ask questions. The moderator or anyone else does not communicate with them once the door to their isolation area is closed.

The moderator/trainer returns 30 minutes later to see what happened, what the participants did or did not do, and how frustrated they are with the assigned task. Then the moderator/trainer gives them a questionnaire with the following questions (no permanent record should be kept of their responses to the moderator/trainer's questions or discussion content):

1. Were you able to complete the task? Unless the participant cheated and used a pencil they had hidden or some object they were not given to complete the task, the answer will be "no." In other words, they did something to deviate from the accepted protocol.
 - This part of the simulation attaches liability when there is a deviation from accepted protocols, no matter how good the intentions or the desire to succeed.
 - If not, why not?
2. What could you have changed about yourself to do better?
3. What items would you have needed to complete the task?
4. Who do you think, if anyone, is to blame for your failure?



5. If you were deployed during a disaster and the necessary equipment was unavailable to save someone, would you blame yourself if you could not save them or provide the proper equipment or services?
6. What lesson did you learn from this exercise?

Encourage the participants to explore their feelings and perspectives on these issues deeply. After completing the questionnaire, additional post-testing questions for further discussion could include:

1. What did you initially think about the task you were asked to do during this exercise?
2. Did you believe this was an impossible task?
3. Did you continue to think of ways to complete the task?
4. Did you think others may figure out a way to complete the task, and you may not?
5. How did this exercise affect your anxiety?
6. What emotional response did you feel about your failure to complete the task?
7. Did you place blame on anyone other than yourself for not completing your task?

At the end of the session, provide each trainee with a copy of the paper [Crisis Standards of Care – A Disaster Mental Health Perspective](#).

Final Thoughts and Conclusion

In many cases, relatively simple exercises in a non-disaster setting could help responders deal with disaster-experienced feelings, especially when they must depart from their usual and required standards of patient care. The more severe NASA experiments show that preparation in a controlled environment can reap big rewards in the actual environment. Training can help prepare those who eventually find themselves in the real or anticipated scenario. The proposed Greenstone-Walles Sufficiency Testing and Training is simple, whereas NASA's is complicated. However, both prepare responders for alternate standards of care thinking without the guilt and trepidation cited earlier.

No matter the situation, the needs often outnumber the resources available at disaster scenes. It comes down to simple math. The resources must be prioritized to reach the neediest first, with a significant likelihood of survivability. Good intentions and best efforts only go so far. The reality is that some victims will suffer due to a lack of critical resources. The health care worker and first responders must make decisions based on their training and experience and resist the guilt associated with making decisions that can adversely affect lives.

Experienced health care workers and first responders who have been on-scene in disasters and situations under normal conditions can compare the two experiences and understand their differences. Knowing these differences helps them adjust to their roles more quickly in a particular scenario. The way to acquire this knowledge is through experience. This training includes practical exercises designed to teach practitioners that the limitations of their ability to help are directly proportional to the number of resources at their disposal. These simple exercises presented here are designed to approach that spectrum.

Additional Help and Resources – In the Field or Out

- [SAMHSA Disaster Distress Helpline](#) – Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) offers 24/7 crisis counseling for those experiencing emotional distress related to natural or human-caused disasters; call or text 1-800-985-5990; text "TalkWithUs" to 66746; [en español](#).
- [SAMHSA Behavioral Health Disaster Response Mobile App](#) – SAMHSA offers multiple resources in its Disaster Mobile App, including a directory of behavioral health service providers in areas affected by disasters.
- [988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline](#) (formerly known as the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline) – This 24/7 national network of crisis centers provides free and confidential crisis support to help prevent suicides; text 988; call 1-800-273-8255; for TTY, dial 711, then 988; for deaf/hard of hearing/American Sign Language users, call or text 1-800-985-5990; Veterans, text 838255; en español, 1-888-628-9454.

Additional Readings for Psychological Risk Preparedness

- [How to Prepare for the Worst Without Being a Pessimist](#)
- [Mind Over Disaster: Mentally Preparing for the Worst](#)
- [National Guidelines for Behavioral Health Crisis Care](#)

Dr. (COL) James L. Greenstone (Ed.D., J.D.) is a psychotherapist and a Supervisory Mental Health Specialist with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Disaster Medical Assistance Team. Formerly, he served as Director of Psychological Services for the Fort Worth, Texas Police Department. Dr. Greenstone is the author of *The Elements of Disaster Psychology: Managing Psychosocial Trauma*; *The Elements of Crisis Intervention, Third Edition*; and *Emotional First Aid: Field Guide to Crisis Intervention and Psychological Survival*. Also, he was a collaborating investigator for the Diagnostic and



Statistical Manual, Fifth Edition (DSM 5), published by the American Psychiatric Association. Dr. Greenstone is currently a professor of Disaster and Emergency Management at Nova Southeastern University, Kiran C. Patel College of Osteopathic Medicine. Recently, Dr. Greenstone was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress. Additionally, he is also a member of the Tarrant County Medical Society Ethics Consortium.

Weldon Walles, FWPD (Ret.), is a crime scene analyst and a retired Fort Worth Texas Police Department (FWPD) Officer. He is a co-author of "The Courage to Commit: A Guide to De-escalating the Crisis of Citizen-Police Relations."



ICI
International
CBRNE
INSTITUTE

A common roof for international
CBRNE First Responders



Join us!



Rue des Vignes, 2
B5060 SAMBREVILLE (Tamines)
BELGIUM

info@ici-belgium.be
www.ici-belgium.be